Ordinary Intuitions Research Articles

The first and the last word

In his book Coercion and the Nature of Law Himma proposes a conceptual analysis of law defending what he calls the Coercion Thesis. Himma’s approach to conceptual analysis is articulated in two steps. The first step is what Himma calls an “empirical observation” of “ordinary intuitions” as they are manifest in the “contingent linguistic conventions for using the relevant concept-term” in “ordinary talk.” The second step consists in identifying “the philosophical assumptions about the metaphysical nature of a thing to which the corresponding concept-term refers.” Our remarks are not intended to question the Coercion Thesis (which, on the contrary, they can possibly corroborate); rather, they intend to show that grounding conceptual analysis exclusively on the canons of ordinary usage of words and on the philosophical assumptions of an undefined and contingent linguistic and cultural community to which the last word is given is not free from risks.

Your word against mine: the power of uptake

Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this the ratification theory of uptake. Several philosophers have recently endorsed an alternative theory of uptake, according to which the hearer can determine the nature of the act the speaker performs. According to this theory, if the hearer regards an utterance as illocutionary act y, then it is act y, even if the speaker intended to perform act x. Call this the constitution theory of uptake. The purported advantage of this theory is that it identifies a common but underanalysed way in which speakers can be silenced. I argue that despite its initial intuitive pull, the constitution theory of uptake should be rejected. It is incompatible with ordinary intuitions about speech, it entails a conceptual impossibility (the unintentional exercise of normative powers), and it has unsavoury political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers barely qualify as agents.

Why Be Random?

AbstractWhen does it make sense to act randomly? A persuasive argument from Bayesian decision theory legitimizes randomization essentially only in tie-breaking situations. Rational behaviour in humans, non-human animals, and artificial agents, however, often seems indeterminate, even random. Moreover, rationales for randomized acts have been offered in a number of disciplines, including game theory, experimental design, and machine learning. A common way of accommodating some of these observations is by appeal to a decision-maker’s bounded computational resources. Making this suggestion both precise and compelling is surprisingly difficult. Toward this end, I propose two fundamental rationales for randomization, drawing upon diverse ideas and results from the wider theory of computation. The first unifies common intuitions in favour of randomization from the aforementioned disciplines. The second introduces a deep connection between randomization and memory: access to a randomizing device is provably helpful for an agent burdened with a finite memory. Aside from fit with ordinary intuitions about rational action, the two rationales also make sense of empirical observations in the biological world. Indeed, random behaviour emerges more or less where it should, according to the proposal.

Give People a Break: Slips and Moral Responsibility

AbstractI examine the question of whether people are sometimes morally blameworthy for what I call ‘slips’: wrongful actions or omissions that a good-willed (or at least no ill-willed) agent inadvertently performs due to a non-negligent failure to be aware of relevant considerations. I focus in particular on the capacitarian answer to this question, according to which possession of the requisite capacities to be aware of relevant considerations and respond appropriately explains blameworthiness for slips. I argue, however, that capacitarianism fails to show that agents have responsibility level control over their slips and, consequently, fails to show that it is reasonable to expect agents to avoid this kind of wrongdoing. I conclude that people are typically not blameworthy for their slips, but only regarding the backward-looking, desert-entailing type of blame that has been at issue in this debate. I suggest that ordinary intuitions about blameworthiness for slips can be accommodated by appealing to other types of responsibility and blame.

A Survey of Folk Intuitions about the Physical Criterion of Personal Identity among Some Philosophically Laypeople

The paper attempts to answer the question whether some of the views and theories on personal identity proposed and debated by professional philosophers is supported by ordinary intuitions. Rather than using the traditional conceptual analysis method of philosophy also known as the armchair method, the paper relies on an experimental method using a questionnaire to investigate ordinary beliefs and conceptions of philosophically laypeople about what constitute personal identity overtime. This was done by seeking the opinion of some members of the lay-public on some of the main claims of common theories on personal identity, thereby determining whether the said theories are intuitive to most laypersons or not. With respect to the physical criterion of personal identity, empirical testing shows that the theories under this criterion are not nearly as intuitive as some of its proponents commonly assume, which then makes it difficult to adopt them as the means through which personal identity overtime can be explained and understood.

Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games

The anarchy driven by private punishment is inopportune and inappropriate in modern human societies. It is necessary for a person to appeal to a higher authority such as the police so that a society can maintain more stable. We introduce strategy intervention instead of punishment in spatial public goods game. Some defectors are forced to contribute to the common pool. We show how strategy intervention affects cooperation of a population. Interestingly, weak intervention restrains the impact of spatial reciprocity leading to a lower level of cooperation or even a full defection state. Such phenomena are in contrast to ordinary intuitions. Intervention is enforced by a higher authority which avoids the second-order problems. Furthermore, high synergy factor and proper intervention has a mutual impact on increasing group incomes. We highlight the importance of institutional intervention in a stable society.

I CAN'T HELP WHAT I BELIEVE: THE MORAL CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS EXCLUSIVIST DOCTRINES

Christianity and Islam subscribe to a doctrine of salvific exclusivism, according to which only the adherents of the one true religion will escape divine punishment – usually conceived of as an eternity of torment. In this article, I argue that salvific exclusivism is inconsistent with ordinary intuitions about fairness and justice, together with certain facts about belief formation. In particular, I argue that what one believes is sufficiently beyond one's capacity to choose that persons cannot fairly be punished for what they believe. It seems unfair, and inconsistent with God's moral perfection, to base the difference between an eternal reward and an eternal punishment on something that one can't control.

Normal Causes for Normal Effects: Reinvigorating the Correspondence Hypothesis About Judgments of Actual Causation

There have been several recent attempts to model ordinary intuitions about actual causation by combining a counterfactual definition of the causal relation with an abnormality-based account of causal judgments. In these models, the underlying psychological theory is that people automatically focus on abnormal events when judging the actual causes of an effect. This approach has enabled authors such as Halpern and Hitchcock (Br J Philos Sci axt050, 2014) to capture an impressive array of ordinary causal intuitions. However, in this paper I demonstrate how these abnormality-based accounts still systematically fail to predict ordinary causal judgments in specific types of scenarios: those in which the effect is normal. I will argue that the reason for this is that the underlying psychological theory is wrong: the idea that intuitive actual causes are abnormal events is only partially correct. To model ordinary judgments more realistically, researchers working in this area must adopt a more plausible underlying psychological theory: the correspondence hypothesis about judgments of actual causation. One of the consequences of this correspondence hypothesis is that normal effects are judged to have normal causes.

The experimental and the empirical: Arne Naess' statistical approach to philosophy

ABSTRACTExperimental philosophy often draws its data from questionnaire-based surveys of ordinary intuitions. Its proponents are keen to identify antecedents in the work of philosophers who have referred to intuition and everyday understanding [e.g. Knobe, Joshua, and Shaun Nichols, ‘An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto’. In Experimental Philosophy, edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, 3–14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007]. In this context, ‘Empirical Semantics’, pioneered by Arne Naess early in the twentieth century, offers striking parallels. Naess believed that much contemporary philosophy was unempirical because it made no reference to ordinary understanding or use of language. In response, he attempted large-scale studies of ordinary understanding of philosophically significant terms [e.g. Naess, Arne. ‘Truth’ as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. Oslo: Jacob Dybwad, 1938]. This article will compare Empirical Semantics and experimental philosophy, and assess what such a comparison reveals that might not be apparent from a consideration of either in isolation. It will concentrate on two points of comparison: the wider philosophical ambitions of the two approaches, and the types of criticisms they have encountered. Naess was straightforwardly interested in folk intuitions as philosophical data, whereas many experimental philosophers are also interested in explaining the intuitions themselves. A comparison of the different types of criticism reveals attitudes to philosophical practice which have recurred across a time period of some eighty years, and those which are more specific to historical context.

Reply to Commentators

Stocker focuses largely on issues related to my discussion of self-other asymmetry, though there is a brief coda on the question of what is attractive about virtue theory. He begins by noting an earlier article of his own that gives examples of self-other asymmetry, and in fact descriptions of such intuitive self-other asymmetry have been offered by many philosophers before Stocker, including Aristotle, Sidgwick, Ross, and Falk. What has been distinctive in my own use of this idea is the effort to illustrate and argue for the oddness and paradoxical character of the asymmetry, especially as combined with other features of the intuitive (or Kantian) moral landscape. (I allude to this on p. 21, fn. 22.) Stocker says that I prefer self-other-symmetric views because they are symmetrical, but that greatly oversimplifies my arguments from symmetry. More than once, I say that I regard symmetry has having some theoretical force, but that other factors, including factors of intuitive ethical fit and plausibility, can outweigh it. I argue that methodological considerations and the idea of ethical theory gain much of their force from the paradoxes and oddities that infect our ordinary intuitions about the moral. Were it not for the latter, we might do well to forget about theory and offer a rich and thoroughgoing account of morality and virtue that gave little weight to considerations of symmetry, self-other or otherwise. And I also argue that we should discard intuitions only to the extent needed to evade peculiarity (not particularity) and paradox. That way, the theory I end up with is supposed to be adequate, and considerable effort is expended to make it adequate, to the richness and complexity of many or most areas of the moral or ethical life, and that in particular means that, contrary to Stocker's opinion, the virtue ethics of From Morality doesn't do away with all ethical asymmetries. It doesn't, as Stocker

Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by Dominic Scott

Reviewed by: Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by Dominic Scott Jakob Leth Fink Dominic Scott. Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 240. Cloth, $70.00. The results of this comparison of the Republic and the Nicomachean Ethics (EN) can be summed up thusly: (i) the texts share the same methodology, (ii) this methodology is based on a functional account of human nature, and (iii) whereas Plato believes that political philosophy needs grounding in metaphysics, Aristotle considers such a thing possible but superfluous. I shall here focus on (i) exclusively. The shared methodology is characterized by two Platonic similes: the cave from the Republic, and the racecourse simile that Aristotle attributes to Plato in EN 1.4. Both represent a research program with three steps: starting from ordinary intuitions about political matters and ascending towards higher principles, grasping these highest principles and, finally, returning to the initial starting points. At the third and final step, the political philosopher applies his knowledge of the highest principles in explanations of the initial intuitions and intervenes in his society with a view to improving his fellow citizens through education and lawgiving. This three-step methodology operates on two levels of argumentation: one that uses ordinary opinions and experience as a basis for its conclusions; another that uses metaphysical principles. The levels are distinguished in terms of precision and explanatory power. Borrowing a phrase from Plato, Scott calls them the shorter and the longer routes. Both routes are circular in that they return to their initial starting point in their final steps. Socrates travels the shorter route in Republic 2–4 and 8–9, but offers only a description of the longer route in books 5–7. Whereas interpreters usually focus on the longer route, Scott has much to say about the shorter one. Most importantly, the shorter route has a more empirical basis than what we usually expect of Plato. In almost all cases, the shorter route does not presuppose the metaphysics of the central books (28). This is quite provocative. If Scott is right, how does he suppose that the shorter and longer routes relate to one another? It seems that he saddles the Republic with a version of the chorismos: if the two routes are completely independent of one another, but lead to the same conclusions, how then are the forms explanatorily relevant for Plato's political philosophy as found in the Republic? The problem is aggravated by the fact that there are indeed metaphysical assumptions on the level of the shorter route; Scott talks about a "middle route" that involves certain metaphysical assumptions (54). However, these are not the metaphysical claims found [End Page 538] on the longer route. So it seems that we are left with a set of unwarranted metaphysical assumptions. The thing is that Plato nowhere takes the longer route. It is left as a necessary but unaccomplished condition for his political thought. Aristotle travels the shorter route in the EN, moving towards the principle: a definition of eudaimonia. He believes that the longer route is possible, but that its pursuit would be counterproductive in a political treatise aimed at action rather than knowledge (118–21). The longer route would lead into theoretical philosophy in order to clarify the terms of the definition of eudaimonia. Aristotle thinks that the philosophy of human affairs will only be complete if a return to the starting points is made, as is clear from EN 10.9. Here, Aristotle advocates the student's engagement in matters concerning real politics. It would be natural to suppose that the ascent from the principles was to be found in the Politics, especially books 7–8. In that case, the account in the Politics would have to rely on the definition of eudaimonia from the EN. But Aristotle relies on exoteric works here and not on the EN (181–85). So Aristotle never attempts the downward move toward the starting points of political philosophy. Let me add that the reliance of the Politics on the EN would also be challenged by...

Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers’ worry—the folk seem to agree!

Are ‘Optimistic’ Theories of Criminal Justice Psychologically Feasible? The Probative Case of Civic Republicanism

‘Optimistic’ normative theories of criminal justice aim to justify criminal sanction in terms of its reprobative/rehabilitative value rather than its punitive nature as such. But do such theories accord with ordinary intuitions about what constitutes a ‘just’ response to wrongdoing? Recent empirical work on the psychology of punishers suggests that human beings have a ‘brutely retributive’ moral psychology, making them unlikely to endorse normative theories that sacrifice retribution for the sake of reprobation or rehabilitation; it would mean, for example, that we cannot expect people to support such optimistic theories democratically, calling their feasibility into question. Taking the civic republican theory as an exemplar of optimistic theories, we argue that it does not fail this feasibility test. We review recent empirical research, including studies of our own, to support the claim that, far from being brute retributivists, human beings are generally satisfied only with punishment that delivers something other than mere retribution. And we show that this coheres very closely with the goals and policies that civic republicanism would support, as it may be expected to cohere also with other optimistic proposals.

An Invariant Content Theory for Epistemic Uses of Modal Terms

I propose and defend an account on which the semantic content of propositions expressed by utterances making use of modals epistemically is constant; i.e., invariant. Although such proposals are typically considered non-starters, I aim to show that combining such a semantics with a performative account in which such utterances perform two speech acts is quite promising. I argue that a performative account, when combined with an invariant semantic content theory, does a good job of accounting for ordinary intuitions in some of the standard test cases discussed in the literature. I further show that the contextualist has a little noticed problem with how a single speaker is able to consider the same epistemic possibility proposition over time. An invariant position has no such problem, and I argue that this counts strongly in its favor.

FAIR CHANCE AND MODAL CONSEQUENTIALISM

Abstract:This paper develops aMultidimensional Decision Theoryand argues that it better captures ordinary intuitions about fair distribution of chances than classical decision theory. The theory is an extension of Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospect and is a form ofModal Consequentialism, according to which the value of actual outcomes often depends on what could have been. Unlike existing versions of modal consequentialism, the multidimensional decision theory allows us toexplicitlymodel the desirabilistic dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes that, I contend, are at the heart of common intuitions about fair distribution of chances.

Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism

Atlas (2007) argues that semantic minimalism (as defended by Cappelen & Lepore 2005) fails because it cannot deal with semantic non-specificity. I argue that thereis a plausible version of minimalism-viz., situated minimalism-which doesn't succumb to the non-specificity charge insofar as non-specificity can be dealt with at a postsemantic level. Thus, pragmatics plays no rolewhen it comes to determining the (minimal) proposition expressed. Instead, pragmatic and other extra-semantic considerations enter the scene in characterizing the situation vis-a-vis which the proposition is evaluated. For this reason a plausible form of minimalism must embrace a form of truth-relativism: a proposition is not universally true/false, but true/false only relative to a situation. I show how the position defended is not only (i) more cognitively plausible than either (semantic) minimalism as proposed by Cappelen & Lepore or the positions appealing to pragmaticintrusion into the proposition expressed, but is also (ii) in accordance with ordinary people's intuitions.

Apparent Generalisations about Fictional Characters

AbstractThis essay will be concerned with an evaluation, modification, and critique of van Inwagen’s famous argument for the existence of fictional characters. In the first section a reconstruction of the original argument will be provided, and three different challenges for this version of the argument will be pointed out. The first challenge concerns van Inwagen’s commitment to first-order predicate logic as a canonical language for the formal representation of truth-conditions of assertoric sentences in natural languages, and the problematic semantic complexity of van Inwagen’s original example sentences of quantifications about fictional objects. The second challenge concerns his commitment to a Quinean conception of ordinary language quantifications that conceives of first-order quantifiers as existentially loaded. The third challenge concerns van Inwagen’s tendency to interpret our ordinary intuitions about the truth-values of specific sentences as intuitions about the truth-values of the literal contents of these sentences. In the second section, a more detailed investigation of these three challenges will be provided; and a modified, and less problematic, alternative version of the argument will be proposed. It will be shown that the truth-conditions of van Inwagen’s original example sentences cannot be adequately represented on the basis of first-order predicate logic. I will propose alternative and less complex example sentences that are sufficient for the required purpose. Additionally, a reformulation of the argument will be proposed that avoids a commitment to a specific sort of formal framework. After that, it will be shown why the assumption of a Quinean conception of quantification unnecessarily increases the burden of proof. A reformulation of the argument will be proposed that avoids the commitment to a Quinean conception of quantification. Furthermore, I will make a third and final adjustment of the argument that allows us to remain neutral concerning the specific status of our truth-value intuitions concerning the proposed example sentences of generalisations about fictional objects. In the third and final section, three possible responses of an irrealist concerning fictional objects will be evaluated. The first option makes use of a recent semantic analysis of the modifying adjective ›fictional‹ proposed by Sainsbury. According to this analysis, a sentence like ›There are fictional mice that talk‹ is semantically equivalent with the claim ›There are fictional works according to which it is the case that at least one mouse talks‹. The second option additionally makes use of Sainsbury’s conception of spotty scope for ordinary language quantifiers and other related sentential operators. It will be shown why both options cannot account for the desired true readings of our example sentences. Finally, a third solution will be proposed and defended. This solution makes use of a substitutional interpretation of specific fictional generalisations based on a negative free logic to undermine the modified argument. It will be shown how this solution allows us to provide a correct analysis of the desired readings of our example sentences of generalisations about fictional characters. After that, two problems of this account will be discussed. The first problem concerns the extension of the proposed strategy to more complicated and sophisticated example sentences. The second problem concerns the independent motivation of a substitutional treatment of at least certain natural language quantificational expressions.

Perceiving the intrinsic properties of objects

In this paper, I discuss Noe’s enactive account of our perceptual encounter with the intrinsic properties of the surrounding objects. First, I argue that this view falls into a dilemma in which either we are left without a satisfactory explanation of this encounter or, in order to keep Noe’s view, we must abandon our ordinary intuitions about the ontological status of the intrinsic properties of objects. Then, I show that, strikingly, there is a suggestive unofficial strand running in Noe that avoids this dilemma. Finally, I argue this unofficial thread leads to a view about the perspectival character of perceptual experience and the place of sensorimotor understanding in perceptual content that is to be preferred over Noe’s official view about these issues.

Experimental evidence for free will revisionism

Philosophers who theorize about whether free will is compatible with causal determinism often rely on ordinary intuitions to bolster their theory. A revisionist theory of free will takes a different approach, saying that the best philosophical theory of what we ought to think about free will conflicts with what we ordinarily do think about free will. I contend that revisionism has not been taken as seriously as should be because philosophers have not realized the extent to which ordinary intuitions are inconsistent. I present an experiment that gives empirical evidence for revisionism. The experiment shows that, in spite of the fact that the ‘is compatible with’ relation is symmetric, folk intuitions change as a function of whether we ask ‘Is determinism compatible with free will?’ versus ‘Is free will compatible with determinism?’ The paper explores possible explanations for why folk intuitions do not mirror the symmetry of the ‘is compatible with’ relation, but regardless of which of these explanations is correct, I argue that we must be revisionists in at least this sense: what we ought to believe about free will cannot include everything we do believe about free will.

Los problemas de la filosofía kripkeana: la crítica a la autoidentificación de los objetos

This paper criticizes the Kripkean ontology, which is based off in modal logic, because of the adoption of the folk psychology as a guide of his philosophical project. Also, it discusses the Millian inheritance of the Kripkean theory of objects, concluding that it is not desirable a philosophical system based on ordinary intuitions.