October 28, 1994 Dear Josh, I still have written a complete response to your SPEP paper, but since what follows deals with one rather circumscribed issue-and one about which I fear are talking past one another-I thought it might be good to send it along now. In your SPEP paper you set out to clear up a mistaken belief/criticism about Derrida: that assimilates realm of concepts, Bedeutungen, in Husserl, to of language ( 195). But Derrida by no means identifies Bedeutungen and bedeuten, with language, even spoken language, in of wordsounds, wordshapes, or even what Professor Evans calls `linguistic expression' (ibid.). Your evidence this is a misinterpretation of comes from Form and Meaning. First, you argue in footnote found on page 114 of Allison's translation does indeed distinguish bedeuten, still meaning intention, and (ibid., 3). But when turn to footnote in Form and Meaning find something else. Derrida's point there is in strict sense includes all of expression by a even if it remains silent (Derrida, SP 114). This animation does indeed, for Derrida, belong to linguistic to order ofspeech in strict sense. It is phenomenological voice. You find further evidence this is a misinterpretation in another passage from Form and Meaning, Production and revelation are unified in impression-expression proper to speech. And since what Husserl is considering here is with all its interwoven (physical and intentional) complexity, but still meaning-intention. (Ibid., 117) But there is a problem here. You leave out a parenthetical clause which is, I think, important. The sentence continues: still meaning-intention (i.e., moment meaning, which is more than sense, has appeared but has yet been effectively and physically offered). (Ibid.) This makes it clear is saying here there is a non-linguistic meaning intention. In writing what Husserl is considering is not order, what clearly means is it is of order of physically uttered. It is silent, but is still a namely phenomenological voice. Do you mean to be saying this voice, voice encounter in soliloquy, is linguistic? (Recall here that, as I noted in Strategies, when Husserl turns to solitary mental life [einsamen Seelenleben] [Husserl, LI II.135/I, 278, trans. modified], what is essential is it is interior [Findlay adds interior to second sentence of 88], but it is communicative. For Husserl, while it is true in soliloquy we are in general content with imagined rather than with actual words [ibid., II. 1 36/I 279, my emphasis], this is crucial to notion of soliloquy. Husserl focuses on imagination here because it helps him make a point, but point can be established independently.) It may be are talking past one another here. When I claim for Husserl, logical meaning is necessarily caught up in language, I don't just mean physically spoken or written language. I am also referring to speech Husserl discusses in First Investigation. When you write does identify logicality, Bedeutungen and bedeuten, with language, even spoken language, in of wordsounds, wordshapes, or even what Professor Evans calls `linguistic expression' ( 195). I think you are missing what I am saying. Of course distinguished between the still meaning intention and ( 195) as long as verbal is taken in of uttered But thinks for Husserl meaning is essentially linguistic seems to be to be clear in Speech and Phenomena. …