Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

NEW FORMATS OF U.S. NUCLEAR ALLIANCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NEW FORMATS OF U.S. NUCLEAR ALLIANCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Potential applications of microbial genomics in nuclear non-proliferation.

As nuclear technology evolves in response to increased demand for diversification and decarbonization of the energy sector, new and innovative approaches are needed to effectively identify and deter the proliferation of nuclear arms, while ensuring safe development of global nuclear energy resources. Preventing the use of nuclear material and technology for unsanctioned development of nuclear weapons has been a long-standing challenge for the International Atomic Energy Agency and signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Environmental swipe sampling has proven to be an effective technique for characterizing clandestine proliferation activities within and around known locations of nuclear facilities and sites. However, limited tools and techniques exist for detecting nuclear proliferation in unknown locations beyond the boundaries of declared nuclear fuel cycle facilities, representing a critical gap in non-proliferation safeguards. Microbiomes, defined as "characteristic communities of microorganisms" found in specific habitats with distinct physical and chemical properties, can provide valuable information about the conditions and activities occurring in the surrounding environment. Microorganisms are known to inhabit radionuclide-contaminated sites, spent nuclear fuel storage pools, and cooling systems of water-cooled nuclear reactors, where they can cause radionuclide migration and corrosion of critical structures. Microbial transformation of radionuclides is a well-established process that has been documented in numerous field and laboratory studies. These studies helped to identify key bacterial taxa and microbially-mediated processes that directly and indirectly control the transformation, mobility, and fate of radionuclides in the environment. Expanding on this work, other studies have used microbial genomics integrated with machine learning models to successfully monitor and predict the occurrence of heavy metals, radionuclides, and other process wastes in the environment, indicating the potential role of nuclear activities in shaping microbial community structure and function. Results of this previous body of work suggest fundamental geochemical-microbial interactions occurring at nuclear fuel cycle facilities could give rise to microbiomes that are characteristic of nuclear activities. These microbiomes could provide valuable information for monitoring nuclear fuel cycle facilities, planning environmental sampling campaigns, and developing biosensor technology for the detection of undisclosed fuel cycle activities and proliferation concerns.

The role of the NPT in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons

The entire atmosphere created by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its presence in the world played one of the responsible roles, since after the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were never used in a military situation (unless, of course, you take into account that the nuclear powers conducted more than 2,000 nuclear explosions at their test sites).
 It can be said that this is the result of a broad consensus reached by the international community on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the result of the actual operation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons during its more than 50 years of existence. Currently, no bilateral or multilateral meeting on international security issues, including at the highest level, is held without a mention of nuclear non-proliferation, and it is often at the top of the agenda.
 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an international legal and ethical norm that has entered the minds of millions of people. Many countries have developed and adopted national legislation establishing export control rules for materials used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, as well as other laws (customs, etc.) to help ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Extensive training of young experts in basic knowledge to support the international non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons is ongoing.
 In the field of technology, scientists and experts in reactor engineering are working in many countries to build nuclear power plants that will not produce materials used to create weapons of mass destruction. Many scientists are working to prevent the construction of reactors that threaten the proliferation of technologies and nuclear materials capable of producing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
 The conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime contributed to a fundamental change in the world’s attitude to nuclear weapons. From the first impression in the eyes of the world public that nuclear weapons are a «genius» discovery, the latter is increasingly perceived as a mortal danger that threatens human existence, and this idea penetrates deeper and deeper into the consciousness of millions of people.

The Budapest memorandum: lessons and unfulfilled expectations on Ukraine’s path to joining NATO

The Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine (the official name is the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) was the result of negotiations on the disposal of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, its nuclear weapons were deployed or stored in four of the fifteen successor states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. This raised important questions of security and protection, as well as command and control; and Moscow and Washington agreed that Russia should be the sole nuclear successor to the Soviet Union. The United States recognized that it would have to offer security guarantees to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to persuade them to hand over their Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. In coordination with London and Moscow, Washington drew up a package of security guarantees. These assurances were set out in the Budapest memorandums regarding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. France and China – the other nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT—have offered their own guarantees unilaterally.
 The Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine confirmed the obligation to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine (according to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975); to refrain from the threat of force or its use against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, as well as from any use of weapons against Ukraine, except in cases of self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and refrain from economic coercion against Ukraine in accordance with the Final Act of the CSCE. The memorandum also reiterated the positive and negative security guarantees provided to all non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT.
 This scientific article is devoted to the study of the significance of the Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine and its influence on the possibility of the country joining NATO. The historical context of the conclusion of the memorandum is studied, the key obligations are determined and the consequences of their violation are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the current security situation in Ukraine, in particular due to the annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. The article examines the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and suggests ways to resolve unfulfilled expectations and restore the international community’s trust in the commitments made within the framework of the memorandum.

Позиции России и США по вопросам ядерной безопасности и перспективы новых договоренностей

In the modern complex system of international relations, in a situation of escalating confrontation between Russia and the United States, increasing tension in relations between Western countries and the "Global South", arms control, primarily nuclear, as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, continues to be one of the most important areas of Russian foreign and defense policy. The Russian Federation pays priority attention to strengthening and developing the system of international treaties in the fields of strategic security and arms control. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to consider the prospects for one of the key aspects of the Russian-American agreements - nuclear arms control and the achievement of sustainable strategic stability. This led to the active use of such methods as analysis and synthesis of data on the current state of nuclear strategic security, a historical approach that identifies the previous context of agreements, as well as a comparative analysis focused on comparing the basic approaches, interests, goals and priorities of the Russian and American sides. Based on foreign policy imperatives, including consolidating Russia's role as a guarantor of international stability and arms control, the authors propose a non-standard scenario for restoring the viability of the key START Treaty of 2010. The article suggests the outlines of possible concrete solutions and potential elements of agreements that can become the basic topic for the resumption of bilateral consultations on strategic stability and an integral part of the new agreement. The authors conclude that reaching mutually acceptable agreements on this topical issue will have a positive impact on reducing the military threat and reducing the risks of unleashing a nuclear conflict, which meets the strategic interests of Russian national security and global stability.

A Balanced Approach to Addressing Nuclear Risks in the Middle East While Preserving the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been one of the primary international arenas for discussing pathways to establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (ME WMDFZ). This contentious issue was considered the make-or-break factor that determined whether some past Review Conferences could adopt a final document. With the commencement of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2019, mandated by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), questions have been raised about whether this new track replaces the NPT in addressing the Zone issue and, if not, in what format both tracks should interact. This essay sets the context for these questions by discussing evolving nuclear risks in the Middle East, the linkages between the NPT and the Zone, and the potential risks of decoupling the Zone issue from the NPT review process. The essay then argues for a balanced approach in which the NPT and the UNGA-mandated tracks function in conjunction with, and complement, each other. This approach would preserve the integrity and efficacy of each process and maintain the region’s commitments to the Zone, to abolishing nuclear weapons and to preventing further proliferation.

The international legal regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Of all the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction of all types, the threats posed by nuclear weapons are the most devastating and far-reaching in their effects, because even limited use of such weapons anywhere in the world would have devastating economic, ecological and societal consequences in overall consequences. Addressing this danger requires a multifaceted approach. It was under this circumstance that the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) became global and approached universality in terms of the number of participating countries.
 Regarding the issue of balance between the consensus model of decision-making and the institutional hierarchical structure of decision­making within the framework of the nuclear non­proliferation system, opponents and supporters of the concept of multilateralism in international relations believe that the nature of the nuclear non-proliferation system should be considered from opposite positions. The first perspective is based on the theory and practice of the Westphalian system of interaction between sovereign states, each of which seeks to survive or maximize its power in a world in which interstate relations are anarchic. From this perspective, nuclear nonproliferation is a purely national policy with its own goals, including disarmament.
 Therefore, the NPT is nothing more than a combination of political will and government commitments aimed at preventing or hindering the possibility of obtaining nuclear weapons by other states. However, the global nature of the threat of nuclear proliferation forces opponents of the concept of multilateralism to recognize the need for limited cooperation between states, mainly within the framework of non-binding agreements that only partially define national policy and often do not contain any provisions for collective enforcement measures. Therefore, for opponents of the concept of multilateralism, the NPT is a tool for promoting national interests.

Exploring the Zone of Possible Agreement on the Nuclear Issue of the Korean Peninsula

From 2003 to 2009, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States engaged in a series of multilateral negotiations to address North Korea’s nuclear program. On September 19, 2005, the six participants achieved a “gold standard” agreement on denuclearization. North Korea agreed to relinquish all nuclear weapons, abstain from deploying nuclear weapons, and rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as adhere to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The United States affirmed its lack of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and expressed no intention of attacking or invading the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with nuclear or conventional weapons. China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States concurred to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. Furthermore, the agreement established the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action,” which holds significance for the spirit of future engagement. The prevailing impasse in resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula prompts the inquiry of a possible negotiation model. This paper uses the Harvard negotiation method to examine a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) between China, North Korea, Russia, and the United States, which culminated in the September 19, 2005 Six Party Talks agreement addressing the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The first section of the article is devoted to scrutinizing the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), which facilitated the 2005 agreement. Based on the acquired insights, the second section assesses the prospects for implementing the 2005 Joint Statement in the current context. This section also concentrates on identifying a ZOPA under current conditions, taking into account past experiences and lessons learned from past negotiations.

The role of the UN in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

According to the UN Charter (Article 26), the UN Security Council is the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Nuclear states agreed to the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution that provided positive security assurances. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution №255 on June 19, 1968, was of particular significance. This resolution stipulated that instances of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would require immediate action by the UN Security Council and its permanent members, who are nuclear-armed states.
 The aim of the work is to determine the role of the UN Security Council in the system of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The methodological basis of the study will focus on the analysis and understanding of the impact of the UN Security Council on strategies and measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the international context.
 The results of our research have shown that the role of the UN Security Council in the disarmament of Iraq’s nuclear program, which could have led to the development of nuclear weapons, proved to be significant. To achieve this, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution №687 adopted on April 3, 1991, the Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established.
 During an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council at the highest level on September 24, 2009, Resolution UN Security Council Resolution № 1887 was adopted, aimed at supporting nuclear non-proliferation, criticizing Iran and North Korea. Resolution №1887 outlines measures to strengthen control and the rights of nuclear-weapon states to demand the return of nuclear materials and equipment in case of violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or withdrawal from it. It also involves enhancing security measures for the storage of nuclear materials and strict export controls.
 Conclusions. In our opinion, the powers of the UN Security Council in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be utilized more promptly and effectively. The insufficient effectiveness of this international mechanism in preventing proliferation remains a cause for serious concern among UN members worldwide. To enhance the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, we propose the adoption of a comprehensive resolution that includes provisions on the procedure for a state’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its violation of commitments to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. This resolution should stipulate the imposition of sanctions against such a state based on a special report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such a mechanism can ensure an effective impact of the international community on states that withdraw from the NPT.

Reducing the risks of nuclear war; the role of health professionals

According to the United Nations, the risk of nuclear weapons use is higher than at any time since the Cold War: "The Russian Federation’s recent announcement of plans to station non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus represents the first 'nuclear sharing' agreement made since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 1970." At this moment of extreme danger, we are preparing to distribute an editorial on the role of health professionals in reducing nuclear danger. We hope to time the announcement of the release of this editorial to the August 6 anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima to underline the very real danger that nuclear weapons may be used again. The editorial was co-authored by the group of journal editors and other supporters of the Nobel-prizewinning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War listed below. All of the authors’ journals will be publishing the editorial. Having so many respected journals around the world publishing the editorial should attract political and media attention. We hope that giving health professionals a more prominent voice in this debate will encourage profound changes in the system of nuclear arms control that has resulted in the current dangerous situation that threatens the health of people and the planet.

Svjetla budućnost za nuklearno razoružanje ili utopija?: Pravna ocjena Ugovora o zabrani nuklearnog oružja iz 2017. i njegov odnos s Ugovorom o neširenju nuklearnog oružja iz 1968.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the first universal international treaty that stipulates the prohibition of nuclear weapons and as such represents a major contribution to international law in the field of nuclear disarmament. The main purpose and goal of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. States that are parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons belong to the group that does not possess nuclear weapons, and in relation to them, compliance with the rules and fulfilment of the obligations prescribed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons should not pose any problem. However, the practical effect of the nuclear arms control treaty is seen by the major nuclear powers as an unrealistic and progressive approach to disarmament. Therefore, it is very difficult to predict that the nuclear states and their allies will decide to ratify the treaty in the near future. Therefore, in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an attempt will be made to offer an answer to the following questions. First, can the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons per se constitute a fundamental legal framework to which all states must adhere? And secondly, can nuclear states, according to the persistent objector rule, prevent the possible establishment of customary international law? It is to be assumed that the pressure of the non-nuclear states may in some way influence the nuclear states so that they feel the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to a certain extent. Due to the establishment of a norm that prohibits nuclear weapons, it is necessary to ultimately explain the relationship of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with already existing legal instruments, especially with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Regulatory and Legal Support of International Nuclear Law

Between the first regulatory and legal development of international nuclear law in 1957 and modern achievements, three main stages of this process can be distinguished.
 The first period of development of international nuclear law corresponds to the period of development of nuclear energy and guarantees of its peaceful use by all non-nuclear weapon states. This dual purpose was legally confirmed by the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.
 The first stage in the development of international nuclear law was complemented by a second growth phase aimed at increasing collective resilience to the dangers of nuclear energy. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and especially the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 triggered intense regulatory activity aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and better managing their consequences on an international scale.
 As a result, several international conventions have been adopted in this area: The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
 Unlike the first-generation nuclear nonpro­liferation treaties, these norms do not violate the essential sovereignty of the states parties. By merging binding provisions and flexible legislation, a cooperative system was created for flexible and decentralized management of nuclear activities on an international scale.
 The third stage of the development of inter­national nuclear law, in which we are currently located, is characterized by both negative and positive elements.
 On the negative side, there are problems that affect the effectiveness of international nuclear law. The most alarming issue in this area is the independence of nuclear regulatory authorities in several countries, although it is regulated by Article 8 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and Article 20 of the Joint Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: there is no gap; there is a first time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez

Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. This article argues that there is no such gap since the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) addresses this issue. What happens is that no Special Procedures models for this kind of nuclear material have yet been elaborated. The article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the discussion regarding the existence of such a gap. Then, it addresses the CSA signed by Australia and Brazil. The final remarks present the inferences regarding this kind of gap. Received on: 30 Apr. 2023 | Accepted on: 18 Nov. 2023

Control over the circulation of dual-use goods and technologies within the international regimes of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

International legal cooperation in the field of control over the export, transfer, transit of dual-use goods and technologies is based on a number of mechanisms of general competence (for example, the UN, WTO) and specific regimes, the core of which constitute international treaties on the non­proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention) and related multilateral export control groups (Zanger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group).
 While the mentioned international treaties define the goals and basic principles of cooperation of their parties to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the critical task of intergovernmental export groups, capable of responding more promptly to security challenges in the light of technological progress and market dynamics, is to ensure the development and regular updating of lists of controlled goods, dissemination and exchange of best practices in this area, articulation of instructions for participating states regarding the strengthening of national export control systems.
 Such a structure, promoting transparency and responsible behaviour of states, objectively increases the level of international security, ensures more profound and comprehensive cooperation and interaction of participating states, regular exchange of information on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, which leads to a consensus on the specifics of the implementation of export control systems and harmonisation of national policies and regulatory mechanisms. At the same time, taking into account the "softness” of obligations arising from the activities of specialised export groups, the effectiveness of the control mechanism depends on the goodwill of the participating states and their commitment to the values and goals of these regimes and is also complicated by the limited participation of individual actors (for instance, India, Pakistan, North Korea, etc.).

Systemic crisis of modern international environmental law

The article examines the issue of a complex crisis situation in the field of international legal mediation of environmental protection activities, caused by the treacherous attack of the aggressor country on the territory of Ukraine, which showed the complete inability of the established model of international law, including its organizational and institutional component, to oppose the aggressor's plans due to the forced cessation of hostilities , which follows from the direct functional purpose of the United Nations as the main world peacemaker. First of all, a terminological excursion was made into the formation of the name of the field of international law, which provides legal protection of the environment, which is characterized by the absence of a unified conceptual and categorical apparatus, where, along with international environmental law, the names of international ecological, international nature protection and international environmental law are used. The author's conclusion is made about the expediency of finally stopping at the universal name of international environmental law. The conducted analysis made it possible to establish that the aggressor violated almost all existing branch principles of international environmental law, except for the principle of inadmissibility of radioactive contamination of the environment, which is also under constant threat of violation. The lack of an effective mechanism for the protection of the rights and interests of subjects of international environmental law is illustrated by the example of a number of international documents, in particular the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Means of Impact on the Natural Environment, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations, the Convention on nuclear safety and the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

International Legal Foundations Of Compliance With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Guarantees

One of the results of the development of international relations in the second half of the current century was the transformation of nuclear weapons directly into a factor of world politics, which hangs over the entire global security system even in the conditions of the “post-confrontational era”. This is not the inertia of the philosophy of containment, as the world in the 1980s and 1990s proved its flexibility and even readiness for transformations by the ever-increasing susceptibility of international relations to scientific and technical influence. The rapid development of atomic energy, despite a number of man-made disasters (from Trimayland to Chernobyl), continues, and the diversity of research in this field is combined with the number of countries interested in the scientific development of this field. Therefore, guarantees of the exclusively peaceful orientation of the energy programs of non-nuclear states, a legally established and effective ban on the production of nuclear weapons best correspond to modern concepts of maintaining stability in certain regions and the world as a whole. However, the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, although it limited the hyperbolization of the nuclear factor in a certain historical segment, could not fully fulfill its second task of ranking states into only two groups - nuclear and non-nuclear. Outside of this dual, simplified scheme of political regulation of conflicting interests, a risk group has emerged, consisting of countries with a vague status of “near-threshold”. This happened not only because the nuclear states created a cult of nuclear weapons, but also because the logic of scientific and technological progress led to this, which was distorted in the prism of rivalry between states, especially at the regional level. First of all, the process of industrial-type countries approaching the nuclear threshold, which the block of post-industrial societies is trying to isolate from them, is absolutely inevitable from the point of view of science and technology. This does not mean equalizing the levels of development, which would create a favorable foundation, and then objective prerequisites for solving a whole series of contradictions in the system of international relations and, perhaps, removing the nuclear problem itself from the agenda. On the contrary, the configuration of inequality remained the same and only moved, pulling the locomotive of technical progress along the rails of global economic relations, to the zone of nuclear coordinates. Key words: IAEA, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, General Assembly of the United Nations.

Irreversibility in nuclear arms control and disarmament law?

Abstract While irreversibility of nuclear arms control and disarmament measures can be supported by compliance with applicable legal norms, the existing treaty regulation has serious gaps: pertinent treaties are not universally applicable; limitations on missiles as important carriers of nuclear warheads have been abrogated; the strategic doctrines of nuclear weapons powers are not fully transparent, and while the latter may strengthen the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, it also raises questions as to compliance with fundamental obligations to refrain from a threat or use of force and to settle international disputes by peaceful means. There are certain principles of general international law that can and should be used in international cooperation to overcome nuclear crisis situations and strengthen international security: fundamental norms regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control have an erga omnes character and are accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole. Furthermore, general rules of international responsibility are fully applicable in the law of nuclear arms control and disarmament. It is in this sense that irreversibility in nuclear arms control and disarmament is served by legal principles and rules, which require States to comply with existing obligations and to cooperate for the maintenance of peace and security.

Virtual Nukes: The Formulation of Japan’s Non-nuclear Weapons Security Policy

Informed by newly-declassified U.S. and Japanese documents, this study explains how Japan made the strategic choice to maintain its status as a non-nuclear weapons state, made possible by external and internal arrangements devised between 1964-1976. Japan obtained official and private security assurances from the U.S. ensuring its nuclear protection, preserved its material capabilities that could allow for an independent nuclear weaponization in emergencies, and simultaneously constructed public narratives that were politically justifiable to international and domestic audiences. U.S.-Japan public statements (such as Joint Communiques) and secret agreements (regarding U.S. nuclear transit rights in Japan and U.S. emergency re-entry rights in Okinawa) mutually reinforced each other, preserving U.S. deterrent capabilities in East Asia. Dual security assurances, in effect, enabled Japan to refrain from pursuing its own nuclear path. Essentially, secrecy characterized the origins of Japan’s non-nuclear weapons security policy, formulated prior to its entry into the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) framework.

Five Decades of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Time to Pass the Baton to the UN Security Council?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970. After renouncing its nuclear weapons programme, South Africa became a party to the NPT in 1991. The NPT is the principal international instrument aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT has generated various other treaties with similar aims, which, together with the NPT, constitute the ‘nuclear non-proliferation regime’. The NPT has, for various reasons, not been a success. Whether the NPT has achieved nuclear non-proliferation is a moot point–a concept which implies nuclear disarmament. For example, there is evidence of a network of covert operations marketing nuclear technology; some non-NPT states have clandestinely embarked on nuclear weapons programmes, and some NPT states have threatened to adopt a policy of actual or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapons states for its deterrent value. Alarm bells are ringing regarding the interpretation of ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-peaceful’ uses of nuclear energy. Despite the NPT, nothing prohibits the testing and refinement of existing nuclear weapons technology. Certain questions need to be answered. Has the NPT not become an instrument of rhetorical posturing by the five major nuclear weapon states–the ‘Club of Five’? Why has none of the Club of Five given their nuclear weapons up? Where do the Club of Five get the moral authority to declare that introducing new members on the Club is unacceptable? Instead of concentrating on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as the NPT does, should there not rather be an emphasis on the total prohibition of all nuclear weapons? It is submitted that a more active role for the UN in nuclear non-proliferation issues be considered. All UN Secretaries-General have made nuclear non-proliferation one of their top priorities. Kofi Annan concluded that the NPT was the victim of insufficient progress in not only nuclear non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament and that the world was sleepwalking towards a nuclear disaster. The basis for greater involvement of the UN Security Council in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is to be found in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Statute of the NPT, the UN Charter and in Security Council Relations 1540 of 2004 and 1929 of 2010. The argument is put forward that as the Security Council has the legal authority to determine threats to the peace or acts of aggression and make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken regarding it, utilising that body may be a more meaningful route to follow than the NPT which appears to have reached its sell-by date.

Changing Security Environment in East Asia and Its Implications on Japan’s Nuclear Policy

ABSTRACT The basic framework of Japan’s nuclear policy, consisting of four pillars, was established just before the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968. Since then, the security environment in modern Japan, surrounded by three nuclear-armed states (China, North Korea, and Russia) that are willing or not hesitant to change the status quo by force, has increasingly become more challenging. The new National Security Strategy of Japan made public in December 2022 states that “Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II”. Despite this severe security environment, there is no indication of significant changes in the basic framework of Japan’s nuclear policy. However, with increasing discussions in the Japanese security community that the strike capability gap with China needs to be filled with nuclear weapons and that Japan should promote nuclear operational integration with the United States, Japan’s security policy may rely more on nuclear weapons, which could end up conflicting with Japan’s current nuclear disarmament policy, even while the basic framework as above remains the same, in particular unless and until the strike capability gap is addressed by fielding counterstrike capabilities. Such policy decisions should be made in a balanced manner so that these would not create a significant security dilemma and not increase the risk of military conflict in the region, in which case the possibility of escalation to the risk of nuclear weapons use cannot be ruled out.