Nuclear Ambiguity Research Articles

Indian and Pakistani views on nuclear deterrence

While officials in India and Pakistan have been virtually silent on the issue of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, a small number of nonofficial strategists in both countries are moving to fill the void. They describe the current low‐level nuclear standoff as “recessed deterrence.” Nuclear weapons advocates within this group have voiced their dissatisfaction with the status quo, ostensibly because nuclear ambiguity undermines stability. This has led them to promote the concept of “minimum deterrence,” described essentially as a scaled‐down version of the superpower assured destruction doctrine. Generally, strategists that favor nuclear deployment have high confidence that India and Pakistan would be responsible nuclear powers. They also contend that just as nuclear deterrence stabilized U.S.‐Soviet relations, so too can it work for South Asia. Other analysts are more skeptical, both of the premise behind minimum deterrence and the observance of nuclear restraint in the subcontinent. They likewise question...

Futility or Utility in Nuclear Ambiguity: A Response to Myhra and Forge's Neo‐realism

Australian Journal of Politics & HistoryVolume 41, Issue 3 p. 435-439 Futility or Utility in Nuclear Ambiguity: A Response to Myhra and Forge's Neo-realism Ralph Summy, Ralph SummySearch for more papers by this author Ralph Summy, Ralph SummySearch for more papers by this author First published: December 1995 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.1995.tb01271.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume41, Issue3December 1995Pages 435-439 RelatedInformation

The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East

A major task of the literature on international regimes is the attempt to identify the conditions under which regimes are likely to emerge. The article evaluates the contribution of this literature to understanding the absence of a nuclear regime in the Middle East and the likely paths which may lead to one in the future. I identify four possible stylized outcomes: overt deterrence, regional “opaqueness,” controlled proliferation, and a nuclear-weapons-free-zone; only the last two fulfill the definitional requirements of a regime. I explore how the three major theoretical thrusts in regime theory—neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and reflectivism—explain why regional opaqueness—rather than overt deterrence or a regime—has been the outcome so far. I then suggest that analyzing the domestic consequences of each regional outcome appears more useful than its conceptual alternatives in explaining why opaqueness was maintained, and why it may be abandoned. The article ends with some lessons from this case for the study of regional and international regimes.

Israel's nuclear ambiguity

Israel's nuclear weapons policy, surrounded by ambiguity and public silence until last fall's revelation about the country's weapons production plant, should now be openly debated in the context of Middle East security.

The Fallacies of Nuclear Ambiguity

The Fallacies of Nuclear Ambiguity