Operational Doctrine Research Articles

The paradox of dominance: The age of civilizational conflict

American dominance of conventional military capabilities has forced potential competitors to explore asymmetric responses. Some of these, such as cyber conflict capabilities, may appear primarily tactical, but taken together with emerging strategic doctrines such as Russian “new generation warfare” or Chinese “unrestricted warfare” and unpredictable and potent technological evolution, an arguably new form of warfare—“civilizational conflict” is emerging. This does not mean that current strategic and operational doctrine and activities are obsolete, but it does mean that a new conceptual framework for conflict among cultures is required, within which such more traditional operations are developed and deployed.

Policing Africa: The US military and visions of crafting ‘good order’

Current Western security doctrines assert that state fragility, radicalization and humanitarian disasters in the global South feed into ‘persistent conflict’. Such a scenario consequently requires a closely coordinated and integrated response from political and military actors. In this context, Western governments have introduced the concept of stabilization in their approaches to ‘fragile’ states. This article aims to understand the expanding activities of the US military in sub-Saharan Africa, which are conducted under the label of stability operations. It will be argued that the vast spectrum of activities under this label – from health projects to drone attacks – can be made comprehensible through the concept of policing, understood as processes of regulating communities with the aim of establishing ‘good order’. Key pillars of the US military’s stability operations operations doctrine – namely, a focus on the welfare of the population (on a par with the minimum use of force) as well as an extended preventative engagement – overlap with concerns of police power. Presented by security strategists as vulnerable to instability, sub-Saharan Africa has become an experimental ground for the US military, where ideas on stability operations are tested. Empirically, the article discusses two manifestations of stability operations that warrant an analysis through the concept of policing: US Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) civil affairs projects and the US military’s active involvement in ongoing conflicts.

The cost of a military operation: A criterion approach

The purpose of the armed forces is to carry out their assigned missions and tasks through a wide range of operations, which may be combat and non-combat ones. The doctrinal theory of the Serbian Armed Forces has redefined the concept of operations. This has greatly contributed to an easier approach to the evaluation of operations through their cost price. In the world there is no single model of calculating the cost of a military operation, which would apply to all types of operations prepared and executed by the military. This paper discusses four criterion approaches to calculating the cost of a military operation, as follows: (1) using the operation factors, as identified by Operations Doctrine, (2) using the phases of operation, and (3) using the standards set by the EU for calculating the costs of peacekeeping missions and operations, and (4) experiences of the US Armed Forces.

Getting It Just Right: Strategic Culture, Cybernetics, and Canada's Goldilocks Grand Strategy

Strategic culture provides a good starting point to explain Canada's goldilocks grand strategy. But it also has important theoretical shortcomings. This article offers an important reconceptualization of strategic culture. It synthesizes the insight from strategic culture and cybernetic theory to better account for Canadian strategic behavior. It introduces the notion of standing operational doctrines—continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism—through which Canada's strategic cultural beliefs, attitudes, and inclinations are standardized and regularized. This theoretical synthesis provides strategic culture with greater specificity, better use as a causal explanation, and can be potentially applied to other cases.

The End of the Incarnation: John Owen, Trinitarian Agency and Christology

AbstractRecent interpreters of John Owen incorrectly argue that Owen's trinitarian theology undermines the doctrine of inseparable operations (Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa). On the contrary, this article argues Owen upheld this doctrine like his Reformed Orthodox contemporaries, using the incarnation as a test case. Owen maintained the incarnation was an undivided act of the Trinity, which had its appropriative terminus on the Son alone – a pattern of thought he extended to the Spirit's work on the Son's humanity. Owen's creative use of the tradition is an example for contemporary theologians who would emphasize the Spirit's role in Christology.

Physiological employment standards IV: integration of women in combat units physiological and medical considerations

Anthropometric and physiological factors place the average female soldier at a disadvantage relative to male soldiers in most aspects of physical performance. Aerobic and anaerobic fitness levels are lower in women than in men. Thus, women have a lower overall work capacity and must therefore exert themselves more than men to achieve the same output. The lower weight and fat-free mass and the higher body fat of women are associated with lower muscle strength and endurance, placing them at disadvantage compared with men in carrying out military tasks such as lifting and carrying weights or marching with a load. Working at a higher percentage of their maximal capacity to achieve the same performance levels as men, women tire earlier and are at increased risk of overuse injuries. Their smaller size, different bone geometry and lower bone strength also predispose women to a higher incidence of stress fractures. Although training in gender-integrated groups narrows the gaps in fitness, significant differences between the genders after basic training still remain. Nevertheless, integration of women into military combat professions is feasible in many cases. Some 'close combat roles' will still be an exception, mainly because of the extreme physical demands that are required in those units that are beyond the physiological adaptability capacities of an average female. There is no direct evidence that women have a negative impact on combat effectiveness. Once the gender differences are acknowledged and operational doctrines adjusted accordingly, female soldiers in mixed-gender units can meet the physical standards for the assigned missions.

Curability of Advanced Indolent or Low-Grade Follicular Lymphomas: Time for a New Paradigm?

Curability of Advanced Indolent or Low-Grade Follicular Lymphomas: Time for a New Paradigm?

‘The Tip of the Spear’—The Bundeswehr, Soviet Force Restructuring & Development of West Germany's Armored Forces, 1951–1986

After the decision to re-arm Germany in the early 1950s, the military leadership in the Federal Republic of Germany or “Bundeswehr” once again set out to create an army capable of not only defending the Federal Republic of Germany but of being able to integrate itself within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) forward defense of Western Europe. This article examines the Bundeswehr's re-armament and its operational and tactical organization as well as the weapons systems, most notably the development of a whole new generation of main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles or personnel carriers that were far superior to either their Soviet or American counterparts. The article likewise examines the incorporation of tactics and operational doctrine employed by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front (1941–1945) during World War II.

A Cyber-based Behavioral Model

While long considered an important aspect of strategic and theater planning, situational awareness (SA) is the linchpin to both cyber planning and execution. As stated in Joint doctrine, before military activities in the information environment can be accurately and effectively planned, the “state” of the environment must be understood. At its core, cyber situational awareness requires understanding the environment in terms of how information, events, and actions will impact goals and objectives, both now and in the near future. Joint Information Operations (IO) doctrine defines three layers of information inherent to this; physical, informational, and cognitive. While a fair amount of time and effort has been focused on the physical and informational aspects of cyber situational awareness, very little emphasis has been placed on the cognitive layer as it relates to cyber space and how best to model and analyze it. This research examines aspects of the cognitive level by defining a cyber-based behavioral model contingent on the activities a user performs while on the Internet. We believe this is foundational to completely defining a cyber situational awareness model, thus providing commanders and decision makers a more comprehensive and real time view of the environment in which they are operating.

A Comparative Analysis of Counterinsurgency Operational doctrines in Vietnam War and Iraqi War.

A Comparative Analysis of Counterinsurgency Operational doctrines in Vietnam War and Iraqi War.

Accounting decoupled: A case study of accounting regime change in a Malaysian company

Abstract Using a case study of accounting regime change in a Malaysian company, this paper analyses how an accounting regime was changed to overcome an instance of decoupling that management of the case company perceived to be problematic and, despite certain technological and managerial improvements, why the accounting regime yet remained decoupled from the control of core operations. Through an eclectic use of ANT, neo-institutionalism and political economy, it demonstrates that accounting remains decoupled from operational processes because of the particular manner in which accounting is constructed and enabled; the ostensive characteristics of accounting objects around which performativity of accounting is defined; and the organisational context, which involves certain ‘political imperfections’ that cannot be narrated within organisational apparatus of modernity. Accounting, being an apparatus of modernity, finds it difficult to codify such ‘imperfections’ and to offer an operational doctrine to govern the real business processes that are embedded within these ‘imperfections’. Hence, it remains decoupled from core operational activities but performs an important role of insulating ‘political imperfections’ with which business operates.

American Ways of War since 1945

This essay considers the literature about an American way of war. It pays particular attention to the U.S. in the world since 1945, but also situates contemporary American warfare in its longer historical trajectory. It addresses the early Cold War era, the Vietnam War era, and the post-Cold War era as distinct periods in which different threats, or threat perceptions, shaped American strategy; yet it also shows underlying continuities in the national security ideology, heavy emphasis on technological solutions, and the search for proper operational approaches and doctrine.

Learning in Doing – Skills Acquisition in [Post-] Modernised Military Communities of Practice

Learning in Doing – Skills Acquisition in [Post-] Modernised Military Communities of Practice

Conventional Missions for China's Second Artillery Corps

China's traditionally nuclear missile force has added a conventional force component with an inventory of over 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles and an emerging class of theater ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles. This growing conventional missile force provides Beijing an operational-tactical and strategic capability in theater without the political and practical constraints associated with nuclear-armed missiles. China's emerging inventory of conventional antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) affords its military an extra employment option enhancing its layered defense posture against potential offshore threats beyond Taiwan. The military's conventional missiles, operational doctrine, and threat perceptions create conditions for China's escalation to conventional missile attacks against U.S. or allied forces and bases in Asia, including ASBM strikes against U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in any hypothetical China–Taiwan conflict. China's senior leaders would be more likely to authorize such strikes if they endorse the missile force's perceptions of a severe threat to its operations from potential U.S. electronic warfare-based information operations and joint firepower attacks.

Modernisation of the Chinese Navy, its Strategic Expansion into the Indian Ocean Region and Likely Impact on the Regional Stability

China has actively begun to increase its naval capabilities since the last decade. As the PLA Navy aims at enhancing its strategic reach and push its maritime defence perimeter seaward, it requires modern naval hardware, additional infrastructure to support the growing force size, transformed operational doctrines, tactics and procedures and a matching manpower profile. The three primary objectives behind the PLA Navy's modernisation programme are the Taiwan question, significant US naval presence in the Pacific Ocean and the desirability to develop a ‘blue water’ fleet to secure its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) passing though the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The last factor perhaps dictates the Chinese compulsion to aim for the PLA Navy's permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. The PLA Navy's current capabilities may not match its ambitions, but the rapid progress related to the acquisition of these capabilities, may pose questions on the future stability quotient in the Indian Ocean Region. Maintaining a clear perspective on this imminent event will serve the interests of the larger global community, well.

First steps towards a police doctrine for UN peace operations (2001–2006)

As a response to the rapid growth of the role and numbers of United Nations (UN) police in peace operations, the Secretariat's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has started to develop formal doctrine to guide the work of its police officers in missions around the world. Based on published and unpublished sources as well as a series of interviews with UN officials and external experts, this paper examines the establishment of an organisational infrastructure for doctrine development within DPKO in the 2001–2006 period and the key factors that have contributed to the success or failure of several recent doctrine development processes.

1.2.1 Development of an Exploratory Computer Model for Acquisition Management of System‐of‐systems

AbstractThe Department of Defense (DoD) has placed a growing emphasis in recent years on the pursuit of agile capabilities via net‐centric operations. In this setting, systems are increasingly required to interoperate along several dimensions. Yet, the manner in which components of these “system‐of‐systems” are acquired (designed, developed, tested and fielded) has not kept pace with the shifts in operational doctrine. Acquisition programs have struggled with complexities in both program management and engineering design. This paper presents a classification of underlying complexities in the acquisition of system‐of‐systems and describes a conceptual model that exposes the connectivity between systems, requirements, and externalities throughout the acquisition lifecycle. Implementing this model in an exploratory computer simulation highlights the relationship between requirement dependencies, risk profiles of the project and management parameters like span‐of‐control of SoS engineers and managers. The objective of the simulation (which remains under development) is to allow acquisition professionals to develop intuition for procuring and deploying system‐of‐systems, providing a venue for experimentation to develop insights that will underpin successful acquisition of SoS‐oriented defense capabilities.

The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War

Cold War marked a new era for America's military, one dominated by nuclear weapons and air power that seemed to diminish the need for conventional forces. Ingo Trauschweizer chronicles the U.S. Army's struggles with its identity, structure, and mission in the face of those challenges, showing how it evolved, redefined its mission more than once, and ultimately transformed itself.Trauschweizer describes how, beginning in the 1950s, the army faced an unprecedented problem: how to maintain a combat-ready fighting force that could operate on both conventional and nuclear battlefields. Faced with shifting threats to national security, budgetary battles, and unstable political developments around the globe, the army also had to keep abreast of new weaponry while navigating changes in its own top brass and the presidency.Trauschweizer particularly considers the army's organizational and doctrinal response to problems posed by deterrence in Europe, focusing on the evolving role of the Seventh in West Germany - the largest and best-prepared field army the U.S. had ever deployed in peacetime. He explores the roles of Generals Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, and others, as well as the use role of tactical nuclear weapons, as he traces the army's transformation through the New Look policy, pentomic reorganization, and the adoption of the ROAD concept.Ultimately, Trauschweizer contends, the army found it impossible to prepare for limited war in the Third World while pursuing its primary mission of deterrence in Europe. His revisionist argument about the army's objectives in the 1960s and early 1970s places the Vietnam War in the context of the wider Cold War, offering new lines of inquiry into both. He also shows how, after the debacle of Vietnam, the army's sense of mission, technological evolution, organizational structure, and operational doctrine matured to produce the AirLand Battle doctrine of 1982, the cornerstone of our defense of Europe until the Cold War finally ended.The U.S. Army's evolution during the 1950s and its role in Europe throughout the Cold War have remained two of the most neglected subjects in American military history. By covering the interaction of strategy, organization, doctrine, and technology in the army during this era - as well as the relationship between army doctrine and U.S./NATO defense strategy - The Cold War U.S. Army marks a major contribution to our understanding of both subjects.

Media and peacebuilding: the new army stability doctrine and media sector development

In October 2008, the US Army released Field Manual 3-07 laying out its dramatically revised doctrine for peace and stability operations. At the heart of the new doctrine is a comprehensive approach to stability operations in fragile states that integrates the work of the military with that of international partners, humanitarian organizations and the private sector. Within this framework, the manual recognizes the important role media plays in successful stability operations. However, it stops short of recommending concrete steps for integrating media sector development with the full spectrum of reconstruction and stabilization activities. This article reviews what the new doctrine says about media sector development, what the gaps are in its treatment of media development, and provides six guidelines for closing these gaps.

Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record Straight on Irregular Warfare

After a slow start, the U.S. military has made remarkable strides in adapting to irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is beginning to institutionalize those adaptations. Recent Department of Defense (DOD) directives and field manuals have elevated stability operations and counterinsurgency to the same level of importance as conventional military offensive and defensive operations. These changes are the outcome of deep reflection about the nature of current and likely future threats to U.S. national security and the military’s role in addressing them. They represent important steps toward transforming a sclerotic organizational culture that long encouraged a 'we don’t do windows' posture on so-called 'military operations other than war,' even as the nation’s leaders called upon the armed forces to perform those types of missions with increasing frequency. Despite the clear need for change from a Cold War military to one that can deal with the threats of the current century, numerous military officers and civilian experts have challenged the U.S. military’s development of improved theory and practice for irregular warfare.