The FVA debate is dead-locked: naysayers are quiet down, acceptors disagree among themselves on methodologies. This article identifies three camps: no-FVA, FVA-without-LOP (law of one price), and FVA-with-LOP, and three key obstacles: a poor FVA definition based on a fully collateralized or CCP swap backed by an uncollateralized swap, failure to acknowledge the competitive market force that would enforce LOP in the liquid segment of the bilateral cleared, uncollateralized OTC derivatives market, and an inflexible accounting rulebook that does not allow recognition of private value of derivatives in the illiquid segment of the market. To overcome the second obstacle, we demonstrate the market mechanism that turns a private bid into a market value in a competitive market. With regard to the last obstacle, a new accounting category – the banking book derivatives – is proposed to allow derivatives deemed either illiquid or non-trading intent to be carried on the banking book at a firm’s own carrying costs, leading to FVA but not LOP. Lower and upper bounds are established to ensure such a private value is commercially reasonable. For trading book derivatives, market is shown to price at the liability-side’s funding, resulting in LOP adhering FVA. FVA with or without LOP camps can coexist, though with separate FVA definitions, models, and capital treatments.