The lapse of twenty years generally suffices to justify reexamination of statesmen's legacies-hence, Mikhail Gorbachev is due those that are now emerging, including contributions in this issue. More specifically, it is roughly fourteen years since Soviet collapse, and extraordinary events and developments of 1985-91 are receding. Among them, one of most extraordinary was way Gorbachev exercised leadership. In Soviet system, degree of insulation of top leadership from outside pressures was extraordinary, and that of top leader, General secretary, even more pronounced. The Gorbachev drama, with its mix of successes and ultimate failure, involves a leader who went beyond that insulation, and chose to act in ways, and in pursuit of objectives, that radically distinguished him from his predecessor and most of his colleagues.The many accounts that trace his thoughts and political moves, and unfolding developments of 1985-91 indicate that Gorbachev, over time, became more convinced that Soviet economic and political structures required radical surgery. Initially, he wanted to reform a Soviet socialism that he saw, in some sense, as an historic made in some manner by the Soviet people. He would use formulations like this, somewhat confusingly, late into a political game that had seen him continually redefining what socialism actually meant-rhetoric would lag behind reality.His general mindset, initially, was not one much attuned to coercive (the October coup, civil war) elements of that choice. Lenin remained iconic ' founder, and performance of system and people in World War II was confirmation of historical correctness of choice under sternest of tests. Again, there is continuing thread of discrepancy between language Gorbachev used, including its ideological tint, and content and tendency of his actions. To a degree, this was tactical-he could not show his hand to party. But it also highlights deficiency of political vocabulary available to him in mid-1980s, which made it difficult for him to express how far he was willing to go, or perhaps even to understand it, before fact, himself.At first, he was not that dissimilar from Dubcek of 1968, who had worked on smaller canvas of Czechoslovakia. On domestic scene, Gorbachev reduced censorship, reformed one-party system's operations to broaden scope of political discussion and bargaining, opened elements of system to new talent and, a bit later, introduced some market elements into socialist economy. All of this may not look like much now. But for a Soviet leader, it was extraordinary. No predecessor had gone this far. None of his Politburo colleagues gave any indication that they might have done same.Leaders before Gorbachev kept a firm grip at home. Khrushchev was no liberator, although he introduced a post-Stalin era that saw no return to Stalinist terror. But those leaders sat atop not only USSR, but external empire of Soviet bloc as well. They did tolerate some variations within bloc. Since 1956, Poland had effectively mixed a Economic Policy (NEP)-like modification of Soviet economics model with a consciously resistant society and omnipresence of Catholic Church. Long before Solidarity years of 1980-81, Poland was a deviant case, endured by Soviet leaders after Khrushchev because they, like he, found prospect of dealing with Poland too daunting. In Hungary, a quiet moderation of harshest methods had gotten underway earlier in 1960s, and since 1968, it had operated with most effective in-system reform-the New Economic Mechanism- of any satellite country. Mostly, Kremlin had left Hungarians alone, just as they themselves downplayed broader consequences at home, and implications abroad, of economic liberalization.But in end, if Kremlin deemed it necessary to intervene forcefully, prior examples (Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968) indicated that they would, and that West would live with it. …
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