North Korean State Research Articles

The Two Faces of North Korean State Power

Approaches to the analysis of North Korean socialism that have been influenced by theories of totalitarianism emphasise the Stalinist aspects of state power in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). I suggest a new understanding of power dynamics and state-society relationships in the DPRK by revealing the two faces of North Korea's state power. Using archival evidence and the testimonies of defectors, I reveal the micro-political face of power that can be found in people's everyday practices during times of national crisis.

The economic geography of North Korean drug trafficking networks

ABSTRACTHow has the involvement of the North Korean state influenced the geographic development of North Korean drug trafficking networks? In this paper, I use global value chain analysis to examine the characteristics of North Korean trade networks engaged in drug trafficking in two time periods during which state hostility toward drug trafficking varied markedly (from the early 1990s until 2005, when the central state encouraged production and trafficking, and since 2005, when North Korea cracked down on drugs). Access to a favourable institutional environment and state resources was associated with a spatial distribution of drug trafficking activities that was both territorially concentrated and territorially dispersed while the North Korean state sought to control as much of the value chain as possible. In the second period, the North Korean central state deprived many drug trafficking networks of state support, leading to networks with territorial distributions of production, distribution, and retail concentrated within both North Korea and adjacent countries, and more complex business relationships with various levels of the North Korean state, leading to a more distributed capture of value along the value chain.

MISDIAGNOSIS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS

ABSTRACTThe “right-to-health” framework asserts that everyone has the right to the “highest attainable standard of health.” In this article, the authors explore how the right-to-health framework can aid our understanding of the state of health in North Korea today. In recent reports, human rights organizations have accused the North Korean state of violating its people's right to health. Critical examination of these reports, however, reveals a myopic focus on the North Korean state and a limited consideration of the relevant political and historical context in which the right to health ofNorth Koreans may be violated. Furthermore, by selectively applying the right-to-health framework to the public health situation in North Korea, while ignoring other low-income countries with similar health problems, the human rights reports politicize humanitarian conditions and use public health problems to justify hostile policies toward North Korea. To help improve health and welfare in North Korea, the right-to-health framework should be applied with greater consideration of the geopolitical context and take actors other than the North Korean government into consideration. Analyses based on the right-to-health framework should also incorporate studies done by the broader movement for peace and justice in the Korean peninsula and be developed in consultation with peace and justice organizations.

The South Korean Catholic Church’s Attitude towards North Korea: from Antagonism to Development of Dialogue and Cooperation

Since the liberation of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the South Korean Catholic Church’s relationship with North Korea has been characterized by several types of attitudes, ranging from the Church’s historically strong antagonistic position toward communism to the more recent development of dialogue and cooperation with North Korea. The purpose of this article is to present and analyze chronologically several key periods that reveal the different kinds of relationships the South Korean Catholic Church has sought to build with North Korea. This paper will focus on three periods: the period of the foundation of the two Korean states when the Korean Catholic Church’s relationship with the emerging North Korean state was strongly antagonistic; the period of South Korean military dictatorship when the South Korean Catholic Church’s anti-communist ideology began partly to erode; and the period after the democratization of the South Korean state when some South Korean governments entered into a period of dialogue and cooperation with North Korea, a movement in which the South Korean Catholic Church participated.

What would Erich Fromm say about North Korea? A preliminary application of humanist psychoanalysis

This paper considers the possibility of applying the sociologically oriented humanist psychoanalysis of Erich Fromm to the evaluation of the political character of the North Korean state and society, with particular attention given to Fromm's concepts of the matricentric complex and patricentric complex, as well as to his analysis of fascism and Stalinism. The author explains that if humanist psychoanalysis is consistently applied, North Korea can be understood as a transitional postcolonial Stalinist state with a patricentric social order that exploits the matricentric complex for mass control.

Do They Mean What They Act? Surveillance, Theatricality, and Mind-Heart among North Koreans

In this article, I am concerned with the dynamics of self among North Koreans, in conjunction with their predicament of being under constant surveillance. To the outside world, the public behavior of North Koreans counts as one of the most puzzling aspects of the reclusive state, while many observers of North Korea point to a “real face” or “pure heart” behind the theatrical “public face” among North Koreans. Based on ethnographic interviews with visitors to North Korea and North Korean refugees, I explore the interweaving relations between the opposing modes of North Koreans’ selfpresentation: a theatrical “public face” and a non-theatrical “pure heart.” I argue that however contrasting they seem, the two modes of self-presentation are in support of, rather than in opposition to, each other for the purposes of the state. Exploiting the cultural notions of public and private and mind-heart, the North Korean state strives to make the face and the heart one and the same in piousness and loyalty. Yet the dramaturgical outlook of North Koreans begs a serious question as to the success of ideological indoctrination when an effort is made to co-opt the mind-heart of a people in the service of state sanctity.

North Korea: Preparing for the End

Even if the immediate Korean crisis eases, the underlying problem of a crippled but dangerous North Korean state will remain. The state, as we know it, may not survive for long. Yet, given its para...

North Korea and the Contradiction of Inversion: Dictatorship, Markets, Social Reform

IntroductionThe problem of North Korea today is the problem of the contradiction of inversion, that is, the inverse relation of dictatorial regime capacity and social reform pressures that have been intensified under impoverished and marketizing socioeconomic conditions. Importantly, this contradiction is not an abstract, metaphysical, or speculative principle formulated in the realm of pure logic or pure theory. Instead, the contradiction is a concrete, empirical, and real social involving the actual momentum of millions of people in everyday life and the struggle of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and Korean People's Army (KPA) elite to maintain its interests, privileges, and survival.While the Soviet-Stalinist-constructed North Korean party-army state-regime had been able to more or less contain the contradiction in the epoch of world Stalinism, with financial aid, fraternal trade, and material assistance from its allies and benefactors in the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc, and China, the 1989 to 1991 liquidation of the Stalinist states and onset of the post-Soviet and post-COMECON era exacerbated the problems for the regime. North Korea confronted a crisis of compounded proportions: collapse of the bureaucratically planned economy, collapse of faith in Marxism-Leninism, collapse of discipline in the WPK, and, most catastrophically, collapse of the food-ration system.With the great famine of 1996 to 1999, an emergent market economy based on the spontaneous rise of petty trade and small proprietorship became the new social reality. Confronted with these conditions, the ruling group determined to secure its existence by distancing itself from Marxism-Leninism in 1992, emphasizing militaryfirst (songun) populism in 1998, adopting pragmatic socialism (shilli sahoejuui; markets plus planning) in 2002, and relinquishing communism in 2009. What the political-economic adaptations of the regime are indicative of is that the contradiction of inversion is moving North Korea into an alignment that is fundamentally in the interests of global capitalism.Contradiction of InversionHow is the contradiction of inversion constituted? North Korean studies scholars do not presently use the term, but its sense-content is axiomatic in empirical and predictive analyses of the contemporary North Korean socioeconomic and sociopolitical situation. A notable example is Un-Chul Yang's 2012 article Downfall of the North Korean State Economy in International Journal of Korean Studies, which speaks of from the bottom of and the rise of markets as a bottom-up process rather than a top-down process, resulting fundamentally from economic failure, financial bankruptcy, food shortages, and incapability of government to provide for the North Korean people.2As economic poverty is protracted and as markets at the bottom grow, the North Korean state-regime experiences declining political authority and decreasing influence of power.3 Summarizing the social process and its materially conditioned trajectory, Yang says:With constant economic difficulties, the reigning force of the dictatorial regime is, in fact, gradually loosening. The number of North Korean defectors is increasing, and corruption already seems to be out of control. In addition, the steady growth of private business will be an index to producing a new future.The pressure from the bottom of society to provide reform measures continues to increase as the capacity of the North Korean regime decreases. With the slowly shifting paradigm of the North Korean people and elites, the foundation for a market economy should gain strength in the near future.4What this description and prediction reveal is that the contradiction of inversion has four main factors: (1) progression of time, (2) social hierarchy, (3) dictatorial regime capacity, and (4) social reform pressures. The latter two factors, existing in the objective contexts of history and society, manifest a decrease-increase relation as a direct consequence of economic difficulties and a vertical opposition between the people and the elite. …

North Korea's Threat Perception and Provocation Under Kim Jong-un: The Security Dilemma and the Obsession with Political Survival

IntroductionA lack of consideration of the founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, and his family's perceptional variants has misled the estimation of North Korea's provocative policy and its determination to take risks. It is argued here that North Korea's security dilemma and its obsession with father-to-son successions have been the principal causes of its provocative behavior. The security dilemma1has impelled North Korea to generate, and thus portray to the world, provocative signals; and the everpressing issue of Kim Il-sung and his family's succession has driven them to prioritize their political survival over that of the survival of the North Korean state. When Kim Il-sung and his family engage simultaneously in encounters related to the security dilemma and major issues involving the succession, they provoke. When their political survival is threatened, they take a step back.Threat Perception and North KoreaWhen a leader perceives that his values and interests are endangered, and at the same time he perceives an inability to control events and faces a lack of resources that can be manipulated against this threat, we witness a leader who perceives threat.2 When a leader is uncertain about his international and domestic circumstances, which would limit his choice between alternatives, perceptions matter.3 A leader's choices are not explicable without some reference to his priorities, obsessions, and perceptions of international relations and domestic politics. His priorities, obsessions, and perceptions are significantly influenced by his assumptions, views, and preexisting beliefs.4 This is why each analysis encounters the issue of the objectivity of the leaders' perceptions and conceptualization.5 One of the most important reasons for the North Korean nuclear stalemate was the perceptional gap between Washington and Pyongyang.6A perception of threat would frame the situation in a way that would emphasize possible gains or possible losses. To frame a threat is to highlight some aspects of the threat and make them more salient in such a way as to suggest a particular problem-solving definition. Essentially, frames define the threat, identify the causes of the threat, and recommend policy alternatives. In this process, threat percep-tion frames the situation and choice of alternatives by drawing attention to specific ways in which to respond and at the same time marginalizing more dovish perspectives. In this respect, the leader would ultimately take greater risks than he had intended.7How a situation is framed, intentionally or unintentionally, affects a leader's policy choices. The most fundamental effect of framing is to define the boundary of a leader's perception by placing a certain situation within a certain sphere of meaning.8 In doing so, frames influence the process in which the leader perceives, understands, and remembers a certain incident, thereby affecting and guiding his subsequent judgment and responses.9A state's foreign policy is made not just by cost-benefit calculations but by various domestic as well as international factors that frame decision-makers.10 As defensive realists argue, the diagnosis of the adversary's motivations in addition to its capability is a critical element in assessing a country's foreign policy. A different interpretation of the adversary's motivations leads to different policy prescriptions, even under similar situations. Thus, interpreting North Korea's motivations behind its nuclear program should determine U.S. policy toward the Pyongyang regime.11North Korea's unconventional interpretation of threat is framed by the Juche ideology and pursued in the name of military-first politics. The theme of Juche may be summarized as defiance of fate and assertion as the actor, or subject, as the creator of history.12 Rather than staying passive, the Juche ideology compels people to struggle against a hostile environment in order to turn it into a favorable one:The Juche ideology manifests a new question on the subject and the source of power to govern and make changes in the world. …

Documenting the “Flower of Reunification”: Lim Su-gyeong and the memories of Korean border crossing

In 1989, 20-year-old South Korean college student Lim Su-gyeong crossed the Military Demarcation Line between the two Koreas while thousands of spectators around the world witnessed this controversial act. To this day, citizens of both Koreas cannot cross the border freely without both Korean governments’ permission, which is nearly impossible to obtain. Hence, when Lim visited North Korea, unbeknownst to the South Korean government, to participate in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students as a one-person delegation representing the League of South Korean University Students, she shocked many with her daring act, which eventually resulted in her imprisonment in South Korea. She was vilified for breaching the National Security Law, therefore causing a huge embarrassment to the South Korean intelligence community, but enjoyed a completely opposite reception in the North. Dubbed the “Flower of Reunification,” Lim was hailed by the North Korean government as a heroic martyr who sacrificed herself at the altar of Korean reunification. Every step of the journey of this unusual South Korean visitor was memorialized in the North Korean documentary film Praise to Lim Su-gyeong, the Flower of Unification ( Janghada, Tongilui kkot Lim Su-gyeong, Naenara Video Jejakso, Pyongyang, 1989), which challenges viewers accustomed to equating the North Korean brand of heroism almost entirely with the canonization of Kim leadership. How does this young South Korean female citizen figure in the long-standing North Korean tradition of identifying male leaders as the legitimate agents of national heroism? What can be gleaned from this North Korean documentary film about how the state remembers the trauma of partition? This article traces the journey of Lim Su-gyeong, one of the most controversial South Korean sojourners to have visited North Korea, as a way of exploring the politics of memory in North Korean documentary film. This article also poses challenges to the overwhelming tendency in scholarship concerning North Korea, which has focused on the figure of the founding father, Kim Il-sung, as the centripetal force of the national personality cult. In the process, the way the North Korean state envisions gender politics and the utopian notion of inter-Korean citizenship will be explored in tandem.

Imaging North Korea: Exploring its Visual Representations in International Politics

North Korea puzzles many observers. Mostly, it is referred to as the most isolated country in the world, being a timeless mystery, enigma, or terra incognita. While these characterizations reveal the presupposition of a genuine void of knowledge concerning the assessment of North Korean state affairs (however, without preventing scholarship from producing, compiling and depending on information regarding North Korea), they also point to the significance in filling this knowledge gap. The article argues that images play an important role in this operation and provides a discussion of selected photographic essays and single images depicting North Korea. Images work; they do something by evoking a particular perspective of what is shown in them allowing only specific kinds of seeing. Relating the viewer and the viewed in ways that determine what or who is (in)visible, images create boundaries and difference which, in turn, affects who “we” and “they” are.

Predictors of Kim Jong-il's On-the-Spot Guidance under Military-First Politics

IntroductionNorth Korean (son'gun chongch'i) is known to privilege the Korean People's Army (KPA) as important resource and catalyst for developing the national economy.2 As the role of the KPA in the national economy and national defense has increased, there has been speculation that the military will ascend to power in North Korea under military-first politics. The difficulty of collecting internal information on the political situation in North Korea has made Kim Jongil's reported public appearances a useful source of information for researchers. Many researchers have thus analyzed the public appearances of the North Korean leader to understand military-first politics. The conclusion has been drawn that the KPA has taken priority over all North Korean state affairs, since the number of Kim's public appearances at military installations and the number of military officers among his entourage have increased.3 Still, the question of which factor causes Kim to appear where and when in public, under military-first politics, remains unanswered. Predictors of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance are thus necessary in an effort to address the question. The application of a predictive model furnishes a meaningful estimate of the frequency of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector and other sectors, with the corresponding implications.Avoiding Circular ReasoningKim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance is conducted in order to inspect implementation of national policies and to discuss state affairs with his entourage, who have allegedly gained an upper hand in the decision-making process.4 Military-first politics brought about a significant change to Kim's on-the-spot guidance, as his visits to the military sector have increased, as well as the number of military officers among his entourage.5 This change has been interpreted as evidence that military-first prioritizes the KPA over all affairs of state.6 If this interpretation is correct, the number of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector should remain at a relatively high level under military-first politics.Demonstrable statistics, however, are not in favor of that proposition. Figure 1 on page 95 shows that the number of Kim's visits to the military sector has not been constant, but has fluctuated over time. This might indicate that the priority of the KPA rises and falls according to certain variables. If one accepts that Kim's increased visits to the military sector are prioritizing the KPA, it is relevant to ask, What makes Kim Jong-il visit the military sector?Assuming that Kim visits the military because the KPA is a top priority, one needs to inquire as to why prioritization has occurred. Yet if one suggests that the increasing number of visits to the military are in themselves proof of the priority of the KPA, the result is the fallacy of circular reasoning. A cause is simultaneously considered an effect. Avoiding circular reasoning, one must attempt to identify predictors that might correspond to the frequency of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance to the military sector and other sectors under military-first politics. The first step must begin with an analysis of the origins of military-first in North Korea.Origins of Military-First PoliticsThe origin of military-first can be explained as a response to external and internal factors. On one hand, the priority given to the North Korean military can be seen as a self-defense tactic, reacting to the breakdown and collapse of the Soviet bloc in the period 1989-1991.7 On the other hand, military-first has been interpreted as a way for Kim to consolidate his political power since the sudden death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994.8 Some scholars following these lines of reasoning perceive the role of the military as one of preventing large-scale social disruption derived from the post-Soviet economic crisis of the 1990s. …

Build It, and They Will Recompense: North Korea's Nuclear Strategy

Build It, and They Will Recompense:North Korea's Nuclear Strategy Sung-Yoon Lee (bio) Rare is the moment when three or more North Korea watchers come together and see eye-to-eye on the North Korean nuclear problem. Jonathan Pollack, with his latest book No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, may have achieved that rarest of feats: creating a consensus among those interested in this deeply polarizing issue. The consensus here may not necessarily be Pollack's main conclusion, which, using the author's own words, can be summarized thus: "North Korea does not treat nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip, and instead views these weapons as central to its identity and security planning....The leadership thus remains locked in a nuclear mindset; it is unprepared to envisage longer-term survival of the extant system without retention and enhancement of its nuclear capabilities" (p. 207). The consensus would instead be that Pollack's No Exit is the most comprehensive and detailed account of the decades-old North Korean nuclear issue in any language—in other words, the best. Pollack begins with the formation of the North Korean state under Kim Il-sung in the 1940s and ends with a first-rate analysis of the current strategic environment in which the key players—North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States—find themselves. He traces the historical, ideological, and political backdrop against which Kim Il-sung built his unique and defiant regime; presents the major milestones in Kim's political dealings with his patrons and adversaries alike; and guides the reader through the tortuous cycles of North Korean provocations and compensatory nuclear negotiations over the past two decades. The result is a tantalizing array of original analysis and rich detail. The generalist will find North Korea's defiant edge and success in building a nuclear arsenal at the cost of a dysfunctional economy curiously fascinating. The specialist will find that the book's cogently presented historical details and insights make it a must-read for both personal gratification and research. And [End Page 178] for anyone teaching a college-level course on Korean politics or U.S.-East Asia relations, the book should be required reading. In chronicling the North Korean leadership's dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities over nearly four decades, Pollack accomplishes something he may not have intended, which is implicitly to undermine the "negotiationist" school of thought—that is, those who believe that negotiations would effect North Korea's denuclearization. Pollack explicitly endorses neither the "collapsist" nor the "reformist" school thinkers—those who believe, respectively, in the eventual collapse of the North Korean regime and in the possibility of the regime adopting genuine economic reform and opening. With his analysis of North Korea's past actions and strategic imperatives, Pollack effectively buries the notion that the United States and its partners, with the right mix of incentives and coercion, could achieve the complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Given the ample evidence presented, it would be folly to argue against Pollack's assessment of the current state of nuclear negotiations or his reading of the North Korean regime's intentions: "Despite pursuit of nearly every imaginable approach to denuclearisation by the U.S. and others, this goal is now farther from realization than at any point since the signing of the Agreed Framework" (p. 190). He further explains: "The leadership...posits a 'no landing' scenario—that is, the perpetuation of the existing system based on the unquestioned power and authority of the Kim family and of the ruling elites that support it, retention of its nuclear weapons capabilities, and a measure of economic recovery" (p. 192). Pollack ends the book with a sober call for efforts to contain North Korea's existing nuclear weapons capabilities: "The ultimate goal remains nuclear abandonment by the North, but a more practicable objective is risk minimisation, both in relation to the DPRK's extant weapons and in any potential transfer of technology and materials beyond North Korea's borders" (p. 209). Some may find Pollack's prescription a bit too passive and ultimately unsatisfactory. Yet it is hard to argue against the historical...

Humanitarian Response and Countermeasures for North Korean Contingency

This paper examines possible social consequences of North Korean contingency and the potential impact on state relations. It suggests the appropriate measures for stabilizing crisis that are also conducive to promoting unification. In a contingency situation, a satisfactory humanitarian response by South Korea will be instrumental in securing the popular support of North Koreans and thus very important to advancing the efforts to realize unification. This paper, therefore, argues first that humanitarian crisis and social disorder will need to be addressed in the initial stage of the contingency. It then looks at the possible responses and situations that may surface within the North Korean state as the contingency situation develops, including dissident actions and behavior, escape and exile, and internal conflict among the elites and the military. It also evaluates the potential impact of the crisis on inter-Korean relations and on neighboring states, including South Korea and the Unites States. Finally, this paper suggests five measures necessary for stabilizing the contingency situation, which are helpful in preparing for the long-term goal of Korean unification within the context of US-ROK cooperation.

Dressed to Kill: Women's Fashion and Body Politics in North Korean Visual Media (1960s – 1970s)

North Korea is a fashion-conscious nation where political leaders are preoccupied with how to dress the nation's people through rigid social practices, such as imposing military-style uniforms to various social sectors and systematically recommending certain designs to civilians. North Korean leaders have issued numerous fashion statements with the intention to promote fashion as a national project meant to groom ideal corporeality. While many other socialist regimes have glorified masculine clothing as a preferred means to represent revolutionized women, North Korean fashion has continuously explored and expressed various degrees of femininity that seemingly contradict a stringent revolutionary spirit. The varying visual representations of traditional femininity and state-organized socialist ideals, which often equal masculinity, collide in North Korea so as to mark a unique sense of fashion for women clearly distinguished from those of its closest neighbors—the People's Republic of China, the former Soviet Union, and South Korea. This article explores the representation of an ideal female body in North Korea by examining women's fashion as manifested in visual media such as stage productions, films, magazine illustrations, paintings, and posters. The article ultimately argues that visual media in North Korea are not merely consumerist objects but by far the most important form of bodily discipline. Their functions are wide in scope—they educate, entertain, and mobilize people. In a society where ideals shape reality itself, the way in which visual images are coordinated and circulated is far from accidental. I argue that in North Korea, the images of women on stage and screen function as models to emulate, thus imposing ideal bodily practices onto viewers. Examining the dress codes of female protagonists on stage and screen illuminates how the North Korean state has set out to craft an ideal female body by constantly negotiating revolutionary masculinity and traditional femininity.

Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the Case of Chŏng Tasan

This article examines the Confucian component of the North Korean juche ideology, appraising the national-Stalinist doctrine in view of its relation to the Reformed Confucianism of Chŏng Tasan. A representative of the indigenous sirhak (practical learning) school in the late Chosŏn era, Tasan merits attention because he was politically endorsed in Kim Il Sung’s 1955 juche speech and was popular in the 1960s. Studying the rise, fall, and revival of Tasan; Kim Jong Il’s statements on behalf of the North Korean state bureaucracy; and the juche and Tasanist conceptions of “man,” the author concludes that Tasan’s Neo-Confucianism was assimilated into juche and that the sirhak scholar is being ideologically re-appreciated for regime legitimacy in North Korea today.

Evolution of North Korean Drug Trafficking: State Control to Private Participation

IntroductionThe North Korean state has been suspected of sponsoring illicit drug trafficking for more than 20 years.1 The rogue state tightly controlled this industry. The ordinary citizens had no knowledge of the existence of drug trafficking.2 However, there are allegations3 that a growing number of civilian North Koreans have been aware of and involved with drug trafficking for personal profit.As a response to the aforementioned allegations, this paper tries to explore the evolution of North Korean drug trafficking from state control into substantial private participation. This study answers three research questions: (1) Is private participation in the North Korea drug trafficking substantial? (2) If so, what is the current state of the privately controlled North Korean illicit drug business? (3) How has North Korean drug operations evolved from tight state control to private participation?The authors have documented and evaluated this issue, and have adopted two feasible ways to collect data: from primary and supplementary sources. Primary data sources are in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors who were victims of human trafficking from North Korea into China. Supplementary data sources include various written documents, reports, and articles. The content analysis of these various written reports will be used as a supplement.4It has been found that the issue of North Korean drug trafficking has very few empirical studies. This may be due to the difficulty of obtaining empirical data as a result of the secluded nature of North Korea on one hand and the overemphasis on political, economic, and security matters of the North Korean state and relative neglect on criminal matters of North Korean private individuals among social scientists. Thus, this study has a certain merit in this regard.Historical Background of North Korean Drug TraffickingDue to North Korea's economic trouble,5 the North Korean state deliberately chose various transnational crime businesses including drug trafficking as a state policy to earn foreign currency.6 In the early 1970s, North Korean officials simply bought and sold foreign-sourced illicit drugs. Then, beginning in 1976, the state itself began to cultivate the opium poppy and sell the raw opium overseas.7 However, since raw opium was not very profitable, the state soon launched the refining process that turns raw opium into heroin. By the mid-1980s, the North Korean state had a wellestablished heroin production system. The state cultivated, refined, and exported products. During this period, illicit drug production and trafficking were under the strict control of the state. Most opium poppy farms were located on remote mountainsides which were strictly off limits to the ordinary population.8Since 1990, a series of international, economic, and environmental crises has significantly weakened the North Korean state.9 The state's production and distribution system collapsed. A substantial proportion of the North Korean population suffered from this economic disaster, known as the March of Tribulation.10 According to a report written by David R. Hawk,11 people were forced to find a way to stay alive. A great number of people wandered around the country in search of food. Crime and black markets emerged. Also, many people escaped North Korea and illegally entered Russia or China. The North Korean state thus experienced great difficulties in controlling its population.12It was during this period that drug trafficking in North Korea became less cen- tralized and individuals participated in this illegal enterprise on a much larger scale to gain private profits or for personal use.13 There were even allegations that gang activity increased and criminal groups became meaningful players in drug trafficking.14 This private participation also expanded to transnational drug trafficking that originated from North Korea.15A Hypothesized Conceptual FrameworkThis study proposes a conceptual framework to explain how North Korean drug trafficking moved from state control towards private participation. …

NORTH KOREA'S POLITICS OF LONGING

Kim Il Sung's death in 1994 was a critical event in modern North Korea. This article examines how the North Korean state has struggled to reinvent itself since the death event; in particular, how it has faced the challenging task of turning the country's founding hero and supreme leader into a physically absent yet spiritually omnipresent ancestral figure. The article focuses on the norms of commemoration and ideas of kinship that have emerged in the process of national bereavement, partly in relation to the existing characterization of the North Korean polity as a family or neo-Confucian state.

Gulag, the Musical: Performing Trauma in North Korea through Yoduk Story

Yoduk Story is the first known North Korean dissident musical, staging a fictional account of the authors' traumatic memories and experiences in a gulag. Despite the creators' indictment of North Korea as a human rights violator and Yoduk Story's efforts to subvert everything that the North Korean state represents, the musical borrows from North Korean propaganda techniques, including propagandist revolutionary operas.

The Making of the North Korean State

Abstract North Korea’s official history emphasizes the indigenousness and autonomy of the North’s state formation process. Meanwhile, scholars from outside present the North as a satellite or a puppet. This article takes the middle ground and argues that the North’s regime formation is best understood as the outcome of the interactions between Kim Il Sung (Kim Ilsŏng)–led communists and the Soviet occupation forces. The North Korean government of the mid- to late-1950s criticized Soviet interference as “modern revisionism” and set a principle of “let’s do things our way.” The Soviet Union criticized the North Korean measures as “anti-Soviet” and as “promotion of nationalism, ” but the North Korean government was finding its own ideology, theory, and methods. North Korea decided to “not live today for today, but to live today for tomorrow. ” North Korea also diverged significantly from the USSR and China, especially in its party structure and its leadership system. As a result, North Korea developed a unique system, different from those of other Eastern European socialist states. The historical process of the North’s state formation sheds light on why it did not collapse with Eastern European communist states or the Soviet Union.