On wanting to be morally perfect

Abstract

Colin McGinn argues that moral perfection is neither an idealistic nor supererogatory goal but one required by ordinary morality. ('Must I be Morally Perfect?', ANALYSIS 52, 1992, pp. 32-34.) In his view you are morally perfect if you always keep on the right side of the moral law, invariably doing what is right and never doing what is wrong. At first sight this seems too anaemic a conception of perfection in the moral sphere, for an agent who not only acted rightly but had some saintly or heroic conduct to his credit would appear to be nearer the ideal suggested by the word 'perfect'. But, as McGinn implies, the notion of perfection is ill-defined if it embraces such supererogatory conduct as well. Perfection is a matter of completeness. However good a dancer or a philosopher you encounter you can always conceive of a better one; similarly, however morally estimable the life of a particular saint or hero you can always imagine a more estimable one. So the notion of a perfect saint is as ill-defined as the notion of a perfect dancer. On the other hand we can talk intelligibly of a perfect circle or a perfect series of calculations because there are definable limits involved. So if we are to make use of any notion of moral perfection it had better be construed on the lines McGinn proposes, as a matter, so to speak, of getting one's moral sums right. His principle does, perhaps, need some amendment, because there are times when we are justified in bringing about wrong, knowingly if not intentionally, for the greater good, as when we can attend to some unexpected but more urgent matter, say helping the victims of an accident, only by letting someone down. The obligation to compensate or at least make some form of reparation or apology in such cases shows that the justified act is a wrong none the less. So I am inclined to amend McGinn's principle to refer to unjustified wrong, but I will not press the point here. On each occasion, we ought morally to do what is right and avoid (unjustified) wrong: so let us grant that we ought morally to be perfect in McGinn's sense, or at least as nearly perfect as we are able to be. But it is another question whether we should want to be perfect, or whether we should have perfection as a goal. Compare the examinee taking a maths test or the author reading the proofs of a weighty book on mathematical logic. The examinee and the author would both prefer the outcome where they make no mistakes: but should they want perfection or have perfection as a goal? If wanting necessarily involves a propensity to try to achieve the desired object, the extreme effort required to achieve perfection may make