Oxford Philosophy Research Articles

R.G. Collingwood and the Idea of a Historical Psychology

R.G. Collingwood's antagonism to scientific psychology is notorious. As a philosopher, especially an Oxford philosopher, such antagonism was hardly exceptional. Yet, in fact, Collingwood's attitude to the new science of psychology was remarkably ambivalent. He showed a keen interest in developments in the new science, regarded Freud as one of the greatest living scientists, and indeed himself pursued a full course of analysis. Nevertheless, Collingwood's criticisms of scientific psychology were searching, and involved a variety of distinct (though largely complementary) arguments. In relation to particular theorists, he objected to self-contradictions, pursuit of `red herrings' arising from prevarication in the use of established terms, and `plagiarism'. More fundamentally, he rejected the `covert scepticism' of psychology in its adoption of a purely empirical, `non-criteriological', approach to the study of thinking, an approach he regarded as appropriate solely to a science of `feeling'. Closely linked to this was his other main criticism of psychology, its presumption that the objects of study are transhistorical universals. In The Idea of History, however, Collingwood raised, though hardly elaborated, an alternative conception for a scientific psychology, as an essentially historical study, whose aim `would be to detect types or patterns of activity, repeated over and over again in history itself' (Collingwood, 1946, p. 224). Collingwood's historical conception of psychology is explored in the light of his objections to scientific psychology.

Why Medievalists should talk to Theologians

Philosophers regularly debate with their predecessors, historians of philosophy are often astonished at the results, yet the two seldom exchange notes. The Bounds of Sense, published in 1966 by Peter Strawson, is one of the best books by one of the finest Oxford philosophers of our day: an interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the author allows in the second sentence of the preface that, ‘as any Kantian scholar who may read it will quickly detect, it is by no means a work of historical-philosophical scholarship’. In the other philosophical tradition, Martin Heidegger brought out a study of Kant in 1929 which immediately sold out: in his preface to the second edition (1950), he allowed that the ‘violence’ of his interpretation, deplored by Kantian scholars, could indeed be substantiated from the text, but fended off the criticism by claiming that ‘historical-philosophical research is always justified when it makes this objection against attempts that want to bring about a thoughtful conversation between thinkers’. He goes on: ‘In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which has its own task, a thoughtful dialogue stands under different laws’. In short, students of the history of philosophy have a job to do; but they have no part in the conversation in which philosophical thought takes place. Heidegger, and even Strawson, clearly regard the work of historians of philosophy as less than vital for the advance of philosophy.University students of philosophy, in whichever tradition, learn within their first few weeks to rehearse the objections to Cartesianism; it is not an objection that, historically, Descartes may never have been a Cartesian.

Schopenhauer's Pessimism

This series of lectures was originally scheduled to include a talk on Schopenhauer by Patrick Gardiner. Sadly, Patrick died during the summer, and I was asked to stand in. Patrick must, I am sure, have been glad to see this series of talks on German Philosophy being put on by the Royal Institute, and he, probably more than anyone on the list, deserves to have been a part of it. Patrick Gardiner taught and wrote with unfailing integrity and quiet refinement in the Oxford of the 1950s, '60s, '70s and '80s, when the changing fashions in philosophy, and Oxford philosophy in particular, were quite remote from his own central interests. He went his own way, radically but quite undemonstratively. His book on Schopenhauer, originally published in 1963, was a beacon in the night as far as English-language publications on that philosopher are concerned. It is still a leader in the field, and I am pleased to say it has been re-issued just this year after being out of print for too long. Patrick worked in aesthetics, on Kant, and on the German Idealists, showing an expertise and a fondness for Fichte which now seem well ahead of their time. He also contributed well known books on Kierkegaard and on the philosophy of history. I am honoured to be invited as Patrick's replacement. He was a true pioneer, whom all of us working in these several fields that have now grown more fashionable and more populated should pause to salute.

The Touch of the Real

Research Article| July 01 1997 The Touch of the Real Stephen Greenblatt Stephen Greenblatt Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Representations (1997) 59: 14–29. https://doi.org/10.2307/2928812 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Stephen Greenblatt; The Touch of the Real. Representations 1 July 1997; 59 14–29. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2928812 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentRepresentations Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1997 The Regents of the University of California. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

A New Grandfather Paradox?

In an article in Scienti c American (March 1994, pp. 68–74) entitled “The Quantum Physics of Time Travel”, Oxford physicist David Deutsch and Oxford philosopher Michael Lockwood give a defense of the physical possibility of time travel based on the “Many Worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. This positive view of theirs is not my concern, however—I want to quarrel with their argument that time travel cannot be accommodated in any other way.1 The best way to spell out the traditional “grandfather paradox” that appears to threaten the possibility of time travel involves the notion of ability, or personal possibility, or free will. An example of David Lewis’s: Tim travels back in time with the intent to kill his grandfather.2 Let us x the case as one in which Tim in fact will not kill Grandfather; still, it seems that he can kill Grandfather because he is a good shot, has a gun, and is alone with Grandfather at close range. As Lewis says, Tim “has what it takes” to kill Grandfather. However, it is also compelling that Tim cannot kill Grandfather, because if Grandfather had been killed in his youth, Tim would not have existed to kill him. It is important to realize that the paradox essentially involves the notion of ability. No inconsistency results from supposing that Tim does not kill Grandfather. As for the case in which Tim does kill Grandfather, there are various possibilities. We could tell a consistent time travel story in which Tim kills Grandfather, but Grandfather is miraculously resurrected. Or one in which Tim kills Grandfather, but in which Grandfather has already had a child. Or one in which Tim kills Grandfather permanently, before Grandfather has any children, but in which Tim’s grandfather is someone other than Grandfather. As for the story in which Tim both kills Grandfather permanently in such a way that Grandfather has no children, and also is descended from Grandfather, this is an inconsistent time travel story; but of course the existence of some

The Use of Alfred of Shareshill's Commentary on the De plantis in University Teaching in the Thirteenth Century

The Use of Alfred of Shareshill's Commentary on the De plantis in University Teaching in the Thirteenth Century. Alfred of Shareshill was the first commentator, and one of the first translators, of the physical works of Aristotle. These works were of great interest and ultimately of great historical importance, but they presented a number of difficulties for a Christian society. Alfred's commentary was designed to overcome these difficulties, particularly in respect of the very different doctrines of soul presented by Aristotle and the church. Alfred's translation of and commentary upon De plantis were used in teaching natural philosophy in Oxford; and, from new manuscript evidence of a common English gloss delivered in lectures, this article shows how the teaching masters of arts used appropriate parts of Alfred's commentary to continue to make Aristotle's natural philosophy acceptable.

Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Humility

In 1929, doubtless to the discomfort of his logical positivist host Moritz Schlick, Wittgenstein remarked, ‘To be sure, I can understand what Heidegger means by Being and Angst’ (WVC, 68). I return to what Heidegger meant and Wittgenstein could understand later. I begin with that remark because it has had an instructive career. When the passage which it prefaced was first published in 1965, the editors left it out—presumably to protect a hero of ‘analytic’ philosophy from being compromised by an expression of sympathy for the arch-fiend of ‘continental’ philosophy. It was as if a diary of Churchill's had been discovered containing admiring references to Hitler. This was the period, after all, when Heidegger was, as Michael Dummett recalls, a ‘joke’ among Oxford philosophers, the paradigm of the sort of metaphysical nonsense Wittgenstein had dedicated himself to exposing.

Performance practice: music, medicine and natural philosophy in Interregnum Oxford.

A generation or so ago, scholarly discussion about the creation of new scientific knowledge in seventeenth-century England was often framed in terms of the respective contributions of scholars and practitioners, the effects of their training and background, the relative importance of the universities compared with London, and of the role of external and internal factors, and so forth. These discourses have now largely been put aside in favour of those emphasizing spatial metaphors and models, which are recognized as powerful conceptual tools for representing the dynamics of complex systems. The role that geographies play in the fostering of creativity and innovation in human systems at both the social and cognitive levels is a subject that is attracting widespread interest.

Kant's Theory of Imagination. Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience (Oxford Philosophical Monographs)

<i>Kant's Theory of Imagination. Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience</i> (Oxford Philosophical Monographs)

Selling war: the British propaganda campaign against American "neutrality" in World War II

'British propoganda brought America to the brink of war, and left it to the Japanese and Hitler to finish the job.' So concludes Nicholas Cull in this absorbing study of how the United States was transformed from isolation to belligerence in the years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. From the moment it realized that all was lost without American aid, the British Government employed a host pf persuasive tactics to draw the U. S. to its rescue. With the help of talents as varied as those of matinee idol Leslie Howard, Oxford philosopher Isaiah Berlin and society photographer Cecil Beaton, no section of America remained untouched and no method - from Secret Service intrigue to the publication of horrifying pictures of Nazi attrocities - remained untried. A fascinating story of how a foreign country promoted America's involvement in its greatest war, Selling War will appeal to all those interested in the modern cultural and political history of Britain in the twentieth century and World War II. The Kirkus Review wrote, 'A valuable study of how British propoganda helped to bring the U. S. into W. W. II...This is a sensible thoughtful, and - in revealing the foibles of many key actors - an often amusing book. '

A Seamless Web? John Finnis and Joseph Raz on Practical Reason and the Obligation to Obey the Law

The last couple of decades have seen a revival of interest in natural law theory, and this interest has taken many forms. This paper explores the recent effort of Oxford philosopher John Finnis to adumbrate a theory of natural law with a particular conception of practical reason. In Natural Law and Natural Rights,' Finnis argues for a theory of natural law that emphasizes the role of law in social co-ordination. The co-ordination of behaviour by law makes it possible for citizens to live together in community and secure various aspects of this common good. By elucidating the dynamics ofsocial co-ordination in light ofhis conception of practical reason, Finnis hopes to show that instrumental accounts of law become fundamentally inadequate. While Finnis's framework has met various criticisms regarding its metaphysical and philosophical claims,2 we will not be explicitly concerned with those criticisms here. Instead, our aim will be to try to understand the relation between Finnis's conception of natural law as a set of moral and other practical principles which require, among other things, that people co-ordinate their activities by law for the sake of securing their common good, and his assertion that there is a general (albeit defeasible) obligation to obey the law. Does natural law theory presuppose this position? Does the connection between law and morality necessarily imply that there is an obligation to obey the law? To investigate this question further, this paper explores the legal and moral philosophy of Joseph Raz, also of Oxford. Calling himself a legal positivist, Raz

Self-Ownership, Reciprocity, and Exploitation, or Why Marxists Shouldn't Be Afraid of Robert Nozick

A common theme of libertarians is that there is a conflict between the values of liberty and equality. Achieving equality, so libertarians often argue, would require frequent interference in individuals’ lives, creating constraints on freedom and obstacles to the development of individuality. Although not himself endorsing a libertarian conception of liberty, Oxford philosopher G.A. Cohen recently has advanced the surprising thesis that there is a tension in Marxist normative thought that in an interesting way parallels the often heard libertarian challenge to egalitarianism.

Music and Religion in the First World War

Listening to instrumental music has really become the only form of worship which is still possible to us.’ These words, said to have / been uttered by a distinguished Oxford philosopher, were quoted by Hastings Rashdall, then an Oxford theologian but later Dean of Carlisle, when he preached in Hereford Cathedral in connection with the Three Choirs Festival in 1912.’ Rashdall rejected the substitution of aesthetic appreciation in the concert hall for Christian worship because, he contended, it did not evoke any practical response. That he should have felt it necessary to stress this difference was in itself evidence of the strength of the view he was repudiating. It was also a significant comment on the secularization of the English academic profession and perhaps of a wider section of the middle class. It is a reminder, too, of suggestions made by scholars of history, sociology, and anthropology that there are significant connections and similarities between the development and social functions of music and religion. H. G. Koenigsberger has argued that the decline of religion left an emotional void in Western Europe which came increasingly to be filled primarily by music. David Martin points out that both music and religion serve similar purposes, ‘such as orgiastic stimulation, group solidarity, martial sentiment’. J. S. Eades begins with the view that both ‘artistic performance and religious ritual may be symbolic expressions of solidarities which can be used for political ends.’

The More Things Change

Among other notable accomplishments, Richard Ryder is a survivor. Whereas others have come and gone, or seen their star rise only to fall, Ryder has demonstrated true British grit Today, after more than twenty years of activism on behalf of nonhuman animals, he is more not less committed, and his influence is larger not smaller. While this former young Turk, an original member of Oxford Group, has become partof animal welfare establishment (Ryder is past chairman ofthe Royal Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [RSPCA] and currently serves as its vice-chairman), he has not lost his fITe or his vision. With publication ofhis impressive historical work, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism, Ryder has consolidated his position as of world's most informed, articulate and politically astute voices being raised against those speciesist attitudes and practices that keep nonhuman animals in bondage. Ryder's own career understandably is part of history he tells. Though small in number, members of Oxford Group played-and many of them continue to play-a decisive role in struggle for animal rights. In addition to Ryder, Andrew Linzey and Stephen Clark were part of Group that was fonned in Oxford in late 19608 and early 1970s, as were three young Oxford philosophers: Roslind and Stanley Godloviteh, and John Harris, who, in 1971, with publication ofAnimals, Men and Morals: AnInquiry into Maltreatment ofNon-humans (Gollancz), fired what many regard as frrst volley in the modem movement for animal rights, a not altogether accurate characterization given earlier, pioneering work of such figures as Helen Jones, for example. Peter Singer, who knew members of Oxford Group but was not himself a member while a student in Oxford, fired next volley when, in 1973, he published his seminal review of Animals, Men and Morals in New York Review ofBooks. Here was a case where a review proved to be even more important than important book that was reviewed. Singer's briefagainst animal exploitation was clear, concise and compelling, and reader response was overwhelmingly favorable-so favorable, in fact, that New York Review ofBooks itself took unusual step ofactually publishing a book by Singer. That book was Animal Liberation. The year was 1975, same year Ryder published Victims ofScience: The Use ofAnimals in Science (Davis-Poynter), one of centIal books of animal liberation movement, in Brigid Brophy's words. A year laterAndrew Linzey's Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment of Man's

THE RUFFIAN ON THE STAIR. REFLECTIONS ON DEATH

A number of people, some of them eminent and some of them ordinary, talk about death and what it means to them in this book. The people featured include Jonathan Miller talking on the metaphors in which he has conceived of death since childhood and how they have influenced his theatre work, Roy Porter on the history of people's attitudes to death, Oxford philosopher Galen Stawson on how he overcame the terror of death despite lacking religious faith and a London fireman on what it is like to face and see death every day of the week. This collection of essays is edited by Rosemary Dinnage, editor of One to One.

Philosophy and Medicine: the Oxford Connection

Three aspects of the approach to philosophy advocated by the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin are outlined: his conception of the nature of philosophical problems, essentially as a mixed bag; his method of linguistic analysis, namely, clarification of our concepts by active observation of the ways in which they are actually used rather than by passive reflection on their meanings; and his views on the organisation of philosophical research, that in some areas it should be pursued rather as a science is pursued, as a corporate rather than merely individual venture. It is suggested that Austin's approach provides the basis for a potentially fruitful two-way relationship between philosophical theory and medical practice.

Kierkegaard on Theistic Proof

It has been customary among analytic philosophers not to think highly of, and even to denigrate Kierkegaard. Their view is exemplified by the late Henry Aiken who writes that that Kierkegaard ‘usually does not argue for his position: he merely presents it’. Or that, as according to Aiken, one ‘distinguished Oxford philosopher’ is reported to have remarked, ‘Kierkegaard is not one of those philosophers on whom you can sharpen your wits’. It seems to me on the contrary, that Kierkegaard does indeed present arguments for his views. What follows is an example of this.

Owen's Remains

Gwil Owen died suddenly in July 1982 in Cambridge, where, after many years as Professor of Ancient Philosophy in Oxford and Harvard, he had made his last academic home. With tragic irony, his death coincided almost exactly with the publication of a Festschrift' in which a generation of classical philosophers celebrated his unique influence on the development of the study of ancient philosophy since the war. Such volumes are frequently notable for the somewhat forced nature of the compliments paid to the dedicatee by the contributors; the uniform and evident depth and sincerity of the tributes contained in his celebration are a mark of the universal respect in which Owen was held in the field that he had done so much to develop. Yet, although it has taken four years for the Collected Papers to appear, as Martha Nussbaum points out in her delicate Preface, this was Gwil's project. He himself prepared the texts for publication; and although there were some gaps and incompletenesses (filled in a sensitive manner by the editor), this is in no sense a posthumous compilation: and for that at least we should be grateful. For Gwil Owen was an original: everything he did bore his unmistakeable personal stamp. To have been left with anything less than the genuine article would have been tragic indeed. The collection contains twenty items, and as such very nearly the whole of Owen's published output (the exceptions, principally review notices, are listed in the Preface). It is a small corpus for such a reputation to rest upon; but in an age in which academic publication records are judged by mass rather than by weight, it is salutary to reflect upon the importance of the material contained in this volume. It is not an exaggeration to say that Owen revolutionised the study of ancient philosophy after the war. The

Oxford Philosophers and the Existence of God, 1340-1350

Oxford Philosophers and the Existence of God, 1340-1350

Greek dramatic conventions - David Bain: Actors and Audience: A Study of Asides and Related Conventions in Greek Drama (Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs). Pp. x + 230. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. £9.75.

Greek dramatic conventions - David Bain: Actors and Audience: A Study of Asides and Related Conventions in Greek Drama (Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs). Pp. x + 230. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. £9.75.