Peace For Galilee Research Articles

“Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory and the 1982 Israel War in Lebanon: Theory and Application”

The article draws on Michael Walzer’s just war theory to assess the conduct of the Lebanon War of 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee) and argues that according to the underpinning principles of Walzer’s theory, it was an unjust war. Sharon’s war plans, codenamed “Grand Oranim,” were designed to relieve the Lebanese Christian militias of their so-called Palestinian burden by driving the refugees into Jordan where they would presumably bring about a regime change and turn Jordan into a Palestinian state. My analysis focuses on the causes of this war, jus ad bellum, whether it was a war of self-defense, and the means that were employed in its conduct, its jus in bello. Likewise explored and analyzed here are the concepts of proportionality and the treatment of non-combatants.

The Jews of Lebanon: between coexistence and conflict

The first book to tell the story of the Jews of Lebanon in the twentieth century. Contents: Foreword by Avi Shlaim; Introduction; Jewish life in the Arab Middle East; Jewish life in Lebanon; A literary survey; A Voyage through History; The historical legacy; Lebanon under Ottoman Rule; The Lebanese Jewish community; Culture, education and religion; Lebanese Jews under the French Mandate: Liberty,; Fraternity and Equality; Grand Liban and the mandate; Merchants and financiers; Inter-communal relations and community life; The Lebanese Zionist project and contacts with the Yishuv; The Palestine question; World War II and the Vichy regime; Lebanese and Israeli Independence: Questions of Identity; Lebanese independence and the National Pact; The Jewish community and the political situation, 1943--1948; Two women remember: a privileged life in Lebanon; The establishment of the State of Israel; Jewish refugees and unavoidable changes; Syrian refugees; The First Civil War: Conflict of Identities; Dual loyalties; The Jewish community and the political situation, 1949--1957; Community life, 1943--1958; The first Lebanese civil war; Political and cultural identification; The Beginning of the Exodus; The Chehabist ''miracle''; Jewish emigration; The Six-Day War and beyond; The Cairo Agreement: the road to disintegration; The second civil war; The Israeli Invasion and Beyond: Renaissance or Decline?; Operation Peace for Galilee; Renaissance in Beirut; The war continues, 1985--1989; The end of the civil war; Conjectures, Considerations, and Conclusions:; A Sentimental Journey; The community in history; The Arab-Israeli conflict; A history of Lebanon; Index.

Israeli Crisis Decision-Making in the Lebanon War: Group Madness or Individual Ambition?

ON 6 JUNE 1982 THE Israel Defense Forces crossed the northern border and invaded Lebanon. Operation Peace for Galilee was announced to the public as a limited, 48-hour operation to remove Palestinian Fedayeen bases. Four months later, however, Israel was still in Lebanon. The objectives of the operation were to destroy the PLO's military and political infrastructure, to strike a serious blow against Syria, and to install a Christian regime that would sign a peace treaty with Israel. Accordingly, Israeli troops advanced beyond Beirut, engaging Palestinians, Lebanese Muslims, and Syrians in battle. Yet the achievement of their objectives remained elusive as Israel became embroiled in Lebanon's on-going civil war and became incapable of extracting itself for the next three years. What was supposed have been a brief operation with a quick victory ended up as Israel's worst war in its short history. Lebanon had become Israel's Vietnam. The conventional explanation of why Israel had gone to war focuses on the personal ambitions of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari's book Israel's Lebanon War, for example, describes Sharon as a cynical, headstrong executor who regarded the IDF as his personal tool for obtaining sweeping achievements--and not necessarily defensive ones and a minister prepared to stake the national interest on his struggle for power., The argument advanced by Schiff and Ya'ari is that it was not until Sharon took up his post in 1981 that a large-scale military operation

Syrian foreign policy and state/resistance dynamics in Lebanon

By analyzing the behavior of the major actors during Israel's “Peace for Galilee” and “Grapes of Wrath” operations in Lebanon, this article explains how Syria foils Israeli policy objectives there. The research proposition investigated is that Syria's policy owes its success to Damascus’ capacity to manage rather than to resolve serious conflicts between the Lebanese government and the resistance movement (Hizballah). This prevents their quarrels from spilling over into the national arena as a result of Israeli provocation. It is argued that it is the Lebanese parties’ strict adherence to unwritten rules governing their behavior during Tel Aviv's military operations that has rendered and will continue to render Israel's use of force in Lebanon self‐defeating. The analysis indicates why, under the prevailing circumstances, several options presently being explored by the Israelis are unlikely to resolve their problem in Lebanon, and suggests that a rapid return to the negotiating table should be encouraged by the United States.

Comparative Politics and Area Studies

Peter Dickens, Simon Duncan, Mark Goodwin and Fred Gray, Housing, States and Localities (London, Methuen, 1985) S. N. Eisenstadt and Ora Ahimeir (eds), The Welfare State and its Aftermath (London, Croom Helm, in association with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1985) Richard N. Langlois (ed.), Economics as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986) Albert Rees, Striking a Balance: Making National Economic Policy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984) Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment (London, Macmillan, 1985) John Scott, Capitalist Property and Financial Power: a Comparative Study of Britain, the United States and Japan (Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1986) Clare Ungerson (ed.), Women and Social Policy: a Reader (London, Macmillan, 1985) David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and The United States (London, Cornell University Press, 1986) John L. Sullivan, Michael Shamir, Patrick Walsh and Nigel S. Roberts, Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Unpopular Minorities in Israel, New Zealand and the United States (London, Westview, 1985) G. K. Wilson, Business and Politics: a Comparative Introduction (London, Macmillan, 1085) William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986) Milton D. Morris, Immigration: the Beleaguered Bureaucracy (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1985) Nathan Glazer (ed.), Clamor at the Gates: the New American Immigration (San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1985) Richard Hodder-Williams and James Ceaser (eds), Politics in Britain and the United States (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1986) Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed (London, Yale University Press, 1986) Jurgen Schmandt and Hilliord Roderick (eds), Acid Rain and Friendly Neighbors: the Policy Dispute between Canada and the United States (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1985) Alan Ware, The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organisation, 1940–1980 (Oxford, Clarendon Press for Oxford University Press, 1985) John Fitzmaurice, Quebec and Canada: Past, Present and Future (London, C. Hurst & Co., 1985) Douglas V. Verney, Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada's Political Traditions (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1986) Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Oxford, Polity Press, 1986) Rosemarie Rogers (ed.), Guests Come to Stay: the Effects of European Labour Migration on Sending and Receiving Countries (London, Westview Press, 1985) K. von Beyme and M. G. Schmidt (eds), Policy and Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany (translated by E. Martin) (Aldershot, Cower, for the German Political Science Association, 1985) Karl Ucakar, Demokratie und Wahlrecht in Osterreich: zur Entwicklung von politischer Partizipation und staatlicher Legitimationspolitik (Vienna, Verlag fur Gesellschaftskritik, 1985) Joan Barth Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, from Togliatti to Berlinguer (London, I. B. Tauris, 1986) R. Amann and J. Cooper (eds), Technical Progress and Soviet Economic Development (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986) C. M. Harm, A village without Solidarity: Polish Peasants in Years of Crisis (London, Yale University Press, 1985) Maria Hirszowicz, Coercion and Control in Communist Society (Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1986) Martin McCauley and Stephen Carter (eds), Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China (Macmillan and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1986) Roger Woods, Opposition in the GDR under Honecker, 1971–85 (London, Macmillan, 1986) David S. Mason, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980–82 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985) Ira Sharkansky, What Makes Israel Tick? (Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 1985) Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: the Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York, Hill and Wang, distributed in Britain by Faber, 1984) Michael Keren, Ben-Gurion and the Intellectuals (Dekalb, III., Northern Illinois University Press, 1983)

The 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israel-PLO War in Lebanon, by Richard A. Gabriel

The 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israel-PLO War in Lebanon, by Richard A. Gabriel

Thoracic wounds in Israeli battle casualties during the 1982 evacuation of wounded from Lebanon.

During the first 3 weeks of the operation "Peace for Galilee" (O.P.G.) 938 wounded soldiers were evacuated from Lebanon to the Rambam Medical Center in Haifa, Israel. Of these, 64 (6.8%) had chest wounds with or without other wounds. The characteristics of these wounds, the treatment given in the field and at the hospital and their results, are examined and a review of the literature of chest war wounds are summarized. A rapid and efficient in-field medical aid was the most important contributing factor to the low mortality and morbidity rates achieved. As far as we know, this is the first time computerized tomography was used in the diagnosis of war wounds of the chest.

West Asian Conflicts and Indian Responses

In recent months significant developments have unfolded in the West Asian region. The Iran-Iraq War has again flared up dangerously. The Iranian allegations of Iraq using chemical weapons continues. Apart from the usual land, aerial and tanker warfare, the current phase of the Iraq-Iran war has witnessed the use of sophisticated missiles such as the Soviet-made Scud-B, surface-to-surface missile (SSM) by the Iranians. Reports strongly suggest that the Libyan's have transferred the Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles to Iran. Indeed, the Arab world continues to be divided on Iran-Iraq. While Libya and Syria strongly support Iran in the war effort, Iraq has the support of the majority of the Arab states. The aggressive Israel has been humbled in Lebanon by the Shia resistance and already it has partially withdrawn from there. The Israeli claim of liquidation of the PLO in June 1982, through its so-called “operation Peace for Galilee” was really a myth as that resulted only in dividing the PLO into moderate and radical groups. While the moderates were in the upswing under the leadership of Yasser Arafat supported by pro-west Arab states, the radicals supported by the Syrians and Libyans did not go into oblivion. In fact, recently the radical groups have staged a come-back. The formation in early March '85 of a Syrian-sponsored anti-PLO, in the shape of a six faction “Palestinian National Salvation Front” (PNSEF), poses the gravest challenge yet to Arafat in all the years of his stewardship as the PLO's anointed leader. Meanwhile, the Syrian dominance of Lebanese politics was recently challenged by the Christian militiamen opposed to what they see as President Gemayel's growing subservience to the Syrians. The Syrians responded quickly by moving their forces into Lebanon to ensure that their gains were not jeopardised. Moreover, the Syrian gains in southern Lebanon are increasing because their supported Shia radical, guerrilla resistance movement has intensified in southern Lebanon causing heavy loss of life to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the decision to withdraw them at the earliest. Indeed, the Shia resistence movement is the first independent and successful Arab guerrilla movement in 70 years.

The Legality of the use of Armed Force by Israel in Lebanon—June 1982

The Government of the United States cannot be expected to suffer the indefinite continuance of existing lawless conditions along its border, which expose its citizens to maltreatment at the hands of ruffianly elements of the Mexican population, which their Government seems unable to control. …No violation of the national sovereignty of Mexico was intended by this expedition [into Mexico by United States troops to hunt down bandits]. It was despatched upon the hot trail of the bandits in question with the sole object of punishing them …, and of preventing future activities of a similar nature upon our frontier…United States Secretary of State Lansing, 26 August 1919The entrance of Israeli forces into Lebanon in June 1982 (“Operation Peace for Galilee”) raises far-reaching legal issues that transcend this particular occurrence. One of the issues raised in this context is the legality of the use of armed force by a State to counter terrorists directing their attacks against its citizens from the territory of another State. Israel considered the action it took against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon to be legitimate self-defence, directed not against the territorial integrity of Lebanon, but rather against the armed PLO terrorists operating from it against Israel. Others viewed Israel's actions as aggression, and Israel as an invader violating Lebanon's sovereignty. This invasion, it was asserted, was contrary to international law.

Emergency centers in Israel: A small community organizes to cope with war related crises*

This paper focuses on community-wide emergencies caused by war-related events in Lebanon at the beginning of June 1982. Mobilization for the "Peace for Galilee" campaign began on Friday, 4th June. Overnight, families were disrupted, husbands and sons were in danger, and within 24 hours there were notifications of casualities and deaths. Families in crisis became a widespread phenomenon. In Herzlia, as in many other communities, a new service - the Emergency Center - emerged under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Municipality. The authors describe this process of getting organized, the populations served, how the Center was staffed, the role of citizen volunteers, and the types of interventions used to help vulnerable families as well as soldiers home on leave. Stress is placed on the unique type of short-term co-operation achieved between social workers of the local Department of Social Welfare, the staff of the Department of Community Services (especially its Volunteer Bureau), the local liason officer of the Israel Defence Force, the municipal government, and public-spirited volunteers. Mention is made of conditions which made possible the activation of such a service within hours, of the Center's capacity to serve all segments of the population, and of how it was deactivated within a few weeks when the emergency ended. On the basis of lessons learned from this experience, the paper ends with a number of specific recommendations. The authors hope that such innovative forms of crisis-intervention will become part of the helping technology widely available at the community level in future years.

Egypto-centrism in Israeli Strategic Planning: The "Peace for Galilee" Operation

EGYPTO-CENTRISM IN ISRAELI_____ STRATEGIC PLANNING: THE "PEACE FOR GALILEE" OPERATION David Wurmser At is crucial to understand the strategic motives behind Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon before onejudges it a success or failure. The "Peace for Galilee" operation has been interpreted by some as a war designed solely to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (plo), concluding that the price paid was greater than the benefits reaped.1 Others have maintained the view that the 1982 war had an internal focus as well: to subdue the West Bank and to bring peace to Galilee.2 The latter was a very important consideration in going to war, but the former, though still a factor, appears to have been important only to a few in the Israeli government. In fact, the Israeli government is inclined to overestimate the plo's threat to its hold on the West Bank. Yet another interpretation ofthe 1982 invasion contends that "Peace for Galilee" grew out of Israel's strategic perceptions of Lebanon.3 Nevertheless, there is ample reason to conclude that the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was an application of comprehensive Israeli security concerns extant since the State of Israel's creation in 1948 and, therefore, should not be viewed as a limited application in Lebanon. Furthermore, the 1982 invasion was a result of doctrine dictated by those same concerns that began to affect Lebanon directly as early as 1963. Israeli-Egyptian relations have always been at the core of Israeli strategic thinking. Consequently, Israeli strategy toward Lebanon has been a function of these southern-oriented considerations. The strategic 1.Anthony Cordesman, "Syrian-Israeli C3I: The West's Third Front," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1984): 87. 2.Fouad Ajami, "The Shadows of Hell," Foreign Policy 48 (Fall 1982): 98. 3.Avner Yaniv and Robert Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," International Security 8 (Fall 1983): 117-42. David Wurmser is a Ph.D. candidate at SAIS. 65 66 SAIS REVIEW perception of Lebanon from 1963 to 1977 was that Lebanon could serve as a possible vehicle with which Egypt could surround Israel by creating one long strategic front from Rosh Haniqra in the north to Gaza in the south. Then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic trip toJerusalem did not mitigate the priority of this focus, plo activity in Lebanon was seen as an obstacle to the peace process with Egypt. And after 1981 Lebanon continued to be the locus for Israeli strategic projections, by virtue of Syria's position and power, and obstructed Israel's attempts to construct a defense perimeter—a security zone extending approximately forty kilometers north of the Israeli border whereby Israel would be able to withstand any conglomeration of attacking forces. The evolution of Israel strategic thinking on Lebanon, spanning from 1963 to the present, is a direct result of Israeli conceptions about the state of Israeli-Egyptian relations and Israeli strategic perception about Egypt. In 1963 the Israelis initiated a new irrigation program that included diverting the main course of the Jordan River. Under Egypt's leadership, the Arab League reacted to the program by threatening to divert all of the sources of the Jordan River, thereby depriving Israel of much of its water. Because some of these water sources originate in Lebanon, Lebanon expressed concern that such action would provoke an Israeli invasion, whereupon Egypt offered military assistance. But Lebanon feared that by accepting Egypt's offer, Lebanese sovereignty would be undermined and that the Israelis would be provoked rather than deterred. Under these considerations, Lebanon's president rejected this proposal. Moreover, because a political union had been attempted earlier by Egypt and Syria, Lebanon's president feared that Egypt's involvement would include Syrian troops, which might present Syrian claims and desires for the reincorporation of Lebanon into Syria. The diversion of the Jordan River was reconsidered in the 1964 Arab summit meeting, although attention, was focused more on the question of stationing Egyptian troops in Lebanon than on the Jordan River diversion plan. In Nasser's mind, Lebanon's territory was important for constructing the infrastructure needed to contemplate the option of war with Israel. At the time, Nasser was...

Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon

Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon

Begin’s War and the Future of Judaism

THE 1982 WAR IN THE LEBANON AND ITS BLOODY AFTERMATH were not accidents of history. They resulted from the takeover of the Israel government and the world Zionist movement by Menachem Begin's Revisionists. This group of Zionist extremists (Dr Chaim Weizmann's description) had been derided and excluded from power for over 50 years. In 1977, they won their first Israeli general election and set about realizing their radical programme.This article will discuss the roots of Begin's War and the challenge of the Begin revolution to world Jewry. First, it will review some of the available evidence about the fighting and the extent of civilian casualties. This review will throw light on Mr Begin's motives for launching ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’.

The Israeli War Machine in Lebanon

The swell and wake of war will always beckon military analysts to distill the lessons of combat. The Palestine-Israel War of 1982 is no exception, but for a number of reasons the lessons are not yet clear. For one, temporal proximity to a still simmering conflict makes it difficult to obtain accurate information concerning many aspects of the conduct of the war. Secondly, disinformation, a common mode of propaganda in wartime, was pervasive. For example, the Israelis described their anabasis as Peace for Galilee, and characterized the enemy as barbaric and cowardly, incompetent and very powerful. The manifestation of these phenomena was exemplified by the Israeli government's public display of captured weaponryl and the denial to Palestinian military personnel of Prisoner-of-War status under the articles of the Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a signatory. Furthermore, Israeli casualties were often translated into equivalents of American casualties. For example, when Israeli casualties were 320 killed we were informed that this was the equivalent of several thousand American dead. A similar equivalency was not provided for Palestinian casualties. Finally, a phenomenon common in the aftermath of the October 1973 war has reappeared: the loser is declaring or at least enjoying a kind of