The Free Choice effect—whereby $\lozenge (p {\textsc {or}} q)$ seems to entail both $\lozenge p$ and $\lozenge q$ —has traditionally been characterized as a phenomenon affecting the deontic modal ‘may’. This paper presents an extension of the semantic account of free choice defended by Fusco (Philosophers’ Imprint, 15, 1–27, 2015) to the agentive modal ‘can’, the ‘can’ which, intuitively, describes an agent’s powers. On this account, free choice is a nonspecific de re phenomenon (Bauerle 1983; Fodor 1970) that—unlike typical cases—affects disjunction. I begin by sketching a model of inexact ability, which grounds a modal approach to agency (Belnap Theoria, 54, 175–199, 1998; Perloff 2001) in a Williamson (Mind, 101, 217–242, 1992; Erkenntnis, 79, 971–999, 2014)-style margin of error. A classical propositional semantics combined with this framework can reflect the intuitions highlighted by Kenny (1976)’s dartboard cases, as well as the counterexamples to simple conditional views recently discussed by Mandelkern et al. (Philosophical Review, 126, 301–343, 2017). In Section 3, I turn to an independently motivated actual-world-sensitive account of disjunction, and show how it extends free choice inferences into an object language for propositional modal logic.
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