Pakistan's Nuclear Testing

Abstract

South Asia’s security profile underwent a major transformation following India’s nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, and Pakistan’s matching response on May 28 and 30. These actions brought an end to the policy of nuclear ambiguity–that despite having nuclear weapon capability, weaponization was avoided–the two countries had been pursuing since the mid-1980s. As a result, the tests made “South Asia and the world a more dangerous place.”1 It could be argued that Pakistan’s response was predictable after India resorted to nuclear explosions because Pakistan had traditionally tagged its nuclear policy with that of India. However, there were signs in the aftermath of India’s nuclear testing that Pakistan might delay but not abandon further nuclear detonations. In the first flush of the nuclear dawn, the Pakistani government withstood the pressure of the pro-bomb domestic groups, who argued that India’s explosions had created a zero-sum situation for Pakistan. The top civil and military leadership summoned the country’s leading nuclear scientists within hours of India’s nuclear explosions on May 11 for a briefing on Pakistan’s preparedness to undertake its own nuclear detonations. The scientists were instructed to begin preparatory work on the already-selected site in Chagai (Balochistan). However, it was not until May 20 that the decisive tilt in favor of testing began to take shape. By May 24–25, the top civil and military leaders made up their minds in favor. The final signal was given in the early hours of May 28.