Patience or Lethargy?: U.S. Policy toward North Korea under the Obama Administration

Inherent to the United States’ approach toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the second North Korean nuclear issue emerged in the early fall of 2002 has been a policy predisposition that has coexisted with little tangible movement in the direction of resolving this very serious regional and global problem. Indeed, since its inception, overall this problem has become worse. That the DPRK has detonated three nuclear bombs hardly makes the security environment in Northeast Asia more stable, contrary to Pyongyang's claims that its nuclear deterrent force does just that, or brings the North Korean nuclear issue any closer to resolution. For sure, major missteps by Pyongyang have exacerbated the nuclear issue. Moreover, because the Bush and Obama administrations have maintained this predisposition embedded in U.S. ideology, which like any belief system, including the DPRK's juche (self reliance) idea, begets emotion1 accompanied by both self-deception and deception on the part of state officials,2 policies implemented by Washington in response to the North's perceived provocations have produced few successes. Policies built on faulty foundations, specifically those that exude the animus of the Cold War, are more likely to fail than not. This paper concludes by providing a practical solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, which should be attractive to both Washington and Pyongyang: a conditional peace treaty that rather quickly leads to the DPRK's denuclearization.

IntroductionThe inauguration of President Obama in January 2009 aroused expectations in Pyongyang that the strained relationship between North Korea and the U.S. would improve under the new U.S. administration, for Obama had indicated during the 2008 presidential campaign his willingness to meet even with leaders of rogue nations, such as Kim Jong-Il of North Korea, if that was what it would take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. However, contrary to North Korea's expectations, the bilateral relationship between the two countries not improved but deteriorated further, especially after North Korea's missile and nuclear tests in the spring of 2009.It is the purpose of this paper to examine U.S.-North Korean relations under the Obama administration from the time of the inauguration on January 20, 2009, to the present with emphasis on an analysis of the factors which have contributed to the deterioration of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. It is a major contention of this paper that, like his predecessors, President Obama is determined to bring about the denuclearization of North Korea and will not relax sanctions against Pyongyang so long as North Korea persists in its ambitious nuclear weapons program.The Obama Administration's Approach to North KoreaDuring the presidential campaign in 2008, Obama said that he would be willing to sit down with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il if it would help persuade the North to give up its nuclear weapons program.1 Apparently, such a statement aroused the expectations on the part of North Koreans that an Obama presidency would provide an opportunity for improved relations. Pyongyang seemed hopeful for an end to what it called the regime change policy of the Bush administration and anticipated better relations with United States.2 In an attempt to establish cordial relations with Washington, North Korea conveyed its wish to send a representative to the Obama inauguration. However, the Obama transition team turned the request down,3 a decision based on the fact that there were no official diplomatic ties between the two countries.Apparently, North Korea was not near the top of the Obama administration's foreign policy priorities. It was also not clear how much time or attention Obama's foreign policy team would pay to North Korea, given urgent problems in such locations as the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.4 Meanwhile, signs of troubles for the Obama administration's North Korea policy began to surface on the eve of the new president's inauguration. According to Selig Harrison, who visited Pyongyang in mid-January 2009, North Koreans had very high hopes for Obama, but they want to confront him from a position of strength. North Korea made it clear that it had no intention of giving up nuclear weapons before normalizing relations with the U.S.5 Moreover, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman declared on the eve of Obama's inauguration that our status as a nuclear weapons state will never flounder as long as the U.S. nuclear threat remains, even a bit. He went on to say that we can live without normalized relations [with the U.S.], but can't live without nuclear deterrence.6 Although President Obama emphasized his intention to depart from President George W. Bush's policy of unilateralism and shift toward multilateral cooperation, it become increasingly clear that, insofar as the U.S. policy toward North Korea is concerned, the bottom line is (in the words of The Daily Yomiuri) continuation rather than change on the nuclear issue.7 Like his predecessors, Obama firmly believes that the prevention of nuclear proliferation is vital, not only to the security of the U.S. but to the preservation of the existing international system. In fact, as Joseph Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund points out, Obama has the most detailed, comprehensive, and transformative nuclear policy agenda any candidate ever carried into the White House. …

The Six Party Talks on North Korean nuclear issues have been ongoing since August 2003. They have not prevented North Korea from having nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the goal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula has been agreed upon by all six countries, including North Korea. Whether these talks will reach that goal is unclear and uncertain. However, the talks have brought the six countries, or at least the United States, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Russia, closer in terms of regional security. All six have agreed to an official dialogue on a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. This dialogue is useful and encouraging. Key words: Chinese foreign policy in Korea, North Korea, nuclear weapons, multilateral security - East Asia Introduction The Six Party Talks (SPT) among the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, Japan, and Russia have been going on for five years-since they started in August 2003. The process has failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons; North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October 2006. However, all six parties in the process including the DPRK have committed themselves to the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.1 Thus, there is hope that the SPT can be successful in reaching that final goal. The Chinese Government's View of the SPT Since the inception of the Six Party Talks in 2003, the Chinese government and its leadership have considered the SPT one of the major issues in Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese Communist Party's Liaison Department, and top Chinese leaders have paid intense attention to the SPT and made tremendous efforts to support the process. Indeed, there are few foreign policy or foreign relations issues in which the Chinese leadership has been more deeply involved. Both President Jiang Zemin and President Hu Jintao have been personally involved in the SPT, talking with North Korean and other countries' leaders, and writing personal letters to Kim Jong Il, the DPRK leader.2 The Chinese government has even made certain commitments to the SPT process and its final goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula that could damage its close bilateral relations with the DPRK if the latter does not continue to participate in the process. Because the Chinese government and its leadership have been involved so deeply, the SPT has become an important element in China's own foreign policy and diplomacy. The success or failure of the SPT is and will become a Chinese foreignpolicy and diplomatic success or failure. There are several reasons behind the deep commitment of the Chinese government and its leadership to the SPT. One of them is historical: China traditionally considers the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia areas in which China has direct interests. Thus, it has to be involved in order to promote an outcome favorable to China. Second, as China continues to rise, it is accepting more international responsibility for economic development and peace and security in Asia and the world.3 Moreover, the Korean peninsula borders China and thus, this international responsibility must first and foremost be focused on neighboring areas. The third reason is the improvement in Sino-U.S. relations since the summer of 2001 when the two countries put the EP-3 incident (in which a Chinese jet and a U.S. surveillance aircraft collided, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and the forced landing of the U.S. crew) behind them. Because their bilateral relations are relatively good and the United States has acted favorably toward China in some matters, especially concerning the Taiwan issue, China feels it needs to reciprocate. This is all the more so because the United States has been pushing China since 2002 to play a key role regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. …

America's North Korea nuclear policy has been a failure. Instead of achieving its goal of preventing North Korea from possessing and proliferating nuclear weapons, it has had the opposite effect. This failure was a result of the George W. Bush administration's blanket rejection of the previous administration's approach to North Korea, the tendency to ignore the advice of experts, neoconservative influence on foreign policy, and divisions within the administration resulting in an inconsistent approach. This article suggests a bold new approach in which the United States offers North Korea full diplomatic recognition and a formal end to the Korean War as first steps toward the goals established in the 2007 Six Party Talks on North Korea, i.e., that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons programs, and cease its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Taking these moves as a starting point rather than a reward for compliance will deepen North Korea's commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation by removing its gravest external security threat—the United States.

IntroductionAre the days of hope for North Korea's nuclear denuclearization over once and for all? North Korea's recent disclosure of its uranium enriched program (UEP), in addition to its plutonium-based nuclear arsenal, the possible instability of power succession from North Korea's top leader, Kim Jong Il, to his son Kim Jong Un, and the North Korean leadership's blind reliance on its nuclear program as the ultimate guarantor of its regime survival, all point to a pessimistic assessment that it would be impossible to persuade North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear program for whatever rewards might obtain from the United States and the international community.Admittedly many people hoped for some sort of breakthrough on the nuclear front as the Obama administration took office in January 2009, expressing its willingness to engage North Korea. Although he didn't mention North Korea by name, President Obama pledged in his inaugural address to reach out to isolated regimes. As Democratic presidential candidate, Obama also expressed an active interest in engaging North Korea in a presidential debate in September 2008 when he criticized the Bush administration's lack of diplomatic engagement with North Korea, and supported sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy to resolve North Korean nuclear issues.2Obama's criticism was clearly directed against the Bush administration's non-engagement policy toward North Korea during its first term. In fact, such an approach was inevitable, given the Bush team's fundamental distrust of the Pyongyang regime that had failed to keep its promises despite a series of previous nuclear pacts with the United States, including the Agreed Framework in 1994. The Bush administration avoided any further nuclear deal with North Korea during its first term, determined not to accept any demands from Pyongyang because doing so might leave them open to comparison with the Clinton Its North Korea policy was even described as the ABC (Anything but Clinton) policy.3However, the Bush team's hawkish stance began to crumble when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006. Tension was already rising since Washington made a big issue of Pyongyang's secret uranium enrichment program (UEP) in October 2005. North Korea initially acknowledged its presence, but has denied it ever since. Hard pressed by the urgent need to keep North Korea's unfettered nuclear pursuits at bay, chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill hastened to pull off a series of nuclear deals with North Korea, with the full support of President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. North Korea froze its plutonium activities and finally submitted its nuclear declaration in 2009, for which it received political benefits from the United States, including being removed from the U.S. terrorism list. However, the previously uneventful nuclear talks stalled when both sides failed to iron out the differences on verification of North Korea's nuclear declaration.It was against this backdrop that many people expected some sort of breakthrough in the stalled nuclear talks when the new Obama administration came in. However, such expectations were shattered by North Korea's unexpected provocations right from the beginning of the Obama administration. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a l ong-range ballistic missile that, it argued, was the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2, intended to be put into orbit through a space launch vehicle, Unha-2. The strong U.S. condemnation, followed by the unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 1874, prompted North Korea to embolden rather than change its behavior. In defiance of the UN resolution, the North conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, which dealt a fatal blow to the Obama administration's efforts for engagement. The second nuclear test unequivocally demonstrated once again Pyongyang's intention of not giving up its nuclear program despite a series of nuclear pacts with the previous Bush administration. …

The North Korean nuclear problem has gradually deteriorated in the past two decades and is becoming increasingly serious.1 Over the course of this worsening crisis, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has staged three nuclear tests and continues to develop its diverse medium- and long-range missile capabilities. North Korea now claims to be a nuclear weapons state and has formally announced its byungjin policy, which aims for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.2 Pyongyang is clearly determined to develop advanced nuclear capabilities and time is running short for the international community to respond. Despite this, diplomatic initiatives aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have thus far been ineffective. Policymakers have bought the same horse three times by attempting, and ultimately failing, to resolve the problem through the Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994), the September 19th agreement (September 2005), and the leap day agreement (February 2012). Likewise, the six-party talks aimed at peaceful denuclearization of North Korea-involving Russia, China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the United States-have in essence stalled. Considering the rate at which North Korea's nuclear program is advancing, it is urgent that the international community adopt a more effective approach soon.This essay explores why efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have been unsuccessful and attempts to outline a more effective approach. The first section examines Pyongyang's inconsistent justifications for the program, as well as its perspectives and motivations regarding denuclearization. Next, the essay assesses the obstacles hindering the international community's efforts toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Last, this essay argues that the nuclear problem is rooted in the nature of the North Korean regime and considers strategies necessary for resolving the crisis. The essay concludes by recommending a more enduring, holistic, and comprehensive approach focused on strengthening deterrence capabilities and gradually altering North Korea's current trajectory through increased engagement.North Korea's Claims for Nuclearization and Understanding of DenuclearizationNorth Korea's actions over time and inconsistent justifications for its nuclear program indicate an unwillingness to denuclearize. Commencing in the late 1950s, North Korea's nuclear program was ostensibly for research purposes and energy generation. Thus, the DPRK asked for compensation for terminating its program in the 1990s, and a coalition of countries agreed to the provision of light-water reactors and heav y-fuel oil under the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 When North Korea's uranium enrichment program was discovered in 2002, Pyongyang denied the program's existence. However, it later acknowledged the continuation of the program and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 to pursue its nuclear ambitions (the first and only signatory country to the NPT to do so). At the same time, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Since the summer of 1998, outside observers have witnessed the country's development of medium- and long-range missiles such as the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.4 As North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities have evolved, Pyongyang has increasingly argued that its nuclear program is intended to be a deterrent against a potential preemptive attack by the United States.The key to understanding North Korea's changing stance on its nuclear program is comprehending how Pyongyang views the issue of denuclearization: when North Korea speaks of denuclearization, it means for the entire Korean Peninsula. In essence, its actions to this end would be conditional upon the United States no longer providing a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Beyond this, North Korea has demanded a U.S. …

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any other government agency. The Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in our interest because, if it is carried out, it will eliminate the North Korean nuclear weapons program. If unchecked, this program threatens two key U.S. interests stability in Asia and checking the spread of nuclear weapons. The stability of Asia is critical to U.S. security and prosperity. The foundation of Northeast Asia's economic growth and political stability is security, and the linchpins of security have been our commitment to our defense relationships with South Korea and Japan. North Korea's long-standing challenge to security and stability in Northeast Asia acquired more ominous dimension with the emergence of major North Korean nuclear weapons program. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has operated large nuclear complex, chiefly at Yongbyon. U.S. intelligence believes that the purpose of the complex is the production of weapons grade plutonium. In addition to small 5 MW(e) reactor in operation since 1985, 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactor are under construction. We estimate that the DPRK nuclear program had generated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons and was poised to leap forward in terms of plutonium production. The North Korean program represented an unacceptable threat to the United States' and our allies' interests for number of mutually-reinforcing reasons: * An unchecked nuclear capability in the North, coupled with its oversized conventional force, could be used for extortion or blackmail against the ROK as well as greatly increasing the costs of war in Korea. * A nuclear arsenal in North Korea could ignite nuclear arms race in Asia generally. * Failure to curb North Korean efforts would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. * North Korea could export nuclear technologies and components to pariah states or terrorists worldwide. * With upgraded missile delivery systems, which the North is developing, the nuclear threat could project across most of Northeast Asia. The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985, entered into safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992 and agreed with the ROK in 1992 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Despite these obligations, in 1989 the DPRK defueled its 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessed the fuel. In 1992 the DPRK refused to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify the amount and disposition of the plutonium from that load of fuel. The DPRK remained out of compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations up to mid-1994. Talks aimed at the resolution of the problem faltered. In 1993 North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT and then suspended its withdrawal. In June 1994 the DPRK defueled its reactor for the second time and refused to allow the IAEA to take steps that could have helped shed light on the amount of plutonium removed during the earlier defueling. It declared it would end its IAEA safeguards agreement, refuel the reactor, and reprocess the spent fuel. In light of these threats, acts, and the lack of progress in bilateral talks, the United States, in cooperation with the ROK and other allies and friends, took steps to obtain UN Security Council sanctions resolution on the DPRK. North Korea declared that sanctions were, in its view, an act of war. In light of the DPRK's massive conventional capability and its threats e.g. to turn Seoul into a sea of fire we augmented our defensive capability, and in consultation with the ROK, considered wide range of options for additional force augmentations. …

Dealing with North Korea is perhaps one of the most difficult diplomatic challenges in global politics today. Totalitarian and reclusive, ideologically isolated and economically ruined, its actions create a range of dilemmas for political analysts and policy makers alike. Pyongyang’s demonstrated nuclear ambition substantially increases the risk of a nuclear arms race in the region and an escalation of the security situation with possible global consequences. The latest escalation began in the autumn of 2002, when Pyongyang admitted to a secret nuclear weapons programme and subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. By early 2003 both the US and North Korea threatened each other with outright war. The situation became even more tense in October 2006, when the UN Security Council unanimously decided on tough sanctions in response to Pyongyang’s announcement that it had successfully completed its first nuclear test. Some of the tensions were diffused through an agreement reached in early 2007, when North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programme. The precondition for detente seemed to increase further with the election of US president Barack Obama, who signalled the advent of a more nuanced and cooperative US foreign policy. But by mid-2009 the situation was as tense as ever after North Korea conducted several new nuclear and missile tests and announced, yet again, that it would renege on its commitment to nuclear disarmament.KeywordsKorean PeninsulaSecurity CouncilEconomic SanctionNuclear ProgrammeMilitary ThreatThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

IntroductionFor over half a century, the Korean Peninsula has posed a foreign-policy dilemma for every American president. During this time, continuity, rather than change, has been the prevailing characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. Since President Reagan's Modest Initiative in 1988, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) have attempted to normalize their relations through dialogue and negotiations.1 In 1994, North Korea and the United States signed an agreement by which Pyongyang pledged to freeze and eventually dismantle its weapons program. In return, the United States pledged to provide a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits. The U.S. support of the Agreed Framework has been inconsistent. Since then North Korea has launched several rockets and missiles, and has increased its weapon arsenal. In recent years six-party talks have been used as a vehicle for change in regard to the North Korean issue. The major players-China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the United States-have worked to collectively implement their national initiative with regard to North Korea. The result has been that these negotiations have yet to result in a concrete solution and direction for forward progression and movement. These sessions of dialogue and negotiations have proceeded without altering the underlying configuration of the United States and North Korea's Cold War postures towards each other, such as armed deterrence. Nonetheless, the persistent duality of diplomacy exercised by U.S. leaders has largely contributed to the inability to resolve their differences. The recent Bush administration, in relation to its policy towards North Korea, has been characterized by its dualism -believing in the same goal, but divided over goal achievement actions. These divisions took place within the administration, which consisted of an influential coalition of Pentagon officials and advisers, among them Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, officials of Vice President Dick Cheney's office, and proliferation experts in the State Department and White House led by Undersecretary of State John Bolton.2Unfortunately, the internal division of policy at home has resulted in the North Korean issue being in a worse shape today than it was eight years ago after the Clinton-Bush regime change. After President Bush refused to follow Clinton's engagement path, North Korea significantly increased its plutonium stockpile, tested bombs and announced itself a nuclear weapons state. With his election as president, Barack Obama inherited not only difficult issues and initiatives on the home front but also internationally. The new Obama administration is inundated with a plethora of policy issues ranging from economics to foreign policy. President Obama has his hands full dealing with the current dismal economic situation at home and with equally important foreign policy issues, especially when it comes to North Korea.Without UN involvement, the North Korean communists held their own elections in September 1948, and under the tutelage of Russia, Kim Il Sung established the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea.3 Thus, the 38th parallel became Korea's Berlin Wall. Since then, the country has been a troubled issue for every American president. Since Obama took office, North Korea has attempted to make a statement to the new president through a series of missile tests. In the past few years, many experts in North Korean policy have juxtaposed various strategies that have been used and should be included with relation to North Korea. This paper will underline motives for North Korea's actions, updates of previously communicated policy options with real-time information and offer a unique twist, with truths that are often overlooked, on how they should be implemented in the new Obama era, moving forward.North Korean MotivationSince the early 1990s, North Korea has dealt with a harsh economic and food crisis that has left the country desperate to earn hard currency. …

What's big deal?The year 2008 saw a paradigm shift in US foreign policy. The US signed 123 civilian nuclear agreement (referred to as nuclear deal or simply deal) with India, a country that is not a nuclear nonproliferation treaty signatory, has nuclear weapons, and until recently was a nuclear pariah. It is extremely surprising that even many scholars of US foreign policy, let alone public, have given little attention to this rather historic paradigm shift in US policy on civilian nuclear trade. The US government, on other hand, has passed new Hyde act, which facilitates implementation of civilian nuclear agreement by exempting India from certain requirements of atomic energy act of 1954.1The deal was signed between Indian and US government on 1 October 2008 and cleared by Nuclear Suppliers Group. It gives India access to civilian nuclear technology and is supposed to help country fulfil its energy requirements. At same time, India has placed 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and has agreed to separate its civilian and military reactors, which it has not done before. In return, US companies hope to get a few of pending multibillion-dollar reactor-building contracts. The deal was signed with India even though it is not a signatory to either nonproliferation or comprehensive test ban treaties. The nuclear deal does not require India to give up its nuclear weapons program, but future nuclear testing by India would, as per US law, lead to US stopping nuclear commerce with India. Republican Senator Richard Lugar stated that this deal was a good incentive for India to refrain from nuclear testing in future.2 However, there seems to be some room for contention on this issue. The Indian government has asserted that nuclear deal theoretically does not constrain it from future testing. Furthermore, according to a Council on Foreign Relations publication, the US Senate rejected an amendment that would require US nuclear supplies to be cut off if India tests nuclear weapons. The deal does not explicitly impose that condition, though it is part of a 2006 law known as Hyde Act, which gave deal preliminary approval.3While it is yet to be seen how deal is implemented under President Barack Obama's leadership, analysis presented here is based on agreement as it exists on paper. The main goal of article is to address some of major critiques of deal, namely that, first, nuclear deal undermines nonproliferation treaty and weakens nonproliferation efforts; second, that deal sets a precedent for other countries like Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan; third, that it allows India to have biggest nuclear arsenal possible as it frees up its domestic resources of uranium; fourth, that it does not ensure energy security for India and takes away its strategic sovereignty; and fifth, that it will lead to a nuclear arms race in south Asia. The article will review benefits of deal and examine who really benefits from it.The main arguments here are that deal has been result of realization that India will never sign nonproliferation treaty and that sanctions that were imposed on India have not yielded any results; it will lead to a greater transparency in India's nuclear sector, which reduces risks of proliferation, nuclear accidents, and nuclear meltdowns; it is a part of America's anti-China strategy; it provides India with opportunity to reduce its energy deficit and does not compromise India's strategic sovereignty; and, finally, it will not significantly escalate tensions between India and Pakistan. There will be recurring tensions between India and Pakistan irrespective of nuclear deal; intractable issues such as terrorism and Kashmir dispute will continue to be major causes of tension between these two countries. …

The election of Barack Obama as president of the United States promised a shift in the fortunes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime after a near decade of intransigence and frustration. This article examines what has been achieved in the wake of Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009, where he articulated the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. Since the Prague speech, the effective norm of the NPT has been re-energised through a number of initiatives, including UN Security Council resolution 1887, the New START agreement and the agreed final document at the NPT review conference in May 2010. However a number of big challenges continue to face the NPT regime, including the nuclear programs of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the continued fallout from the US-India civil nuclear deal. The article concludes that the NPT continues to play a role in creating parameters within which powerful states face some constraints; and, crucially, that the Treaty maintains an international consensus that proliferation of nuclear weapons, even by democratic states, is a threat to global security. However, the NPT has not and will not replace power politics.

OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the Policy. Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North KoreaIn June 2000, Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Kim Jong-il of North Korea met for the first time to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Since this meeting, the two Koreas have expanded the scope of reconciliation and economic cooperation. The two countries agreed on the reunion of separated families, the establishment of an industrial complex in Kaesong, and the joint exploration of Kumgang Mountain as a means of promoting tourism. This honeymoon abruptly ended when North Korea fired two nuclear missiles on October 9, 2006. During the period 2000-06, President Kim Dae-jung and his successor President Roh Moo-hyun implemented the engagement policy of reconciliation toward North Korea. With generous economic aid from South Korea, North Korea was able to overcome severe food and energy shortages. In return, North Korea opened Kumgang Mountain to South Koreans, and allowed South Korean businesses to hire lower-wage workers in the Kaesong industrial complex. …

Acting on the North Korea Playbook:Japan’s Responses to North Korea’s Provocations Yasuhiro Izumikawa (bio) In 2009, when a series of nuclear and missile tests conducted by North Korea led some analysts to argue that Pyongyang had abandoned diplomacy and aimed to reunify the Korean Peninsula militarily, a highly respected North Korea watcher, Narushige Michishita, opined that Pyongyang was still “playing the same game.”1 While North Korea has continued to upgrade its nuclear and missile capabilities since then, Japan has ironically developed its own playbook on how to respond to Pyongyang’s repeated provocations. Tokyo’s responses to Pyongyang’s defiant actions in 2016 are faithfully based on this playbook: seeking enhanced sanctions, ensuring U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, and enhancing security cooperation with South Korea. Unfortunately, this playbook contains no silver lining that may lead to the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Furthermore, the effects of Japan’s policies based on its North Korea playbook may be undermined by unexpected domestic turmoil in its security partners. In this essay, I elaborate on the three main components of Japan’s responses to North Korea’s provocations and discuss the problems of each component. In the concluding remarks, I point out two immediate challenges for which Japan needs to be prepared and then propose how Japan may be able to overcome the problems with its existing North Korea policies. Seeking Enhanced Sanctions When North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test on September 9, 2016, Japan’s denunciation was swift. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the nuclear test “totally unacceptable” and promised to “consider further measures against North Korea including further action in the United Nations Security Council.”2 At the UN General Assembly on September 21, [End Page 90] he argued that “the nature of the military provocations North Korea has persisted with…are substantially more serious than before” and declared that Japan would lead the Security Council discussions on how to confront North Korea.3 On the sidelines of the General Assembly, Abe met Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and requested that Iran sever ties with North Korea in military cooperation.4 Given the fact that arms exports are an important source of North Korea’s foreign currency and that Iran is one of Pyongyang’s largest customers, it certainly makes sense to try to undermine Iran’s ties with North Korea.5 However, it is unclear whether these calls for more effective sanctions against North Korea will be heeded internationally, or even whether they may prove effective if adopted. Needless to say, the most significant impediment to enhanced economic sanctions is China, which provides the lifeline for the Kim Jong-un regime. China prioritizes stability on the Korean Peninsula and opposes North Korea’s nuclear program, which it considers a threat that could destabilize the region and potentially risk further nuclear proliferation there. Precisely because Beijing prioritizes the peninsula’s stability, however, it adamantly refuses to take any action, such as cutting North Korea’s energy supply, that could either prompt more aggressive reactions from Pyongyang or lead to the regime’s collapse.6 In addition, Chinese officials suspect that taking tough actions against North Korea could open a gate for Washington to approach Pyongyang, which has sought better relations with the United States from the beginning. For these reasons, it would be extremely difficult to persuade China to comply with Japan’s and the international community’s wish to coerce North Korea economically. Ensuring U.S. Extended Deterrence Following North Korea’s nuclear test on September 9, Prime Minister Abe called President Barack Obama and expressed his desire for maintaining close security cooperation with the United States. [End Page 91] In response, President Obama “explained that he hopes to convey to Prime Minister Abe and the people of Japan that the U.S.-Japan alliance is solid and the United States security commitment to Japan including its extended deterrence is unshakable.”7 Obtaining such explicit assurances from the United States is necessary not only for policy reasons but also for political reasons. With the increasing evidence that North Korea has been mastering technologies needed for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the...

Article VI of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all state parties to disarm nuclear weapon. Following its official withdrawal from NPT in 2003, North Korea maintains to develop its nuclear weapon and conducts several nuclear tests. Moreover, it even proudly declared as a nuclear state in its Constitution's preamble. It also argues that the nuclear weapon developments and tests were conducted within their territory and, currently, North Korea is not bound by any treaty prohibiting such developments and tests. The statement is strongly opposed by the international community, particularly their neighboring states: Japan and South Korea. This article argues that the obligation to disarm nuclear weapon deriving from the NPT still binds North Korea since such obligation has reached the status of customary international law and consequently binds every state unless such state persistently objects the rule from the beginning of its formation. In this case, North Korea has failed to prove itself as a persistent objector due to the fact it used to be a party to the NPT. This article also argues that, according to 2001 ILC Articles, Japan and South Korea still have a proper legal basis to claim for reparation against North Korea despite the fact that they are not specifically affected by North Korea’s conducts.

IntroductionThe relationship between the United States and North Korea is wavering between confrontation and communication, depending on the choices made by President Obama and Kim Jong Il. To have a realistic outlook upon the situation, it would be of significant value to categorize the relationship and to determine the South Korean government's countermeasures based on these categories.President Obama has already made public his stance over the two Koreas. For South Korea, he has revealed his plan to develop the U.S.-South Korea relationship into one of companionship, based on alliance. In his electoral manifesto, The Blueprint for Change, he expressed his will to construct a new form of companionship that would go beyond a mutual alliance, summit conferences, and the Six-Party Talks. Instead of emphasizing bilateral relations, he chose to maintain a strong connection with multiple allies such as Japan, Australia, and Korea.President Obama has also established his stance1 upon the U.S. relationship with North Korea. In the spring of 2009, relations between North Korea and the United States seemed to be cold. However, by the end of the year, there had been some improvements, and the relationship now seems to have warmed. In the long run, it is likely that President Obama will attempt direct talks with Kim Jong Il, and so we can predict some improvement in the bilateral relations between the United States and North Korea. During the Clinton administration, while the Democrats were in office, North Korea felt unsatisfied due to the fact that there were insufficient improvements in relations. These situations have created the basis for the virtuous circle of dialogue between Kim and President Obama.In the process of improving relations, it is likely that President Obama will promote smart diplomacy by alleviating the remaining sanctions, admitting North Korea into a U.S.-led global society, and recognizing North Korea as a normal state. North Korea seems to anticipate this as well.Throughout this process, President Obama may move towards declaring the end of the Korean War and the beginnings of negotiation for a peace treaty. In the end, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) may reach a mutual agreement on the issue of normalization during President Obama's term.However, in the short run, President Obama is unlikely to be able to find an easy solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. North Korea is pressuring the United States with its Edge-of-Cliff policy, and is constantly intensifying the pressure.Also, the North Korean nuclear problem can be resolved only if there are changes in North Korea's stance, not those of South Korea or the United States. It is difficult to envisage a peaceful, complete settlement to the North Korean nuclear problem without North Korea's decision-making and participation. A complete settlement of the problem may even have to be delayed until after normalization between the DPRK and the United States.North Korea chose nuclear weapons as the most inexpensive method of ensuring national security. The United States has decided that it is dangerous for North Korea, the base of tyranny, to possess nuclear power and has urged North Korea to abandon it.2There are many factors in determining peace in the Korean Peninsula, but there are none as definitive as the confrontation and communication between North Korea and the United States. This does not mean that other elements, such as the role of South Korea and China, are unimportant, and these elements will be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, in this paper, the relationship between North Korea and United States will be considered as the most important factor in our analysis.If the two possibilities of communication and confrontation between North Korea and United States are mixed and the relation categorized, then four types concerning the future of the Korean Peninsula can be extracted. …