Normative Reasons Research Articles

Coercive, mimetic and normative: Interdiscursivity in Malaysian CSR reports

Malaysian corporations have to disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR), and a typical genre for disclosure is CSR reports. These reports incorporate other discourses which indicate the presence of interdiscursivity. The article examines interdiscursivity in Malaysian CSR reports. It selects the CSR reports of 10 major corporations and pursues an interdiscursive analysis which involves four sequential stages. CSR reports contain discourses of public relations, sustainability, strategic management, compliance and financial accounting. Although the discourses are often multisemiotic, language maintains primacy in content, while image tends to exemplify or simplify content. These discourses constitute an interdiscursive profile, and it has central and auxiliary discourses. The central discourse is public relations discourse, and it promotes corporations helping and not harming society. The auxiliary discourses are sustainability, strategic management, compliance and financial accounting discourses, and these discourses mitigate the promotional focus. Interdiscursivity enables the primarily promotional CSR reports to not seem overtly promotional. The choice of discourses is probably influenced by coercive, mimetic and normative reasons. These discourses enhance the reliability of CSR reports because their disclosure is anchored to various CSR aspects, international or reporting practices and professional domains. Interdiscursivity helps to build stakeholders’ confidence in disclosure and, therefore, in corporations. It joins other functions in CSR reports to convey corporations as agents of positive social change. The article also probes the relationship between interdiscursivity and intertextuality and advances a matrix of intertextual–interdiscursive use.

The international mediation of power-sharing settlements

Power sharing is largely accepted among scholars and policy-makers as a potentially effective mechanism for building peace in the aftermath of violent ethnic conflicts and self-determination disputes. Although the operation of power sharing may be prone to ongoing challenges and even political crises arising from the legacy of the conflict, international actors continue to promote power-sharing arrangements to manage self-determination and other ethnopolitical conflicts. This article investigates the normative and instrumental reasons why third-party mediators (on behalf of international organizations and/or states) turn to power-sharing strategies during peace negotiations. It considers the reasons why third-party mediators promote power sharing when its maintenance is likely to depend on their ongoing commitment and governance involvement. We argue that mediators draw from four different perspectives in their support of power-sharing settlements: international law, regional and internal security, democracy and minority rights, and a technical approach where mediators focus on the mechanics of power-sharing designs. The article draws on in-depth semi-structured interviews with officials from the United Nations and the European Union working for the organizations’ respective mediation units as well as documentary analysis of official mediation documents.

Reasons and practical possibility

According to a common thesis about normative reasons for action, you have a reason to perform a given action only if you can act for that reason. This thesis has long had broad appeal and is intended to capture the practical character of practical reasons. I’ll call it the ‘Practicality Thesis’. Recently, however, various writers have developed subtly different objections to it, each designed to show that there can be actions you have a reason to perform even though you could not act for that reason – because, were you aware of the reason-giving facts in the ways needed to act for the reason, it would no longer be a reason for you to so act. This article defends the Practicality Thesis against such objections. It considers some extant defences but shows that these are inadequate. It then advances an alternative approach intended to counter any structurally similar objection.

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire-independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.

Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons

In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.

Pragmatism, Utilitarianism, and the Stagnation of Analytical Moral Theory

This paper addresses the failure of analytical moral theory to recognize social conflict as driving perceptions of utility, the necessity of convergence of opposing positions to produce a consensual viewpoint, and of the transformation of moral reasoning for successful resolutions. Law provides an empirical context for understanding normative inquiry as an extended, dispute-driven inductive process. Leading utilitarian conceptions view the calculus of normative reasons as static, picturing all expected consequences as if visible at once, through a lens displaying prospective utility. Utilitarianism is blind to the revision of reasons that must take place if opposing positions are to converge. Pragmatism stresses the necessity of retirement of incommensurable reasons for success in conflict resolution. Derek Parfit has argued that all three “secular moral traditions” of mainstream philosophy (consequentialism, Kantianism, and contractualism) are “climbing the same mountain.” If so, all three are situated on a momentary, stationary conceptual landscape, attempting to perform what Parfit calls “moral mathematics” from a synchronic viewpoint. The analytical lens is blind to the often precarious world of engagement with specific moral problems, from which public acceptance and compliance must constantly be wrought, and on a piecemeal basis, not through a static global analytical rationale.

Revisiting the Classical View of Benefit‐based Taxation

This paper explores how the persistently popular classical logic of bene…t based taxation, in which an individual’s bene…t from public goods is tied to his or her income-earning ability, can be incorporated into modern optimal tax theory. If Lindahl’s methods are applied to that view of bene…ts, …rst-best optimal policy can be characterized analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics, in particular the coe¢ cient of complementarity between public goods and innate talent. Constrained optimal policy with a Pareto-e¢ cient objective that strikes a balance–controlled by a single parameter–between this principle and the familiar utilitarian criterion can be simulated using conventional constraints and methods. A wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result, including those that match well several features of existing policies. To the extent that such an objective re‡ects the mixed normative reasoning behind prevailing

\u201cRight to recommend, wrong to require\u201d- an empirical and philosophical study of the views among physicians and the general public on smoking cessation as a condition for surgery

BackgroundIn many countries, there are health care initiatives to make smokers give up smoking in the peri-operative setting. There is empirical evidence that this may improve some, but not all, operative outcomes. However, it may be feared that some support for such policies stems from ethically questionable opinions, such as paternalism or anti-smoker sentiments. This study aimed at investigating the support for a policy of smoking cessation prior to surgery among Swedish physicians and members of the general public, as well as the reasons provided for this.MethodsA random sample of general practitioners and orthopaedic surgeons (n = 795) as well as members of the general public (n = 485) received a mail questionnaire. It contained a vignette case with a smoking 57-year old male farmer with hip osteoarthritis. The patient had been recommended hip replacement therapy, but told that in order to qualify for surgery he needed to give up smoking four weeks prior to and after surgery. The respondents were asked whether making such qualifying demands is acceptable, and asked to rate their agreement with pre-set arguments for and against this policy.ResultsResponse rates were 58.2% among physicians and 53.8% among the general public. Of these, 83.9% and 86.6%, respectively, agreed that surgery should be made conditional upon smoking cessation. Reference to the peri-operative risks associated with smoking was the most common argument given. However, there was also strong support for the argument that such a policy is mandated in order to achieve long term health gains.ConclusionsThere is strong support for a policy of smoking cessation prior to surgery in Sweden. This support is based on considerations of peri-operative risks as well as the general long term risks of smoking. This study indicates that paternalistic attitudes may inform some of the support for peri-operative smoking cessation policies and that at least some respondents seem to favour a “recommendation strategy” vis-à-vis smoking cessation prior to surgery rather than a “requirement strategy”. The normative reasons speak in favour of the “recommendation strategy”.

Subjective Unpossessed Reasons

A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective’ and ‘possessed’ are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know and reasons that we are in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.

Not seven, but eleven? European crises or “new normal”?

Not seven, but eleven? European crises or “new normal”?

Corporate Responsibilization

AbstractThis article examines the conditions for responsibilizing corporations. When we responsibilize an agent, we hold him responsible for his choices – although we are aware that he is not yet fully fit to be held responsible – in order to induce in him the relevant characteristics for being fit to be held responsible at a later time. I find that the conditions of responsibilizability are not identical to the conditions for responsibilization we usually and reasonably apply. Typically, we only responsibilize agents who do not only meet the comparably weak conditions of responsibilizability, but who also fulfil additional criteria, as for example having demonstrated first signs of normative reasoning. I argue that corporations do not only meet the minimum threshold of responsibilizability, but also a comparably higher threshold, which allows us to engage in particularly effective forms of responsibilization. Basically, we may permissibly responsibilize the overwhelming majority of corporations in the same way parents responsibilize their growing children.

Fact-sensitive political theory

The purpose of this paper is to argue for the importance of attention to facts in normative theorising. I discuss the problems that arise from both not displaying such attention (as some idealists do) and from doing so in the wrong way (as, for example, realists do). I propose a different brand of theorising – fact-sensitive political theory, which aims to avoid these two problems by paying attention to key facts while retaining a solid normative anchoring in abstract normative principles. The merit of abstract vs. non-abstract reasoning is that the normative debate is not torn between two distinct ends of a spectrum in the way the idealist–realist debate is. By contrast, the locus of the investigations is vertical in the sense that abstract and concrete normative discussions are given equal status and can co-exist compatibly. One of the main differences between abstract and concrete normative principles is whether abstract or concrete facts are considered necessary for the determination of the normative principles. The fact-sensitive account of normativity is neither realist nor non-ideal: it is an ambitious and demanding normative theory that contains both abstract and concrete normative reasoning. The fact-sensitive account of political theory meets the two criteria set out in this article: to integrate concrete and empirical facts about the subject matter and to subject the selection of facts to theoretical and methodological discussion and justification.

Intermediaries of Intervention: How Local Power Brokers Shape External Peace- and State-Building in Afghanistan and Congo

ABSTRACTWhy do international peace- and state-building interventions regularly fail to transform conflict-ridden countries into liberal states? This paper argues that interventionists’ practices and dependency on local intermediaries help explain the disappointing outcomes of intervention. Based on a relational theoretical approach and original empirical material, the paper compares two of the largest peace- and state-building interventions in recent years. For practical and normative reasons, peacebuilders need to find local partners who help them instil change. However, as partners of peace- and state-building interventions, local elites may appropriate international resources and use them to strengthen their own positions. Interventionists abstain from sanctioning such appropriation as long as their own short-term and purpose-oriented goals are not undermined. Contrary to assumptions in much of the literature, interventionists do not eagerly defend their alleged liberal agendas. Instead, their pragmatism strengthens existing neo-patrimonial figurations rather than fostering fundamental transformation. The paper argues that research should focus on peacebuilders’ actual practices rather than normative statements. Such an approach allows for a better understanding of evolving political orders in conflict societies.

The Rise of Hospitalists: An Opportunity for Clinical Ethics

Translating ethical theories into clinical practice presents a perennial challenge to educators. While many suggestions have been put forth to bridge the theory-practice gap, none have sufficiently remedied the problem. We believe the ascendance of hospital medicine, as a dominant new force in medical education and patient care, presents a unique opportunity that could redefine the way clinical ethics is taught. The field of hospital medicine in the United States is comprised of more than 50,000 hospitalists-specialists in inpatient medicine-representing the fastest growing subspecialty in the history of medicine, and its members have emerged as a dominant new force around which medical education and patient care pivot. This evolution in medical education presents a unique opportunity for the clinical ethics community. Through their proximity to patients and trainees, hospitalists have the potential to teach medical ethics in real time on the wards, but most hospitalists have not received formal training in clinical ethics. We believe it is time to strengthen the ties between hospital medicine and medical ethics, and in this article we outline how clinical ethicists might collaborate with hospitalists to identify routine issues that do not rise to the level of an "ethics consult," but nonetheless require an intellectual grounding in normative reasoning. We use a clinical vignette to explore how this approach might enhance and broaden the scope of medical education that occurs in the inpatient setting: A patient with an intra-abdominal abscess is admitted to the academic hospitalist teaching service for drainage of the fluid, hemodynamic support, and antimicrobial therapy. During the initial encounter with the hospitalist and his team of medical students and residents, the patient reports night sweats and asks if this symptom could be due to the abscess. How should the hospitalist approach this question?

Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?

Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a normative reason to believe that p. The primary objective of this paper is to demonstrate that that style of answer cannot be right, because we must conceive of believing for a normative reason as constitutively involving a kind of rationality-involving relation that can be instantiated at all only if there is a known fact on the scene, which the agent treats as a normative reason. A secondary objective, achieved along the way, is to demonstrate that in their Prime Time (for the Basing Relation) Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan do not succeed in undermining the factoring picture in general, only a simple-minded version of it.

Revisando Foucault: homo politicus e homo oeconomicus / terceiro capítulo de Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Nova Iorque: Zone Books / MIT Press, 2015)

Tradução do terceiro capítulo de Undoing the Demos, livro no qual Wendy Brown procura compreender como a emergência do homo oeconomincus subjugou outras gurações e interpelações do humano. Brown primeiro apresenta uma leitura crítica da teorização do homo oeconomicus que Foucault formulou em suas aulas sobre o neoliberalismo no Collège de France. A autora censura o lósofo francês por não ter atentado su cientemente para o homo politicus, lócus da soberania popular que consegue resistir a hegemonia do homo oeconomicus. Em seguida, re ete sobre a morfologia e posicionamento variáveis do homo oeconomicus e do homo politicus nos trabalhos de Adam Smith, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Bentham e J. S. Mill. Por último, analisa o gênero do homo oeconomicus contemporâneo e discute a disseminação do homo oeconomicus por meio da ordem de uma razão normativa e de uma racionalidade governante construída sobre essa ordem.

Normativity in Comparative Religious Ethics

AbstractThis essay seeks to clarify the meaning and nature of normativity in metaethics and offers reasons why comparative religious ethics (CRE) must properly address questions about normativity. Though many comparative religious ethicists take CRE to be a normative discipline, what they say about normativity is often unclear and confusing. I argue that the third‐wave scholars face serious questions with respect to not only the justification of moral belief but also the rationality of moral belief and action. These scholars tend to view the justification of moral belief to be a matter of process (that is, discursive social practice) rather than evidence‐possession, thus overlooking crucial differences between the two. They also run the risk of confusing motivating and explanatory reasons with normative reasons for moral belief and action. Consequently, their account of normativity would be insufficient for determining the rationality of moral beliefs and actions as well as for justifying moral beliefs.

‘Wild’ in the city context: Do relative wild areas offer opportunities for urban biodiversity?

Urbanization is increasing worldwide, making it essential to improve management of urban greenspaces for better provisioning of ecosystem services and greater biodiversity benefits. At the same time, societal interest in reduced intensity management regimes is growing for a range of practical and normative reasons. We assessed if relative wild urban greenspaces, under little or no management, are associated with increased levels of biodiversity. We conducted a GIS-based relative wildness mapping for the Danish city Aarhus, and compared relative wildness to field-measured perceived biodiversity at 100 randomly placed sample sites in the city centre. Perceived biodiversity was estimated using the bioscore methodology. The results show a positive relationship between mapped wildness and bioscores, notably within artificial vegetated areas such as parks and gardens, while woodland had the highest wildness and bioscore values overall. All bioscore components measuring structural diversity increased with increasing mapped wildness. The bioscore component compositional richness covered site-level species richness for birds, invertebrates and plants, with invertebrate and bird species richness increasing and plant species richness decreasing with increasing wildness. The latter reflects that woodlands had low site-level plant diversity. Overall, woodlands nevertheless harboured many unique plant species, with woodlands and ruderal areas contributing the greatest beta diversity (inter-site variability in species composition). These findings show that urban greenspace management allowing for spontaneous ecological processes (greater wildness) overall also promotes urban biodiversity, pointing to potential synergies between urban design and management goals for reduced management intensity, increased wildness experiences, and higher biodiversity in urban greenspaces.

Global constitutionalism and constitutional imagination

Abstract:There is a difference between the normative reasons for endorsing global constitutionalism and the conditions determining its emergence. This article addresses the latter issue. Specifically, the article claims that global constitutionalism rests on an underexploredshift in constitutional imagination. To account for this claim, the article is structured in several parts. It begins by clarifying the meaning of ‘constitutional imagination’. In so doing it builds on Kant’s concept of imagination (‘Einbildungskraft’) and in its reception by Hannah Arendt. The article then illustrates the significance of constitutional imagination by focusing on two major developments in constitutional thinking. The first development involves the shift away from a narrative reconstruction of constitutional authority; the second points to acosmopolitanisationof constitutional imagination.

The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning

According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that the norms of practical reasoning, like the norms of theoretical reasoning, are characteristically defeasible, in a sense I make precise. Recognizing this property of those norms makes space for a solution to the problem. The resulting view is in a way analogous to the familiar defeasibility theory of knowledge, but it avoids a standard objection to that theory.