Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans Research Articles

Are prison settings included in national preparedness plans?

Abstract With the aim to explore the extent to which places of detention are considered in national preparedness planning in the WHO European Region, a desktop review was conducted and combined with responses to the Health in Prisons European Database (HIPED) survey from Member States referring to 2020. In both searches, the aim was to identify the existence of: 1) national pandemic preparedness plans written prior to the COVID-19 pandemic; and 2) national pandemic preparedness and response plans specific to the COVID-19 pandemic. Where prisons were included, all aspects of pandemic preparedness relating to prisons were extracted and collated as per the main domains of the WHO checklist for influenza pandemic preparedness plans. The desktop review found that 30 Member States had pandemic plans accessible online, but only seven included any mention of prisons. Responses to the HIPED survey suggested wide dissemination of a COVID-19 preparedness and/or response plan, but only six out of 36 Member States referred to prisons or the vulnerabilities of people living in places of detention. The combined findings suggest that prisons are rarely considered in national planning and that lessons from previous pandemics have not led to a change in recognizing that prisons are high-risk environments for pathogen transmission and that failing to consider them in national planning may lead to impacts that affect the wider community.

The 2021-2023 Italian influenza pandemic plan: a critical evaluation of its regional implementation

Abstract Background Influenza pandemic preparedness plans should be adopted, regularly updated in every country, and comply with international guidelines to ensure proper management of public health emergencies. In Italy, each region develops its pandemic plan based on a National Plan. This study, conducted within a project funded by the Italian Ministry of Health, aims to assess the level of compliance of these plans with the national guidelines. Methods The assessment was based on a checklist of 192 items reporting the actions prescribed by the national plan. The items were divided into macro-areas by pandemic phase: general, alert, inter-pandemic, pandemic, and transition. The compliance regarding the presence and contextualization of each item in the regional plans was evaluated. Each macro-area was further assessed for easy identification of actions, congruence with the National Plan, and contextualization in the regional healthcare system. Some analyses grouped the regions into North, Centre, and South/Islands. Results Some macro-areas, such as ‘Communication’ and ‘Prevention and Control measures,’ showed some weaknesses in all phases, especially in the northern regions, which reached levels of full compliance below 50%. Central regions were highly compliant in almost all macro-areas, especially in ‘Strategy/Governance’ (100%), ‘Supplying’ (75-100%), and ‘Surveillance’ (75-100%). Overall, contextualization was the weakest aspect in all phases, while easy identification and congruence were mainly better achieved. Only three regions fully met all the assessed parameters. Conclusions A strict surveillance and monitoring process of planned activities is necessary to strengthen the country’s preparedness. This study identified critical issues and key areas for improvement at the regional level. This might allow us to verify the correct implementation of national guidelines and define the best strategies for improving readiness for public health emergencies in the future. Key messages • Implementation of the Italian influenza pandemic plan was uneven across regions. • Identification of lacking areas of the regional implementation is essential to improving national preparedness.

Pandemic preparedness and health system resilience in 14 European countries.

To assess national pandemic preparedness and response plans from a health system perspective to determine the extent to which implementation strategies that support health system performance have been included. We systematically mapped pandemic preparedness and response implementation strategies that improve resilience to pandemics onto the Health System Performance Assessment Framework for Universal Health Coverage. Using this framework, we conducted a document analysis of 14 publicly available national influenza pandemic preparedness plans, submitted to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, to assess how well health system functions are accounted for in each plan. Implementation strategies found in national influenza pandemic preparedness plans do not systematically consider all health system functions. Instead, they mostly focus on specific aspects of governance. In contrast, little to no mention is made of implementation strategies that aim to strengthen health financing. There was also a lack of implementation strategies to strengthen the health workforce, ensure availability of medical equipment and infrastructure, govern the generation of resources and ensure delivery of public health services. While national influenza pandemic preparedness plans often include provisions to support health system governance, implementation strategies that support other health system functions, namely, resource generation, service delivery, and in particular, financing, are given less attention. These oversights in key planning documents may undermine health system resilience when public health emergencies occur.

Pandemic influenza preparedness plan in Liguria, Italy: a valuable tool for Public Health.

As known, influenza presents a multifaceted challenge to public health, causing disease that ranges from mild cases to severe pandemics with significant morbidity and mortality. Effective pandemic preparedness demands a comprehensive strategy that integrates research, surveillance, response coordination and community engagement, to mitigate the impact of future health emergencies. The pandemic preparedness cycle involves dynamic, cyclical phases of preparation and response aimed at enhancing response capacity. Italy's 2021-2023 National Strategic-Operational Plan for Pandemic Influenza (PanFlu) incorporates lessons learned from past pandemics and serves as a framework for regional plans, such as Liguria's. The Ligurian plan delineates governance structures, surveillance strategies, healthcare services and communication measures necessary for effective pandemic management. It emphasizes the need to strengthen links between emergency structures, to avoid duplication and to adopt flexible approaches to scale actions appropriately and highlights the need for risk/benefit analysis to support evidence-based decision-making as well as clear guidance on data collection and communication activities. By integrating these elements, the region's overall readiness and resilience against influenza pandemics are expected to be reinforced.

An appraisal of peer-reviewed published literature on Influenza, 2000-2021 from countries in South-East Asia Region.

Influenza poses a major public health challenge in South-East Asia Region (SEAR). To address the challenge, there is a need to generate contextual evidence that could inform policy makers and program managers for response preparedness and impact mitigation. The World Health Organization has identified priority areas across five streams for research evidence generation at a global level (WHO Public Health Research Agenda). Stream 1 focuses on research for reducing the risk of emergence, Stream 2 on limiting the spread, Stream 3 on minimizing the impact, Stream 4 on optimizing the treatment and Stream 5 on promoting public health tools and technologies for Influenza. However, evidence generation from SEAR has been arguably low and needs a relook for alignment with priorities. This study aimed to undertake a bibliometric analysis of medical literature on Influenza over the past 21 years to identify gaps in research evidence and for identifying major areas for focusing with a view to provide recommendations to member states and SEAR office for prioritizing avenues for future research. We searched Scopus, PubMed, Embase, and Cochrane databases in August 2021. We identified studies on influenza published from the 11 countries in WHO SEAR in the date range of 1 January 2000-31 December 2021. Data was retrieved, tagged and analyzed based on the WHO priority streams for Influenza, member states, study design and type of research. Bibliometric analysis was done on Vosviewer. We included a total of 1,641 articles (Stream 1: n = 307; Stream 2: n = 516; Stream 3: n = 470; Stream 4: n = 309; Stream 5: n = 227). Maximum number of publications were seen in Stream 2, i.e., limiting the spread of pandemic, zoonotic, and seasonal epidemic influenza which majorly included transmission, spread of virus at global and local levels and public health measures to limit the transmission. The highest number of publications was from India (n = 524) followed by Thailand (n = 407), Indonesia (n = 214) and Bangladesh (n = 158). Bhutan (n = 10), Maldives (n = 1), Democratic People's Republic of Korea (n = 1), and Timor-Leste (n = 3) had the least contribution in Influenza research. The top-most journal was PloS One which had the maximum number of influenza articles (n = 94) published from SEAR countries. Research that generated actionable evidence, i.e., implementation and intervention related topics were less common. Similarly, research on pharmaceutical interventions and on innovations was low. SEAR member states had inconsistent output across the five priority research streams, and there was a much higher scope and need for collaborative research. Basic science research showed declining trends and needed reprioritization. While a priority research agenda has been set for influenza at the global level through the WHO Global Influenza Program since 2009, and subsequently revisited in 2011 and again in 2016-2017, a structured contextualized approach to guide actionable evidence generation activities in SEAR has been lacking. In the backset of the Global Influenza Strategy 2019-2030 and the COVID-19 pandemic, attuning research endeavors in SEAR could help in improved pandemic influenza preparedness planning. There is a need to prioritize contextually relevant research themes within priority streams. Member states must inculcate a culture of within and inter-country collaboration to produce evidence that has regional as well as global value.

Changed epidemiology of narcolepsy before, during, and after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic: a nationwide narcolepsy surveillance network study in mainland China, 1990-2017.

Increased incidence of narcolepsy was reported in children during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic following Pandemrix, a H1N1 flu vaccine. A link with A(H1N1) pdm09 infections remains controversial. Using nationwide surveillance data from China (1990 to 2017), the epidemiology of narcolepsy was analyzed. Individual records of narcolepsy patients were collected from 15 of 42 hospitals across China known to diagnose cases. Incidence was estimated assuming the representativeness of these hospitals. Age-specific incidence, epidemiological and clinical characteristics of patients were evaluated before, during, and after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Sensitivity analyses were conducted by including NT1 cases only and excluding the effect of the 2009 H1N1 vaccination. Average annual incidence was 0.79 per 100 000 person-years (PY) from 1990 to 2017 and 1.08 per 100 000 PY from 2003 to 2017. Incidence increased 4.17 (95% CI 4.12, 4.22) and 1.42 (95% CI 1.41, 1.44) fold during and after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic when compared to baseline. These results were robust in sensitivity analyses. Patients with the onset of narcolepsy during the pandemic period were younger (notably in 5-9-year-old strata), and the age shift toward younger children reversed to baseline following the pandemic. Increased incidence of narcolepsy was observed during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic period. This is likely to be associated with the circulation of the wild type A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. This observation should be considered for future influenza pandemic preparedness plans.

Striving for Health Equity: The Importance of Social Determinants of Health and Ethical Considerations in Pandemic Preparedness Planning.

Since the WHO’s “Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan” in 1999, pandemic preparedness plans at the international and national level have been constantly adapted with the common goal to respond early to outbreaks, identify risks, and outline promising interventions for pandemic containment. Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, public health experts have started to reflect on the extent to which previous preparations have been helpful as well as on the gaps in pandemic preparedness planning. In the present commentary, we advocate for the inclusion of social and ethical factors in future pandemic planning—factors that have been insufficiently considered so far, although social determinants of infection risk and infectious disease severity contribute to aggravated social inequalities in health.

Kanta Subbarao—confronting influenza and COVID-19

Kanta Subbarao—confronting influenza and COVID-19

Leveraging International Influenza Surveillance Systems and Programs during the COVID-19 Pandemic

A network of global respiratory disease surveillance systems and partnerships has been built over decades as a direct response to the persistent threat of seasonal, zoonotic, and pandemic influenza. These efforts have been spearheaded by the World Health Organization, country ministries of health, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, nongovernmental organizations, academic groups, and others. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention worked closely with ministries of health in partner countries and the World Health Organization to leverage influenza surveillance systems and programs to respond to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Countries used existing surveillance systems for severe acute respiratory infection and influenza-like illness, respiratory virus laboratory resources, pandemic influenza preparedness plans, and ongoing population-based influenza studies to track, study, and respond to SARS-CoV-2 infections. The incorporation of COVID-19 surveillance into existing influenza sentinel surveillance systems can support continued global surveillance for respiratory viruses with pandemic potential.

Turkey’s response to COVID-19 pandemic: strategy and key actions

COVID-19 emerged at the end of 2019 in Wuhan, China, and spread rapidly around the world causing many deaths. Due to the intercontinental escalation in the epidemic, while WHO declared a pandemic on March 11, 2020, our country’s first case was diagnosed. Before this, the MoH established the Operations Center against possible risks regarding the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan on January 10, 2020 and formed the Scientific Committee, which has a critical importance in epidemic management. National and Provincial Pandemic Coordination Boards were established within the scope of this plan. Fast, effective and frequently updated decisions were implemented. The epidemic was kept under control by stopping mutual flights to countries with cases, intermittent curfews, transportation restrictions, closure of schools, filiation, social isolation, use of PPE, social media communication, and intensive work of healthcare workers. Softwares were developed for analysis and data reporting, case and contact tracing. Various mobile applications were developed providing a safe social life in social areas and enabling filiation teams to intervene in the necessary areas in the fastest way and to record data instantly in the system. Prior to normalization process, “COVID-19 Epidemic Management and Working Guide” was prepared including epidemic measures for social life, institutions, organizations, and businesses. Variants of concern, recommended by WHO to be monitored, led to an increase in the number of cases around the world. In our country, the number of laboratories and tests were expanded to monitor variant viruses. Vaccination activities continue in line with the National Vaccine Administration Strategy. In the fight against pandemic, it will be possible to maintain and increase our country’s acquisitions so far, owing to the strong health infrastructure both in terms of manpower and institutions, free health care, success in the production of PPE and medical devices, and finally, rapid acceleration of the vaccination.

The Effectiveness of Table-Top Exercises in Improving Pandemic Crisis Preparedness

The World Health Organization carried out a global survey in 2018 to ascertain the level of preparedness for pandemic influenza. It was discovered that simulation exercises to test national pandemic influenza preparedness plans were carried out in the previous 5 years, by 42 out of the 104 countries that completed the survey. The table-top exercise (TTX) being the preferred format, with 86% of the countries using them. Although no table-top exercise can convey a realistic picture of a pandemic, they can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures, clarify roles and responsibilities, and identify resource gaps in an operational environment. However, table-top exercises are only effective if they are properly designed, carefully conducted, fully evaluated, and most importantly, the results and recommendations identified are actually implemented. TTXs used as part of preparedness for pandemics are not cost free, a failure to implement the lessons learned from them can have both human and economic consequences. To understand the value of TTXs, a sample of national and large scale TTXs are examined in an effort to identify the effectiveness of table-top exercises, as a part of improving pandemic crisis preparedness.

Prophylaxis and treatment of influenza: options, antiviral susceptibility, and existing recommendations.

Influenza viruses of types A and B attack 5–10% of adults and 20–30% of children, thereby causing millions of acute respiratory infections in Germany annually. A significant number of these infections are associated with complications such as pneumonia and bacterial superinfections that need hospitalization and might lead to death. In addition to vaccines, drugs were developed that might support influenza prevention and that can be used to treat influenza patients. The timely application of anti-influenza drugs can inhibit virus replication, help reduce and shorten the symptoms, and prevent death as well as virus transmission.This review concisely describes the mechanism of action, the potential for prophylactic and therapeutic use, and the knowledge on resistance of anti-influenza drugs approved today. However, the main aim is to give an overview on the recommendations available in Germany for the proper use of these drugs. In doing so, the recommendations published in statements and guidelines of medical societies as well as the German influenza pandemic preparedness plan are summarized with the consideration of specific circumstances and groups of patients.

On Pandemic Preparedness: How Well is the Modeling Community Prepared for COVID-19?

On Pandemic Preparedness: How Well is the Modeling Community Prepared for COVID-19?

Country level analysis of COVID-19 policies.

Country level analysis of COVID-19 policies.

Mexico: Lessons learned from the 2009 pandemic that help us fight COVID-19.

In April 2009, Mexican, American, and Canadian authorities announced a novel influenza that became the first pandemic of the century. We report on lessons learned in Mexico. The Mexican Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan, developed and implemented since 2005, was a decisive element for the early response. Major lessons-learned were the need for flexible plans that consider different scenarios; the need to continuously strengthen routine surveillance programs and laboratory capacity and strengthen coordination between epidemiological departments, clinicians, and laboratories; maintain strategic stockpiles; establish a fund for public health emergencies; and collaboration among neighboring countries. Mexico responded with immediate reporting and transparency, implemented aggressive control measures and generous sharing of data and samples. Lessons learned induced changes leading to a better response to public health critical events.

Nonpharmaceutical Measures for Pandemic Influenza in Nonhealthcare Settings-International Travel-Related Measures.

International travel–related nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), which can include traveler screening, travel restrictions, and border closures, often are included in national influenza pandemic preparedness plans. We performed systematic reviews to identify evidence for their effectiveness. We found 15 studies in total. Some studies reported that NPIs could delay the introduction of influenza virus. However, no available evidence indicated that screening of inbound travelers would have a substantial effect on preventing spread of pandemic influenza, and no studies examining exit screening were found. Some studies reported that travel restrictions could delay the start of local transmission and slow international spread, and 1 study indicated that small Pacific islands were able to prevent importation of pandemic influenza during 1918–19 through complete border closure. This limited evidence base indicates that international travel-related NPIs would have limited effectiveness in controlling pandemic influenza and that these measures require considerable resources to implement.

Strengthening emergency preparedness and response systems: experience from Indonesia

Indonesia has made excellent progress on emergency preparedness in compliance with the International Health Regulations, 2005, including a joint external evaluation (JEE) of IHR core capacities in 2017. Development of the National action plan for health security (NAPHS) began soon after the JEE, through multisectoral coordination and collaboration and with the support of a presidential instruction. The logic model approach was used to develop the NAPHS, and provided a robust framework to ensure that activities were linked to indicators at the various capacity levels delineated in the JEE. The NAPHS includes a comprehensive tool within which monitoring and evaluation are completely separated and different indicators applied. Furthermore, development of the NAPHS was done in parallel and in line with that of the National medium-term development plan 2020-2024, which included a focus on health system strengthening based on the primary health-care approach. An innovative approach taken in 2018 was the inclusion of emergency preparedness in the mandatory minimum service standards for provincial and district governments. These standards clearly articulate the importance of local emergency preparedness in Indonesia's decentralized governance through the development of contingency plans and simulation exercises for natural disasters and potential disease outbreaks. Development of the NAPHS has benefited from Indonesia's extensive experience in pandemic influenza preparedness planning and exercises, integrated with a national disaster management system. By signing the Delhi Declaration on Emergency Preparedness in the South-East Asia Region, Indonesia has signalled its commitment to implementing the NAPHS in full, focusing on enhanced emergency preparedness at all administrative levels.

Pandemic influenza preparedness in the WHO South-East Asia Region: a model for planning regional preparedness for other priority high-threat pathogens

Pandemic influenza preparedness has contributed significantly to building, strengthening and maintaining countries' core capacities to prepare for health emergencies. The Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits (the PIP framework) was adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2011. The experiences and lessons learnt from the implementation of the PIP framework have provided insights that can be used to strengthen preparedness for epidemics of other priority high-threat pathogens in the World Health Organization (WHO) South-East Asia Region in line with obligations under the International Health Regulations, 2005 (IHR). Implementation has established policies, strategies, action plans, strengthened systems and operational readiness to promptly diagnose influenza virus strains with pandemic potential and ensure timely event notifications and management in compliance with the IHR. WHO collaborating centres and the annual bi-regional meeting of national influenza centres and influenza surveillance have strengthened the influenza laboratory diagnostic knowledge network in the region. After action reviews following influenza outbreaks have documented best practices, strengths, constraints and areas for improvement in pandemic preparedness. The pandemic in 2009 and recent seasonal influenza outbreaks have offered real-life scenarios for testing national pandemic influenza preparedness plans and deploying vaccines. The successful implementation of the PIP framework, along with strengthening of health systems and operational procedures and continued technical collaboration with global centres of excellence, should be tapped into to strengthen preparedness to respond to epidemics of other high-threat pathogens based on the influenza model. The political commitment reflected in the Delhi Declaration on Emergency Preparedness, signed by all ministers of health in September 2019 and supported by the Five-year regional strategic plan to strengthen public health preparedness and response - 2019-2023, should be a catalyst for guidance and support in developing a broad, long-term strategic plan for preparedness and response to high-threat pathogens in the region.

An Evaluation Tool for National-Level Pandemic Influenza Planning.

The historical threat of pandemic influenza and the circulation of novel influenza viruses have led countries to strengthen their efforts in pandemic influenza preparedness planning. A cornerstone of these efforts is the creation of a comprehensive national plan that addresses all of the capacities required to prevent, detect, and respond to novel influenza outbreaks. In 2017 and 2018, the World Health Organization issued updated guidance for national pandemic planning efforts, based on lessons learned from the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) outbreak, the International Health Regulations (World Health Organization, 2005a), and other developments in health security. We have created a tool to assess national‐level plans based on these updated guidelines. This tool will allow for countries to identify both strengths and weaknesses in their national plans, identify capacities and sectors that require improvement, and to help frame the updating or drafting of plans in line with the most updated guidance.

Heterologous prime-boost with A(H5N1) pandemic influenza vaccines induces broader cross-clade antibody responses than homologous prime-boost

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5Nx) viruses continue to pose a pandemic threat. US national vaccine stockpiles are a cornerstone of the influenza pandemic preparedness plans. However, continual genetic and antigenic divergence of A(H5Nx) viruses requires the development of effective vaccination strategies using stockpiled vaccines and adjuvants for pandemic preparedness. Human sera collected from healthy adults who received either homologous (2 doses of a AS03A-adjuvanted A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005, A/Turkey), or heterologous (primed with AS03A-adjuvanted A/Indonesia/5/2005, A/Indo, followed by A/Turkey boost) prime-boost vaccination regimens were analyzed by hemagglutination inhibition and microneutralization assays against 8 wild-type HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses from 6 genetic clades. Molecular, structural and antigenic features of the A(H5Nx) viruses that could influence the cross-clade antibody responses were also explored. Compared with homologous prime-boost vaccinations, priming with a clade 2.1.3.2 antigen (A/Indo) followed by one booster dose of a clade 2.2.1 antigen (A/Turkey) administered 18 months apart did not compromise the antibody responses to the booster vaccine (A/Turkey), it also broadened the cross-clade antibody responses to several antigenically drifted variants from 6 heterologous clades, including an antigenically distant A(H5N8) virus (A/gyrfalcon/Washington/410886/2014, clade 2.3.4.4) that caused recent outbreaks in US poultry. The magnitude and breadth of the cross-clade antibody responses against emerging HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses are associated with genetic, structural and antigenic differences from the vaccine viruses and enhanced by the inclusion of an adjuvant. Heterologous prime-boost vaccination with AS03A adjuvanted vaccine offers a vaccination strategy to use existing stockpiled vaccines for pandemic preparedness against new emerging HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses.