Constructing a Moorean ‘Open Question’ Argument: The Real Thought Move and the Real Objective

Nicholas Shackel

doi:10.1163/18756735-00000140

Abstract

Abstract How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. The author’s purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, he does not claim to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, the author offers a reconstruction, making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the argument is played by what the author calls the real thought move. He shows that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. The author finishes by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s moderate rationalism, and showing how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today.

Highlights

At the beginning of Principia Ethica Moore offers an argument for the simplicity and indefinability of good, an argument that has come to be known
I shall show how this move plays a significant role in every part of the argument, how it strengthens the argument by avoiding the obscurities of open questions, and how it makes sense of several steps made by Moore that are mysterious when understood in terms of the openness of questions
I shall finish by arguing that the real objective may yet be significant by showing how it is a commitment difficult for non-naturalists to avoid if they are to sustain a substantive moral realism that is distinct from non-reductive synthetic naturalism

Summary

Introduction

At the beginning of Principia Ethica Moore offers an argument for the simplicity and indefinability of good, an argument that has come to be known. I shall suggest that the weight commonly placed on the openness of questions is not a good way of understanding how the argument works. I shall show how this move plays a significant role in every part of the argument, how it strengthens the argument by avoiding the obscurities of open questions, and how it makes sense of several steps made by Moore that are mysterious when understood in terms of the openness of questions. I shall offer a reconstruction of the argument based on this suggestion, making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and making assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. Having given the reconstructed open question argument, I shall discuss some standard objections and their application to the reconstruction and move on to drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint. I shall finish by arguing that the real objective may yet be significant by showing how it is a commitment difficult for non-naturalists to avoid if they are to sustain a substantive moral realism that is distinct from non-reductive synthetic naturalism

Defence from Faults

Challenging the Open Question in the Open Question Argument

The Real Thought Move

The Reconstructed Open Question Argument

The Reconstruction and Standard Objections