Ontic Structural Realism Research Articles

How Ontic Structural Realism would Formalize Scientific Progress

This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper, T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, we will first connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before their progressive distancing. Finally, we will outline a formulation of scientific progress inferred from the structural realism approach; in particular, our definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go as we will emphasize that it also provides an answer to the aforementioned original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce. Keywords: structural realism, scientific progress, J Ladyman, speculative realism

An ESR Framework for the Study of Consciousness.

I will argue that, in an interdisciplinary study of consciousness, epistemic structural realism (ESR) can offer a feasible philosophical background for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena in neuroscience and cognitive science while also taking into account the mathematical structures involved in this type of research. Applying the ESR principles also to the study of the neurophysiological phenomena associated with free will (or rather conscious free choice) and with various alterations of consciousness (AOCs) generated by various pathologies such as epilepsy would add explanatory value to the matter. This interdisciplinary approach would be in tune with Quine’s well known idea that philosophy is not simple conceptual analysis but is continuous with science and actually represents an abstract branch of the empirical research. The ESR could thus resonate with scientific models of consciousness such as the global neuronal workspace model (inspired by the global workspace theory—GWT) and the integrated information theory (IIT) model. While structural realism has already been employed in physics or biology, its application as a meta-theory contextualising and relating various scientific findings on consciousness is new indeed. Out of the two variants: ontic structural realism (OSR) and epistemic structural realism (ESR), the latter can be considered more suitable for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena because it removes the pressure of the still unanswered ‘What is consciousness?’ ontological question and allows us to concentrate instead on the ‘What can we know about consciousness?’ epistemological question.

DISPOSITIONAL ONTOLOGY AS A BASIS FOR STRUCTURAL REALISM

M. Esfeld has proposed to use the ontology of external causal properties, or dispositions, of objects as a basis for ontic structural realism. It is this approach that makes possible realism towards objects as they are understood by S. French and J. Ladyman –objects are mere nodes in the structure. In our paper dispositional ontology is con-trasted withD. Lewis’ metaphysics of categorical properties, and through this juxtaposition the last is rendered inappropriate and the first appears promising as a foundation for structural realism and scientific metaphysics.

Deformation quantization as an appropriate guide to ontic structure

Karim Thebault has argued that for ontic structural realism to be a viable ontology it should accommodate two principles: physico-mathematical structures it deploys must be firstly consistent and secondly substantial. He then contends that in geometric quantization, a transitional machinery from classical to quantum mechanics, the two principles are followed, showing that it is a guide to ontic structure. In this article, I will argue that geometric quantization violates the consistency principle. To compensate for this shortcoming, the deformation quantization procedure will be offered.

Realismo estructural óntico y modalidad

En el presente trabajo analizo críticamente dos estrategias empleadas para esclarecer la naturaleza modal de las estructuras tal como son concebidas por el realismo estructural óntico (reo) en su versión eliminativista: los patrones reales de Ladyman y Ross (2007) y las leyes y simetrías de French (2014). Ofrezco argumentos para mostrar que ambas resultan incapaces de brindar una caracterización de las estructuras como entidades inherentemente modales. Ese resultado impone serias dificultades al proyecto de presentar el reo como una posición realista acerca del mundo físico.

Thomist vs. Scotist Perspectives on Ontic Structural Realism

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.

Онтический структурный реализм: онтология паттернов и модальная природа структур

The paper aims torefute S. Psillos’s arguments that ontic structural realism should obey the logic of ante rem / in re in understanding structures and that there are “fundamental difficulties” with understanding causality in it. The very fact that withinD. Dennett’s ontology of patterns, the characteristics of the “structure”, as well as the individual properties of the “object” (whichdescribe it, and also fix the relations in which the “object” participates), do not exist separately from each other - these are characteristics of one real pattern, relative to which the “object” is singled out conventionally and “for reasons of practical convenience”, indicates that ontic structural realism actually “combines” ante rem and in re understanding of “structures”. The “metaphysics of causal properties” (M. Esfeld), including A. Bird’s dispositionalism and E.J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism”, fully responds to S. Psillos’s claim that ontic structural realism “cannot satisfactorily represent causality”. “Causes” and “effects” are linked by the relationship of essential dependence, and “a truthmaker for statements about causal relationships” doesnot require individual objects and hypostatized properties.

What’s Wrong With the Assemblage Theory?

The paper examines Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory in order to show that two of its key concepts - flat ontology and the idea of emergence - are incompatible with each other. The philosophical context of assemblage theory is outlined with a brief consideration of different interpretations of Deleuze’s ideas and an examination of DeLanda’s reconstruction of Deleuze’s ontology, which served as the conceptual foundation for assemblage theory. The author then exposes key flaws in this reconstruction, in particular the conversion of the scientific ontology of dynamic systems theory into a univocal philosophical ontology and metaphysics of assemblages. When coupled with the universalization of relations of exteriority, this leads to numerous conceptual deficiencies ranging from infinite reductionist regress and mereological atomism to overlooking the relations of necessity between assemblages. The lack of such a relation is a key to evaluating assemblage theory. DeLanda interprets the concept of emergence as a product of exclusively exterior relations while ignoring interior (internal) relations. Consequently, he refuses to regard assemblages as ontologically dependent on each other. The existence of interior relations between parts of assemblages suggests that causal interactions between those parts precede assemblages with emergent properties not only, or not merely, as a matter of logic or chronology. They precede assemblages transcendentally as conditions of their possibility. This presupposes that there is ontological dependence between an assemblage and its elements, and this dependence itself presupposes a hierarchical structure in the world such that, for an assemblage to exist as a whole, its parts must also exist. This structure is incompatible with the main tenet of assemblage theory, which is the concept of flat ontology. In closing, the implications of the epistemological problems in assemblage theory are discussed, and a position that follows logically from solving these problems is considered. This position is the ontic structural realism of James Ladyman and Don Ross, and its main thrust is that mathematical structures are all that really exists.

The Conceptual Basis and Empirical Grounds of Ontic Structural Realism

The Conceptual Basis and Empirical Grounds of Ontic Structural Realism

The Benacerraf Problem as a Challenge for Ontic Structural Realism†

ABSTRACTBenacerraf has presented two problems for the philosophy of mathematics. These are the problem of identification and the problem of representation. This paper aims to reconstruct the latter problem and to unpack its undermining bearing on the version of Ontic Structural Realism that frames scientific representations in terms of abstract structures. I argue that the dichotomy between mathematical structures and physical ones cannot be used to address the Benacerraf problem but strengthens it. I conclude by arguing that versions of OSR that do not rely on mathematical frameworks for representational purposes need not be vulnerable to Benacerraf’s second problem.

A Metaphysics for Mathematical and Structural Realism

The goal of this paper is to preserve realism in both ontology and truth for the philosophy of mathematics and science. It begins by arguing that scientific realism can only be attained given mathematical realism due to the indispensable nature of the latter to the prior. Ultimately, the paper argues for a position combining both Ontic Structural Realism and Ante Rem Structuralism, or what the author refers to as Strong Ontic Structural Realism, which has the potential to reconcile realism for both science and mathematics. The paper goes on to claims that this theory does not succumb to the same traditional epistemological problems, which have damaged the credibility of its predecessors.

Imprints of the underlying structure of physical theories

In the context of scientific realism, this paper intends to provide a formal and accurate description of the structural-based ontology posited by classical mechanics, quantum mechanics and special relativity, which is preserved across the empirical domains of these theories and explain their successful predictions. Along the lines of ontic structural realism, such a description is undertaken by a particular ontological commitment: the belief in the existence of a freestanding actual structure, approximately represented by a subgroup of the Inhomogeneous Symplectic Group (up to group homomorphisms), and their corresponding state-space representations. Accordingly, the hierarchy and the complexity of this group-theoretical structure is represented by appropriate philosophical tools, namely, by the language of partial structures. Upon this approach, the lack of knowledge of some relations that hold at the boundary between mathematics and physics, and the presence of surplus structure within the structural edifice are explored and represented. The conclusive issue appeals to an interesting example of a surplus but fruitful structure, where superposition of states with different mass are suggested to be actual relativistic remnants within non-relativistic quantum mechanics, as opposed to the standard interpretation in which they are empirically meaningless.

Quantum entanglement: a hylomorphic account

In this paper, it is argued that Aristotelian hylomorphism can supply a useful and informative account of composite entities as these are described by physical theory. In particular, a hylomorphic account of quantum entangled systems is defined in detail, and compared to other alternatives currently on offer—in particular, ontic structural realism. In closing, it is suggested that the view of entanglement outlined here meshes well with a recently proposed ‘coherentist’ conception.

What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science

What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science

Dissolving the measurement problem is not an option for the realist

This paper critically assesses the proposal that scientific realists do not need to search for a solution of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, but should instead dismiss the problem as ill-posed. James Ladyman and Don Ross have sought to support this proposal with arguments drawn from their naturalized metaphysics and from a Bohr-inspired approach to quantum mechanics. I show that the first class of arguments is unsuccessful, because formulating the measurement problem does not depend on the metaphysical commitments which are undermined by ontic structural realism, rainforest realism, or naturalism in general. The second class of arguments is problematic due to its refusal to provide an analysis of the term “measurement”. It turns out that the proposed dissolution of the measurement problem is in conflict not only with traditional forms of scientific realism but even with the rather minimal realism that Ladyman and Ross themselves defend. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of two related proposals: Healey's pragmatist approach and Bub's information-theoretic interpretation.

Defending eliminative structuralism and a whole lot more (or less)

Ontic structural realism argues that structure is all there is. In (French, 2014) I argued for an ‘eliminativist’ version of this view, according to which the world should be conceived, metaphysically, as structure, and objects, at both the fundamental and ‘everyday’ levels, should be eliminated. This paper is a response to a number of profound concerns that have been raised, such as how we might distinguish between the kind of structure invoked by this view and mathematical structure in general, how we should choose between eliminativist ontic structural realism and alternative metaphysical accounts such as dispositionalism, and how we should capture, in metaphysical terms, the relationship between structures and particles. In developing my response I shall touch on a number of broad issues, including the applicability of mathematics, the nature of representation and the relationship between metaphysics and science in general.

Structural realism, mathematics, and ontology

Over the last two decades structural realism has been given progressively more elaborated formulations. Steven French has been at the forefront of the development of the most conceptually sophisticated and historically sensitive version of the view. In his book, The Structure of the World (French (2014)), French shows how structural realism, the view according to which structure is all there is (ontic structural realism), is able to illuminate central issues in the philosophy of science: underdetermination, scientific representation, dispositions, natural modality, and laws of nature. The discussion consistently sheds novel light on the problems under consideration while developing insightful and provocative views. In this paper, I focus on the status of mathematics within French's ontic structural realism, and I raise some concerns about its proper understanding vis-à-vis the realist components of the view.

From ontic structural realism to metaphysical coherentism

The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, symmetries and the like are fundamental – especially in physics – should not be understood in terms of physical relations being fundamental. Rather, they should be understood in terms of ‘metaphysical coherentism’ - the idea that object-like parts of reality exhibit symmetric relations of ontological dependence. The view is developed in some detail, in particular by showing that i) symmetric ontological dependence does not necessarily lead to uninformative metaphysical explanations, and ii) metaphysical coherentism strikes the best balance between the requirements of naturalism and those of theoretical consistency – especially in view of the difficulties that structuralists seem to have in accounting for all state-independent properties of particles in relational terms. On this basis, the coherentist picture is applied to the interpretation of the quantum domain, and contrasted with extant varieties of structuralism, of both the eliminative and the non-eliminative sort, and holism.

Why eliminativism?

A central thesis of Steven French's brand of ontic structural realism has always been his eliminativism about objects. Unsurprisingly, this bold and controversial thesis has seen a lot of critical discussion. In his book The Structure of the World—Metaphysics & Representation, French accordingly defends this thesis against a range of challenges. A novel feature of this defense is the use of dependence relations to articulate his eliminativism. In this paper I take a critical look at French's defense of eliminativism and argue that the dependence relations invoked do not eliminate objects.

Scientific Realism Again

The present paper concerns how scientific realism is formulated and defended. It is argued that van Fraassen is fundamentally right that scientific realism requires metaphysics in general, and modality in particular. This is because of several relationships that raise problems for the ontology of scientific realism, namely those between: scientific realism and common sense realism; past and current theories; the sciences of different scales; and the ontologies of the special sciences and fundamental physics. These problems are related. It is argued that ontic structural realism, in the form of the real-patterns account of ontology, offers a unified solution to them all (or at least that it is required to do so, if it is to make good on the promise of naturalised metaphysics).