Non-nuclear States Research Articles

Feasibility and Safeguards Policy for Nuclear Power Plants: A Case Study in Indonesia within the NPT Framework, Emphasizing Global Security Analysis

This study examines the feasibility of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force with nuclear capabilities to improve global security. It starts with a historical overview of nuclear weapons and international agreements. The research then addresses challenges such as proliferation, cyber threats, and nuclear energy expansion. This paper analyses Indonesia's stance on the Iranian nuclear issue and the challenges of balancing international relations with domestic pressures, with a focus on its role in the UN Security Council. Using a descriptive qualitative approach, the research assesses global security, technical challenges, political considerations, moral implications, cost allocation, roles of non-nuclear states, regional impacts, transparency, nuclear disarmament, public perception, and alternative security approaches. The study highlights the importance of a comprehensive evaluation that takes into account technical, political, ethical, economic, and regional dimensions. The text emphasizes the importance of transparency, accountability, and international consensus in achieving effective global security. While acknowledging both the potential benefits and risks, the research recommends careful consideration and multilateral diplomatic efforts to promote global stability.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime as a “Failed Promise”: Contestation and Self-Undermining Dynamics in a Liberal Order

Abstract The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) forms the core of the most prominent multilateral security governance regime of the liberal international order (LIO). Despite being a widely supported and remarkably successful security regime to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons, NPT politics have become increasingly polarized. In this article, I analyze contestation and self-undermining dynamics in the nuclear regime. The NPT is a strongly institutionalized but weakly liberal regime. However, it is unevenly institutionalized. Patterns of contestation in the regime derive from these characteristics. The basic source of contestation is the fundamental inequality between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Specifically, dissatisfied states seek to strengthen the rules and obligations in the less institutionalized domain. I argue that when efforts at order-consistent reform fail, states shift to a more radical strategy of liberal counter-institutionalization to pursue their goal of equality. Nonnuclear states have long been dissatisfied with the uneven distribution of the burdens and benefits of the regime, and especially the nuclear-armed states’ failure to pursue their obligation of disarmament. Most of the contestation in the NPT over the decades has been order-consistent and pursued “liberal reform.” However, when proponents of nuclear disarmament failed to achieve meaningful progress through the NPT, they shifted to a liberal counter-institutionalization strategy and adopted an entirely new legal instrument, the 2017 Nuclear Prohibition Treaty, to pursue disarmament. This was a direct—but liberal—challenge to the existing suborder. This treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons for all, legalizes the NPT obligation to pursue disarmament.

Svjetla budućnost za nuklearno razoružanje ili utopija?: Pravna ocjena Ugovora o zabrani nuklearnog oružja iz 2017. i njegov odnos s Ugovorom o neširenju nuklearnog oružja iz 1968.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the first universal international treaty that stipulates the prohibition of nuclear weapons and as such represents a major contribution to international law in the field of nuclear disarmament. The main purpose and goal of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. States that are parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons belong to the group that does not possess nuclear weapons, and in relation to them, compliance with the rules and fulfilment of the obligations prescribed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons should not pose any problem. However, the practical effect of the nuclear arms control treaty is seen by the major nuclear powers as an unrealistic and progressive approach to disarmament. Therefore, it is very difficult to predict that the nuclear states and their allies will decide to ratify the treaty in the near future. Therefore, in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an attempt will be made to offer an answer to the following questions. First, can the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons per se constitute a fundamental legal framework to which all states must adhere? And secondly, can nuclear states, according to the persistent objector rule, prevent the possible establishment of customary international law? It is to be assumed that the pressure of the non-nuclear states may in some way influence the nuclear states so that they feel the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to a certain extent. Due to the establishment of a norm that prohibits nuclear weapons, it is necessary to ultimately explain the relationship of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with already existing legal instruments, especially with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The failure of Euratom to harmonize the EU nuclear safety and environmental regulation. Can a recent ECJ judgment become a breakthrough, beneficial for EU’s quest for a sustainable, renewable-driver future?

The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (known as the Euratom Treaty), which was signed on 25 March 1957, contained commitments to promote nuclear energy technology and to integrate financial and technical efforts to develop that technology in the six signatory countries, in order to enhance wealth creation and the wellbeing of their citizens. The 66 year history of the Euratom Treaty undoubtedly shows that it didn’t fulfil its promises and worse, it became completely obsolete in the light of the European integration efforts contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This article examines its fundamental shortcomings, whereby national interests in nuclear energy were at the forefront and whereby the harmonization of Nuclear Safety Standards and the protection of the environment and the health of the EU citizens became secondary, when confronted with industrial interests and the promotion of nuclear technologies (promotion which still continues for an industrial nuclear sector which is fully mature). This provoked a painful discord between nuclear counties and non-nuclear EU Member States, still the Achilles’ heel of Euratom as can be concluded from the discussion regarding nuclear energy as part of the EU Green Taxonomy. Euratom can be seen as the flagship of the pro-nuclear countries, albeit that the content of the Treaty is obsolete, as will be explained below from a legal angle. Because the EU Commission is the executive body of the Euratom Community, it is to blame for the failure to harmonize the safety standards as foreseen in the Euratom Treaty and for the unwillingness to integrate the EU legal environmental principles into nuclear law. It will be argued that the Nuclear Basic Safety Standards, as foreseen by the Euratom Treaty and the secondary Euratom Directives, are ‘empty shells’ and should no longer stand in isolation from the EU environmental acquis. The Justification and the ALARA principles should be informed by the Precautionary Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle. This entails that with the risks of global warming (such as heat waves, floodings, cooling water, wildfires, terrorism etc.) and the many caveats on nuclear decommissioning and disposal of high-level nuclear waste, the equation between the advantages of nuclear power (e.g., minor CO2 emissions) and its major risks should be reconsidered, not leaving this justification process to the nuclear industry, as in Belgium. The EU national governments should undertake this justification process at every stage of their political decisions regarding nuclear energy (e.g., life time extension), in full transparency and giving access to justice, as foreseen in the AARHUS Convention. A specialized EU Nuclear Safety Agency should receive a mandate by the EU Commission to harmonize such a justification process in the EU Member States and to harmonize the Nuclear Basic Safety Standards. The elementary decisions on the future of (nuclear) energy should be taken in a democratic way and not based on the promotional Euratom Treaty, in the light of the EU Green Deal and the energy transition towards renewable energy sources.

International Legal Foundations Of Compliance With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Guarantees

One of the results of the development of international relations in the second half of the current century was the transformation of nuclear weapons directly into a factor of world politics, which hangs over the entire global security system even in the conditions of the “post-confrontational era”. This is not the inertia of the philosophy of containment, as the world in the 1980s and 1990s proved its flexibility and even readiness for transformations by the ever-increasing susceptibility of international relations to scientific and technical influence. The rapid development of atomic energy, despite a number of man-made disasters (from Trimayland to Chernobyl), continues, and the diversity of research in this field is combined with the number of countries interested in the scientific development of this field. Therefore, guarantees of the exclusively peaceful orientation of the energy programs of non-nuclear states, a legally established and effective ban on the production of nuclear weapons best correspond to modern concepts of maintaining stability in certain regions and the world as a whole. However, the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, although it limited the hyperbolization of the nuclear factor in a certain historical segment, could not fully fulfill its second task of ranking states into only two groups - nuclear and non-nuclear. Outside of this dual, simplified scheme of political regulation of conflicting interests, a risk group has emerged, consisting of countries with a vague status of “near-threshold”. This happened not only because the nuclear states created a cult of nuclear weapons, but also because the logic of scientific and technological progress led to this, which was distorted in the prism of rivalry between states, especially at the regional level. First of all, the process of industrial-type countries approaching the nuclear threshold, which the block of post-industrial societies is trying to isolate from them, is absolutely inevitable from the point of view of science and technology. This does not mean equalizing the levels of development, which would create a favorable foundation, and then objective prerequisites for solving a whole series of contradictions in the system of international relations and, perhaps, removing the nuclear problem itself from the agenda. On the contrary, the configuration of inequality remained the same and only moved, pulling the locomotive of technical progress along the rails of global economic relations, to the zone of nuclear coordinates. Key words: IAEA, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, General Assembly of the United Nations.

Exorbitant Privilege of Nuclear-weapon States in a Multipolar World

As a Chinese-brokered peace deal for the war in Ukraine starts to form, the previously unthinkable reality that Russia as the aggressor may end up possessing a substantial amount of occupied territories sinks in. In violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and turning Article 51 on its head, Russias adventurism since the 2014 annexation of Crimea signifies the emerging norm of exorbitant privilege enjoyed by nuclear-weapon states. Through case study of Russias nuclear coercion and systematic review of realist literature, the essay seeks to demonstrate the potency of such exorbitant privilege and its implications in a multipolar world. The essay finds that nuclear-weapon states possess emerging ability to legitimize use of force against, possess occupied territories of, and extract political concessions from nonnuclear states, in spite of the U.N. Charter and its founding principle of the sovereign equality of all states.

Virtual Nukes: The Formulation of Japan’s Non-nuclear Weapons Security Policy

Informed by newly-declassified U.S. and Japanese documents, this study explains how Japan made the strategic choice to maintain its status as a non-nuclear weapons state, made possible by external and internal arrangements devised between 1964-1976. Japan obtained official and private security assurances from the U.S. ensuring its nuclear protection, preserved its material capabilities that could allow for an independent nuclear weaponization in emergencies, and simultaneously constructed public narratives that were politically justifiable to international and domestic audiences. U.S.-Japan public statements (such as Joint Communiques) and secret agreements (regarding U.S. nuclear transit rights in Japan and U.S. emergency re-entry rights in Okinawa) mutually reinforced each other, preserving U.S. deterrent capabilities in East Asia. Dual security assurances, in effect, enabled Japan to refrain from pursuing its own nuclear path. Essentially, secrecy characterized the origins of Japan’s non-nuclear weapons security policy, formulated prior to its entry into the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) framework.

Achieving Minimum Deterrence: A New Dyadic Dataset on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capabilities

This paper argues that existing quantitative studies mistakenly assume that all nuclear states can impose nuclear destruction on opponents by simply distinguishing nuclear states from non-nuclear states. This practice, however, does not capture variation in 1) nuclear states’ possession of delivery capabilities, 2) the range of deployed nuclear delivery systems, and 3) the geographic distance between nuclear states and their dyadic counterparts. Instead of this monadic nuclear statehood approach, I propose the dyadic nuclear reach approach, which uses a new dyad-specific measure of states’ strategic nuclear delivery capabilities. It codes whether a nuclear state can launch a nuclear strike against a given opponent by using the information about the estimated range of each nuclear state’s strategic nuclear delivery platforms, nuclear operation bases, and states’ capital cities. An empirical application shows that using an appropriate measure of nuclear capabilities does significantly alter existing empirical knowledge of nuclear weapons and international conflict.

Challenging war traditions: humanitarian discourse and the nuclear prohibition treaty

Abstract This article interrogates the humanitarian discourse and the emergence of the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Often acknowledged as decisive for adopting the TPNW, the humanitarian discourse is considered vital to stigmatizing nuclear weapons and their purported deterrence value. However, the literature has not thoroughly examined the mechanisms through which speaking in humanitarian terms enabled proponents of the TPNW to exercise agency, failing to appreciate the complex discursive practices sustaining power relations in nuclear politics. This article introduces a theoretical framework that can help us make sense of these complexities, while illuminating additional ways through which the humanitarian discourse contributed to the TPNW. Using a feminist post-structuralist lens, I argue that the humanitarian discourse enabled small and middle-power states to challenge war traditions that sustain dominant configurations of power in nuclear politics. Upon speaking in humanitarian terms, these states destabilized the ongoing reiteration of the protector/protected dichotomy that has placed non-nuclear states in a position of subordination. The article draws attention to how dominant assumptions of the masculine and feminine shape global politics, while advancing theoretical tools to help us grasp and seize possibilities for policy innovation and change.

Does the Bomb Really Embolden? Revisiting the Statistical Evidence for the Nuclear Emboldenment Thesis

This paper revisits the latest statistical evidence for the nuclear emboldenment thesis—nuclear-armed states are more likely to initiate military aggression than non-nuclear states—from ( Bell and Miller 2015 ). If correct, their findings have important theoretical and policy implications regarding the effect of nuclear proliferation on international conflict. This paper shows, however, that Bell and Miller’s findings heavily rely on two important components of their statistical analysis: (1) using all state dyad observations, and (2) employing pooled regression models to analyze time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data. I argue that those components are based on questionable assumptions on heterogeneity in their dataset. Based on alternative strategies dealing with heterogeneity in dyadic data, my reanalysis shows that the emboldening effect of nuclear weapons is not as robust as originally claimed. Instead, I find the robust deterrent effect of nuclear weapons: nuclear-armed states are less likely to be targeted in military disputes. These findings highlight the need for careful application of quantitative methods to produce a more robust understanding of nuclear issues.

Leveraging Intellectual Property to Prevent Nuclear War

Although international law forbids nuclear attacks, only nine states have mutually assured destruction available to prevent direct attacks against themselves, while non-nuclear states have few substantive options to deter a nuclear attack. This study analyzes the economic impacts of a theoretical international agreement that eliminates patent rights for any nuclear aggressor (i.e., free global compulsory licensing of all intellectual property (IP) for a nuclear aggressor). The results found that all but one of the nuclear states would have a significant economic disincentive to start a nuclear attack if the proposal was put into force. Payback times ranged from 1.2 to 40 years, where the entire GDP of a nuclear aggressor would be needed to offset the loss for aggression, indicate such a mechanism as a whole would be an effective nuclear deterrent. This method would not be universally effective without ensuring all nuclear states are members of the international economy and IP processes. With the growth of open-source products and reduced value of patents, this mechanism does have a limited effectiveness time. Currently it appears to be a policy trajectory worthy of future work that can enhance safety from nuclear threat without causing harm to countries of goodwill.

Atomic aesthetics: gender, visualization and popular culture in Egypt

Abstract How was the atomic age visualized in Egypt in the years immediately after the creation of the bomb? What role did gendered images, symbols and metaphors play in narrating and normalizing nuclear technology? How can these help us understand nuclear policy today? This article engages visual and textual media, including satirical magazines, cultural journals and film. It presents a plurality of images: the depiction of the bomb as an egg, as a miniscule and aesthetically pleasing object, alongside more alarming illustrations of the bomb as a monster. Through fluid and unstable visualizations, nationalist modernizers highlighted the ambivalence of nuclear technology, seen as containing potential for postcolonial rebirth and global death simultaneously. By exploring nuclear imaginaries from the decolonizing world, the article challenges the dominant narratives, histories and aesthetics of the atomic age. Despite the continuous reiteration of nuclear weapons as masculine in feminist International Relations, this conceptualization is not necessarily universal, and this research illustrates that feminizing nuclear imagery can still reinforce the nuclearized world. Considering visualization from, and not only of, the global South, the article emphasizes that people in non-nuclear weapons-possessing states also participated in the production of the nuclear-armed world and in discussions on the nuclear condition.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN HUMANITER LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE

Human life and technological developments are closely related to the legal awareness of the international community. The discovery of nuclear weapons for the first time was by the United States (US). It was used in World War II to attack and bomb the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The incident resulted in the death of 160,000 (one hundred and sixty thousand) people, and damage to almost all the ecosystem. The devastating negative effects resulting from the use of nuclear weapons were then regulated and contradicted the norms outlined in Additional Protocol I of 1977, to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which regulates the methods and methods of war. Although it has been regulated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (international humanitarian law), however, it turns out that there are still many countries that continue to develop nuclear weapons for reasons of national security. The research method used is a type of normative juridical research and uses a statutory approach and conceptual thinking. The results of the study indicate that the governing norms regarding; research and possession of nuclear weapons are still discriminatory. In practice, there is a distinction between a nuclear state and a non-nuclear state. Furthermore, in the current reality, there are still countries that are classified as not having good intentions to carry out the agenda of disarming and stopping the development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, according to the results of this study, to overcome these problems, it is necessary to have new legal principles that can be universally binding.

The Security of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Middle East as a Test Case for Unconditional Security Assurances

ABSTRACT A just nuclear order based on voluntary abstinence by states and the promotion of nuclear weapon-free zones would require more credible negative security assurances than provided by the current non-proliferation regime. The question here is: how to create the necessary conditions for such a change? The negative security assurances issued to the non-nuclear states in general and to the existing regional nuclear weapon-free zones in particular are reviewed. These are analysed in relation to their conditionality and ambiguity in order to understand the security provided. On this basis, possible options to achieve unconditional, legally based security assurances collectively for all the zone states are presented. These assurances could potentially be a tool to increase the number of non-nuclear states and nuclear weapon-free zones, especially in cases where there are one or several nuclear weapon states. Currently, the most acute example is the one in the Middle East. The lack of progress in this case will haunt the NPT review conferences and deepen the crisis until some positive steps take place. In case unconditional, legal security assurances are agreed to, these could provide an interim first phase for the WMD-free zone in the Middle East and allow for some of the disagreements among the participants to at least be discussed. The model here would be the transformation of the hostile relations between Brazil and Argentina initiated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Power to the have-nots? The NPT and the limits of a treaty hijacked by a “power-over” model

ABSTRACT The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its evolution over the past five decades, and the dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear states within it, can be analyzed by focusing on different understandings of power. Within the various concepts of power are claims which distinguish between what is known broadly as “power-over” and a more subtle form of influence, “power-to.” This article explores the history of the NPT, showing how the nuclear weapon states have shaped and limited this institution by practices which fall within the relational emphasis of “power-over.” Recently, however, non-nuclear states have adopted a “power-to” approach. Frustrated by their inability to bring about substantive change within the limits of the NPT, these states have realized and applied their agency and collective “power-to” in order to create an alternative approach to the problem of nuclear weapons in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

No-first-use of nuclear weapons: Australian perspectives and possible contributions

Nuclear arms control and disarmament processes have stalled in recent years, and there is concern, especially among non-nuclear states, that the nuclear risk-reduction measures previously called for are not being met. One of the most important of these is the need for no first use (NFU) commitments to be given by all the nuclear weapon states (China and India have already done so.) The idea has been given recent impetus in the United States, especially as President Biden prepares the next US Nuclear Posture Review. Some states under the US nuclear umbrella, however, have expressed resistance to this idea, even as NFU would be highly-useful in reducing nuclear dangers. This paper argues that Australia, even though it is not formally under a US nuclear umbrella, has an important role to play in furthering prospects for NFU. The paper suggests ways in which this might be done.

Emerging Complexity of Nuclear South Asia

South Asia is a geo-political system which has its unique security characters. The emerging complex nature of a system could lead either to the security or insecurity of that system. India and Pakistan are the emerging nuclear powers of South Asia. The nuclear doctrines and behavior of India and Pakistan promote the advancement of their nuclear programs in both strategic and civil domains. Both countries desire stability, the balance of power and security through the possession of nuclear options. However, the author argues that South Asia’s existing nuclear environment and its emerging complexity have produced insecurity and instability in the region at large. This paper is an attempt to identify the complexity of actors and behaviors and their emerging threats to the security of the region. There is also a lack of literature to portray the nuclear risk that the non-nuclear states face in South Asia. This paper tries to fill that gap as well.

Disarmament, Indian Ocean and Strategic Externalities: The Case of Sri Lanka

ABSTRACT South Asia, surrounded by the Indian Ocean, is a favorite theatre to continue with the contemporary global strategic power competition of nuclear states. The non-nuclear states in South Asia simply cannot afford to remain complacent about the rapid nuclearisation that is taking place in the region since it results in adverse impacts on their security. Strangely, its underlying security impacts are somewhat ignored and never fully grasped by the non-nuclear states for various reasons. In this setting the author brings out the account of Sri Lanka’s role in disarmament in the passage of South Asia’s gradual transformation into a volatile nuclear region. It also questions the popular opinion whether the cause of disarmament happens to be an exclusive mater to be dealt by the nuclear club. The objective of this paper is to discuss the role that Sri Lanka traditionally played in global disarmament and the effects of third-party security concerns she faces under the emerging nuclear shadow.

أنظمة المسؤولية المدنية النووية والخطوة التالية لدولة قطر

While many states are moving away from nuclear power and decommissioning their reactors for cheaper and safer alternative energy sources, recent years have seen a spark in interest for nuclear power within the Middle East under the pretext of ‘energy independence’. This trend poses a potential threat for the safety of the region considering that nuclear power plants are prone to human errors, deliberate attacks, and natural environmental convulsions which could trigger potential transboundary fallout. Given the region’s small and compacted geography along with the increasingly volatile geopolitical instability, a regional incident would likely have much direr consequences compared to other previous nuclear incidents. As a non-nuclear power state, Qatar is not currently party to any of the nuclear civil liability conventions which could guarantee some level of compensation for the victims in case of transboundary nuclear harm. In due course, Qatar will be surrounded by nuclear reactors from the north (the Iranian Bushehr plant), the east (the UAE Barakah plant) and the west (the planned Saudi plants). As exemplified by the COVID-19 pandemic, theoretical transboundary calamities can unexpectedly become a sudden reality and there is a solemn need to work proactively when dealing with such consequential hypotheticals. Therefore, this article qualitatively assesses the relevant international conventions with an aim of being policy relevant and navigate Qatari decision-makers through the vexing web of the nuclear civil liability regimes.

Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence

Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In “Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach” I have applied the “sociology of technology” in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the “Mexican amendments” from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.