Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

BUSTING OUT

This report explores Iranian popular opinion on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the determinants of Iranian attitudes. Using data from a 2008 survey of 710 Iranians administered by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, we find that that a significant minority of Iranians (10 percent in 2006 and 14 percent in 2008) would prefer that Iran withdraw from the NPT. Our statistical analysis shows that Iranians who fear a US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and distrust the International Atomic Energy Agency are more likely to want to quit the NPT. We therefore argue that those who do not trust other nations are most likely to oppose the NPT.

The Nonproliferation Complex

For more than four decades the twin goals of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have been an almost unchallenged objective of the “international community.” Like drought prevention, or bans on the use of child soldiers, nonproliferation remains a mostly uncontroversial, largely universalistic initiative to which few object. The proponents of nonproliferation are fond of stressing that the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has more signatories than any other arms control treaty. Who would not want to prevent more states from obtaining nuclear weapons? And who, for that matter, would oppose the ideal of a world free of such weapons?

Critical Study of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

In 1964 China claimed the position of being the fifth nuclear weapon state and this changed the dimension of world politics right before us.As power had shifted to the east it therefore created a balance between the east and west, thus china‟s acquisition of nuclear power led the world powers and victors of the World War II (USSR, USA, UK and France) to think of formulatingan international agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevent other countries to acquire nuclear bombs, hereafter the world powers and the permanent members of security council with the support of United Nations formulated an International Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaponry Agreement. The motivation behind the creation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the mounting concern regarding the future, the safety and well-being of humanity considering the development and spread of nuclear technology and sophisticated nuclear weapons. Apart from this the fear that prevailed was the advancements and growing amounts of nuclear weapons that evidently increased the chance of accidents and the possibilities of these hazardous weapons falling into the wrong hands. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had allowed the world to see firsthand the devastation that these weapons could incur. In addition, the Cold War between the USA and the USSR served to highlight the danger and terror that the possession of nuclear weapons creates, 1 thus, because of such reasons the superpowers of the world jointly created the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the treaty‟s objectives being, firstly to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology, secondly to promote cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament in general and complete disarmament. 2 The NPT opened for signature in 1968 after the United Nations (UN) recommended the signature by a resolution. The Treaty finally entered into force in 1970. 3

MIDDLE EAST NONPROLIFERATION

The Middle East is a crucial region for the global nonproliferation regime. In 2010, the state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proposed a conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone. The nuclear weapon-free zone model, on which this idea builds, has achieved important results in other regions, but faces especially stark challenges in the Middle East. However, the attempt to apply the boldly imaginative zone approach to the Middle East holds promise for building a more inclusive dialogue on nonproliferation and regional security.

THE PROLIFERATION RISKS OF GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT AT THE DAWN OF THE NPT

The negotiating history of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is analyzed using previously overlooked archival sources. Contrary to received wisdom, there was a lively debate in the spring of 1968, much of it restricted to behind-the-scenes exchanges between Washington and London, over the proliferation risks of gas centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment. The United States put its faith in classification, safeguards, and peaceful use. The United Kingdom feared that clandestine enrichment using centrifuges would render the NPT a dead letter.

Mirando o passado: autonomia e proteção nas Conferências de Exame do TNP (2000-2010)

O objetivo do artigo é examinar as posições de Estados nuclearmente e não-nuclearmente armados com relação à não-proliferação, ao desarmamento e aos usos pacíficos da energia nuclear nas três últimas Conferências de Exame do TNP. O argumento central é o de que os Estados nuclearmente armados almejavam desenvolver medidas mais rigorosas quanto à não-proliferação de armas nucleares e preservar sua autonomia em relação a outros Estados, fazendo concessões predominantemente marginais na área de desarmamento nuclear a fim de minimizar a oposição de Estados não-nuclearmente armados, especialmente em 2000 e 2010. Já os Estados não-nuclearmente armados desejavam evitar a adoção de medidas propostas pelos Estados nuclearmente armados que minassem o direito inalienável aos usos pacíficos da energia nuclear e ampliar os compromissos dos Estados nuclearmente armados com relação ao desarmamento nuclear.

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the challenges of nuclear capability projects in Iran and North-Korea

One of the greatest challenges facing the world today is the overwhelming quest by some member nations to acquire, develop and possess nuclear capabilities with the intention of balancing power, fears and terror at the centre stage of world politics. Iran and North Korea have been in the fore front of arms race. Therefore, it is the task of this paper to examine the circumstances surrounding the development and possessions of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea. Hence, this paper seeks to link between the limitations of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the level of nuclear capabilities achieved by the North Korea and Iran. Particularly, primary challenges such as non-compliance to the NPT in North Korea and Iran, are carefully examined. We adopted qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. We argue that Iran and North Korea have acquired and developed nuclear capability project with the aim of striking a power balance at the center stage of world politics. This major motive accounts for non-compliance of the NPT by the two nations. We therefore recommend that the United Nations should expand its check mechanism and intensify its effort, by marrying its words on nuclear non – proliferation with full actions. Key words: Non-proliferation, international atomic energy agency, nuclear weapons, nuclear smuggling, terrorists, non-compliance, Middle East.

Standing together or Doing the Splits? Evaluating European Union Performance in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Negotiations

There is a widely held belief that when the European Union (EU) stands together - when it 'speaks with one voice' - then it is at its most influential as an international actor. An assumption follows that, where the Member States are divided, doing the splits, and working towards their national objectives, effectiveness is then limited and the EU is marginalized. Very little however has been said on how not 'speaking with one voice' can in fact be an advantage to the EU. Evaluating EU performance in what is arguably a hard case - the most recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon) in May 2010 - this article argues that the EU not only challenged the low expectations traditionally afforded it in such a high politics negotiation but did so by both standing together and doing the splits. By maintaining a unified and visible EU presence coupled with the utilization of Member States' own diplomatic relationships within other negotiation groupings, the EU was able to spread its voice, act as an information 'conveyor belt' and ultimately enhance its role, in fact performing creditably - at least as well as the other major players. This article thus challenges perceptions that it is only by 'speaking with one voice' that the EU can make a difference in multilateral negotiations: suggesting instead that the EU can perform well and make an impact not by always speaking with one voice but with many.

Patience or Lethargy?: U.S. Policy toward North Korea under the Obama Administration

IntroductionThe denuclearization of North Korea (officially, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been most important policy objective in U.S.-North Korea relations since end of Cold War. But U.S. foreign policy in North Korea proved unsuccessful when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Both William J. Clinton administration (1993-2000) and George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) sought to prevent a nuclear North Korea by adopting a ety of toward country, ranging from a possible use of military force to a negotiated settlement. Despite many years of hard work, however, their efforts failed.President Obama has been seeking denuclearization of North Korea since his inauguration in 2009. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and counterterrorism are top priorities in his foreign policy. Like his predecessors, Obama also believes that nuclear nonproliferation is critical not only security of United States, but also peace of international community. On April 5, 2009, he revealed his vision a world without nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic.1 Approximately one year later, Obama administration also announced a radical shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy in that United States will not use its nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks involving biological or chemical weapons or large- scale conventional forces.2 On April 8, 2010, he also signed a historic nuclear arms control treaty with Russian president Dmitri A. Medvedev.3 He was even awarded 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.4However, Obama has not been so successful with North Korean nuclear issue. Since Obama administration adopted a policy, no progress has been made: neither denuclearization process nor Six-Party Talks have resumed. Pyongyang even conducted a second nuclear test during Obama's term, and has not rejoined Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).The central goal of this paper is to explain why Obama administration has not had any noticeable accomplishment in its policy on North Korean nuclear issue. By closely examining policy goals and strategies of Obama administration over past two and a half years, this paper seeks to uncover what is missing from U.S. policy toward North Korea. The starting point is to make sense of what Pyongyang really wants from Washington. Giving due consideration to Pyongyang's objectives, President Obama faces a choice of three different strategies: coercive diplomacy, strategic patience (the status quo), and engagement.This paper argues that success of Obama administration in achieving denuclearization of North Korea is dependent on an appropriate understanding of Pyongyang's security concerns and a careful analysis of North Korean nuclear policy. It suggests that President Obama should radically change his North Korea policy. More specifically, he should abandon strategic patience policy and instead adopt a constructive engagement policy in order to achieve denuclearization of North Korea and security of East Asian region.The North Korea Policy of Obama AdministrationPresident Barack Obama was expected to bring about dramatic change in not only U.S. domestic policy but also foreign policy. These expectations were incredibly high, both because Obama symbolized change as first African American president in American history and because he retained political power to do so with Democratic Party's control of both chambers of Congress. The inauguration of President Obama also generated expectations in Pyongyang that the strained relationship between North Korea and U.S. would improve under new U.S. administration, Obama had indicated during 2008 presidential campaign his willingness to meet even with leaders of rogue nations, such as Kim Jong-Il of North Korea, if that was what it would take to resolve North Korean nuclear issue. …

Global norms and major state behaviour: The cases of China and the United States

When do major states conform to or diverge from global behavioural norms? We argue that existing theories find it difficult to explain important aspects of this variation in behaviour and we offer instead a framework consisting of three explanatory variables: degree of ‘fit’ between global norms and dominant domestic-level norms; actor perceptions of procedural and substantive legitimacy; and actor perceptions of consequences for the global power hierarchy. We argue that the relative importance of these variables is contingent on the level of domestic salience of the issue area. When salience is high, the degree of normative fit is the primary driver of behavioural consistency; when salience is low, degree of fit becomes less important and the other two variables play a more powerful role in driving behavioural outcomes. We demonstrate how this framework helps to account for the behaviour of the two most important states in the global system, China and the United States, in five areas of central importance to the contemporary global order: the limited use of force, macroeconomic policy surveillance, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, climate protection and financial regulation. Our argument also explains why globalization may reduce rather than increase levels of behavioural consistency with global norms.

Daniel H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was extended indefinitely in 1995, provides a comprehensive legal structure of rights and obligations designed to protect mankind from nuclear aggression and accidental extinction. Yet its implementation takes place in a political environment of uncertainties and controversies. The still existing universality gap,1 an apparent implementation gap (Iran), and the absence of effective measures towards general and complete nuclear disarmament � which are to be seen against the background of the global challenge that non-state actors are getting access to weapons of mass destruction � call for urgent and effective measures to increase implementation of the NPT and ensure compliance with its rules. Any of these measures at first requires an interpretation of the Treaty. Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not provide an article-by-article commentary to the NPT, a task that Daniel Joyner undertook in the first chapter of his previous book, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and that has meanwhile been supplemented by the Final Document of the most recent NPT Review Conference.2 The present book is rather a monograph on important principles and rules of the Treaty including its three pillars: peaceful use of nuclear energy (Preamble, paragraphs 4�7, and Articles IV�V); nuclear disarmament (Preamble, paragraphs 8�12, and Article VI); and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Preamble, paragraphs 1�3, and Articles I�III). The author convincingly claims the equal relevance of these pillars on the basis of the textual context and the negotiating history and he critically evaluates their perception by important states parties over time. His book is �thesis-driven�, in that it undertakes to reveal �distorted and unsustainable policy positions, particularly among Western, nuclear-weapon-possessing states�. It is the policy of these states to request non-nuclear-weapon states

Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing 235U, 233U, and 232Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of 235U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving 233U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The announcement by American President G.W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh on 18 July 2005 of an agreement on civil nuclear co-operation marked a fundamental change in three decades of American policy on trade in nuclear equipment and applied technology which brooked no exceptions.

Redefining the Nonproliferation Norm? Australian Uranium, the NPT, and the Global Nuclear Revival

Optimists maintain that great powers oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons and have a moral aversion to their use. The Eighth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May 2010 produced a final declaration calling for steps toward complete disarmament. Yet recent optimism belies some contradictory, incremental foreign policy decisions taken by countries like Australia and the United States that could produce a change of meaning for the nuclear nonproliferation norm. Building on the “norm life‐cycle” model developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, this article links a new constructivist model of normative change to decisions by developed states to expand the global nuclear fuel cycle and provide sensitive nuclear assistance to other countries. An exploratory case study of Australian government policies on nuclear energy and uranium exports (2006‐present), including the possible sale of uranium to India, a non‐NPT signatory, suggests an important role for elite agency in norm redefinition.

Africa–India nuclear cooperation: Pragmatism, principle, post-colonialism and the Pelindaba Treaty

The United States–India nuclear agreement, announced in 2005, was a first step in the process to normalise India's international nuclear relations despite the fact that India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Africa is largely seen as a uranium supplier rather than nuclear power producer in the world nuclear order. The position that African states take towards Africa–India nuclear cooperation, uranium supply to India in particular, is informed by two seemingly contrasting factors, namely economic and political pragmatism on the one hand, and non-proliferation imperatives and norms on the other. The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, also referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty, prohibits uranium and nuclear-related exports to states without comprehensive safeguards of their nuclear facilities, but the case of India is still open for interpretation. Africa and India's shared post-colonial consciousness, manifesting in their historical ties, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement and South–South cooperation, is often regarded as another factor facilitating Africa–India nuclear relations. A more critical view points to the different notions of post-coloniality in Africa and India, resulting in different approaches to nuclear non-proliferation that constrain their nuclear relations.

Scaling the Nuclear Abolition Mountain: Is the United Nations up to the Task?

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, delivered to the East–West Institute conference on The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, United Nations, 24 October 2008. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11881.doc.htm. 2. Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Vol 1 Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, adopted on 28 May 2010. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29. 3. UN Resolution 1 (1), Establishment of a commission to deal with the problem raised by the discovery of atomic energy, adopted without a vote on 24 January 1946. 4. Most recently UNGA Resolution 65/76, which calls for the commencement of negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention and which was adopted on 8 December 2010 with a vote of 133 in favour, 28 against and 23 abstaining. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com10/gares/A%20RES%2065%2076.pdf. 5. See Joint Statement by President Obama and President Medvedev, 1 April 2009. “We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world …” http://www.fpif.org/articles/obama_and_medvedev_on_nukes; and the Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India; 8 November 2010. “The two leaders affirmed that their countries’ common ideals, complementary strengths and a shared commitment to a world without nuclear weapons give them a responsibility to forge a strong partnership to lead global efforts for non-proliferation and universal and non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament in the 21st century.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india. 6. NATO Strategic Concept, adopted 19 November 2010, “We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm. 7. See, for example, the US Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p 47: “The long-term goal of U.S. policy is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons”, “The United States should … Set a course for the verified elimination of all nuclear weapons”, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf. 8. See UK–Norway Initiative: Research into the Verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement, http://www.norway-un.org/NorwayandUN/Selected_Topics/Disarmament/UK-Norway-Iniatitive-Research-into-the-Verification-of-nuclear-warhead-dismantlement. 9. See Eliminating Nuclear Threats – A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Final Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Section 6.3, Rethinking other justifications for retaining nuclear weapons, available at: http://www.icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/default.htm and http://www.icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/part-iii-6.html#justification. 10. See Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention mean a different international security system? in Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, IPPNW, 2007. http://icanw.org/files/sos.pdf. 11. ‘Advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament’, resolution adopted by consensus at the 120th IPU Assembly, 10 April 2009. http://www.ipu.org/conf-e/120/120-1.htm. 12. Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see footnote 2). 13. See A Global Law to Ban Nuclear Weapons, Middle Powers Initiative, June 2011. http://www.middlepowers.org/pubs/Global_Law.pdf. 14. See, Security Without Nuclear Deterrence, Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Ret'd), Ashton Media and the Disarmament and Security Centre 2010; Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, BARRY M. BLECHMAN and ALEXANDER K. BOLLFRASS (EDITORS), The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010; Securing our Survival, see footnote 10; and the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, UN Document A/62/650, http://inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap_old/mNWC_2007_Unversion_English_N0821377.pdf 15. See footnote 1. 16. Speech by Manmohan Singh to International Conference ‘Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons’ held in Delhi on 9–10 June 2008. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/manmohan-singh-on-nuclear-disarmament-2600.html. 17. See note 5. 18. See note 16.

Explaining Dynamics and Stasis in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Challenges of Nested Public Goods

Why do states that are members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) refuse efforts to strengthen the institution or broader nonproliferation regime? This paper systematically explores this question with a set of hypotheses that arise from the literature on collective action and international regimes. The analysis highlights the notion that a wide range of potential regime-strengthening activities creates a wide array of collective action challenges, each with different implications for the provision of an underlying public good. Thus, building responsible stakeholders for the broadest public good challenge (nuclear nonproliferation) essentially becomes a problem of “solving” the “nested public goods provision” problems within.

ACHIEVING THE VISION OF THE NPT

This article assesses the prospects for a strategy of incrementalism to lead to achievement of the core bargain of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: non-nuclear weapon states' nuclear nonproliferation in exchange for nuclear weapon states' nuclear disarmament to the point of “global zero.” Game theory, prospect theory, and liberal international theory are used to evaluate the potential of a strategy of incrementalism. While separately each has insights to offer, it is when all three theoretical approaches are used in tandem that meaningful explanatory gains emerge. The article concludes that incrementalism probably cannot lead to complete nonproliferation and global nuclear zero. Instead, signal events (as described by prospect theory) are needed to “punctuate” incremental processes in negotiations (best explained by liberal international theory) in order to move past hindrances such as international structural constraints (exemplified by game theory) and the conservative risk-taking propensities of state elites (described by prospect theory).

IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE?

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Universalization of the Additional Protocol

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been under serious strain for nearly two decades since the ‘discovery’ after the 1991 Gulf War of the clandestine development of nuclear weapons in Iraq. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors responded to the revelation by adopting the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, which would give the IAEA a much broader power than the comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) and would provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities on the territories of its parties. However, the universalization of the Additional Protocol is still a distant goal. This article first considers whether one can argue that the conclusion and bringing into force of an additional protocol is an obligation under the NPT. It then discusses the ways and means to make the Additional Protocol universal. Such ways and means may take the form of a direct call for the conclusion of an additional protocol. Its universalization may also be pursued indirectly by requiring a State to conclude an additional protocol as a condition for benefiting in nuclear cooperation. Legal possibilities and limitations are explored for both of these (direct and indirect) approaches. In doing so, an analysis of the relevant discussions at the 2010 NPT Review Conference held in May 2010 in New York is also provided.