Abstract
ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument (OQA), moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco (2015), an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin.
Highlights
It has become commonplace for epistemologists to emphasize the normative character of their discipline
Charles Côte-Bouchard plausible consequence is that many questions and argument that traditionally belong to moral philosophy can be transposed to epistemology
After briefly presenting the Open Question’ argument (OQA) and Greco’s case for the openness thesis, I argue in sections 2 and 3 that his argument is not persuasive
Summary
It has become commonplace for epistemologists to emphasize the normative character of their discipline. Many argue, are inherently normative just like moral facts and concepts.. Charles Côte-Bouchard plausible consequence is that many questions and argument that traditionally belong to moral philosophy can be transposed to epistemology This includes metaethical questions about the nature and existence of moral facts. An epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin This is because, he argues, claims linking natural and epistemological properties – natural/epistemological linking claims for short – give rise to open or substantive questions just like natural/moral linking claims. After briefly presenting the OQA and Greco’s case for the openness thesis, I argue in sections 2 and 3 that his argument is not persuasive. I conclude that, pace Greco, an epistemological OQA is not as promising as its moral cousin
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