Canada and the G8 Global Partnership Program

Abstract

The attacks of 11 September 2001 have ushered in a paradigm shift with regard to way states assess international threats. Fear of unfathomable damage that terrorists could cause if they acquired weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has plagued United States and its allies ever since. In American nuclear posture review published in April 2010, Obama administration recognizes that the most immediate and extreme threat today is nuclear terrorism.1 Perhaps surprisingly, not all states agree on nature and urgency ofthe threat of nuclear terrorism. Although many programs have been developed to address threat at both national and international levels, some states are still reluctant to join effort to contain it. President Barack Obama has sought to redress this asymmetry in threat perception by launching an ambitious program to prevent proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction and to prevent nuclear terrorism.The agenda on nuclear security was thus developed as a response to threat posed by nuclear terrorism. It aims to safely manage existing stockpiles, prevent proliferation of weapons-usable materials, and plan for emergency response in case of a nuclear or radiological incident.2 From Prague speech in April 2009 to nuclear security summit in Washington, DC, a year later, Obama's agenda is giving visibuity to nonproliferation regime. Even if tackling threat posed by WMD has risen up rank of American (and international) priorities, responding to this threat on a global scale represents an immense chaUenge. To implement international commitments, we must look to individual states and their domestic enforcement capabilities. Unfortunately, some states lack these assets, despite adhering to UN security coundl resolution 1540, which establishes binding obligations on aU UN member states under Chapter VII of UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials.3 The G8 global partnership against spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction (referred to as global partnership program) has emerged as a response to this conundrum. In 2002, Canada pledged $1 billion to this program over a 10-year period. To date, it has spent $640 million on WMD-related security projects in Russia and other states in former Soviet Union. Many observers were expecting a renewal of program during G8 meeting in Muskoka in June 2010, in anticipation of partnership's 2012 deadline. Those hopes were clashed when G8 leaders simply opted to progress made to date instead, thereby postponing a decision on extending program.4This article provides an assessment of G8 global partnership with two concerns in mind: extension of partnership beyond 2012 and geographic expansion of program to other regions of world. It raises a number of key questions: how does partnership fit in to broader WMD security agenda? Why and how should we plan for its extension beyond 2012 deadline? How should G8 countries plan for geographic expansion of partnership beyond former Soviet Union? What are implications of Canada's participation? Finally, what lessons can be drawn from first 10 -year cycle of partnership?The G8 global partnership is a successful multilateral program, one that has engaged in practical steps to achieve clear benchmarks for threat reduction, yet despite this success, relatively little attention has been accorded to GPP by academics, media, and general public.5 G8 countries have invested a lot of resources in implementing partnership, but attention paid to program has been scant and has generally been purview of states, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks. Countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, and United States have produced valuable annual reports that evaluate threat reduction projects, but these efforts have remained limited and not very visible to general public. …