Nuclear Posture Research Articles

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.

No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy

The release of the Barack Obama administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats. Despite general agreement that the United States' nuclear policy and posture was in need of overhaul, there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made. At the core of these debates was the issue of U.S. declaratory policy—the stated role and purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whereas some members of the administration advocated that the United States retain all of the flexibility and options afforded by the policy of calculated ambiguity, others contended that to fulfill President Obama's commitment to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,” the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as no first use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. By not adopting NFU, the NPR missed an important opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. The traditional case for NFU hinges on the argument that the threat of nuclear first use is unnecessary for deterrence. Yet the continued U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first is not only unnecessary but dangerous. Given the size and accuracy of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, and given the variation in the nuclear capabilities of current and potential adversaries, the first-use option risks creating instabilities in a severe crisis that increase the chances of accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate nuclear use. In a future crisis with a nuclear-armed state, the fear—whether real or imagined—that the United States might attempt a disarming nuclear first-strike increases the possibility of nuclear escalation.

Iranians and the Bomb: Religion and Support for or Opposition to the Development of Nuclear Weapons

This essay examines the Iranian public‘s beliefs about Iran‘s development of nuclear weapons. To some extent, it also explains how and why Iranians have differing opinions on this important policy issue. In order to understand these views, we develop an argument about the role that religion can play in mitigating and shaping views on foreign policy issues. We next test this hypothesis in an effort to explain observed variation in Iranian individual-level attitudes toward developing nuclear weapons. We find that approximately 25% of surveyed Iranians are in favor of their government‘s development of nuclear weapons. Our regression analyses indicate that respondents‘ views on whether Islam tolerates the development of nuclear weapons explain, in some measure, the observed variation in support for a weapons program. These findings suggest that Iranians, as do other publics, use core values to determine their position on foreign policy issues and their country‘s nuclear posture rather than relying on detailed information about Iran‘s national security concerns.

Canada and the G8 Global Partnership Program

The attacks of 11 September 2001 have ushered in a paradigm shift with regard to way states assess international threats. Fear of unfathomable damage that terrorists could cause if they acquired weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has plagued United States and its allies ever since. In American nuclear posture review published in April 2010, Obama administration recognizes that the most immediate and extreme threat today is nuclear terrorism.1 Perhaps surprisingly, not all states agree on nature and urgency ofthe threat of nuclear terrorism. Although many programs have been developed to address threat at both national and international levels, some states are still reluctant to join effort to contain it. President Barack Obama has sought to redress this asymmetry in threat perception by launching an ambitious program to prevent proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction and to prevent nuclear terrorism.The agenda on nuclear security was thus developed as a response to threat posed by nuclear terrorism. It aims to safely manage existing stockpiles, prevent proliferation of weapons-usable materials, and plan for emergency response in case of a nuclear or radiological incident.2 From Prague speech in April 2009 to nuclear security summit in Washington, DC, a year later, Obama's agenda is giving visibuity to nonproliferation regime. Even if tackling threat posed by WMD has risen up rank of American (and international) priorities, responding to this threat on a global scale represents an immense chaUenge. To implement international commitments, we must look to individual states and their domestic enforcement capabilities. Unfortunately, some states lack these assets, despite adhering to UN security coundl resolution 1540, which establishes binding obligations on aU UN member states under Chapter VII of UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials.3 The G8 global partnership against spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction (referred to as global partnership program) has emerged as a response to this conundrum. In 2002, Canada pledged $1 billion to this program over a 10-year period. To date, it has spent $640 million on WMD-related security projects in Russia and other states in former Soviet Union. Many observers were expecting a renewal of program during G8 meeting in Muskoka in June 2010, in anticipation of partnership's 2012 deadline. Those hopes were clashed when G8 leaders simply opted to progress made to date instead, thereby postponing a decision on extending program.4This article provides an assessment of G8 global partnership with two concerns in mind: extension of partnership beyond 2012 and geographic expansion of program to other regions of world. It raises a number of key questions: how does partnership fit in to broader WMD security agenda? Why and how should we plan for its extension beyond 2012 deadline? How should G8 countries plan for geographic expansion of partnership beyond former Soviet Union? What are implications of Canada's participation? Finally, what lessons can be drawn from first 10 -year cycle of partnership?The G8 global partnership is a successful multilateral program, one that has engaged in practical steps to achieve clear benchmarks for threat reduction, yet despite this success, relatively little attention has been accorded to GPP by academics, media, and general public.5 G8 countries have invested a lot of resources in implementing partnership, but attention paid to program has been scant and has generally been purview of states, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks. Countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, and United States have produced valuable annual reports that evaluate threat reduction projects, but these efforts have remained limited and not very visible to general public. …

THE NUCLEAR PIVOT

The current US government inherited a complex strategic landscape that included weak American commitment to arms control. Following a flurry of agreements and reviews, the Obama administration's nuclear posture now pivots on its declared pledge to the permanent reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Taking on critics of the new policy, Joseph Cirincione and Alexandra Bell argue that, though there is a long way to go, this is the moment nuclear disarmament has been waiting for.

SALVAGING GLOBAL ZERO

A year ago Barack Obama proffered a vision of a nuclear-free world. But as Iran moves closer to acquiring nuclear weapon technology, the existing nuclear order appears to be unravelling. Joachim Krause and Benjamin Schreer argue that, despite a convincing vision, both the US administration's new bilateral agreement with Russia and its own Nuclear Posture Review are too conservative in their attempts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in strategic decision-making. It is Europe that must step up to play a mediatory role in ensuring Global Zero is an attainable goal.

Never Say Never: Considerations about the Possibility of Australia Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nuclear program. These conditions interact with Australia's relationship with Indonesia and the technological and industrial feasibility of “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear weapons postures, respectively. The only Australian nuclear posture that does not lack credibility in light of all these factors is the use of “tactical” weapons to deter major landings on the Australian mainland.

A Counter-WMD Strategy for the Future

past year has witnessed a renewed emphasis by US government agencies addressing threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In December 2009, Obama Administration released its second presidential policy directive, a National Strategy to Counter Biological Threats, which addressed challenge of combating infectious diseases, regardless of whether they were natural or manmade. In February 2010, Quadrennial Defense Review stressed how proliferation of WMD continues to undermine global In April, Nuclear Posture Review was released for first time as an unclassified document, along with a newly signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, reducing deployable number of Russian and US nuclear weapons. In May, representatives from across globe met to renew Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which attempts to reduce (and eventually eliminate) total number of nuclear-owning weapon in world. It has been a busy spring. During talks related to these initiatives, President Barack Obama directly connected threat of nuclear terrorism to success of nuclear proliferation efforts. He declared, The greatest threat to US and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states. (1) current focus on nonproliferation activities, however, does not stop terrorists from seeking and potentially obtaining nuclear and biological materials, technology, and devices. For that matter, emphasis on combating terrorism has not resulted in a reduction of terrorist ambitions to obtain these materials, either. US government, and Department of Defense (DOD) in particular, needs to review its strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. combating WMD framework is based on a counterproliferation strategy developed in response to threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons to military forces in 1990s, however, its scope was broadened after September 2001 to address concerns relating to homeland security. For talk about the most dangerous weapons in hands of most dangerous people, there has been little discussion on whether combating WMD strategy is adequate against current and future threats. This article will review development of combating WMD strategy from its initiation in 1990s, as a result of post-conflict analysis of Persian Gulf War in 1991. It will outline creation of combating WMD strategy during George W. Bush Administration. article focuses on challenges in interpretation, largely due to thesis that terrorists were actively seeking WMD materials and technology from rogue states that had developed this capability (or were in process of doing so). Last, it will offer suggestions on how to improve framework, largely by defining strategy to counter nation-state WMD programs as distinct from strategy to counter terrorist pursuit of WMD. If US government clearly articulates these two strategies as separate but related, as opposed to being one single strategy to counter WMD, agencies responsible for executing these strategies will be much more effective. Genesis of DOD's Combating WMD Strategy In 1993, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative with image of ill-prepared US forces facing Iraq's chemical and biological (CB) weapons still fresh in its mind. There was some initial concern by nonproliferation community that DOD was attempting to usurp its role that a focus on developing offensive and defensive capabilities to counter adversarial use of CB weapons would come at cost of reducing nonproliferation efforts. (2) After a few years of discussion, OSD tasked Joint Staff in 1996 to develop a counterproliferation strategy, stating in Defense Planning Guidance that all US forces must be prepared to conduct wartime operations against adversaries armed with chemical or biological weapons. …

U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2010

Two important recent events—the signing of New START and the release of the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review—will shape the configuration of the U.S. nuclear arsenal for years to come.

NEW U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

THE ADMINISTRATION announced last week that it would reduce the number of ready-to-launch nuclear weapons in the U.S. by 30% over the next seven years, limit the actions that could trigger a U.S. nuclear attack, and raise the threshold for construction or testing of new nuclear weapons. The announcements were part of the April 6 release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), an internal government assessment document outlining the nation’s nuclear weapons strategy, and the April 8 signing of the international Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The START agreement would cut deployed strategic nuclear weapons from 2,200 each for the U.S. and Russia to 1,550. It does not, however, address tactical nuclear weapons that number in the thousands, some of which are several times larger than those dropped by the U.S. in Japan during World War II. When announcing the NPR, Secretary of ...

Obama's nuclear posture review

Obama's nuclear posture review

China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World

A new wave of interest in the complete elimination of nuclear-weapons is washing over international security institutions. Although the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is as old as the nuclear...

THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

The nuclear weapon states (NWS) have different perspectives on the desirability and feasibility of a world without nuclear weapons. A review of each of the current nuclear doctrines, postures, and disarmament policies of the five NWS shows that there is a clear divide between them, with some showing relatively determined leadership (the United States and the United Kingdom) and others expressing skepticism, if not complete disinterest (France, Russia, and China). Nevertheless, the prospects for progress on disarmament by the NWS at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remain reasonably good. Yet complete success will require much time as well as sustained and applied efforts from the NWS, first and foremost to improve their performance as international security guarantors.

What, if anything, will France's reintegration imply for the alliance debate on nuclear weapons?

This article asks whether France's return to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s integrated military command could translate into a bigger role on nuclear issues within NATO. As NATO prepares its new strategic concept, its nuclear doctrine is bound to change as several allies have expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The presence of American theater nuclear weapons in five NATO countries remains controversial. First, I argue that the removal of NATO's nuclear weapons does not mean the end of extended nuclear deterrence, by making a distinction between extended deterrence and collective-actor deterrence. Second, I compare the nuclear postures of NATO, France and the USA to show that harmonization is possible. Finally, I outline several options for a new nuclear doctrine under NATO and formulate some policy recommendations.

Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability

A probe of various regional power nuclear postures reveals that such postures, rather than simply the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can have differential effects on deterrence and stability dynamics. The India-Pakistan dyad is a useful candidate for exploring these various effects because the three regional power nuclear postures—catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation—have interacted with each other in South Asia. In particular, Pakistan's shift from a catalytic posture to an asymmetric escalation posture in 1998 against a continuous Indian assured retaliation posture allows the effects of nuclear posture to be isolated in an enduring rivalry in which many variables can be held constant. The asymmetric escalation posture may be “deterrence optimal” for Pakistan, suggesting that nuclear postures do have different effects on conflict dynamics, but it has also enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding revisionist preferences in India, triggering more frequent and intense crises on the subcontinent. Furthermore, the command and control procedures that Pakistan undertakes to make its asymmetric escalation posture credible amplify this instability. These procedures generate risks to the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets, both at present and as India and Pakistan continue to dynamically evolve nuclear and conventional postures. The conclusions for South Asian and international security of this reality are grim.

Nuclear Reason: At the Limits of Strategy

Is nuclear strategic reason rational? Barack Obama’s April 2009 speech looking towards a world free of nuclear weapons appeared to promise positive new directions in global disarmament and non-proliferation. Yet it came on the heels of one of the most destabilising periods in global nuclear security since the early 1980s. This article argues that the growing interpenetration of nuclear and conventional conflict, and the dangers of nuclear terrorism, provide disarmament with compelling security logic. However, progress will hinge on key states adopting nuclear postures that reduce nuclear dangers and can acknowledge the fundamental impossibility of nuclear strategy as a system of reason: one that has never been able to connect nuclear means and security ends in a way that is either viable or legitimate. In an era of radically asymmetric conflict and competition, disarmament is an imperative, but to succeed it must find a rational way through strategic irrationality.

TOGETHER TOWARD NUCLEAR ZERO

To understand the prospects for engaging China and Russia on disarmament, the authors examine views of U.S. strategic policy in Beijing and Moscow, the two countries’ mutual perspectives, and prospects for particular disarmament measures. Through an appraisal of nuclear force postures and doctrines and linkages to missile defense, conventional military capabilities, and possible space weaponization, the authors explain why nuclear disarmament involves strategic considerations writ large, and not simply nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. They analyze Chinese and Russian views of a variety of possible disarmament and arms control measures and relevant strategic considerations. While formal arms reduction negotiations are only likely with Russia in the short term, they note that confidence-building measures could already be instituted that involve China. Finally, they note there exists a small window of opportunity to move cooperatively toward nuclear zero; however, as decisions on military procurement are realized, this window will shrink.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons

1. Introduction 2. Pakistan's Nuclearisation Process: Proliferation Lessons and the rise of the second nuclear age 3. Pakistan's Emerging Nuclear Posture and Doctrinal Contemplation 4. Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent: Force Level and Missile Capabilities 5. Command and Control System 6. Pakistan and the Global Non-proliferation Regime 7. Proliferation Control Challenges, Nuclear Terrorism, and Pakistan 8. Conclusion

US nuclear weapons policy after the Cold War: Russians, 'rogues' and domestic division

Introduction 1. The policy-making process. Actors involved in nuclear weapons policy. The annual nuclear policy budgetary process 2. American nuclear weapons policy at the end of the Cold War 3. Nuclear weapons policy under George H. W. Bush. Key decisions. Nuclear arms control. Nuclear forces. 'Rogue' states and nuclear planning. The nuclear weapons production complex. Conclusion 4. Nuclear weapons policy under Bill Clinton. Nuclear forces. Nuclear arms control. Russia, 'rogues' and nuclear planning. The nuclear weapons complex. Conclusion 5. Nuclear weapons policy under George W. Bush. Nuclear policy and the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. Nuclear forces. Nuclear arms control. The nuclear weapons production complex. Conclusion 6. Post-Cold War trends in nuclear weapons policy 7. The influence of ideas on nuclear weapons policy. Three competing 'idea sets' Idea set 1: Managing the drawdown of Cold War nuclear forces Idea set 2: Responding to nuclear proliferation through progress in arms control and disarmament Idea set 3: Responding to nuclear proliferation by re-orienting Cold War nuclear weapons policy to a post-Cold War war-fighting policy Conclusion 8. Domestic politics and nuclear weapons policy. Policy inertia. Political disinterest in nuclear weapons policy. Military disinterest in nuclear weapons policy. Nuclear conservatism and neglect. Conclusion

CHINESE NUCLEAR POSTURE AND FORCE MODERNIZATION

Claims that China is the only nuclear power currently expanding its arsenal fail to take into account the technical, historical, and bureaucratic realities that shaped China's nuclear posture and drive its ongoing modernization. China's strategic modernization is largely a process of deploying new delivery systems, not designing new nuclear warheads; the majority of its new missiles are conventionally armed. Today, China maintains the smallest operationally deployed nuclear force of any of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, operates under a no-first-use pledge, and keeps its warheads off alert. The modernization of China's delivery systems is the culmination of a decades-long plan to acquire the same capabilities deployed by the other nuclear powers. U.S. concerns about this modernization focus too much on deterring a deliberate Chinese attack and ignore the risk that modernized U.S. and Chinese forces could interact in unexpected ways during a crisis, creating uncontrollable escalatory pressures. To manage this risk, Washington should assure Chinese leaders that it does not seek to deny China's deterrent, in exchange for some understanding that China will not seek numerical parity with U.S. nuclear forces.