Notion Of Perfection Research Articles

"Sheltered and secure": Facilitators and barriers toward recovery for Haredi Jewish women with mental illness.

The overall aim of this study was to elicit and document the recovery-related perspectives and experiences of Haredi Jews with lived experience of mental illness living in Canada. A more focused objective was to specifically explore self-identified facilitators and barriers toward recovery from mental illness in this group. We conducted a qualitative study involving semistructured interviews with 20 women who (a) identified as Haredi Jews, (b) had used mental health services in recent years, and (c) were 18+ years of age. Interviews were transcribed and analyzed using thematic analysis techniques. Four prominent themes emerged from the analysis. The first two themes were predominantly facilitators, and the last two themes were predominantly barriers. These themes were (i) a close-knit, supportive, and lively community with considerable social capital; (ii) Judaic beliefs and practices regarding Gd, daily life, and health care giving structure, meaning, and purpose; (iii) community stigma and self-stigma, often related to marriageability of self or offspring, as well as notions of perfection; and (iv) a lack of wider mental health literacy, despite participants speaking positively about mental health services such as medication and therapy. This study indicates several individual-level and community-level factors that are reported to facilitate recovery in Haredi Jews. However, problems of stigma and mental health literacy remain an issue. Targeted antistigma programs, such as co-constructed contact-based educational interventions, may be helpful in contributing to a community climate that further facilitates recovery. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

“Lost in Austen,” Found in Regency

The charm of Jane Austen’s writing and the historical context of the Regency era are so appealing that even in the 21st century, Austen texts and contents have continued to be produced through adaptations. These adaptations that function as re-visitings of the Austenian Regency have presented visual realms where we voyeuristically gaze and miss the Austenian past with nostalgic feelings. Austen, as a keen observer and social critic of her time, occupies such a place at the heart of the cultural heritage that she has become the symbol of Englishness whose works are the tools to remind longed notions of perfection and innocence lost after the Industrial Revolution. With the reflection of the romance plot, in these adaptations, the remote space of the Austenian Regency has become a “heterotopia” where past and present coexist simultaneously. In this article, I assert that the ITV mini-series Lost in Austen (2008), directed by Dan Zeff as an example of current adaptations, compares the Regency and the contemporary in such a way that it leads the forthcoming 21st-century adaptations to evolve into neo-Austenian phase that evokes a postmodern sense of nostalgia.

Dietrich of Freiberg’s Theory of Perfectional Forms

Abstract This article investigates the philosophical elaboration of the concept of “perfectional form” (forma perfectionalis) in Dietrich of Freiberg’s works. Although Dietrich draws on the traditional notion of perfection to a certain extent, it appears that in his view, what he calls perfectional forms represent a special type of form distinct from the classical division between substantial and accidental forms. The main part of the article analyzes the different uses of this concept made by Dietrich, from his theory of light to his views on the essence of the intellect. The final part of this study aims to evaluate the influence of Dietrich’s theory on the so-called German Dominican school. It is argued that, while Dietrich’s influence on Nicholas of Strasbourg is possible but cannot be firmly established, his theory was explicitly taken up and extended to a more metaphysical dimension by Berthold of Moosburg.

Both Sides Now: Reflections on Writing Zayn Adam’s Biography

Biography (hereinafter construed to also include autobiography) is an attempt to reconstruct a life through various biographic means, ranging from, amongst others, access to (archival) records, documents, interviews etc. These fragmentary pieces are of necessity not representative of an ‘entire’ life but constitute some of the component parts which the biographer must use to construct a life. Consequently, the process of biographic writing has an intrinsic, built-in flaw, that is, it is impossible to ‘rewrite’ a life perfectly. Even the notion of perfection is flawed, precisely because what constitutes a life has no inherent definition, life being composed of both visible, and invisible (psychological and spiritual) dimensions, the latter not being readily accessible or available to interrogation because they reside in a non-physical space unless the subject makes this material available through, for example, writing their thoughts down or disclosing them in conversation (at the time, for example, of an interview).Thus, this essay reflects on precisely the difficult journey of (re)constructing a life and creating, like film adaptations of novels do, a particular, nuanced biographic offering that coincides with what perhaps is the biographer’s first goal, merely to ‘write’ about somebody, but which, inevitably, becomes more than just a one-dimensional excavation of personal history, and instead, evolves, not unlike narrative fiction, into a dynamic weaving together of mini-narratives into a story-world, replete with protagonist, multiple characters and a life trajectory. I shall also draw on the works of various experts on biography, such as, Biography as High Adventure: Life writers speak on their art (ed. Stephen B. Oates), Beyond memory: recording the history, moments and memories of South African music (Max Mojapelo and Sello Galane) and Metaphors of Self (James Olney), among others, to help articulate my journey and its unique challenges..

Around Logical Perfection

AbstractIn this article we present a notion of “logical perfection”. We first describe through examples a notion of logical perfection extracted from the contemporary logical concept of categoricity. Categoricity (in power) has become in the past half century a main driver of ideas in model theory, both mathematically (stability theory may be regarded as a way of approximating categoricity) and philosophically. In the past two decades, categoricity notions have started to overlap with more classical notions of robustness and smoothness. These have been crucial in various parts of mathematics since the nineteenth century. We postulate and present the category of logical perfection. We draw on various notions of perfection from mathematics of the 19th and 20th centuries and then trace the relation to the concept of categoricity in power as a logical notion of what a “mathematically perfect” structure is.

Battista Carioni da Crema (c.1460–1534) and the ‘Third Life’: Visions of Reform in Early Sixteenth-Century Italy

Abstract This essay sheds new light on the spirituality and historical significance of the influential and controversial Dominican friar Battista Carioni da Crema (c.1460–1534). A popular spiritual writer, charismatic founder of devout associations such as the Barnabites, and a spiritual director of several well-known Catholic figures, including Gaetano Thiene, Battista’s significance has not yet been fully acknowledged. The essay considers his spirituality in the framework of reforming movements emerging in Italy in the first half of the sixteenth century. In dialogue with previous interpretations of Battista, the essay provides a novel and systematic analysis of his notion of perfection and concept of the Church. Synthesising ascetic and mystic spiritual influences rooted in the monastic and humanist culture of the fifteenth century, Battista presented a distinctive view of Christian life, which included an ecclesiological perspective and a new geography of the sacred. Defined as the ‘third life’ and conceived in a period of religious fluidity, it neither fitted emerging Lutheran ideas nor the orthodox Catholicism of the Roman Church. In addition, the essay argues that Battista’s proselytism can be seen as an attempt to reform society which preceded proposals for religious reform made by groups such as the Spirituali.

How Much Is Enough in a Perfect World? Cultural Variation in Ideal Levels of Happiness, Pleasure, Freedom, Health, Self-Esteem, Longevity, and Intelligence

The maximization principle—that people aspire to the highest possible level of something good if all practical constraints are removed—is a common yet untested assumption about human nature. We predict that in holistic cultures—where contradiction, change, and context are emphasized—ideal states of being for the self will be more moderate than in other cultures. In two studies (Ns = 2,392 and 6,239), we asked this question: If participants could choose their ideal level of happiness, pleasure, freedom, health, self-esteem, longevity, and intelligence, what level would they choose? Consistent with predictions, results showed that maximization was less pronounced in holistic cultures; members of holistic cultures aspired to less happiness, pleasure, freedom, health, self-esteem, longevity, and IQ than did members of other cultures. In contrast, no differences emerged on ideals for society. The studies show that the maximization principle is not a universal aspect of human nature and that there are predictable cultural differences in people’s notions of perfection.

Extensive Form Generalized Games

This paper introduces extensive form generalized games, a general framework for modeling dynamic strategic settings where players' feasible strategies depend on the strategies chosen by others. Extensive form generalized games nest a variety of existing game theoretic frameworks, including games with bounded rationality, endogenous information acquisition, rationally inattentive players, and games played by finite automata. Sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in behavioral strategies are provided for finite extensive form generalized games, and are shown to be tight. The most salient of these conditions, generalized perfect recall, is a generalized convexity condition which is equivalent to perfect recall in standard extensive form games. Feasibility correspondences describing rational inattention are shown to satisfy generalized perfect recall, and a notion of perfection is introduced to rule out incredible self restraint, a novel type of incredible threat in these settings.

Backpackers’ Utopianism in Alex Garland’s “THE BEACH”

This study focuses on analyzing the backpackers' utopianism in Alex Garland’s The Beach and the problem presented in this study is how is the backpackers’ utopianism presented in the novel. The study intends to identify utopianism that exist in the backpackers' community. The writers hopes that this study can give contribution to those interested in further analyzing the novel. In this case, the library research is used and the objective theory is employed as the basic principal of the analysis. Having a desire to find and experience something unusual and different through travel is what drives many young western backpackers to Thailand with adventure on their mind. Unfortunately what they find is no more than just a dirty reality of many overrun tourist resorts instead of a tourist free tropical paradise they long. Existing among those popularized tourist resorts is apparently, the beach, known for its beauty and natural purity. The beach happens to be an improbable tale among backpackers and travelers. However, for some other backpackers, this beach does exist. Guided by quite a top secret map, three backpackers find their pristine beach on an unspoiled island of Thailand. Once there, they are convinced that they have discovered Eden, or at least their very own version of it. Wearied by many overrun tourist spots, and impressed by the beauty of foe beach, those backpackers decide to live on the beach area eternally and secretly. In, this secret community, those backpackers adapt to foe needs and pleasures of alternatives. Unfortunately those backpackers supposedly ideal beach life is unable to be perfectly realize due to the imperfection that they find there, or more to the point, the imperfections they find within themselves. After, studying the backpackers utopianism, the writer can conclude that the backpackers’ notion of perfection upon an ideal place is in fact normal for it suggest the nature of humans as an imaginative creatures endowed with desire for perfection, especially reaction to their imperfect world. Aside from that, humans are, at the same time, likely to be considered absurd for being utopians those appear to be too exigent in demanding their particular version of ideal and thus, being less aware of the impracticability of his ideal. It is therefore to say that humans need to be sensible in idealizing their dreams. They must have complete knowledge and awareness of their own capability instead of blind faith.

Cosmopolitan Sociality and the Bildungsroman

Cosmopolitan Sociality and the Bildungsroman

Back to the Future

This article presents a reconceptualization of public administration within a profoundly different political economy. The depiction is based on an alternative set of assumptions to those most typically held about human nature and the corollary approach to political and economic life. Ideas are drawn from two sets of scholars, each writing respectively at the turn of the last two centuries. As both historical periods are marked by claims of progressivism, the reconceptualization is framed around an alternative understanding of “progress” and exploration of a political economy that would support this different meaning. Specifically, in a relational rather than material understanding of progress, public administration would be transformed into a process of self-governance within political and economic institutions based on assumptions of generative rather than degenerative principles that replace fear with love, scarcity with abundance, self-interest with mutual interest, and dialectical competition and hierarchy with collaboration. Although this might sound utopian at face value, no such notions of perfection are assumed. Rather, the methods of progress—collaboration and cocreation—are simply assumed to be possible and the proper basis for social institutions seeking to foster them. This reconceptualization offers a transformational role for public administration in advocating a new meaning of progress, cocreating political democracy, democratizing the economy, and changing the role of government, in addition to a facilitative role in the resulting political economy.

Backpackers’ Utopianism in Alex Garland’s “THE BEACH”

This study focuses on analyzing the backpackers' utopianism in Alex Garland’s The Beach and the problem presented in this study is how is the backpackers’ utopianism presented in the novel. The study intends to identify utopianism that exist in the backpackers' community. The writers hopes that this study can give contribution to those interested in further analyzing the novel. In this case, the library research is used and the objective theory is employed as the basic principal of the analysis.Having a desire to find and experience something unusual and different through travel is what drives many young western backpackers to Thailand with adventure on their mind. Unfortunately what they find is no more than just a dirty reality of many overrun tourist resorts instead of a tourist free tropical paradise they long. Existing among those popularized tourist resorts is apparently, the beach, known for its beauty and natural purity. The beach happens to be an improbable tale among backpackers and travelers. However, for some other backpackers, this beach does exist. Guided by quite a top secret map, three backpackers find their pristine beach on an unspoiled island of Thailand. Once there, they are convinced that they have discovered Eden, or at least their very own version of it. Wearied by many overrun tourist spots, and impressed by the beauty of foe beach, those backpackers decide to live on the beach area eternally and secretly. In, this secret community, those backpackers adapt to foe needs and pleasures of alternatives. Unfortunately those backpackers supposedly ideal beach life is unable to be perfectly realize due to the imperfection that they find there, or more to the point, the imperfections they find within themselves.After, studying the backpackers utopianism, the writer can conclude that the backpackers’ notion of perfection upon an ideal place is in fact normal for it suggest the nature of humans as an imaginative creatures endowed with desire for perfection, especially reaction to their imperfect world. Aside from that, humans are, at the same time, likely to be considered absurd for being utopians those appear to be too exigent in demanding their particular version of ideal and thus, being less aware of the impracticability of his ideal. It is therefore to say that humans need to be sensible in idealizing their dreams. They must have complete knowledge and awareness of their own capability instead of blind faith.

Between coloring and list-coloring: μ-coloring

A new variation of the coloring problem, μ-coloring, is defined in this paper. A coloring of a graph G = (V,E) is a function f : V → N such that f(v) 6= f(w) if v is adjacent to w. Given a graph G = (V,E) and a function μ : V → N, G is μ-colorable if it admits a coloring f with f(v) ≤ μ(v) for each v ∈ V . It is proved that μ-coloring lies between coloring and list-coloring, in the sense of generalization of problems and computational complexity. Furthermore, the notion of perfection is extended to μ-coloring, giving rise to a new characterization of cographs. Finally, a polynomial time algorithm to solve μ-coloring for cographs is shown.

Man of the century

To the Editor, In June 1997, the journal devoted an entire issue to assisted suicide and euthanasia. In the November-December 1999 issue, Drs Rodriguez and Gorovitz1 imply that guns have no acceptable uses, so the civilian population should be disarmed. Drs Caplan, McGee, and Magnus2 ask, “What is immoral about eugenics?” and conclude that the pursuit of “perfection” is permissible if coercion is absent. How to guarantee its absence is not stated. In short, the authors, and presumably the editors, believe it is both ethical and safe to construct a society in which the elite are free to pursue their notions of perfection—and, by extension, their desires on what to do with imperfection—on a helpless populace. I would be fascinated to learn my uncle's opinion of these developments, but I cannot do so; he died in the Lodz Ghetto during the Holocaust. The mere fact that the Nazis did something does not mean we must avoid it. Hitler detested smoking, was a vegetarian, and drank little alcohol; this does not mean I should smoke a pack of cigarettes daily, eat red meat at every meal, and drink myself into a stupor. But if what the Nazis did was integral to their murderous program, surely we should be reluctant to do something similar. That the ideas of euthanasia and eugenics, plus a disarmed populace, do not evoke anxiety in many physicians and scientists is a source of profound disappointment. Recently Time chose Albert Einstein as person of the century. With due respect for the gentle genius, Time was wrong. The person with the most lasting influence was clearly Adolf Hitler.

The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology by Oliva Blanchette

BOOK REVIEWS The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology. By OLIVA BLANCHETTE. University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. Pp. xvii + 334. $35.00 (cloth). This work represents a significant and most welcome contribution to Thomistic interpretation as well as to the broader study of medieval philosophy . While its tone is unpretentious, its theme, the structure and purpose of the whole created universe, is crucial for Aquinas's philosophy. Those familiar with Thomas's corpus know how often this theme appears-frequently supplying the foundation for the argument-and know equally well how elusive it becomes when one seeks an extended treatment of it. Hence, to have recognized the chief elements of the larger picture, to have identified and collected the pertinent texts, and to have ordered and synthesized them as this book has done represents a major and lasting scholarly achievement. Moreover, while primarily concerned with Aquinas's own philosophical thought, the book also places him in conversation with a number of classical and modern thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and Collingwood. Blanchette begins his study by clarifying the very notion of perfection (Chapter 1). It first refers, in the order of our conceptions, to the completion of a process. A thing is perjectum, "thoroughly made," when its process of generation is finished. Motion, in fact, is precisely a passage from imperfection to perfection. By extension, the term can then be applied apart from motion to anything which lacks nothing it should have, or, as in the case of God, which lacks nothing at all. Analyzing the Greek and Latin terms connected with generation and perfection (poiein/facere; genesthai/fieri; teleion/perfectum; telos/finis; teleiosislperfectio) Blanchette shows why it is that for the Greeks the infinite usually signified imperfection, while Aquinas was able to conceive of an infinity which was perfection. For the present study, a crucial distinction among the kinds of perfection is that between first and second perfection, i.e., between a being's "ontological " perfection, the complete generation of its nature with all its natural powers , and its "operational" perfection, the activities carried out by means of those powers. Only in its operations does a being attain its ultimate perfection , which always lies in a relation to something exterior to itself. This fundamental distinction between first and second perfection underlies the basic 485 486 BOOK REVIEWS structure of the book. Part One describes the universe in its first perfection, i.e., the constituent parts whose presence gives it its integrity. Part Two takes up the activities of the parts which taken together constitute the order within the universe and by which the universe attains to its external good, God himself . At the level of first perfection, the universe is considered to be perfect first of all simply because it is the universe, i.e., the whole of what is (Chapter 2). As a whole, it is perfect (complete) in comparison to any of its parts. Thus it is a priori impossible to have plural universes, since each "universe" would in fact be only a part of the whole which was the universe. Second, simply as a body, the universe enjoys the perfection of having all three dimensions. Third, not having any bodies outside it, the universe does not share the imperfection of being limited by bodies external to it, as does every particular body. Finally, in containing the perfection of each kind of being, the universe possesses a universal perfection not shared by any one kind of being. These perfections belong to the universe simply qua universe. Beyond these, however, we can speak of the perfection of this universe. As Blanchette points out, for Aquinas there is no "best of all possible worlds" in the sense that God could not create a better one. Yet we can speak of the perfection (or completeness) of this world that God, for reasons not accessible to human reason, actually chose to create. The perfection of this universe is such that were any new essential parts, i.e., new species, added, it would no longer be the same universe, but rather a new universe of which the old now constituted a part...

On wanting to be morally perfect

Colin McGinn argues that moral perfection is neither an idealistic nor supererogatory goal but one required by ordinary morality. ('Must I be Morally Perfect?', ANALYSIS 52, 1992, pp. 32-34.) In his view you are morally perfect if you always keep on the right side of the moral law, invariably doing what is right and never doing what is wrong. At first sight this seems too anaemic a conception of perfection in the moral sphere, for an agent who not only acted rightly but had some saintly or heroic conduct to his credit would appear to be nearer the ideal suggested by the word 'perfect'. But, as McGinn implies, the notion of perfection is ill-defined if it embraces such supererogatory conduct as well. Perfection is a matter of completeness. However good a dancer or a philosopher you encounter you can always conceive of a better one; similarly, however morally estimable the life of a particular saint or hero you can always imagine a more estimable one. So the notion of a perfect saint is as ill-defined as the notion of a perfect dancer. On the other hand we can talk intelligibly of a perfect circle or a perfect series of calculations because there are definable limits involved. So if we are to make use of any notion of moral perfection it had better be construed on the lines McGinn proposes, as a matter, so to speak, of getting one's moral sums right. His principle does, perhaps, need some amendment, because there are times when we are justified in bringing about wrong, knowingly if not intentionally, for the greater good, as when we can attend to some unexpected but more urgent matter, say helping the victims of an accident, only by letting someone down. The obligation to compensate or at least make some form of reparation or apology in such cases shows that the justified act is a wrong none the less. So I am inclined to amend McGinn's principle to refer to unjustified wrong, but I will not press the point here. On each occasion, we ought morally to do what is right and avoid (unjustified) wrong: so let us grant that we ought morally to be perfect in McGinn's sense, or at least as nearly perfect as we are able to be. But it is another question whether we should want to be perfect, or whether we should have perfection as a goal. Compare the examinee taking a maths test or the author reading the proofs of a weighty book on mathematical logic. The examinee and the author would both prefer the outcome where they make no mistakes: but should they want perfection or have perfection as a goal? If wanting necessarily involves a propensity to try to achieve the desired object, the extreme effort required to achieve perfection may make

John Palsgrave’s ‘Lesclaircissement De La Langue Francoyse’ (1530)

Summary John Palsgrave, an Englishman, wrote the first detailed grammar of the French language, Lesclaircissement de la langue francoyse (1530). This work is remarkable not only for its length but also for its quality. Palsgrave wrote a pedagogical text for his English readers, using a system which leads the learner from the development of passive skills (interpretation, both oral andintellectual, of written texts) to the development of active skills (expressing oneself in the target language). At the same time, he responded to the French Humanist desire to bring the vernacular languages under the control of ‘rules certayne’. In its grammatical method, Lesclaircissement exemplifies a stage in the development of Humanist grammar, as the Renaissance grammarians moved from a method based on forms to a more abstract representation of linguistic facts. As such, Palsgrave’s work stands half-way between the early Renaissance calques upon Donatus and the later excursions into logical grammar. In phonetics, Palsgrave’s attention to detail leads him to a clear recognition of the importance of nasal vowels in French (even if his articulatory description of the nasal vowels leaves something to be desired). In phonology, he aspires to a greater level of abstraction through his attempts to link liaison and elision phenomena to French phonotactics. In morpho-syntax, he uses the notion of perfection in language to provide an underlying structure in which the syntactic and the logical structure are explicit. He then explains how the languages in question ‘circumlocute’ to express the underlying structures. In this way, he prefigures the work of Meigret in French grammar. For all of his accomplishments, however, Palsgrave’s work had little influence on his successors. It had only one printing of 750 copies, and Palsgrave himself restricted the sales. Still, the work deserves our attention because of its wealth of detail and because of the method it uses.

Some Reflections on the Medieval Idea of Perfection

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF PERFECTION* T. E. Hulme's term "critique of satisfaction" provides us with a very useful tool in approaching the history of ideas, for not only do ideas and concepts change with the passing of time but the very canons of satisfactory proof change. I do not deny a continuity in both, but as an historian of ideas I am more interested in their variability. What is it that gives a unique flavor to each historic epoch or indeed to each century or decade ? The persistence of ideas and canons cannot be doubted by one who believes in reason, in certain absolute standards, and in some kind of continuity in human nature; but at the same time it must not be forgotten that there is change, growth and development, at least in the sub-lunar world. As historian, one must, while not forgetting the persistence, concentrate on the change without necessarily committing oneself to the metaphysical proposition that there is ever true novelty in the universe. By the phrase "critique of satisfaction," Hulme points up the fact that what seems a satisfactory answer to one age may not content another. In the realm of natural science, no one can seriously question such a proposition. A modem would not be satisfied, in asking the question of why an apple is red, to be told that it is red because it possesses the accident of redness or that all apples, potentially red, become red in act by maturation. We would be satisfied, however, if we were told that the skin of the apple possesses, along with other qualities, the power of absorbing all the colors in the spectrum except red which is hence reflected. Whether this reply really answers the question or not depends on how deeply one may wish to probe, and I do not wish to eliminate the philosophic as opposed to the scientific question here ; but at least most moderns would not feel it worthwhile to pursue the matter further. This response satisfies their critique of satisfaction, as far as the question of color goes. * This article was delivered in substantially this form as a speech before a meeting of the East-Central Conference of the ACPA held at the Pontifical Josephinum College, Worthington, Ohio on March 24, 1957. 213 214?· w· BLOOMFIELD One of the ways of approaching the reality of the thought of the past is through awareness of the differences in critiques of satisfaction. As soon as we delve into medieval philosophy we have the sensation that we are meeting, in at least some matters, with critiques of satisfaction different from our own. To enter sympathetically, then, into medieval thought, whether for the purpose of discovering truth or for establishing what was then believed to be truth, we must be conscious of this difference in answering questions at different times. On many matters there is no problem at all. We silently make the adjustment and do not let it interfere, if the point under discussion can otherwise be substantiated to us, with our belief or with our awareness. In the matter, for instance, of the etymological mode of argument, we have no difficulty. Until fairly recent times it was believed that the history of words provided us with a clue to their present meaning. When we find in St. Thomas, for instance, a passage in a brilliantly argued "questio" which deals with the etymology or even worse an assumed etymology of the word or words involved in the proof being used as an additional argument in its favor, we silently excise the passage; and if the rationality of the rest of the argument is strong, we can accept the truth of his answer, provided of course that in general we accept his intellectual premisses.1 We do the same when St. Thomas makes use of antiquated science to support an argument. There is, however, more difficulty with certain other canons of verificability and response, and it is with one of them, the notion of perfection, that I wish to deal today. I have deliberately entitled this address some reflections on the medieval idea of perfection, for I am very conscious...

The Idea of Perfection in the Western World by Martin Foss

BOOK REVIEWS The Idea of Perfection in the Western World. By MARTIN Foss. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. Pp. 10~, with index. This slender volume deserves greatest consideration. It is destined, the author states in his preface, to " clear the way, by means of criticism, for a more elaborate and constructive approach," to be published under the title Symbol and Metaphor. The present book is undoubtedly the work of a scholar who has given much thought, of no small originality, to the problems he discusses, and who also has endeavored to do justice to his predecessors, even though he believes them to have held false opinions. Sometimes, however, it seems that he has failed to grasp the true meaning of the ideas he opposes, as will become evident in the analysis of his theory. The main thesis of the book is that the notion of perfection, as developed by Greek speculative thought and incorporated into Christian faith and philosophy, is a mistaken one. It consists, the author feels, in relating perfection to end, hence viewing it under a quantitative category, defining it as the progress towards a definite state which then is assumed to be perfect. The starting point of the whole argument is given early: " Perfection is the conformity of a reality to its concept." (p. 8) That is to say, the adequation of a thing to the idea we have of it, is what we call perfection. The statement raises some doubt: adequacy to the " concept "? or, adequacy to the " nature "? When our " idea " proves to be erroneousas wen· it may be-then our judgment of perfection, on the prior premise, is false also. If, however, the adequation is between a thing and its nature, whether or not this be known wholly, the situation is different. It seems that the author fails to distinguish between these two fundamental notions, that of the concept as it may exist in this or that mind (or even in all minds within a definite setting) on the one hand, and the nature or essence of a thing on the other. The view taken leads further to the assumption that perfection " will occur most whenever a thing has been constructed after the model of the concept." Here one senses another equivocation. The " concept " in accordance with which we construct a thing is not the same as the concept which stands, as a true universal, for the nature of a being. One might submit also that a thing may be eventually superior to the idea we had of it previously. We may have felt, too, that there could not be beauty greater than that which we knew, and then discovered a degree of the beautiful the like of which we could never have imagined. Our idea of perfed beauty will change, and the adequation does not start 502 BOOK REVIEWS 503 with the idea but with the object experienced. Similar instance may occur with tools; the one we thought perfect may appear as rather imperfect when a new instrument is put at our disposal. Unfortunately, the author does not consider such facts which are, after all, rather obvious. Mr. Foss stresses the relation of " end " and perfection, identifying end with purpose. Such identification is, of course, in many instances absolutely right; that it is universally justified is questionable. To be sure, we read in Aristotle that the end is the essence of perfection, obviously because no change can exist once the end is attained; and, perfection is as well a process, or progress, and a state to be achieved thereby. In one sense, an end is indeed a purpose, provided this purpose be not envisioned as contained in a " plan "; so, we may speak of man being the " end " of all other beings in the material universe. But this does not mean that man is the perfection of the other beings, although they are " because of him " (Summa Theologica I, q. 65, a. 2 c.). To identify simply, without any further qualification, end, purpose, and perfection does not appear justified. Yet, it is this identification which furnishes the basis for the author's argument. Insofar as end and perfection are related, perfection is that...

The Notion of Perfection

The Notion of Perfection