EUROPEAN COMPLIANCE AND POLITICIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN ROMANIA

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of public administration politicization in Romania between 1990 and 2012. The approach taken here is that of Europeanization by conditionality and social learning, and of reform reversal hypothesis where the social learning is absent. This theoretical framework consists, briefly stated, in the belief that the adhering CEE (Central and Eastern European) states are subjected to a” sticks and carrots” mechanism and they respond to it by a (usually high enough) degree of compliance with the EU (European Union) norm. From this, once this mechanism gone (when EU membership is granted) if the social learning was unsuccessful, it is to be expected to observe a regress of reform or a reform reversal. I discuss this reform reversal hypothesis for the Romanian case. The paper is organized as follows: first, I briefly deal with the problem of Europeanization; second, I discuss the problem of the general class of international compliance theories and I analyze the specific case of compliance by Europeanization; third, I discuss the problem of conditionality and conditional regress hypothesis; fourth, I deal with a specific case of European compliance, the problem of civil service’s neutrality in CEE states before and after EU accession; fifth, I address the problem of Romanian public administration reform as a case of reform reversal. The argument I employ here is that the Romania experienced a reversal of reform after joining the EU and that might suggest a poor level of social learning in the case of depoliticization.