Nuclear Ambiguity Research Articles

İsrail’in Nükleer Belirsizlik Politikasının Orta Doğu’nun Güvenliğine Etkisi

Orta Doğu coğrafyasının güvenliğine yönelik tehditler arasında bölgesel anlaşmazlıklar ve konvansiyonel silah rekabetinde denge arayışı yer almakla birlikte en önemli tehditlerden birisi nükleer silahlardır. Orta Doğu coğrafyasına nükleer silahları sokan ilk devlet olan İsrail, 1960’lı yıllardan beri nükleer silahlara sahip olmasına rağmen, nükleer silahlarının varlığını hiçbir zaman resmi olarak doğrulamadığı, nükleer belirsizlik politikasını sürdürmektedir. İsrail, nükleer belirsizlik politikası ile Orta Doğu devletleri karşısında caydırıcılık avantajını sağlarken aynı zamanda Orta Doğu coğrafyasında nükleer tekelini koruma kararlılığını devam ettirmektedir. Ancak, İsrail’in nükleer silahları ve genişleyen füze ve uzay tabanlı gözetleme sistemleri, Orta Doğu devletleri ile arasındaki stratejik denge üzerinde derin bir etki yaratmaktadır. 
 
 Dünyanın diğer yerlerinde olduğu gibi, bir devletin kendi güvenliğini artırmaya yönelik askeri çabaları, diğer devletlerin kendilerini daha az güvende hissetmelerine ve dolayısıyla benzer çabalara girişme olasılıklarının artmasına neden olarak güvenlik ikilemi sorunu yaratmaktadır. Orta Doğu coğrafyasında da, İsrail’in nükleer kapasitesi bölge devletleri arasında güvenlik sorunlarına ve askeri dengesizliklere yol açmaktadır. Çalışmada güvenlik ikilemi kavramı, İsrail’in nükleer güce sahip olmasının Orta Doğu coğrafyasının güvenliği üzerindeki dinamikleri anlamlandırmada analitik bir kavram olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda çalışmanın amacı, İsrail’in nükleer kapasitesinin doğası ve gelişiminin incelenmesinin yanı sıra İsrail’in nükleer belirsizlik politikasının güvenlik ikilemi kavramı çerçevesinde Orta Doğu’nun güvenliği üzerindeki etkisinin değerlendirilmesidir. Çalışma, İsrail’in nükleer belirsizlik politikasının Orta Doğu coğrafyasının güvenliğini ve olası uzlaşmayı engellediğini ileri sürmektedir.

The evolution and future of Israeli nuclear ambiguity

ABSTRACT Israel’s posture of nuclear ambiguity has achieved a high level of consensus among its security elite, but are there any alternative approaches and what circumstances could facilitate change? This article argues that the longevity of ambiguity has been buttressed by three external factors that may change in the future and lead to a reassessment: the lack of another nuclear state in the region, bipartisan support in the United States, and the lack of a well-established peace in the region. To gain insight into the ideas that would inform a broader reassessment, I outline the strategic logic of three alternative approaches that have existed continuously in Israel’s security discourse. Nuclear advocates seek to move toward an open posture; nuclear skeptics seek to prevent proliferation by joining international treaties; and nuclear pragmatists support maintaining ambiguity under a US umbrella. Based on interviews with former officials, primary sources of Israeli elite discourse, and a broad survey of previous research, this article provides new insights into the making of Israel’s nuclear strategy by highlighting the continuity of the basic predispositions of each approach over the past 70 years, demonstrating how external factors have upheld the core elements of the policy of ambiguity while allowing room for changes on its margins, and outlining the possible future scenarios that may facilitate a more substantial policy shift.

Conceptualizing Pakistan's evolving nuclear policy after two decades of nuclearization

This article attempts to answer the question as to how much nuclear ambiguity prevails within the broader contours of Pakistan's nuclear policy and how challenging this could be for its evolving nuclear policy. While conceptualizing the rudimentary pillars of Pakistan's evolving nuclear policy, this article implies that although nuclear ambiguity plays a central role in Pakistan's evolving nuclear policy particularly at the operational level, it remains less ambiguous at the declaratory level despite the absence of detailed official documentation. As part of the policy implication for Pakistan in general and the South Asian region in particular, this article concludes that on the one hand nuclear ambiguity helps shape the essential pillars of Pakistan's nuclear policy, but on the other hand too much nuclear ambiguity in turn could become challenging for Pakistan as its nuclear policy gradually evolves to secure a effective command and control system for newer deterrent forces, retain flexibility between the nuclear and conventional forces, and strive for nuclear legitimacy.

Nuclear ambiguity, no-first-use, and crisis s­tability in asymmetric crises

ABSTRACTThe United States has long embraced calculated ambiguity over the conditions under which it might use nuclear weapons against adversaries, a trend that President Donald J. Trump has continued. This ambiguity could unsettle some observers, especially those who believe that the United States should declare a no-first-use (NFU) policy such that it would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons in either a crisis or an armed conflict. NFU advocates identify three potential pathways whereby a more ambiguous posture can lead to increased danger: downward spiral, accidental war, and use-it-or-lose-it. For evidence, they invoke Saddam Hussein’s risk-accepting decision to pre-delegate chemical-weapons use following US nuclear threats in the 1991 Gulf War. In analyzing the reasoning and evidence of these arguments, we argue that the alleged benefits of NFU may be overstated, at least for crisis stability in asymmetric crises, defined by one side’s overwhelming conventional military superiority. Each of the three foregoing pathways is logically inconsistent and the empirical case is misinterpreted. Nuclear ambiguity may not be so dangerous as NFU advocates claim.

South Asia's Missile Expansion

ABSTRACTOver the past decade, contrary to declarations that they are pursuing “minimum” deterrence, India and Pakistan have considerably expanded their missile forces. India has developed eleven types of missiles while Pakistan has fielded nine. These missile forces have a mixed impact on deterrence stability. Both states' medium-range missiles strengthen their countervalue deterrent capabilities against the other, though India's China-specific missiles still have limitations. India's and Pakistan's short-range missiles and first-generation naval systems raise concerns about nuclear ambiguity, command and control, and escalation across the nuclear threshold, ultimately undermining deterrence stability on the subcontinent.

Pakistan's Nuclear First-Use Doctrine: Obsessions and Obstacles

A close look at the literature on Pakistan's nuclear weapons doctrine reveals the ambiguity in Pakistan's nuclear-use options. Pakistani officials and commentators leave open the possibility that Pakistan would use its nuclear weapon first, but it is not clear when, where, or how it would. Others conclude that Islamabad would use its nuclear weapon only as a last resort, but that condition too remains vague. This article examines the puzzle of Pakistan's nuclear weapons use, demonstrating that ambiguity plays a central role in Pakistan's nuclear weapons policy, much as nuclear ambiguity exists in each nuclear weapons state's policy. This article departs from previous research and commentary on Pakistan's nuclear doctrine by introducing the thesis that Pakistan's nuclear ambiguity is real, but far from internationally unique. Pakistan, like the USA at the onset of the nuclear era, relies on nuclear weapons for survival. The development of Pakistan's forces, including tactical nuclear weapons, suggests an emphasis on counterforce targeting. The role of domestic political processes, the civil–military dilemma and its impact on strategic policy in Pakistan, have received considerable attention, but still require untangling. Progress towards no first use probably requires changes to the conventional balance in South Asia, and stronger democratic, civilian rule in Pakistan, free of direct intervention from the army. Finally, global dynamics shaping the salience of nuclear weapons globally cannot be disregarded in any assessment of South Asian and Pakistani dynamics.

The conceptual essentials of minimum: explaining Pakistan's rationale of minimum deterrence

Very little is known about Pakistan's nuclear policy and, in particular, about its adoption of minimum deterrence, given the existence of nuclear ambiguity and the absence of public, official documentation of Pakistan's understanding of minimum deterrence. Therefore, despite its innocuousness, ‘minimum’ remains a vague and complex phenomenon short of definitional concreteness when it is brought to a real conceptual test. On the one hand, minimum is regarded as a small number of deterrent forces arguing against expansion and arms competition, while, on the other hand, it is viewed as a relative, and therefore continually evolving, concept depending on the region's fast-changing strategic environment. A conceptual basis for the concept of minimum is explored, leading to the question: why does Pakistan pursue minimum deterrence? It traces out the rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence as conceptualized following the 1998 nuclear tests. This rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence is then analysed in light of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to see whether it is consistent with the basics of minimum as conceived here.

Misuse of power in Israeli intelligence

One of the relatively minor security organizations in the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the MALMAB – tasked with protecting Israel's well-known policy of nuclear ambiguity – has gone beyond the usual criminal process established by the rule of law to the grey area of interrogating and even harassing people who seemed to not abide by its strict policies, thus highlighting the tension between legal rules and non-legal sanctions exercised in the name of national security. This article analyses three different cases connected to the issue of nuclear ambiguity, while aiming to debate the sensitive issue, prominent in every democracy, of the limits and balance of security versus democracy.

The Sum of all Fears: Israel's Perception of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Thucydides’ ancient logic still governs: uncertainty (over Iran’s nuclear intentions) and the fear this inspires (in Israel) increases the risk of another war (in the Middle East). Even if Israel’s response to the Iranian nuclear program does not lead the region into a war, Israel’s fears will be crucial in shaping Middle Eastern politics and will help to determine the stability of the region in the years ahead. The U.S. public has been hearing about Israeli fears of a nuclear Iran for several years. It is understandable if most Americans discount this drama as

The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb (review)

Reviewed by: The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb Emily B. Landau The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb, by Avner Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 370 pp. $27.99 The added value of Avner Cohen's new book on Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity—or as he prefers to call it, "amimut"—is at the descriptive level: interesting historical and anecdotal evidence and documentation on the birth, development, and supporting features of Israel's bargain with the bomb. But analytically speaking, Cohen's book is largely a disappointment. He is critical of amimut and informs his reader from the outset that the time has come for change. But when he attempts to support his thesis—on both domestic and strategic grounds—the result is weak and unsubstantiated. It is quite clear that the impetus for writing this book was the domestic Israeli front, and the unacceptable costs that Cohen believes that Israel as a society and a state has paid for maintaining secrecy in the nuclear realm and upholding the national nuclear taboo. Intellectually, however, Cohen knows that the case for ending amimut must be anchored in strategic realities. The problem is that his two "strategic" chapters—which appear almost as an afterthought —offer a logic that doesn't stand up to scrutiny, especially for the more informed reader. On the issue of taboo, it seems that Cohen cannot escape the chains of his own past experience—namely, the personal price that he paid with the taboo-keepers [End Page 148] in Israel for writing his previous book on Israel and the Bomb. But this personal aversion to secrecy should not be confused with the strategic dimensions and implications of Israel's policy of ambiguity and/or the discussion of whether the time has come for a change. Cohen's depiction of the taboo's effect on society is troubling. His static portrayal fails to appreciate the reality that has evolved in Israel, especially over the past 10 to 15 years: the quite extensive debate that is carried out on this topic in Israel on a regular basis—in the media, at conferences, and in academic writing. Academics address the nuclear issue frequently and without concern. One of Cohen's mistakes is to reduce "having a debate on the nuclear issue" to the presence of an active protest movement against the bomb—a problematic criterion for assessing whether Israelis discuss their nation's nuclear policy. Cohen has harsh words for the Israeli public—he regards Israelis as willing accomplices in a culture of non-debate of nuclear issues. He derides them and complains that they support the nuclear policy even though they don't understand it. Even the educated, in his view, have little understanding of the "legal and political intricacies of the nonproliferation regime," and blindly support amimut. From their position of ignorance, "Israelis regard compromising amimut as a direct threat to their national security." But Israelis might be smarter than Cohen gives them credit for. Indeed, they most likely well understand the rather straightforward strategic logic of nuclear ambiguity, which gives them an insurance policy at very low cost. They also seem to realize that "coming clean" will be viewed negatively world-wide, and will increase demands for Israel to disarm. Indeed, although Cohen assumes that people are holding on to their positions for the wrong reasons, they are more likely doing so for the right ones. At the end of the day, the strongest advocate for the continuation of a nuclear taboo—in the sense that he will not admit to any erosion of the omnipresent norm—seems to be Avner Cohen himself. The taboo is actually the linchpin of his analysis—without it, his thesis crumbles. On the strategic front—where the logic of amimut is solid and strong—Cohen's attempt to undermine the policy is even more problematic. He provides a superficial and often tautological reasoning for ending amimut that rests on repeated assertions that the policy is anachronistic. But to say that "everybody knows" Israel is nuclear is not a compelling argument—this has been the situation for at least 25 years. And...

Iran and nuclear ambiguity

A comparison between Iran's current nuclear efforts and those of the pro-Western regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi shows that Iranian ambitions for a full-fledged civilian nuclear programme have remained relatively constant for nearly half a century. Today, fuel cycle technology provides Iran with a latent nuclear weapon's potential. However, US concerns about an Iranian bomb, which began in the early 1970s and aggravated after the Iranian Revolution, long predate Teheran's uranium enrichment programme. Thus, Iran is a specific case of the general problem presented by the inherent potential of nuclear technology to both civilian and military ends. Approaches to dealing with a long-term, ambiguous, latent nuclear weapon threat, whether Iranian or other, are suggested.

The Nuclear Factor in India’s Foreign Policy

Throughout the history of independent India, nuclear and foreign policy issues have been democratically debated in the country. The nuclear debate, particularly, may be seen in four phases. The debate soon after independence was marked by the country’s concerns for disarmament and nonalignment. After China’s attack on India in 1962, the debate centered around India’s concerns about nuclear proliferation, loopholes in the nonproliferation regime and the dilemma whether India should manufacture its own nuclear weapons. The third phase of the debate commenced in 1998, after India successfully tested its nuclear weapons at Pokhran. (The earlier test in 1974 was avowedly a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion.) The focus in the current phase of the nuclear debate (the fourth phase) is whether nuclear weaponization is a continuity or departure from India’s long-held policy of nuclear ambiguity. India’s engagement with the US in the post-Pokhran-II period and the recently concluded Indo-US civilian nuclear deal has brought the debate of “continuity or change” in India’s foreign policy to the fore. One school is of the view that the nuclear tests and post-Pokhran-II diplomacy have changed the way the Indian elite began to think about external relations; that nuclear diplomacy has inevitably brought maturity and self-assurance to India’s foreign policy. The other school, while viewing the policy of nuclear weaponization not as continuity but a “reactionary departure”, considers the burgeoning Indo-US strategic partnership as a euphemism for India’s joining the “US Empire” as a junior partner, unmindful of its long-term national interest. While India’s domestic nuclear debate is prominent in academic and media discourse, the intrinsic link between the country’s nuclear policy and its foreign policy and how nuclear policy has impinged upon the foreign policy discourse has not been enquired adequately. Indian diplomacy has always shouldered the responsibility of propagating the country’s beliefs, concerns, and agenda in the nuclear domain and allaying misapprehensions regarding its nuclear policy. In turn, the nuclear factor has sufficiently influenced the structure, nature and strategy of Indian diplomatic undertakings. This paper highlights the importance of the nuclear factor in India’s foreign policy discourse and how it has remained a major determinant in its diplomatic endeavor.

Deep in the Basement

Research Article| September 01 2009 Deep in the Basement: Israel's Harmonious Nuclear Ambiguity Michael Karpin Michael Karpin 1Michael Karpin is the author of The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel went Nuclear and What That Means for the World (Simon & Schuster, 2006) and Tightrope: Six Centuries of a Jewish Dynasty (Wiley, 2008). Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google World Policy Journal (2009) 26 (3): 31–40. https://doi.org/10.1162/wopj.2009.26.3.31 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Karpin; Deep in the Basement: Israel's Harmonious Nuclear Ambiguity. World Policy Journal 1 September 2009; 26 (3): 31–40. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/wopj.2009.26.3.31 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsWorld Policy Journal Search Advanced Search Issue Section: ARTICLE You do not currently have access to this content.

Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea

Between the poles of nuclear-weapons acquisition and transparent disarmament lies a third option: cultivating ambiguity about capabilities. The current crises with Iran and North Korea are playing out against the backdrop of the contrasting nonproliferation precedents set in 2003 - in Iraq, through a change of regime, and, in Libya, through change within a regime. Washington has sent mixed messages to Tehran and Pyongyang whether the US objective is regime change or behaviour change. Coercive diplomacy, combining credible inducements and penalties to roll back their nuclear programmes, is not possible when the goal is the maximalist one of regime change. But even if the United States clarifies its objective, negotiations with North Korea and Iran can realistically aim only to narrow, but not to eliminate, the ambiguity. A strategy of containment, whose key elements are deterrence and reassurance, offers the best approach for narrowing and hedging against these states' nuclear ambiguity.

To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The Impact of Nuclear Ambiguity on Israeli Security

This article argues that Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, which has recently come under fire due to unfolding events in the Middle East, has played a critical role in the Arab world's strategic calculus vis-à-vis Israel. It has convinced Arab leaders of Israel's military superiority, putting an end to their efforts to annihilate the Jewish state. At the same time, it has shielded them from public pressure to become nuclear powers themselves. Indeed, Arab leaders have, in practice, reconciled themselves to Israel's existence, creating the possibility for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict through peace diplomacy. Israel would be mistaken, I argue, to abandon its doctrine of nuclear ambiguity, a move that could accelerate nuclear proliferation in the region, bring about a pre-emptive attack on Israel's nuclear facilities, and harm US-Israeli relations.

Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Asher Arian, Ilan Talmud and Tamar Hermann, National Security and Public Opinion in Israel, Tel Aviv, 1988. 2. Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, Cambridge, MA, 1988, pp. 386–387m 3. See Protocols of the Vanunu Trial, No. 260139. 4. Shlomo Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, Albany, NY, 1992. 5. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, Tel Aviv, 1983. 6. Yuval Neeman, ‘Israel in the Nuclear Age’, Nativ, Vol. 5, No. 46 (1995). 7. Avner Cohen, ‘Nuclear Weapons, Opacity, and Israeli Democracy’, in Avner Yaniv (ed.), National Security and Democracy in Israel, Boulder and London, 1993. 8. Dina Goren, Secrecy and The Right to Know, Ramat Gan, 1979. 9. Moshe Negbi, Paper Tiger: The Struggle for Press Freedom in Israel, Tel Aviv, 1985. 10. Zeev Segal, Freedom of the Press — Between Myth and Reality, Tel Aviv, 1996. 11. Protocols of the Vanunu Trial, No. 260138. 12. Politika, November 1987. 13. Davar, 29–30 December 1986. 14. Alternativa, March 1987; June 1987. 15. Politika, March 1987. 16. Asher Arian, ‘Public Opinion in Israel on the Nuclear Subject’, Strategic Update, November 1998. 17. Goren, Secrecy and the Right to Know, Chapters 10, 11. 18. Survey carried put by the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1999. 19. Ha'aretz, 29 March 2000. 20. Ha'aretz, 29 March 2000 21. Ha'aretz, 29 March 2000, 25 May 2000. 22. Ha'aretz, 29 March 2000, 29 March 2000. 23. Survey by the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1987. 24. Ha'aretz, 25 March 1976. 25. Address by Hanoch Marmori at conference on ‘Nuclear Weaponry, the Public and The Media’, Haifa University, 1995. 26. Politika, November 1992. 27. Zvi Lavie, ‘The Editors Committee: Myth and Reality’, in 1987 Journalists Yearbook, Tel Aviv, Israel Journalists' Association. 28. Ha'aretz, 12 October 1962. 29. Politika, March 1987. 30. Shishi, 24 February 1993. 31. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York, 1998; Yediot Aharonot, 12 June 2000; http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/israel/history/ltm. 32. Ha'aretz, 20 July 2000. 33. Ha'aretz, 17 August 1998. 34. pp. 508–511. 35. Sunday Times, 5 October 1986; Yoel Cohen, The Whistleblower from Dimona: Vanunu, Israel and the Bomb, Tel Aviv, 2005. 36. William Burrows and Robert Windem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superpowers a Fragmenting World, NewYork, 1994. 37. Ha'aretz, 29 February 1976. 38. Harold Hough, ‘Israel's Nuclear Infrastructure’, Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1994. 39. Ma'ariv, 29 April 1994. Additional informationNotes on contributorsYoel CohenYoel Cohen is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Communications, Netanya Academic College, Netanya, Israel. He is author of Whistleblowers and the Bomb: Vanunu, Israel, & Nuclear Secrecy (London, Pluto Press 2005).

Israel and Samson: Biblical Lessons for Israeli Strategy in the Nuclear Age

Although Israel's strategic posture of nuclear ambiguity has assuredly not led to any serious doubts about its overall nuclear capacity, there is no necessary correlation between such a capacity and enemy perceptions of usable nuclear power. Before Israel's nuclear arsenal can purposefully enhance that country's security, it will first have to contribute recognizably to Israeli nuclear deterrence and to Israel's perceived ability to undertake certain vital preemptions. With these points in mind, this article seeks to draw certain timely strategic lessons for Israel from the hero of the post-Pentateuchal Book, JUDGES. Looking to Samson, Israel can learn new ways to enhance its nuclear deterrence, preemption and warfighting options. Here, Scripture can inform strategy-and in surprisingly imaginative and generally unanticipated ways. The article explicitly identifies six important lessons from Samson: (1) Perceived willingness to take some existential risks can strengthen Israel's deterrence, preemption and warfighting postures; (2) Israel, like Samson, possesses great strength, but that strength can be blunted if it is not properly understood and exploited; (3) Israel must soon understand from Samson that all things move in the midst of death, and that such an understanding is altogether critical to defeating its Arab/Islamic enemies; (4) Israel can benefit from Samson's very concrete and palpable sense of catastrophe; from learning that its physical survival is never assured; (5) Samson can teach Israel that there is great and mortal danger in wishful thinking; and (6) Along similar lines, Israel can learn from Samson that self-delusion is a threat on several different levels, including the nurturance of erroneous presumptions about the stability of the state system itself-a decentralized system of world politics that came into being in 1648, after the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia.

The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy

M ost observers seem to agree on three issues regarding Israel's nuclear policy. First, Israel's acquisition of a significant nuclear capability occurred over a relatively long period of time. Second, its policy of nuclear ambiguity has been balanced and sound, enabling Israel to develop a nuclear arsenal while maintaining close relations with the United States and other countries committed to nuclear non-

Pakistan's nuclear strategy

The debate on the rationale for Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence and the security of Pakistan has been intertwined. Many Pakistani defence analysts see both deterrence and security as synonymous. This paper analyses Pakistan's nuclear strategy in the context of first, its threat perception, second, its plan to achieve parity with India and third, its objective after the tests to portray Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint to persuade the world community's indulgence and intervention to resolve the issue. Pakistan, like India, has maintained nuclear ambiguity and mentioned the deterrence value of its nuclear strategy. This paper also analyses Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy from the perspective of its security and discusses its nuclear doctrine, its nuclear strategy in the context of the Kargil conflict and the recent standoff with India to examine the extent to which it has been able to achieve its objectives of nuclear deterrence. The ambit of the paper further includes the impact that Pakistan's nuclear strategy has had on its Kashmir policy.

Pakistan's Nuclear Testing

South Asia’s security profile underwent a major transformation following India’s nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, and Pakistan’s matching response on May 28 and 30. These actions brought an end to the policy of nuclear ambiguity–that despite having nuclear weapon capability, weaponization was avoided–the two countries had been pursuing since the mid-1980s. As a result, the tests made “South Asia and the world a more dangerous place.”1 It could be argued that Pakistan’s response was predictable after India resorted to nuclear explosions because Pakistan had traditionally tagged its nuclear policy with that of India. However, there were signs in the aftermath of India’s nuclear testing that Pakistan might delay but not abandon further nuclear detonations. In the first flush of the nuclear dawn, the Pakistani government withstood the pressure of the pro-bomb domestic groups, who argued that India’s explosions had created a zero-sum situation for Pakistan. The top civil and military leadership summoned the country’s leading nuclear scientists within hours of India’s nuclear explosions on May 11 for a briefing on Pakistan’s preparedness to undertake its own nuclear detonations. The scientists were instructed to begin preparatory work on the already-selected site in Chagai (Balochistan). However, it was not until May 20 that the decisive tilt in favor of testing began to take shape. By May 24–25, the top civil and military leaders made up their minds in favor. The final signal was given in the early hours of May 28.