Non-nuclear States Research Articles

Changing Security Environment and Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia

The 1989 Malta Summit between President Bush and President Gorbachev put an end to the Cold War. Europe is no longer politically divided, and the world is now undergoing rapid changes. East Asia was also affected by these changes positively, but is still divided into two conflicting ideological blocks. The problem and the danger of nuclear proliferation was vividly shown by the North Korean nuclear crisis in recent years. This paper reviews the issue of nuclear proliferation of the three non-nuclear states in the region, South and North Korea as well as Japan, and deals with the non-introduction of nuclear weapons in the region by the nuclear powers. The prospects of a nuclear-weapons-free zone as well as of a sustainable security environment in East Asia are briefly discussed. Although the solution to the problem of non-proliferation in East Asia depends on economic and political development in the region, non-proliferation needs to be linked to existing global measures with the ultimate goal of global disarmament. The creation of a regional nuclear organization like EURATOM, to be called EATOM or ASIATOM, is proposed. Balance-of-power strategy and defense arrangements with outside powers need to be adjusted. For a sustainable security environment in the region, new thinking about security is much needed and improvement of relations between the countries including North Korea is crucial.

Q-star equation of state and the prompt shock in supernovae.

We examine equations of state derived from effective field theories. Such equations of state can allow for objects of high baryon number (10{sup 57}) with properties very different from models constructed using a conventional nuclear matter equation of state. In particular, they can lead to an abnormal non-nuclear state of baryonic matter which, for some values of the parameters, is the true ground state at high densities. We study phase transitions between this state and ordinary hadronic matter and explore the possible observational consequences of the fact that this phase transition can cause the release of large amounts of latent heat. We present results of numerical core collapse simulations which show that this release of latent heat can cause very strong shocks to form in supernovae. Thus, the possible existence of this state of matter may be constrainable by observed supernova properties. {copyright} 1995 The American Physical Society.

Nuclear Taboo And War Initiation in Regional Conflicts

This article addresses the role of nuclear taboo or the tradition of nonuse of nuclear weapons in limited wars involving a nuclear- and a nonnuclear-weapon state and the importance of this prohibitionary norm to deterrence theory. It explores nonnuclear states' strategic calculations before launching wars against nuclear-armed states. It discusses the historical, moral, normative, and rational bases of the taboo and explains why nuclear states have refrained from using their capability vis-à-vis nonnuclear challengers. Two cases of nonnuclear states initiating wars—the 1973 Egyptian offensive against Israel and the 1982 Argentine invasion of the British Falkland Islands—and the calculations of these states' decision makers on their adversaries' nuclear capability are addressed. The article concludes by discussing the implications of nuclear taboo for deterrence theory and regional conflicts, the conditions under which it could be broken, and the likely consequences of its infraction.

The Paradox of Power: Nuclear Weapons in a Changed World

The decision to resume nuclear testing by China and France in the summer of 1995, despite intense international opposition, has been motivated to a great extent by their desire to maintain power and status in international politics through the possession of a modernized nuclear weapons force. These decisions came on the heels of an unprecedented agreement by over 185 countries in New York in May 1995 to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in perpetuity. This conference outcome reflected a belief among a large number of nonnuclear states that the possession of atomic weapons would not add much to their power status. Yet the five declared nuclear states and a handful of undeclared states hold on to their nu-

Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Notwithstanding the fact that weapons have lost much of their relevance in the post Cold War era, they are still the object of heavy disputes on both sides of the Atlantic. One central issue is the question whether weapons should have a future role at all. The strategic community in the United States is particularly eloquent in arguing the pros and cons of deterrence as a means of maintaining stability in a world with an increasing number of players. A second dimension of the current debate is the problem of how to arrange deterrence in the future. This is of particular importance for the European and non-nuclear states. The ongoing process of creating a true European Union, including a European Security and Defense Identity, will lead sooner or later to the question of how to integrate the nuclear element in a future European security structure.

End Run Around the NPT

The authors discuss concerns about the proposed construction of a National Ignition Facility (NIF), as it relates to the perceived message this project sends regarding proliferation and the non-proliferation treaty. Many concerns have been expressed at public hearings. The authors try to present the arguments from the perspective of one concerned about the issue of arms control. The project keeps large numbers of weapons scientists employed in a weapons lab. While it does not clearly show that weapons testing is ongoing, it does show that there is an interest in weapons testing within the administration, which is visible to other nuclear and non-nuclear states when pondering issues related to non-proliferation policies and proposed treaties.

Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Entitlement

The debate over nuclear proliferation has generated a large literature, but this literature does not adequately address the moral issues. A moral analysis of proliferation must go beyond concerns of international security. In this essay, Lee addresses the following questions: (1) Does nuclear proliferation make the world a more dangerous place; that is, does it increase security? (2) Is it morally permissible for a nonnuclear state to acquire nuclear weapons? (3) What are morally permissible actions for states trying to keep other states from acquiring nuclear weapons?

The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent

Most Western observers want Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. In this view, articulated recently by President Bill Clinton, Europe would be more stable if Russia were to become only nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union. The United States and its European allies have been press ing Ukraine to transfer all of the nuclear weapons on its territory to the Russians, who naturally think this is an excellent idea. President Clinton is wrong. The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fash ion its own nuclear deterrent. Even now, pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake.

Conference a Qualified Success

Although participants in the fourth and final review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) failed to agree on a final declaration or even a formal reaffirmation of support for the treaty, the review was not a disaster. In fact, many considered the August-September Geneva meeting a qualified success. It was also the most interesting review to data because participants had their eyes fixed on 1995, when the first term of the treaty expires and a conference will decide the treaty's future. Because the main decision at the future conference - how long to extend the treaty - will require a simple majority, the non-nuclear parties have acquired the kind of political leverage they have not possessed since the treaty was negotiated. The nuclear signatories, as well as the non-nuclear parties, regard the NPT as the most important pillar of the nonproliferation regime, with more parties (141) than any other disarmament treaty. However, some nonaligned countries noted that the NPT had been a great success in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons states, but had been an utter failure in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons per se, which is the purpose of the treaty as indicatedmore » in its title. The nonaligned and other non-nuclear states came to the 1990 review prepared to use their renewed leverage to once again press the case for a comprehensive test ban and nuclear disarmament.« less

Non-nuclear states move to end testing

The United Nations has called a conference to amend the Partial Test Ban Treaty and make it comprehensive. The three principals—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—have agreed to come.

Coexistence, cooperation, and common security: annals of Pugwash 1986

Part 1 The nuclear arms race: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, B.Sanders connection between horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, D.Frei nuclear-free zones as a step towards global nuclear disarmament, P.Pamir the unilateral initiatives and reciprocal responses for arms control and disarmament, F.A.Long. Part 2 European security: extended deterrence, no first use, and European security, J.P.Holdren certainties and uncertainties about military doctrines, L.Valki the political significance of the non-nuclear defence policy of the British Labour Party, M.Kaldor nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, A.T.Balevski & C.Kluranov military technology and non-offensive defense in Europe, J.J.Graaback balance of conventional forces in europe, A.Karkoszka reducing threat perceptions - guidelines for enhanced stability in Europe, K.F.Birnbaum defensive conventional force structures a a catalyst for a second detente, A.A.C.Von Muller. Part 3 Role of non-nuclear-weapon states: the role of non-nuclear states in reducing the nuclear danger, O.R.Grimsson the role of Canada in efforts to reduce the nuclear danger within alliances, G.Ignatieff nuclear weapons and the neutral country - the case of Sweden, M.B.Theorin role of non-alignedstates in efort to reduce the nuclear danger, K.Subrahmanyam. Part 4 Non-military aspects of reducing East-West tension: addressing the roots of East-WEst confrontation can detente be restored?, F.Calogero roots of East-Westconfrontation - asymmetrical symmetries, E.E.Galal non-military aspects of mutual security - interrelation between regional and global problems, N.Behar scientific and cultural cooperation as a means for reducing East-West tensions, K.Gottstein world peace initiative - a comprehensive international research and development programme for the solution of the global problems, H.P.Durr. Part 5 International economic relations: military expenditures, international economic relations and detente, N.Ball East-West trade and economic relations, O.T.Bogomolov strategic aspects of the development of East-WEst economic relations, T.Palankai strengthening South-south cooperation for the maintenance of world peace, W.Houkang where is the world economy going, if anywhere?, M.S.Wionczek. Appendix: Coexistence, cooperation, and common security - statement from the Pugwash council.

South Korea's Participation in the SDI

This article illuminates a serious concern about South Korea's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative. There is a perception that it may adversely affect the strategic environment in Northeast Asia, in which a most precarious military balance is maintained. The author advises that the Republic of Korea's participation might destabilize the area. Also, it is in South Korea's security interests not to aggravate the Soviet Union, which is most likely to use its proxy, North Korea, to disturb this region. The author proposes that South Korea should participate in a regional version of SDI-a Northeast Asian defense initiative (NADI) initiated by Japan-as an alternative to its commitment to the U.S. SDI. Since Japan is a nonnuclear weapons state, Moscow may accept a Japanled NADI as a genuine defensive system.

Communication on energy: Nuclear power and the non proliferation treaty: how the carrot became a turnip

In September 1985 the 3rd Review Conference of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) saw the demands of developing countries for improved access to nuclear technology move from the centre of discussions to the periphery. This almost certainly reflects the declining importance attached to nuclear power as an energy source by the vast majority of these countries. The NPT is the world's only multilateral treaty aimed at halting both the spread and the build up of nuclear weapons. One hundred and thirty nations have signed the Treaty which came into force in 1970. In return for the non-nuclear states eschewing the bomb, they are offered preferred access to nuclear power and a firm promise that the three nuclear signatories, the USA, the USSR and the UK will move towards meaningful disarmament.

Nuclear Policy and World Order: Why Denuclearization

While taking note of the growing anxiety, particularly on the part of the superpowers, over the spread of nuclear technology and of the frantic campaign (most of all on the part of the USA), through a combination of pressures and blandishments, to halt proliferation, the paper does not see much chance of the campaign succeeding so long as as it remains suspect because, among other reasons, of its being spearheaded by a power which is itself the greatest proliferator and one, too, which has not only got an enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons, but is constantly engaged in evolving ever more sophisticated (which means deadly) weapons. Nonproliferation, unless wedded to denuclearization, will continue to be viewed by non-nuclear states as unacceptably discriminatory and as a geopolitical confidence trick calculated to freeze the present hegemonistic global structure. Obviously, the first moves toward denuclearization have to be made by nuclear nations, but, above all, by the two superpowers. However, denuclearization will be illusory if a distinction is made between the military and the civilian uses of the atom. Denuclearization must, therefore, at some stage-now rather than later, when it might be too late-involve the total renunciation of nuclear power for whatever purpose and its substitution with other less centralized, less costly, and pollution-free sources of energy, such as sun, wind, water and biomass. In between, however, the ruling elites all the world over, but principally in its industrialized part, have to accept a concept of world order securely anchored to the values of peace, economic well-being of all, social and political justice, both within and between nations, and environmental quality. Recognising that such a world order cannot be erected at one go, the author suggests transition steps, none frighteningly radical in itself and each demonstrably feasible, although establishment circles, unable to move out of the narrow groove of conventional wisdom, may scoff at them as ‘romantic’ or ‘utopian’.

Bargaining in Arms Control Negotiations: The Seabeds Denuclearization Treaty

This article analyzes the bargaining process in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference/Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in Geneva during 1969–70, on the issue of the Seabeds Denuclearization Treaty, which was opened for signature in 1971. A procedure called bargaining process analysis was employed to content analyze the interactions within this forum throughout four major phases of these negotiations. Limited support was given to several hypotheses about the effects of the bargaining process on the level of agreement. First, in several phases of these negotiations, the more the negotiating strategies were characterized as soft rather than as hard, the greater was the level of agreement relative to disagreement. Second, in several phases, the higher the ratio of task-oriented to affect-oriented behavior in bargaining style, the greater was the ratio of agreements to disagreements on issues under negotiation. Finally, the bargaining process analysis was able to describe several trends in these negotiations, especially the ability of the nuclear powers to reach relatively rapid agreement after initial differences, followed by much longer bargaining where differences between the nuclear and the nonnuclear states had to be resolved. This line of division may be increasingly characteristic of multilateral arms control negotiations and may be reflected in future negotiations in which nonnuclear states are important participants.

Nonproliferation and Control: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The possibility—or probability—of converting atomic energy from peaceful to military uses presents manifold political and technical problems: of management, distribution, control. A quarter-century after Hiroshima, we have the Nonproliferation Treaty, but not all nuclear powers have signed it, and many nonnuclear states are holdouts. Georges C. Delcoigne, Legal Division, and G. Rubinstein, Department of Safeguards, of the International Atomic Energy Agency summarize the current situation and have a sober look at the future.

Nuclear Guarantees and Nonproliferation

On March 5, 1970, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect, having been ratified by 47 states including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty legally bars these three nuclear powers from transferring atomic weapons to nonnuclear states and formally pledges those nonnuclear states signing the treaty to refrain from developing such weapons or acquiring them from other powers. It thus caps a long effort by the United States to inhibit—so long as it could not preclude—the spread of nuclear weapons and to avoid the potential instabilities associated with that spread.

The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) devoted its major efforts from the endof July 1965 until April 1968 to negotiating the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, spending little time on other arms control measures in the sessions throughout this period. In May 1968 the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly presented the draft treaty to the First (Political and Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. After lengthy debate and acceptance of several amendments to meet the wishes of nonnuclear states the Treaty reached its final form on May 21, 1968, and was “commended” in General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) of June 12, 1968.