Palestinian Legislative Council Research Articles

Legal References for Palestinian Foreign Policy

The current Palestinian foreign policy arose under the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and is now led by the Palestinian National Authority which was established after the Oslo Accords in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Therefore, it is important to know the nature of the legal references and the frame of reference for these Palestinian institutions in the environment of the international community in their practice of foreign policy, as a measure of progress in achieving Palestinian goals and ending the Israeli occupation. There is a problem in these references because they are somewhat vague, and the researcher has sought to clarify them through this study by following the descriptive-analytical approach where the study discussed the nature of international references that emerged from the Oslo Accords, as well as international diplomatic law, and its impact on Palestinian foreign policy. The study also discussed the internal references that emerged from the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Palestinian Basic Law. The study is concluded with several results, most notably the existence of a real weakness in the references of the Palestinian foreign policy, in the absence of oversight over performance, and the freezing of the work of the Palestinian Legislative Council. The study also made several recommendations, most notably the need to reconsider the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has retreated in favor of the Palestinian National Authority.

The Position of The Hamas Movement on The Political Participation of Palestinian Women

The importance of this study lies in illustrating the role of Palestinian women in the development of Palestinian society as a result of their political participation and aims to examine the position of the Hamas movement on the political participation of Palestinian women during its various stages since with the movement's founding, leading to its assumption of power after winning the legislative elections. A qualitative research methodology used to address the study objectives by conducting 4 personal interviews. The researcher interviews Palestinian women leaders of the Islamic women's movement affiliated with Hamas, who participated in the political and social work fields, in addition to their participation in the management of ministries after Hamas’s assumption of power. The interview includes 6 semi-structured questions. Personal interviews have been conducted in Gaza. Later, comparisons with previous studies have been made, analyzed, and reviewed. The study has several results, the most important of which are that the Palestinian woman in Hamas enjoys a large area of participation in political work of all kinds as Hamas' interest in women's affairs has been proven since the early stages of the movement's founding. This is evident as Hamas has allowed women to work in advocacy and to assume leadership positions within the social and educational institutions, leading to assuming power, after being elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council and obtaining their membership in the Palestinian Ministry. Nevertheless, women's political participation is still weak and limited in formal and informal institutions and decision-making places. Finally, the researchers recommend that future research deal with the political participation of Palestinian women on other dimensions, including social, cultural, educational, economic, and political factors.

The Internal Statute of Palestinian Legislative Council and Its Constitutionality Scope

يتناول هذا البحث ماهية النظام الداخلي للمجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني ونطاق دستوريته؛ استناد لأحكام القانون الأساسي الفلسطيني. فتطرق البحث إلى تعريف هذا النظام، وطبيعته القانونية، وطريقة إصداره، ومرتبته القانونية. وقد توصل الباحث إلى أن النظام الداخلي للمجلس التشريعي يشير إلى مجموعة من القواعد التي تنظّم تكوين أجهزته، وشؤونه الداخلية، وكيفية أداء مهامه الدستورية في مجال الرقابة والتشريع، مما يضفي على قواعده الطبيعة الدستورية؛ لتعلقها بالمجلس التشريعي كسلطة دستورية، وعلاقته بالسلطة التنفيذية. كما توصل الباحث إلى أن القانون الأساسي أناط بالمجلس ذاته وضع وإصدار نظامه الداخلي، الذي يحتل مرتبة أدنى من هذا القانون، إلا أن إجراءات تعديل ذلك النظام منحته مرتبة أعلى من القوانين العادية. وفي إطار تناوله لنطاق دستورية النظام الداخلي، توصل الباحث إلى العديد من أوجه عدم الدستورية في تنظيمه لعلاقة المجلس بالحكومة، وفي وظيفته التشريعية، لذلك اقترح عدة تعديلات على النظام الداخلي بما يكفل معالجة أوجه المخالفة الدستورية في ضبط علاقة المجلس بالحكومة، وتنظيم وظيفته التشريعية.

قانون الانتخابات العامة المنظم للانتخابات التشريعية والرئاسية في فلسطين للعام 2021: نسخة مدمجة (Palestinian General Elections Law: A "Compact" Version)

Arabic Abstract: عقب ما يرنوا عن خمسة عشر عاما على آخر انتخابات رئاسية (2005) وتشريعية (2006)، تعطلت خلالها دورية الانتخابات، وساد فيها الانقسام، تخوض فلسطين اليوم انتخابات عامة، تشريعية ورئاسية، محتكمة إلى القرار بقانون رقم (1) لسنة 2007 (القانون الأصلي)، الذي جرى تعديله مؤخرا بموجب القرار بقانون رقم (1) لسنة 2021 (القانون المعدل)، قبيل شهر من انطلاق العملية الانتخابية. وألحق التعديل بتنويه/ تصحيح، بخصوص المادة (39/5)، نشرته الجريدة الرسمية. تعتبر النسخة المدرجة في هذا الكتيب نسخة مدمجة، تظهر التعديلات التي أجراها القانون المعدل على القانون الأصلي، وموضع التصحيح المتعلق بالمادة المذكورة أعلاه. وترد في الكتيب حواشي للتعليق على أبرز أحكامه المعدلة وأكثرها جوهرية و/أو إشكالية. كما يتصدر الكتيب قائمة محتويات أوتوماتيكية تتيح مطالعة أحكام المواد حسب موضوعاتها، بسهولة ويسر. يأتي إعداد هذا الكتيب ونشره، إسهاما بالتوعية القانونية لجمهور الناخبين، في ظل عدم توفر نسخة مدمجة من قانون الانتخابات العامة (التشريعية والرئاسية). English Abstract: After fifteen years of holding its last electoral process; Palestine is currently preparing for its general elections. The elections will consist of elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and for the President of the Palestinian National Authority. The elections will be held according to the law by decree No (1) of 2007; which is the original law, which was recently amended through the law by decree No (1) of 2021; which is the amending law. The amending law was released one month before the beginning of the electoral process. The amending law was also accompanied by an amendment/ correction to article (39/5) and was published in the Palestinian Official Gazette. The copy which is included in this booklet is considered a combined version which shows the amendments made by the amended law to the original law, and the amendments/corrections of the aforementioned amended article. Through its footnotes the booklet also provides comments to the most significant, fundamental and problematic amended provisions. The booklet also contains an automatic content list that allows easy access to the articles/provisions according to their topics. The preparation and publication of this booklet comes as a contribution to legal awareness of the electorate, in light of the absence of a compact version of the General Elections Law (legislative and presidential).

Review

Review

الشغور المفاجئ في منصب الرئيس: المعضلة والسيناريوهات المتوقعة (Sudden Vacancy in the office of the President: Dilemmas and Expected Scenarios)

Arabic Abstract: يشغل السيد محمود عباس حاليا ثلاثة مناصب: رئيس اللجنة التنفيذية لمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية ورئيس دولة فلسطين ورئيس السلطة الفلسطينية. وفي حال يسهل إشغال المنصبين الأولين حال شغورهما المفاجئ، فإن هنالك إشكالية في شغل المنصب الثالث، بحكم حل المجلس التشريعي، الذي يتولى رئيسه رئاسة السلطة في حالة الشغور المفاجئ. تتناول الورقة هذه المشكلة، وتحاول توقع السيناريوهات التي قد يجري العمل بها لسد الشغور، وبعض الإشكاليات المترتبة عليها، دون أن توصي بأي منها. English Abstract: Mahmoud Abbas is currently the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) Executive Committee and president of the State of Palestine and the Palestinian Authority (PA). If he were to no longer be able to fulfil these roles, then the Executive Committee would appoint one of its members and the Central Council would nominate/appoint a president of the State of Palestine – it would most likely be the same person, as was also the case under Yasser Arafat. However, this leaves the question of who would become president of the PA if this office was suddenly vacated. The Basic Law (BL) suggests that the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) would became president on an interim basis, which only opens up a further question as the Council has been dissolved and no new elections are currently scheduled to take place. Scenario One: Aziz Dweik, who was the speaker of the PLC when it was dissolved, would assume the presidency on an interim basis. The 2005 amendment to the Basic Law (BL) establishes that the mandate of incumbent PLC representatives ends when new members take their oath of office. The mandate of ‘incumbent’ members is therefore still in effect. Scenario Two: The PLO Central Council may repeat its actions of 1993, and would therefore select the PA’s president and instruct the PLO Executive Committee to appoint the PA’s Council, which would henceforth apply executive and legislative powers. Scenario Three: The PLO Central Council would officially replace the PLC. Salim Zanon, the speaker of the PLO Central Council, would henceforth serve as the PA’s interim president. Scenario Four: It is possible that the Draft Constitution of Palestine will be officially endorsed. If/When this occurs, it will stipulate that the vice-president should replace the president – if the vice-presidency is unoccupied, the chairman of the Constitutional Court will be asked to fill the role. Scenario Five: The State of Palestine has now replaced the PA, and its president could therefore be appointed/selected. In the absence of an incumbent president, the Central Council would elect/appoint the Head of State. Scenario Six: The PA president may declare a state of emergency, which would suspend the interim BL provisions related to the presidency, and would task the vice-president with fulfilling the mandate of the president. This paper recognizes that both Palestinians and the international community are closely preoccupied with the question of who will be the next president of the PA and the State of Palestine, and it therefore outlines six different scenarios, without indicating a specific preference for any one. But this overlooks what is perhaps the central question, which is the fragmentation of the Palestinian political agency without any real central Palestinian authority, and regardless of who will be the next president. Whereas the preceding scenarios operate within a de jure framework of reference, this question instead orientates towards a series of de facto considerations.

Hamas

This paper addresses the evolving role of the Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas – following its integration into “the establishment” in the aftermath of the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections. By becoming the establishment in Gaza, Hamas and its leadership moved beyond earlier ideologically based concerns over legitimizing Israel’s existence. This move followed the evolutionary framework outlined by Jon Anderson. This paper contends that Anderson’s framework, which addresses the stages through which new media moves – from pioneer, to activist, to official (Islamic) discourse – can be applied to social movements to better understand their evolutionary processes. Within the limits of this paper, I will aply this framework to Hamas and its evolution and then trace this transition by analyzing both the secondary and primary literature. The nominal turning points that mark these three phases include the emergence of Hamas (1988), the claiming of an activist mantle (the mid-to-late 1990s), and its becoming the official discourse (i.e., the establishment) by winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections.

Hamas

This paper addresses the evolving role of the Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas – following its integration into “the establishment” in the aftermath of the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections. By becoming the establishment in Gaza, Hamas and its leadership moved beyond earlier ideologically based concerns over legitimizing Israel’s existence. This move followed the evolutionary framework outlined by Jon Anderson. This paper contends that Anderson’s framework, which addresses the stages through which new media moves – from pioneer, to activist, to official (Islamic) discourse – can be applied to social movements to better understand their evolutionary processes. Within the limits of this paper, I will aply this framework to Hamas and its evolution and then trace this transition by analyzing both the secondary and primary literature. The nominal turning points that mark these three phases include the emergence of Hamas (1988), the claiming of an activist mantle (the mid-to-late 1990s), and its becoming the official discourse (i.e., the establishment) by winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections.

Rebel-to-political and back? Hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion, politics and governance

ABSTRACT After winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections and subsequently taking control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, the Palestinian Hamas – a hybrid political, social and military actor – undertook a complex process to ascertain authority and control over Gaza. The article focuses on understanding Hamas’s performance as a political party and a “rebel government” as well as the impact of this newly acquired role on the group’s strategy. Relying on primary sources, field-work and interviews with members of the Hamas government and its security sector, the study looks at Hamas’s role as a security provider and analyses the complex relationship between the institutionalized security sector and the group’s insurgent armed wing. Examining Hamas’s logic as a security provider and exploring the inherent tensions between political and insurgent logics allows for a better understanding of both the rebel group’s role as a political actor and the broader challenges behind the successful rebel-to-political transformations of non-state armed organizations. In doing so it contributes to the emerging literature on non-state actors’ shifts between ballots and bullets and on their potential role as alternative governance providers.

The demise of Oslo and Hamas’s political engagement

This article explores the consequences of the Oslo Accords on the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. It shows how the movement positioned itself from the onset in opposition to the treaty and ensuing peace negotiations, rejecting the changes which took place within the Palestinian political establishment; namely, the creation of the interim self-governing Palestinian Authority. It demonstrates how Hamas’s refusal to grant the Oslo Accords any legitimacy was a primary factor in its decision to boycott the first Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections in 1996. With the failure of the peace negotiations and the subsequent eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada, the framework for the implementation of the Oslo Accords was seen to have effectively collapsed. This article argues that it is this perceived ‘demise’ of the peace process which—to a large extent—underpinned Hamas’s decision to participate in the PLC elections a decade later, in 2006. In mapping this transition, the article explores the factors motivating Hamas’s subsequent entry into the Palestinian political establishment.

From Revolution to Political Participation: Institutionalization of Militant Islamic Movements

Social movements often undergo substantial changes as they grow more politically popular and influential, foremost of which is the shift from a single founding/charismatic leader to a hierarchic structure of representative institutions and rational political decision-making. Such changes are said to enable transformation from revolutionary to reformist strategies based on pragmatic calculations. Despite the wealth of studies on the political development of Islamic movements, this theoretical assumption is yet to be tested, especially in cases of popular Islamic movements identified with jihad as a core element in their ideology of resistance to an alien power. This article takes on to scrutinize the political trajectories of two jihadist-resistant movements, namely, Hamas and Hezbollah. Both Hamas and Hezbollah emerged as contentious, counter-elite movements adopting extreme Islamic agendas, yet along the years, they came to adopt national-Islamic attributes. Moreover, both movements moved from the fringes of opposition to the political center and government, each one establishing itself as ‘a state within a state’. Despite their different sectarian identities (Sunni and Shi`i, respectively) and domestic political arenas, these two movements share major attributes, especially their dedicated involvement in social and community concerns on the one hand, and ideological and practical commitment to jihad against Israel, on the other. At the same time, despite their involvement in violence (in the case of Hezbollah, also international terrorism), both movements made discernible efforts to win international recognition, especially by propagating their broad political constituency and civic activities. Whereas Hezbollah attained representation in the Lebanese governments since 1992, Hamas’s unexpectedly decisive victory in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council forced it to take responsibility as a government. Following its violent takeover of full control over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Hamas has exercised full internal sovereignty over this territory and won a substantial international recognition, mainly from Islamic countries. Against this backdrop, what changes can be discerned in the thought and practice of these movements? Especially, what effect had the shift from ‘resistance’ to government—or rather, the mixture of both—had on these movements. The article’s working assumption is that notwithstanding processes of popular growth, institutionalization, and generational changes of leadership, neither Hezbollah nor Hamas deviated from their strategic goals and core principles. Nonetheless, on the tactical level, they proved to be innovative in legitimizing temporary deviations from stated ideologies and policies.

Gaza 2014: Hamas' Strategic Calculus

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes Hamas' strategic and political calculations during the 2014 conflict with Israel in Gaza. I argue Hamas did not plan the conflict, which came mostly in response to Israel's crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank (Operation Brothers Keeper). However, Hamas sought to use the conflict to reverse its increasingly weak strategic position, and had some success in doing so. However, given Gaza's continued physical and regional isolation, Hamas' enhanced position coming out of the conflict is not likely to be long-lived. ********** The purpose of this paper is to explore the strategic calculations Hamas made during the Summer 2014 conflict with Israel. (1) I While Hamas is categorized by both the US Government and the European Union as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), its leaders have a long history of making rational calculations (and sometimes miscalculations) seeking to maximize advantages to Hamas as an organization and social movement. (2) Even groups that engage in terrorism are typically rational actors seeking to advance their causes. By now, we have an extensive body of work analyzing Hamas' rise, history, politics and decision-making. (3) Using a rational actor model, my central argument is that Hamas sought to use the 2014 conflict to reverse its overall weak position within Palestinian society and did, in fact, succeed in making significant--but likely short lived--political gains. More broadly, my argument is as follows. By the of 2014, Hamas' position as the pre-eminent Palestinian power inside the Gaza Strip had weakened substantially. Years of isolation and regional changes brought on by the Arab Spring worked against the interests of Hamas. Israel's embargo of the Gaza Strip, in place since 2007, further immiserated an already impoverished population. Gaza's isolation only intensified as regional changes lost important external support for Hamas from Egypt, Syria, and Iran. Indeed, the Fatah-Hamas agreement in April 2014 signaled Hamas was no longer willing and able to rule Gaza alone, and essentially had to yield to Palestinian Authority (PA) demands. Hamas did not plan to engage Israel militarily in Gaza in 2014. The series of events between the April agreement with Fatah and the start of the shooting were not planned by Hamas leadership. However, that leadership sought to take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, and even more broadly in the region. Hamas was able to alter the strategic status quo in its favor as a result of the conflict, but its successes will most likely not be permanent. After providing some background, this article examines Hamas' strategic position with regard to the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and the region, and why Hamas calculated the conflict with Israel would advance its interests with each of those parties. Hamas' Rule in Gaza, 2006-2014 In a surprise outcome for the Bush administration, which had pushed the Palestinian Authority hard to hold new elections, Hamas won a plurality (44%) of the national parliamentary vote in 2006. Given the odd hybrid system the PA adopted for elections, Hamas was able to parlay its plurality into a supermajority of seats in parliament. Almost immediately, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and the European Union adopted a rejectionist posture toward any Hamas participation in Palestinian governance, with Israel arresting many Hamas officials and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC, or parliament). The United States, led by Elliot Abrams, and Fatah (the PLO's largest faction, and the party of most of the PA leadership), led by Muhammad Dahlan, began to organize a PA-led coup against Hamas, which ended disastrously in 2007 when Hamas drove Fatah from the Gaza Strip after a brief but bloody battle. (4) Hamas has ruled over Gaza ever since. …

Hamas as a Political Party: Democratization in the Palestinian Territories

Why do violent movements participate in elections? To answer this question, we examine Hamas's formation of the Reform and Change Party and its iconic victory in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council. We argue that Hamas's formation of this party was a logical step, following nearly two decades of participation in local and municipal elections. Hamas's need to attract resources from external donors, who make funding decisions based on civilian support for the movement, best explains why Hamas decided to participate in local elections in the early 1990s, taking Hamas on a path that eventually led to its 2006 legislative victory. Hamas's foray into elections was consistent with its dual strategy of directing violence against Israel and building Palestinian support through welfare services. We demonstrate that changes in political opportunities (Fatah's decline and the increase in Hamas's popularity), institutional incentives (lax electoral laws and the holding of municipal elections), and the rise of moderate voices within Hamas explain the timing of its entry into legislative elections. Finally, we discuss Hamas's electoral victory, the need for cooperation between Fatah and Hamas, and the role played by international actors as significant factors influencing prospects for peace and democratization in the region.

The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza Strip

International aid to the Palestinian Authority is conditioned in part on democratization and good governance. However, since Hamas's victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections and its takeover of the Gaza Strip, aid agencies have supported the international boycott of the Hamas government. This article argues that aid agencies, by operating in Gaza while boycotting its government, subvert their mandates and serve the political interests of donors and the PA rather than the humanitarian and development needs of Gazans. As a consequence, assistance has, inadvertently and unintentionally, increased Gazans' dependence on humanitarian aid, impeded economic development, and enabled Israel to maintain its occupation and the blockade of Gaza.

Suicide Campaigns as a Strategic Choice: The Case of Hamas

This article examines the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas as a case study of an organization engaging in suicide campaigns as a result of a strategic choice. It examines the political, cultural and strategic preconditions that make this choice possible. In order to do this, the article also examines the interaction between Hamas and Palestinian society--how Hamas gains support at the grassroots level and how it in turn operates to Islamize the society and how Hamas came to a turning point where its political leadership found that starting suicide campaign was a necessary strategic choice. The article refers to Hamas suicide campaigns in 1994-96 and 2001-04. Hamas achieved its campaign goals: the campaigns sabotaged the peace process and Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006. The suicide missions represented a big shift away from Hamas' previous policies and strategies. Language: en

After the Fall: Palestinian Communist Journalism in the Post–Cold War World

This study examines how the Palestinian Communist Party, renamed the People's Party in 1991, conceptualized its new role in Palestinian politics in its documents and its press based on its perceptions of its own strengths and weaknesses after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the weakening of Arab unity, the rise of the Islamic Movement, the entry of the Palestine Liberation Organization into the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, and the success of Hamas at the expense of Fateh in the 2006 Legislative Council elections. The study concludes that the party fares better when it does not deny its Marxist roots, and describes how the party is in the process of reclaiming its Marxist heritage, even after Palestinians elected Hamas to the Palestinian Legislative Council.

B2. PA President Mahmud Abbas, Address to the Second Palestinian Legislative Council, Ramallah, 18 February 2006 (excerpts)

B2. PA President Mahmud Abbas, Address to the Second Palestinian Legislative Council, Ramallah, 18 February 2006 (excerpts)

C4. Israeli Cabinet, Decision on Government Measures vis-àà-vis the Palestinian Authority Following the Swearing In of the New Palestinian Legislative Council, Jerusalem, 19 February 2006

C4. Israeli Cabinet, Decision on Government Measures vis-àà-vis the Palestinian Authority Following the Swearing In of the New Palestinian Legislative Council, Jerusalem, 19 February 2006

معايير اختيار عضو المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني لدى الناخب الفلسطيني في العام 2006

The aim of this study is to define and arrange the characteristics that voters wish to see in the members of the Palestinian Legislative هدف هذا البحث إلى تحديد الصفات التي يراها الناخب الفلسطيني مؤهلة لعضو المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني في انتخابات عام 2006م. وقد جاء ترتيب هذه الصفات كما يلي: كون المرشح غير متهم بالفساد، والمؤهل العلمي للمرشح، وكون المرشح متدينا، والتاريخ النضالي للمرشح، والانتماء الحزبي للمرشح، وكون المرشح ذكرا، والانتماء العائلي، والوضع الاقتصادي للمرشح، وصلة القرابة، ومكان سكن المرشح، وكون المرشح أنثى، وكون المرشح نائبا سابقا. وقد تفاوت ترتيب هذه الصفات حسب خصائص الناخبين، إلا أنهم أجمعوا على الصفتين الأوليين وهما: كون المرشح غير متهم بالفساد، والمؤهل العلمي له. أما كون المرشح نائبا سابقا فقد جاءت في المرتبة الآخرة.

Israel and Palestine

The last quarter of 2005 proved to be a watershed in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and in the politics of the two conflicting societies. In September, Israel withdrew its last army battalions from the Gaza strip. Elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, in which Hamas is set to take part, were rescheduled to January 2006 in the tense uncertainty surrounding the pullout. In Israel, the left-leaning Labor alignment held a leadership election that toppled Shimon Peres and elevated Amir Peretz. On 21 November, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon dissolved parliament, set an early date of 28 March, 2006, for fresh elections and left the Likud party he founded to establish a new one.