Nuclear Weapons In Europe Research Articles

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Poetry in the Age of the Arms Race: Ingrid Sjöstrand’s Poem “Otänkbart” (“Unthinkable”) on the NATO Rearmament Decisions of 1979
 Within the popular movements poetry is used as a tool in the struggle for social and political change. The poetry cherished by the movements can thus be described as utilitarian, performing rhetorical functions in relevant contexts. The article deals with the poem “Otänkbart” (“Unthinkable”) by Ingrid Sjöstrand, which addresses a pertinent social problem from the perspective of the peace movement. The poem was published in Dagens Nyheter, Sweden’s largest daily newspaper, on 28 December, 1979. It is a response to the NATO decision made at a summit conference in Brussels on 12 December of that year to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe. A theoretical basis for the analysis is provided by Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison’s cognitive approach to social movements. In my study, I consider “Unthinkable” as part of the peace movement’s cognitive practice, exploring the explanation of the arms race formulated in the poem. I also investigate the relationship of the poem to articles published in Dagens Nyheter in December 1979 concerning the NATO decision, as well as to other texts dealing with related themes. Further, I scrutinize the poem’s uses of rhetorical devices and strategies to convince the reader to adopt the peace movement’s position on the issue and to create commitment and readiness to act. The analysis shows that “Unthinkable” was clearly a part of the peace movement’s knowledge production concerning the causes and consequences of the arms race, and of the movement’s values and alternative strategies for action. Structurally, “Unthinkable” offers creative opportunities for committed reception.

NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk-and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual-capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non-nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long-standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk- and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSES

The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) received more attention in European NATO member states than did its predecessor, the 2001 NPR, thanks in large part to President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague speech and to the context of work on NATO's new strategic concept. The pivotal issue for most NATO states was how to handle the US sub-strategic nuclear weapons that remain in Europe. NATO member states perceived the issue differently, depending on the security interests and preferences of the country; each state read into the NPR what matched its preferences best, from an encouragement to pursue nuclear disarmament to a rather conservative preservation of the existing deterrence system. The reactions of five NATO states—France, Estonia, Poland, Germany, and Norway—illustrate this. There is widespread consent that the US sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe are militarily obsolete, but some countries ascribe to them a certain political-symbolic function, be it as the “glue of the alliance” or as disarmament showstoppers. Ultimately, the NPR did not end the existing cleavages on the issue of US nuclear weapons based in Europe, but rather postponed resolving them. The current way out for NATO is to move the issue to negotiations with Russia—if Russia is game.

US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011

The authors write about US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and how NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010, places less importance on these weapons. Though the current Europe-based arsenal is only a fraction of what it was at its peak in 1971, 150—200 bombs are currently deployed in Europe and stored at six bases in five countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The authors present information on the weapons at each of these arsenals.

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons: A European perspective

The debate over the removal of tactical weapons is not a simple one; linked with it are the debates over the utility of NATO and how to reach a global consensus on nuclear disarmament. Advocates of withdrawal view inaction regarding tactical nuclear weapons as just one example of general inertia within the alliance; the lack of a serious political discussion inside NATO, they argue, is a cause of concern for the true value of NATO. Belgian author Tom Sauer writes that such a debate has only stalled action, resulting in missed opportunities to remove the weapons from Europe. Looking at the arguments for and against the removal of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the author writes that the answers to this debate are to be found in the capitals of NATO member states. The time is ripe to withdraw all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe; the arguments of the few opponents do not outweigh the benefits of withdrawal. The political climate—with a U.S. president who is personally committed to the nuclear weapons threat—is also ideal. The question is not if but rather how NATO will change its policy.

Realist Theory and Central & Eastern Europe after the Cold War

At the end of the Cold War realist scholars assessed the future of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) pessimistically. Predictions included inevitable war and conflict as a result of the collapse of the bipolar international system and a concurrent collapse of the Soviet Union. Some realists predicted the rise of a new European powers and rampant nuclear proliferation across Europe. Realist John Mearsheimer went so far as to suggest that only through “limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe”, “active balancing” by European powers and the control of nationalism in Eastern Europe would the continent remain peaceful.Yet today, fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, such realist predictions are far from the reality. Most CEE states have joined the democratic European Union (EU), there has been no arms race and, instead of a group of powers competing over European spoils, the EU has become the common, peaceful project for Western and CEE states alike. The pessimistic assessment of the post-Cold War future of CEE states by realists has been proven wrong – but why did the realists make such poor predictions in the first place?This paper suggests that the problem with the realist predictions lies not in their disdain for the power of institutions or their rejection of the democratic peace; rather, it focuses on the realist conception of the nature of the international system itself. This paper argues that an assessment of the post-Cold War future of the CEE states based on a competitive anarchical system necessarily led the realists to predict a pessimistic future for the CEE states. In contrast, assuming a chaotic international system offers insights into why the post-Cold War period evolved as it did and suggests why chaos, not anarchy, should be the foundation of future international relations theory.

Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Control of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons has remained an elusive goal since the end of the Cold War, despite the fact that these weapons are particularly attractive to nuclear terrorists and represent a major danger from the standpoint of early or accidental use. Meaningful progress will probably require a larger deal in which there are trade-off between US concessions on issues of interest to Russia and Russian concessions on tactical nuclear weapons. Two options merit serious consideration. The first entails the withdrawal of the small number of US tactical weapons that remain in Europe to jump-start a dialogue. The second option involves a package deal that would include Russian agreement to initiate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons reductions in exchange for NATO agreement to discuss changes in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. An optimal approach would be to launch a meaningful dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons in a separate forum, yet in parallel to the next stage of START negotiations.

U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954–2004

U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954–2004

U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954-2004

U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954-2004

Trick or truth? The British ANF proposal, west Germany and US nonproliferation policy, 1964–68

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme ‐ the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.

Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Notwithstanding the fact that weapons have lost much of their relevance in the post Cold War era, they are still the object of heavy disputes on both sides of the Atlantic. One central issue is the question whether weapons should have a future role at all. The strategic community in the United States is particularly eloquent in arguing the pros and cons of deterrence as a means of maintaining stability in a world with an increasing number of players. A second dimension of the current debate is the problem of how to arrange deterrence in the future. This is of particular importance for the European and non-nuclear states. The ongoing process of creating a true European Union, including a European Security and Defense Identity, will lead sooner or later to the question of how to integrate the nuclear element in a future European security structure.

The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–1987. By Jonathan Haslam. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 227p. $34.95 cloth, $13.95 paper. - The German Nuclear Dilemma. By Jeffrey Boutwell. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 247p. $29.95. - Enhancing European Security: Living in a Less Nuclear World. By Ian M. Cuthbertson and David Robertson. New York: St.

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The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-1987

The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-1987

Negotiating on nuclear weapons in Europe

Negotiating on nuclear weapons in Europe

The Soviet Union and the politics of nuclear weapons in Europe, 1969–87: the problem of the SS-20

The Soviet Union and the politics of nuclear weapons in Europe, 1969–87: the problem of the SS-20

The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-1977

The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-1977

After the Cold War: New tasks for arms controllers

"After the Cold War: New tasks for arms controllers." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 45(6), pp. 7–8

Dealing with nuclear weapons in Europe

Dealing with nuclear weapons in Europe

Rethinking the nuclear weapons dilemma in Europe

This book is covering the following topics; Nuclear weapons in Europe: Tactical and intermediate-range weapons; no first use of nuclear weapons in Europe; Alternatives to nucleus deterrence in Europe; Crisis management and war avoidance in Europe; Conventional arms, arms control, and the nuclear threshold to domestic political context.