Open Question Argument Research Articles

Ecumenical expressivism: The Frege-Geach problem and the open question argument

This paper examines the position of ecumenical expressivism, a metaethical theory according to which moral judgments simultaneously express an individual?s sentiment of (dis)approval towards objects, actions, and practices instantiating certain properties, as well as their belief that these objects, actions, and practices instantiate the mentioned properties. After a detailed exposition of the central tenets of this philosophical position, we will analyze how successfully it can address the threat posed by the modified version of the open-question argument and whether it can resolve the famous Frege-Geach problem, which is rightly considered the most serious obstacle to adopting any form of expressivism. The conclusion of this analysis is that the claim that ecumenical expressivism can be considered a superior position compared to non-ecumenical forms of expressivist and cognitivist views is unjustified. This contrasts with the case of ecumenical cognitivism, where such a claim finds stronger support.

Constructing a Moorean ‘Open Question’ Argument: The Real Thought Move and the Real Objective

Abstract How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. The author’s purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, he does not claim to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, the author offers a reconstruction, making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the argument is played by what the author calls the real thought move. He shows that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. The author finishes by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s moderate rationalism, and showing how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

A dose of reality for moral twin earth

ABSTRACT Nearly 30 years ago, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons published a now- popular article that combines Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario with G.E. Moore’s open question argument in an effort to show that moral naturalism – the view that moral facts are at bottom ordinary, natural facts of some sort – is probably false. Responses to Horgan and Timmons’s “revised open question argument” have been legion, but surprisingly, no one has attempted to test the core assumption upon which the argument is based; namely, that competent language users univocally treat natural kind-terms as rigid designators. Here, I present evidence that the intuitions of competent English speakers are not as univocal as Horgan and Timmons need them to be to ground their argument against moral naturalism. I also briefly sketch a way that the moral naturalist can respond even if competent language speakers do treat natural-kind terms in the way that Horgan and Timmons suggest.

Non-natural natural law: bridging the gap between Aristotle and Ross

Aristotelianism is often considered to be a version of naturalism. As a result, non-naturalism is often considered to be incompatible with Aristotelianism. In this paper, I will show that the Aristotelian can actually accept much of what the non-naturalist wants to say. I will show that the Aristotelian can accept a non-natural account of the good, need not be concerned by G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument and that, as long as we carefully consider and define our terms, they can accept much of non-naturalism in abstract. This then paves the way for the possibility of a non-natural natural law and should go some way to challenging the prevailing orthodoxy that Aristotelianism is a version of naturalism. I do not go so far as to label Aristotelianism a form of non-naturalism as there are some important areas of disagreement. Instead, I think that Aristotelianism should count as its own label and that it will resist any attempts to label it a form of naturalism, non-naturalism or, indeed, supernaturalism.

What Is Meaning: Reference or Something Else?

The debate over the meaning of referential terms has a long history in both linguistics and language philosophy. Moore applied referential theory of meaning in two famous arguments: The Refutation of Idealism and The Open Question Argument. The validity of referential theory is key point to decide whether these two arguments are successful or not. This paper argues that the plausibility of referential theory is subject to controversy and thus the conclusions of these two arguments are logically invalid. This research firstly demonstrates the logic behind Moore’s two arguments and explain how Moore reached his conclusions by assuming the referential theory of meaning, then discusses problems that referentialism inevitably confronts, proving the solutions that Moore proposed to solve these problems are unfeasible, and concludes that these arguments fail for it doesn’t comply with our rational intuition, providing linguistic perspective to examine philosophical problems.

The Perfectionist Turn

Abstract In The Perfectionist Turn, Den Uyl and Rasmussen argue for an ethics of responsibility and oppose the prevailing ethics of respect. Political philosophy must be “tethered” ontologically, and arguments such as Moore’s open question argument that would, if correct, show that tethering is not possible do not succeed.

Rupert Schreibers Deskriptionsthese

This paper deals with the ‚description-thesis‘ (R. Schreiber 1962) according to which normative or prescriptive legal statements are reducible to, or translatable into, descriptive propositions. The arguments Schreiber produced in support of his thesis are briefly presented, followed by a discussion of the thesis against the background of Hume’s law and G. E. Moore’s open-question argument. In order to broaden the perspective, some other philosophical views are examined; emphasis is placed on how the is-ought relation was conceived, in conflicting ways, by Hans Kelsen and Friedrich Müller respectively, as compared to the current state of discussion, and what are, according to Ernst Tugendhat and Christoph Möllers, the constituents of (social) norms. As a result, the paper suggests that the description-thesis can not be maintained in its entirety. A special version is presented which seems to respond to the criticism discussed while implying at least part of what Schreiber’s original version claimed.

Possible Thomistic Response to Hume’s Law and to Moore’s Open-Question Argument

This article concerns Aquinas’s practical doctrine on two philosophical difficulties underlying much contemporary ethical debate. One is Hume’s Is-ought thesis and the other is its radical consequence, Moore’s Open-question argument. These ethical paradoxes appear to have their roots in epistemological scepticism and in a deficient anthropology. Possible response to them can be found in that Aquinas’s human intellect (essentially theoretical and practical at the same time) naturally performs three main operations: 1º) To apprehend the intellecta and universal notions ens, verum and bonum. 2º) To formulate the first theoretical and practical principles. 3º) To order that the intellectum and universal good be done and the opposite avoided. Thomistic philosophical response to both predicaments will not be exclusively ethical, but will harmonically embrace ontology, anthropology and epistemology.

The ethics–mathematics analogy

AbstractEthics and mathematics have long invited comparisons. On the one hand, both ethical and mathematical propositions can appear to be knowable a priori, if knowable at all. On the other hand, mathematical propositions seem to admit of proof, and to enter into empirical scientific theories, in a way that ethical propositions do not. In this article, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between ethical and mathematical knowledge, realistically construed—that is, construed as independent of human mind and languages. I argue that some are merely apparent, while others are of little consequence. There is a difference between the cases. But it is not an epistemological difference per se. The difference, surprisingly, is that ethical knowledge, if it is practical, cannot fail to be objective in a way that factual knowledge can. One upshot of the discussion is radicalization of Moore's Open Question Argument. Another is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension.

Metaethics: Aquinas, Hume and Moore

This article concerns Aquinas’ practical doctrine on two philosophical difficulties underlying much contemporary ethical debate. One is Hume’s Is-ought thesis and the other is its radical con-sequence, Moore’s Open-question argument. These ethical paradoxes appear to have their roots in epistemological scepticism and in a deficient anthropology. Possible response to them can be found in that Aquinas’ human intellect (essentially theoretical and practical at the same time) naturally performs three main operations: 1º) To apprehend the intellecta and universal notions ens, verum and bonum. 2º) To formulate the first theoretical and practical principles. 3º) To order that the intellectum and universal good be done and the opposite avoided. Thomistic philosophical response to both predicaments will not be exclusively ethical, but will harmonically embrace ontology, anthropology and epistemology.

철학적 정신치료의 개념적 명료화를 위한 물리주의적 시도

It is no exaggeration to say that the new topic of Korean philosophy in the 21st century is humanities therapy, more specifically philosophical therapy. However, criticism that the concepts and theories that make up humanities therapy are not clear can be raised. Therefore, I think that the conceptual clarification is necessary to establish this therapy academically against the this negative criticism. The problem, I have argued, is that because the concepts used in humanities therapy are value-dependent, they are not free from the Open Question Argument implicated in the matter of fact-value gap elaborated by G. E. Moore. Therefore, it is necessary to objectify the epistemological uncertainty as a physicalistic epistemological perspective, in the diagnosis and treatment process of humanities treatment. To this end, I try to clarify the concept of humanities therapy through conceptual supervenience of mental causation, and to make the process and results of the therapy cognitively transparent.

Posible respuesta tomista a la ley de Hume y a la pregunta abierta de Moore

Este artículo se refiere a la doctrina práctica de Aquino sobre dos dificultades filosóficas que subyacen en gran parte del debate ético contemporáneo. Una es la Is-ought thesis de Hume y la otra es su consecuencia radical la Open-question argument de Moore. Estas paradojas éticas parecen tener sus raíces en un scepticismo epistemológico y en una antropología deficiente. La posible respuesta a ellas se puede encontrar en que: a) Tomás de Aquino defiende la esencial racionalidad y unidad del ser humano; b) La ley natural tomista es una consecuencia natural del ser racional; c) La razón humana es esencialmente teórica y práctica al mismotiempo. El intelecto humano de Aquino naturalmente realiza tres operaciones principales: 1º) Aprehender las nociones inteligidas y universales ens, verum y bonum. 2º) Formular los primeros principios teóricos y prácticos. 3º) Ordenar que se haga el bien inteligido y universal y se evite lo contrario. Por estas razones,la respuesta filosófica de Aquino a ambas dificultades no es exclusivamente ética, sino que abarca armónicamente la ontología, antropología y epistemología. La ética de Tomás de Aquino es fundamentalmente diferente de las éticas que califican las acciones como buenas o por mero consenso social (contractualismo) o simplemente calculando sus consecuencias (consecuencialismo).

Drawing the line in clinical treatment of companion animals: recommendations from an ethics working party

Modern veterinary medicine offers numerous options for treatment and clinicians must decide on the best one to use. Interventions causing short-term harm but ultimately benefitting the animal are often justified...

Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco

ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument (OQA), moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco (2015), an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin.

Questions open and closed: lessons from metaethics for identity arguments for the existence of god

ABSTRACT Identity arguments for the existence of god offer an intriguing blend of conceptual and existential claims. As it happens, this sort of blend has been probed for more than a century in metaethics, ever since G.E. Moore formulated the Open Question Argument (OQA) against metaethical naturalism. Moore envisaged naturalism as offering identity claims between good and natural properties. His central worry was that such identity claims should render certain questions closed and hence meaningless. However, he contended that speakers competent with the respective concepts would find these questions meaningful, thereby indicating the failure of the identity claim in question, and of all such identity claims. The history of this issue in metaethics provides an important perspective on the prospects of devising cogent, rhetorically successful versions of identity arguments for the existence of god. Both the conceptual and existential premises of such arguments involve conceptual nuances that metaethicists have studied. Overall, the history of the OQA provides reason to think that rationally compelling versions of identity arguments for the existence of god are very unlikely to be constructed.

Reducing Reasons

Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can pick out with purely descriptive terms, and that the connection between normative reasons and sound reasoning therefore provides the basis for a reductive account of reasons. Like all proposed reductions, this one must confront some version of G. E. Moore’s open question argument. I argue that a reductive view rooted in the idea that reasons figure in sound reasoning is well-equipped to meet the open question challenge head on.

Intuitions about Disagreement Do Not Support the Normativity of Meaning

Allan Gibbard (2012) argues that the term ‘meaning’ expresses a normative concept, primarily on the basis of arguments that parallel Moore's famous Open Question Argument. In this paper I argue that Gibbard's evidence for normativity rests on idiosyncrasies of the Open Question Argument, and that when we use related thought experiments designed to bring out unusual semantic intuitions associated with normative terms we fail to find such evidence. These thought experiments, moreover, strongly suggest there are basic requirements for a theory of meaning incompatible with Gibbard's ultimate goal of providing an expressivist account of meaning-related concepts. I conclude by considering a possible way in which meaning could be normative, consistent with the intuitions about disagreement; but this form of normativism about meaning appears incompatible with Gibbard's expressivism.

Confusion of tongues: A theory of normative language by Stephen Finlay

Reviewed by: Confusion of tongues: A theory of normative language by Stephen Finlay James Lenman Confusion of tongues: A theory of normative language. By Stephen Finlay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 288. ISBN 9780199347490. $69 (Hb). We begin with good. Good, Finlay suggests, is an incomplete predicate. When we say something is good we are saying something of this form. (1) It is good for e if p. Where p is some proposition (for good, he argues, is fundamentally expressive of a propositional operator), and e is some end salient in the context. Such salience is a slippery thing. Sometimes Drinking a lot of gin is good might be relative to the end of having fun. But we can still ask Drinking a lot of gin may be fun, but is it good? to raise the question of its conduciveness to some other end comparable in eligibility for salience, such as health perhaps. So we have a form of reductive naturalism that offers to defuse the open question argument. Or at least we do when we complete the reduction in the way F proposes. (2) ‘It is good for e if p’ means that p increases the probability of e. Or more precisely: (3) ‘It is good for e if p’ means that pr(e/p & b) > pr(e/~p & b). Where b specifies certain background conditions. Along the way in discussing good, F has a swipe at the Aristotelian moral functionalist. A sentence saying X is a good K, where K is some functional kind, has both a functional reading, where the end served by the state of affairs denoted by p in which X features as a K is that end eK specified by the function of K; and a nonfunctional reading, where X is something that happens to be a K featuring in some state of affairs good for some contextually salient e. F now claims we can distinguish these readings in the following way. On a nonfunctional reading, X being a good (or bad) K entails X being a K. On a functional reading, it does not. (This test is credited to Shyam Nair.) To be a good (or bad) person, he then proposes, entails being a person. Likewise, to be a good (or bad) human being entails being a good human being. Goodbye moral functionalism. It would be good to see this very quick argument slowed down a bit. As it stands, I am not quite clear what the rules would be for seeking counterexamples. An ice-axe is not a weapon, but it may be a good weapon. Only, if it is a good weapon, it surely is a weapon. Do we take weapon here to mean something made for a martial purpose or something serviceable to one? On the latter understanding, weapon surely still counts as a functional kind, but it is hard here to see how a good weapon could fail to be a weapon. Maybe things get clearer if we accentuate the negative. A postage stamp is a really bad weapon. Indeed, it is (partly for that reason) not a weapon at all. We turn next to ought. F focuses on the instrumental conditional. (4) If Max wants to evade arrest, then he ought to mingle with the crowd. F tackles this in two steps. The first offers an analysis of the more straightforward: (5) If Max is going to evade arrest, then he has to mingle with the crowd. [End Page 1000] This F takes to mean that, in all possibilities consistent with certain background conditions in which Max will evade arrest, Max will mingle with the crowd. F then offers the neat proposal that we read the original wants to as a relevance or ‘biscuit’ conditional akin to 6, which is supposedly elliptical for 7. (6) If you want biscuits, there are some on the table. (7) If you want biscuits, [then this will be relevant information:] there are some on the table. Likewise, for 8 we get the preliminary analysis proposed in 9. (8) If Max wants to evade arrest, then he ought to mingle with the crowd. (9) If Max wants to evade arrest, [then...

Epistemological Open Questions

While there has been a great deal of recent interest in parallels between metaethics and metaepistemology, there has been little discussion of epistemological analogues of the open question argument (hereafter: OQA). This is somewhat surprising—the general trend in recent work is in the direction of emphasizing the continuity between metaethics and metaepistemology, and to treat metanormative questions as arising in parallel in these two normative domains. And while the OQA has been subjected to a wide variety of objections, it is still influential in metaethics. In this paper, I aim to show that an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin. That's not to say that I'll unqualifiedly endorse either argument. Rather, my aim is to show that there is just as strong a prima facie (really, secunda facie) case for an OQA in metaepistemology as there is in metaethics—I leave open whether the ultima facie case collapses.