Nuclear Apartheid Research Articles

Law as discursive resource: the politics of the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Realist approaches to international law conceptualize the law as epiphenomenal to state interest, whereas liberal institutionalist approaches theorize the ability of law to curb state power. Through the example of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this article challenges these approaches by arguing that law’s power comes from its productive and constitutive effects. Despite perennial conflict, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons endures because it has ordered nuclear politics by constituting a legal distinction between “nuclear weapon states” and “non-nuclear weapon states.” Instead of assuming that this distinction reflects self-evident material differences, this article shows how states actively construct nuclear status through international law. The dynamics of this construction reflect significant actions on the behalf of conventionally disempowered states and not merely great powers. An analysis of the meeting documents of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee finds that the participants used the forum to perform a burgeoning “non-nuclear” identity. The politics of this distinction also generated the discourse of “nuclear apartheid,” which was subsequently used by states outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime to justify their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Taken together, the role of non-nuclear diplomacy and the discourse of nuclear apartheid demonstrate that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not simply endure because the powerful have sanctioned it, but because it created a space for the disempowered to expand their influence from below. Though the article builds on existing sociological approaches to the law, it also moves beyond conflicts over legal and textual interpretation to demonstrate the diplomatic practices around the constitution of legal categories.

The 2015 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Review or a Requiem?

THE YEAR 2015 WILL BE A MEMORABLE YEAR IN THE HISTORY OF THE TREATY on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It will be forty-five years since this unique treaty--with 189 states parties, the most widely subscribed to a multilateral disarmament treaty--entered into force and twenty years after its historic indefinite extension and reinforcement in 1995. For me, it will mark a thirty-year association with the NPT since I chaired the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Third NPT Review Conference in 1985 and Main Committee I of that Review Conference. Ten years later, I presided over the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Countless words have been written in exegesis of the final packages of the Three Decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, all of which will no doubt be regurgitated as we approach the 2015 NPT Review Conference. On 12 May 1995, in my closing statement as president of the historic NPT Review and Extension Conference that extended the treaty for an indefinite duration, I stated: permanence of the Treaty does not represent a permanence of unbalanced obligations, nor does it represent the permanence of nuclear apartheid between nuclear haves and have-nots. What it does represent is our collective dedication to the permanence of an international legal barrier against nuclear proliferation so that we can forge ahead in our tasks towards a nuclear weapon-free world. Since then, despite the emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons-armed states and the unprincipled concessions made through the US-India nuclear cooperation deal, the continued outlier status of Israel with its undeclared nuclear weapons possession, and the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and its outrageous nuclear weapons testing, the nuclear nonproliferation norm has held firm for the 184 non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT--especially after the 24 November 2013 interim agreement over Iran's nuclear program. Article VI--the disarmament article of the NPT--remains unimplemented despite the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Thirteen Steps agreed on at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the 2010 Review Conference's sixty-four-point Action Programme, together with the agreement on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) proposal and the conceptual breakthrough on recognizing the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, augured well for the strengthened review process. However, the report cards meticulously maintained by civil society on actual achievements, the return to Cold War mind-sets by the United States and Russia, and the negative record of all the nuclear weapons states have converted the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world into a mirage. Unless the Ninth NPT Review Conference reverses these ominous trends, it is doomed to fail and imperils the future of the NPT. Taking Stock Some stocktaking is relevant. In 1995, we had five nuclear weapons states and one was outside of the NPT. Today, we have nine nuclear weapons-armed states--four of them outside the NPT. One of them (India) is being given special privileges by the entire Nuclear Suppliers Group in violation of Article I of the treaty and paragraph 12 of Decision II in the 1995 package. Another (Pakistan) has received two power reactors from China, a nuclear weapons state within the NPT. In 1970, when the NPT entered into force, we had a total of 38,153 nuclear warheads. Today we have 16,300--just 21,853 fewer--with over 4,000 on deployed status and the promise by the two main nuclear weapons states to reduce their deployed arsenals by 30 percent to 1,550 each within seven years of the new START (the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) entering into force. Another NPT nuclear weapons state, the United Kingdom, is on the verge of renewing its Trident nuclear weapons program. …

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Let's Make Peace the Way We Did in Stanleyville and Saigon

Motivated by a desire to preserve American nuclear hegemony and characterized by a richly bipartisan combination of arrogance, incompetence, mendacity, fear, and cynicism, U.S. policy towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been disastrously incoherent from the dawn of the nuclear age through the administration of George W. Bush. While historian Shane J. Maddock’s study of the subject is nuanced and well researched, this stark conclusion looms over Nuclear Apartheid. Its primary value lies not in any stunningly new revelations about American nuclear policy, but rather in Maddock’s methodical work in weaving together six decades of history to tell a story that is depressing as it is important. Ultimately, Nuclear Apartheid falls short of delivering on the author’s laudable ambition to wed a study of race, gender, and ideology to the tortuous history of nuclear proliferation policy. Nevertheless, this is a necessary and bracing book for scholars of nuclear history and the Cold War.

Dealing with the Bomb: Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and the Quest to Develop Usable Weapons

In recent years, the US government has elevated the stature of nonproliferation in the realm of international affairs. For instance, on April 8, 2010, in Prague, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New START Treaty. Quickly ratified, the treaty will drastically reduce the number of both US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Nonproliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism also received the highest priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. These initiatives are the latest in a long chain of US efforts since 1945 to come to grips with the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons. Three recent books examine different aspects of this conundrum. In his study, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present, Shane J. Maddock, a professor of history at Stonehill College, examines Washington's efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons since 1945. Having an abiding faith in America's industrial might and technological innovation, both Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman believed that the United States could maintain a nuclear monopoly for many years. To a certain degree, their faith in the nuclear monopoly made sense on scientific and geopolitical grounds. During World War II, the United States was in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other countries to build an atomic bomb, as the country possessed the world's largest industrial base, a geographic location beyond the reach of enemy bombers, and an unparalleled body of nuclear scientists, many of whom fled Hitler's new order in Europe. By contrast, the Axis Powers, along with the Soviet Union and Britain, could not afford to divert resources to a hypothetical weapon while they were in the throes of an existential conflict. Moreover, the territories of all of these countries were subject to invasion and repeated bombings, which rendered large-scale research facilities vulnerable to destruction.

Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present, by Shane J. Maddock.

<i>Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present</i>, by Shane J. Maddock.

Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present

Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present

Nuclear apartheid: the quest for American atomic supremacy from World War II to the present

Nuclear apartheid: the quest for American atomic supremacy from World War II to the present

Harnessing the Atom: Strengthening the Regulatory Board for Nuclear Safety in India Based on the Canadian Experience

Ending months of uncertainty and political drama, the present Indian Government headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh won a confidence vote on the floor of the Parliament of India paving the way forward for the historic 123 Agreement with the United States. Once operational, this Agreement could end India’s nuclear apartheid making civilian nuclear commerce with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group a reality. While energy-hungry India needs enormous power to fuel its surging economy, this also raises serious concerns about nuclear safety. With several cases of near misses and accidents, India’s track record on nuclear safety is suspect. However, not much is known about the true state of affairs, primarily because the civilian and weapons programme are intertwined and the Indian nuclear establishment functions in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy. Given the high population densities, the consequences of a nuclear accident could be catastrophic. This article argues that the 123 Agreement provides India with the opportunity to re-engineer the working of its nuclear establishment in order to ensure greater safety, transparency and accountability. It uses the Canadian experience to offer some suggestions to remodel the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India’s watch dog on nuclear safety.

“Nuclear Apartheid” as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?

Shampa Biswas (*) Reflecting on colonial traces that remain in current conduct and study of global politics, Roxanne Doty expresses her frustrations with the very definition of field of international relations, whose central problems and categories have been framed in such a way as to preclude investigation into categories such as 'race.' (1) While scholars of international political economy have brought considerable attention to questions of global material inequalities and culturalist/constructivist approaches have highlighted issues of discursive and representational power, category of race still continues to be conspicuous by its absence from field. However, this absence is less curious in subfield of security studies, which remains perhaps one of most enduring bastions of neorealism. When questions of (couched as peace) continue to be privileged over questions of justice, as is case in much of mainstream security studies, there is little epistemic space to raise question of ra ce. But even new critical turn in security studies, which has done much to unsettle epistemological and ontological presuppositions in dominant security thinking, has failed to raise question of race as an explicit category of analysis. India's decision to nuclearize in May 1998 propelled it into international limelight, and along with reprimands, resolutions, and statements that were rapidly issued by international bodies like U.N. General Assembly and Conference on Disarmament, regional bodies like Non-Aligned Movement and European Union, governments from both North and South, and many nongovernmental groups and organizations, all kinds of issues began to be raised with respect to India's motivations, intelligibility of such a decision, consequences of this act for regional and global security, and so on. Little attention, however, journalistic or scholarly, was paid to use by government of a significant racial signifier--nuclear apartheid--to justify and defend its actions. Simply put, nuclear-apartheid position quite starkly and compellingly points to material inequities in distribution of global nuclear resources--inequities that are written into, institutionalized, an d legitimized through some of major arms-control treaties, creating an elite club of nuclear haves with exclusive rights to maintain nuclear arsenals that are to be denied to vast majority of nuclear have-nots. What insights might we gain, as scholars of international relations, from interrogating invocation of race through deployment of nuclear-apartheid position? My attempt in this article is to draw out dynamics of two processes of racialization through a critical scrutiny of nuclear-apartheid position--both processes participating simultaneously in co-constructing racialized domestic and international hierarchic orders. In other words, I will argue that nuclear-apartheid position, articulated in voice of government, simultaneously performs a dual role: At same time that it points to a series of racial exclusions in contemporary global order, it also masks, and hence constitutes an Indian nation through another series of racialized exclusions. I argue that both these dynamics need to be understood simultaneously in order to grasp force and effect of deploying this position. I will briefly explain. It is clear that concept of apartheid draws its enunciative force from category of race, and I will argue that deployment of nuclear-apartheid position by government points to a racially institutionalized global hierarchy. In other words, scrutinizing nuclear-apartheid position means at very least taking seriously manner in which deployment of such a racial signifier by government is able to unsettle a certain taken-for-granted terrain in conduct of international relations and in writing of discipline. …

India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications

There is nothing quite like a big bang to focus minds, shatter prevalent myths and draw the attention of the whole world. With three big bangs on the afternoon of 11 May 1998, India - long suspected of being a weapons state - finally came out of the closet. Two days later, New Delhi tested two more devices, all of which was to eventually force Pakistan to follow suit. By blasting its way to self-proclaimed status as a power, India put a question mark over the widespread view that economic interdependence, globalization in the information age, and international co-operation will override traditional geopolitical concerns or military rivalries in the post-Cold War era. The tests challenged the myth that the world could live happily with the Big Five powers (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) armed to the teeth, while others could not. And they fundamentally altered the balance of power and undermined the global non-proliferation regime just when seemed to be in the process of consolidation. India's tests marked an end not only to ambiguity and uncertainty about India's posture but also to a 34-year long debate by India's strategic community (which began soon after China exploded its first bomb in 1964) over the pros and cons of going nuclear. No other weapons state (NWS) had ever agonized for as long as India has over whether should or should not be a power. There are two important questions in this context. Why did India publicly decide to go nuclear? And what are its implications? Rationale There were several reasons behind India's decision to blast its way into the exclusive weapons club. Those reasons are rooted in broad geopolitical issues and extend far beyond the narrow confines of the Indian subcontinent. Seen from New Delhi's perspective, these constituted compelling reasons for to acquire weapons. The year 1995 marked a turning point in India's policy towards weapons. India had all along championed the goal of disarmament, as opposed to non-proliferation. For this reason, New Delhi refused to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that perpetuated a nuclear apartheid of haves and have-nots, with the five haves failing to commit themselves to disarmament. From India's perspective, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995, which divided the world permanently into the haves and the have-nots, demonstrated that the five NWSs - which also happened to be the five permanent members (P-5) of the United Nations Security Council - were unwilling to negotiate, in good faith, disarmament. Then came the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 with its controversial Entry Into Force clause. This clause, inserted primarily at China's insistence, was strongly resisted by India, which required New Delhi to sign the CTBT by September 1999 or face the prospect of UN-imposed trade sanctions similar to the ones against Iraq. The utility of the CTBT lies in its ability to permanently freeze the perceived strategic and technological advantages of the NWSs while forever foreclosing the option to any other state. The discussions leading up to the CTBT shattered New Delhi's misplaced hope in disarmament in the post-Cold War world.(1) Wedged between a nuclear-armed China and a nuclear-capable Pakistan, India defended its right to build weapons on national security grounds. The NPT and CTBT were seen as instruments of surrender and unequal treaties, accession to which would have amounted to relegating countries like India into the ranks of second-grade nations.(2) Confronted with the cruel choice of use or lose it on the long-held option, India resolved to break out of the straitjacket stipulations of the CTBT and thereby end the monopoly of the five NWSs. …

The In-Comprehensive Test Ban

The author examines why the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB) treaty might not make it through the political minefields. Negotiators at the 60-nation U.N. The conference on Disarmament in Geneva reached an impasse, prompted by India`s assertions that the treaty was an inadequate document that perpetuated {open_quotes}nuclear apartheid{close_quotes} while violating India`s sovereignty. Because the Conference on Disarmament-often called the {open_quotes}Geneva Conference{close_quotes} or the {open_quotes}CD{close_quotes}-operates by consensus, India was able to veto the adoption of the treaty, which the conference had planned to transmit to the United Nations in early September. Australia saved the treaty with a last minute decision to bypass the Geneva Conference and take the CTB directly to the General Assembly in the form of a resolution. Some 127 nations co-sponsored Australia`s resolution, to which the treaty draft was attached. The General Assembly endorsed the treaty by a vote of 158 to three. India, Bhutan, and Libya voted against it. Despite the overwhelming vote, the treaty`s long-range outlook is uncertain. On the day of the vote, India`s chief test-ban negotiator, declared that India would {open_quotes}never sign this unequal treaty because Article XIV of the treaty, which requires that all 44 nuclear-capable nations who also belong to the Conferencemore » on Disarmament must sign and ratify the treaty. That requirement was viewed as contrary to international law because it denied India`s right of voluntary consent to an international treaty, thus violating India`s sovereignty.« less

Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010)

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