Syrian foreign policy and state/resistance dynamics in Lebanon

Abstract

By analyzing the behavior of the major actors during Israel's “Peace for Galilee” and “Grapes of Wrath” operations in Lebanon, this article explains how Syria foils Israeli policy objectives there. The research proposition investigated is that Syria's policy owes its success to Damascus’ capacity to manage rather than to resolve serious conflicts between the Lebanese government and the resistance movement (Hizballah). This prevents their quarrels from spilling over into the national arena as a result of Israeli provocation. It is argued that it is the Lebanese parties’ strict adherence to unwritten rules governing their behavior during Tel Aviv's military operations that has rendered and will continue to render Israel's use of force in Lebanon self‐defeating. The analysis indicates why, under the prevailing circumstances, several options presently being explored by the Israelis are unlikely to resolve their problem in Lebanon, and suggests that a rapid return to the negotiating table should be encouraged by the United States.