Gaza 2014: Hamas' Strategic Calculus

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes Hamas' strategic and political calculations during the 2014 conflict with Israel in Gaza. I argue Hamas did not plan the conflict, which came mostly in response to Israel's crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank (Operation Brothers Keeper). However, Hamas sought to use the conflict to reverse its increasingly weak strategic position, and had some success in doing so. However, given Gaza's continued physical and regional isolation, Hamas' enhanced position coming out of the conflict is not likely to be long-lived. ********** The purpose of this paper is to explore the strategic calculations Hamas made during the Summer 2014 conflict with Israel. (1) I While Hamas is categorized by both the US Government and the European Union as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), its leaders have a long history of making rational calculations (and sometimes miscalculations) seeking to maximize advantages to Hamas as an organization and social movement. (2) Even groups that engage in terrorism are typically rational actors seeking to advance their causes. By now, we have an extensive body of work analyzing Hamas' rise, history, politics and decision-making. (3) Using a rational actor model, my central argument is that Hamas sought to use the 2014 conflict to reverse its overall weak position within Palestinian society and did, in fact, succeed in making significant--but likely short lived--political gains. More broadly, my argument is as follows. By the of 2014, Hamas' position as the pre-eminent Palestinian power inside the Gaza Strip had weakened substantially. Years of isolation and regional changes brought on by the Arab Spring worked against the interests of Hamas. Israel's embargo of the Gaza Strip, in place since 2007, further immiserated an already impoverished population. Gaza's isolation only intensified as regional changes lost important external support for Hamas from Egypt, Syria, and Iran. Indeed, the Fatah-Hamas agreement in April 2014 signaled Hamas was no longer willing and able to rule Gaza alone, and essentially had to yield to Palestinian Authority (PA) demands. Hamas did not plan to engage Israel militarily in Gaza in 2014. The series of events between the April agreement with Fatah and the start of the shooting were not planned by Hamas leadership. However, that leadership sought to take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, and even more broadly in the region. Hamas was able to alter the strategic status quo in its favor as a result of the conflict, but its successes will most likely not be permanent. After providing some background, this article examines Hamas' strategic position with regard to the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and the region, and why Hamas calculated the conflict with Israel would advance its interests with each of those parties. Hamas' Rule in Gaza, 2006-2014 In a surprise outcome for the Bush administration, which had pushed the Palestinian Authority hard to hold new elections, Hamas won a plurality (44%) of the national parliamentary vote in 2006. Given the odd hybrid system the PA adopted for elections, Hamas was able to parlay its plurality into a supermajority of seats in parliament. Almost immediately, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and the European Union adopted a rejectionist posture toward any Hamas participation in Palestinian governance, with Israel arresting many Hamas officials and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC, or parliament). The United States, led by Elliot Abrams, and Fatah (the PLO's largest faction, and the party of most of the PA leadership), led by Muhammad Dahlan, began to organize a PA-led coup against Hamas, which ended disastrously in 2007 when Hamas drove Fatah from the Gaza Strip after a brief but bloody battle. (4) Hamas has ruled over Gaza ever since. …