Realist Theory and Central & Eastern Europe after the Cold War

Abstract

At the end of the Cold War realist scholars assessed the future of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) pessimistically. Predictions included inevitable war and conflict as a result of the collapse of the bipolar international system and a concurrent collapse of the Soviet Union. Some realists predicted the rise of a new European powers and rampant nuclear proliferation across Europe. Realist John Mearsheimer went so far as to suggest that only through “limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe”, “active balancing” by European powers and the control of nationalism in Eastern Europe would the continent remain peaceful.Yet today, fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, such realist predictions are far from the reality. Most CEE states have joined the democratic European Union (EU), there has been no arms race and, instead of a group of powers competing over European spoils, the EU has become the common, peaceful project for Western and CEE states alike. The pessimistic assessment of the post-Cold War future of CEE states by realists has been proven wrong – but why did the realists make such poor predictions in the first place?This paper suggests that the problem with the realist predictions lies not in their disdain for the power of institutions or their rejection of the democratic peace; rather, it focuses on the realist conception of the nature of the international system itself. This paper argues that an assessment of the post-Cold War future of the CEE states based on a competitive anarchical system necessarily led the realists to predict a pessimistic future for the CEE states. In contrast, assuming a chaotic international system offers insights into why the post-Cold War period evolved as it did and suggests why chaos, not anarchy, should be the foundation of future international relations theory.