Old-age Pension System Research Articles

A Socio-Economic Analysis of the Three Paths to Social Security Reform

As this century ends, old-age pension systems worldwide are experiencing tremendous strain and undergoing rigorous examination. At issue is the ability of current schemes to survive demographic changes which threaten to bankrupt most OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) members' old age pension systems by the early part of the twenty-first century (Peterson, 1996; Steuerle & Bakija, 1994; World Bank, 1994). A variety of proposals have been advanced in response to this concern, which reflect different underlying values and priorities. Varying significantly in their recommendations for the appropriate balance between public and private efforts, these proposals form a continuum of policy choices ranging from the ameliorative model (first advocated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) to the fully privatized model (recommended by the Cato Institute). Between these two extremes, the World Bank and others recommend diversification of the public-only format by relying more heavily on other retirement-income sources. These three alternatives to pension reform-the ameliorative, mixed and privatized models-have economic and social implications. The emerging field of socio-economic theory merges dimensions of economics and social science to create a broader perspective that accounts for both cost benefit analysis and humanistic considerations. Applying this approach, six socio-economic criteria have been identified to conduct a systematic comparison and assessment of the ameliorative, mixed and privatized paths to Social Security reform.

A Payable Alternative for the Dutch Old-Age Pension System

It is generally assumed that a transition from an unfunded old-age pension scheme into a pension system based on a capital reserve system is not payable. In this paper we show for The Netherlands that it is possible to change over from the combined pay-as-you-go (the public pension) and capital-funded (the supplementary old-age pension) based system to a mainly capital-funded system, including a minimum provision. In the long run, the alternative proposals will be considerably cheaper than the current system. Older cohorts may sustain some losses due to the transition, but younger cohorts stand to gain.

Aging and Welfare Policies in China

This paper examines Chinese population aging problems in light of the demographic and welfare policy perspectives. Statistical analysis reveals that Chinese population aging problems are not yet serious, but have already emerged. China is rapidly approaching a post-industrial state in terms of its demographic composition. Empirical data show that the majority of Chinese elderly still rely on a traditional type of family support, despite the socialist claims of collective welfare. In other words, Marxism has not yet totally replaced the traditional Chinese family framework. However, it remains to be seen whether the contemporary Chinese family can withstand the threat of rapid industrialization. It appears inevitable that due to the increase of rural-urban migration, the family will become a less likely source of elderly cares. Eventually, the Chinese elderly may have to rely on themselves and the state to provide the needed retirement assistance. An adequate old-age pension system is the only policy alternative.

The Welfare Analysis of Fertility Reduction

The various cost-benefit studies of fertility reduction are discusse d. The main weakness of all types of cost-benefit studies is that they have no welfare content. They measure the costs of raising a child in different societies but do not measure the psychic pleasures that children give to their parents. In this study it is assumed that parents enjoy their children in general and that actual family sizes will not be reduced much without prior motivation toward smaller familie s. Government policies to change reproductive behavior will depend on net external costs of various family sizes the receptiveness of couples to bribes and incentives and the effects of government policy on income distribution between families in the society. There is little evidence to show that more available contraceptive information and subsidized contraceptives will result in a change in reproductive behavior. Incentive payments for restriction of family size are shown to be ineffective. Government-established disability and old-age pension systems may have an effect in motivating couples to have fewer children.

Public Opinion About the Functioning of Social Institutions

The aim of the study was to measure images concerning the successfulness of the functioning of seven social institutions. The data are based on a nation wide representative Finnish survey. Institutions as attitude-objects were Provincial Governments, Judiciary, Old-Age Pension system, Church, Municipal Social Service Authorities, Parliament, and Taxation Authorities. The study has two specific aims: (1) to descripc the range, averages and dimensionality of the evaluations and, (2) to specify the nature of the ex plaining mechanisms (structural variables, identification variables, and gene ral attitude variables) of these evaluations.

Use of Homemaker Service in Families That Neglect Their Children

The latest crisis in the Lithuanian social insurance system began in the fourth quarter of 2008. The system that had been fully and successfully functioning since 2002 again entered a recession phase. The decline promoted a public debate on the measures necessary for preventing similar events in the future. The authors of the present article analyse and discuss the major external threats, shocks and disturbances that caused the failures of the social insurance system in 2008 and 2009. The article concludes with a suggestion for ensuring long-term financial sustainability of the old-age pension system and for solving the population decline problem. The paper proposes a mixed pension-funding principle, the novelty of which lies in the direct contribution of children to their parents’ pensions.