We extend the dynamic Cournot duopoly framework with emission charges on output by Mamada and Perrings (Econ Anal Policy 66:370–380, 2020), which encompassed homogeneous products in its original formulation, to the more general case of differentiated goods, in order to highlight the richness in its static and dynamic outcomes. Each firm is taxed proportionally to its own emission only and charge functions are quadratic. Moreover, due to an adjustment capacity constraint, firms partially modify their output level toward the best response. Like in Mamada and Perrings (Econ Anal Policy 66:370–380, 2020), the only steady state coincides with the Nash equilibrium, and it will be considered admissible when it guarantees the positivity of the marginal emission charge. We find that the full efficacy of the environmental policy, which applies to an equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable anytime it is admissible, is achieved in the case of independent goods, as well as with a low good interdependence degree in absolute value, independently of being substitutes or complements. When goods are substitutes and their interdependence degree is high, the considered environmental policy is still able to reduce pollution at the equilibrium, but the latter is stable just when the policy intensity degree is large enough. When instead goods are complements and their interdependence degree is high in absolute value, the considered environmental policy produces detrimental effects on the pollution level and the unique equilibrium is always unstable, when admissible. This highlights that, from the static viewpoint, even in the absence of free riding possibilities, the choice of the mechanism to implement has to be carefully pondered, according to the features of the considered economy.
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