Dealing with the Bomb: Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and the Quest to Develop Usable Weapons

Abstract

In recent years, the US government has elevated the stature of nonproliferation in the realm of international affairs. For instance, on April 8, 2010, in Prague, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New START Treaty. Quickly ratified, the treaty will drastically reduce the number of both US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Nonproliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism also received the highest priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. These initiatives are the latest in a long chain of US efforts since 1945 to come to grips with the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons. Three recent books examine different aspects of this conundrum. In his study, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present, Shane J. Maddock, a professor of history at Stonehill College, examines Washington's efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons since 1945. Having an abiding faith in America's industrial might and technological innovation, both Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman believed that the United States could maintain a nuclear monopoly for many years. To a certain degree, their faith in the nuclear monopoly made sense on scientific and geopolitical grounds. During World War II, the United States was in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other countries to build an atomic bomb, as the country possessed the world's largest industrial base, a geographic location beyond the reach of enemy bombers, and an unparalleled body of nuclear scientists, many of whom fled Hitler's new order in Europe. By contrast, the Axis Powers, along with the Soviet Union and Britain, could not afford to divert resources to a hypothetical weapon while they were in the throes of an existential conflict. Moreover, the territories of all of these countries were subject to invasion and repeated bombings, which rendered large-scale research facilities vulnerable to destruction.