Abstract
The last couple of decades have seen a revival of interest in natural law theory, and this interest has taken many forms. This paper explores the recent effort of Oxford philosopher John Finnis to adumbrate a theory of natural law with a particular conception of practical reason. In Natural Law and Natural Rights,' Finnis argues for a theory of natural law that emphasizes the role of law in social co-ordination. The co-ordination of behaviour by law makes it possible for citizens to live together in community and secure various aspects of this common good. By elucidating the dynamics ofsocial co-ordination in light ofhis conception of practical reason, Finnis hopes to show that instrumental accounts of law become fundamentally inadequate. While Finnis's framework has met various criticisms regarding its metaphysical and philosophical claims,2 we will not be explicitly concerned with those criticisms here. Instead, our aim will be to try to understand the relation between Finnis's conception of natural law as a set of moral and other practical principles which require, among other things, that people co-ordinate their activities by law for the sake of securing their common good, and his assertion that there is a general (albeit defeasible) obligation to obey the law. Does natural law theory presuppose this position? Does the connection between law and morality necessarily imply that there is an obligation to obey the law? To investigate this question further, this paper explores the legal and moral philosophy of Joseph Raz, also of Oxford. Calling himself a legal positivist, Raz
Published Version
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