Policy Of Non-alignment Research Articles

INDIA'S STRATEGIC THINKING AND ITS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created grave problems for India’s foreign policy. New Delhi no longer enjoys the protection of the Soviet veto in the U.N. Security Council; the new Russian state no longer willingly acts as the guardian of India’s interests in international forums; and Moscow is no longer able to provide softcurrency military equipment deals. This dramatic and rapid shift in the strategic realm provides unprecedented opportunities for India to reassess its international orientation and maneuver itself into a dominant regional position, beyond the narrow geopolitical confines of the old East-West division, so as to realize fully its economic, cultural, and military potential. Thus, with the emergence of a unipolar world, India is less idealistic, moralistic, and doctrinaire than it was in the years when Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian foreign policy. Although fundamentally the character of India’s nonalignment policy has not changed, pragmatically the country’s policy toward the West is more open and soft as compared to the Cold War period. New Delhi is beginning to come to terms with the new realities of a world in which “non-alignment” has lost meaning. The main challenges for Indian diplomats and policy makers facing the post-Cold War world with its changing security environment are the need to (1) build a strong economic base capable of sustaining the country’s military growth and (2) maintain a higher diplomatic profile. This article evaluates the circumstances under which Indian elites develop national security strategy. Little analysis exists that systematically reviews the interplay of factors formulating Indian strategies and the characteristics of

Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf & Rutger Lindahl, Non-Alignment and European Security Policy: Ambiguity at Work

Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf & Rutger Lindahl, Non-Alignment and European Security Policy: Ambiguity at Work

Indo‐Iranian relations 1947–2000

India and Iran have interacted with each other since time immemorial. During the post‐independence period, their relations passed through strains. During the 1950s, Indo‐Iranian relations remained cool because of Iran's alignment with the West and India's policy of non alignment. Their relations however started improving during the 1960s and 1970s, except during Ayatollah Khomeini's period. After the end of the Cold War, common security threat perceptions brought India and Iran closer. Iran was deeply concerned with the US ties with the Arab states, and unstable states to its north. As a result Iran wanted to promote regional ties. India's main security dilemmas arose from international pressures and regional rivalries. All this led to the convergence of their interests, the main areas being—energy, Afghanistan, Central Asia and business. As their interests coincide the two started making concious efforts to improve ties by keeping up high level contacts, which was followed by very important visits, particularly, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to Iran in 1993 and President Hashemi Rafsanjani's visit to India in 1995. The Indo‐Iranian equation is a significant evolving factor affecting regional politics in South and West Asia. Both the countries have realised that their relations were not determined only by the issue of Islam but extend much farther. The mutual desire for friendship and cooperation has lessened the misunderstandings and both the countries can now look forward to a more stable relationship.

Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire

Research Article| June 01 1997 Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire Donald M. Seekins Donald M. Seekins Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1997) 37 (6): 525–539. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645527 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Donald M. Seekins; Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire. Asian Survey 1 June 1997; 37 (6): 525–539. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645527 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1997 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Yugoslav Universities and Inter‐University International Co‐Operation

Inter‐university international co‐operation is very strongly favoured by the Yugoslav government as part of its overall policy of nonalignment. Numerous bilateral and multilateral projects are being pursued by the Union of Universities of Yugoslavia and by individual Yugoslav universities. The sponsorship of the “University Today” International Seminar by the Union is one manifestation of this policy as is the encouragement which it gives its member universities to join appropriate international university associations, including regional ones. Currently, the Union is favouring the increased international exchange of students. The internationalization of universities opens them to the most progressive and advanced tendencies in teaching and in research.

Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy by Assassi Lassassi Aldershot, Avebury; Brookfield, Vermont, Gower; 1988. Pp. xv + 234. £26.00.

Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy by Assassi Lassassi Aldershot, Avebury; Brookfield, Vermont, Gower; 1988. Pp. xv + 234. £26.00.

A View from Khartoum

A VIEW FROM KHARTOUM A jL JLlthough the Sudanese people threw off the autocratic rule of Jaafar al-Nimeiri two years ago, they are still struggling to undo the economic and political damage that he wrought and to reorient their foreign policy in a way that will enhance their flexibility and credibility in the international arena.1 In the quest for badly needed aid and support for ending the debilitating civil war in the south, the current prime min ister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, has articulated a foreign policy of non alignment, in contrast to the close relationship Nimeiri had with the United States. In Mahdi's view, Sudan should neither become entangled in the East-West rivalry nor take sides in regional conflicts. His desire for amicable relations with all of Sudan's neighbors and the significant external powers makes sense, given the location and social complexion of the country. But the government is already discovering that the policy is not easy to implement. The major internal priorities of the new democratic government are to end the war, resolve the country's staggering economic problems, and chart a constitu tional course that will balance the varied religious and political interests in order to stabilize parliamentary rule. Diplomatic priorities are closely linked to those domestic concerns. Sudan is the largest country in Africa, covering a million square miles. Its pivotal location astride the river Nile links the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa and borders the vital international shipping lane that passes through the Red Sea. The country is vulnerable, unable to police its borders with eight states, and open to pressure and influence from all sides.

Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania

The East African countries of Kenya and Tanzania provide an interesting comparative context for examining the evolution of African foreign relations. In the past decade both countries have significantly broadened the range of issues on their foreign policy agendas in response to changes in both regional and international environments. Tanzania has shifted its trade and aid relations away from the European powers and has become heavily involved in the diplomacy surrounding southern African conflicts. Kenya has become a significant exporter of goods to other Third World countries. Relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply in the latter 1970s, but, since 1983, have entered a new period of cooperation. Tanzania has maintained a policy of strict nonalignment, while Kenya has developed close strategic ties to the United States. International financial institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have been increasingly involved in both countries. IMF relations with Tanzania have been highly conflictual; Kenyan-IMF relations, while cordial, have also had their problems. In sum, both countries have been relatively successful in utilizing foreign relations to promote national goals.

Nepal in 1982: Panchayat Leadership in Crisis

THE MONARCHY IN NEPAL is widely regarded as an indispensable institution by the people, but, depending on their political affiliation and profession, they differ on the kind of political and economic powers the King should exercise. In foreign policy, because of Nepal's geographic location between the two Asian giants democratic India and Communist China the people of Nepal believe that the King should follow a nonaligned policy, thereby maintaining a political balance and possibly saving the sovereignty of the country. However, the King and responsible elected political leaders face important political and economic problems that can no longer be neglected or avoided. The reformed Panchayat political system was established as the people's political representational system by a narrow victory in the National Referendum on May 2, 1980, and in the General Election on May 8, 1981. The political features of the reformed Panchayat system include: election of a National Panchayat (assembly) through adult franchise; election of the Prime Minister by the National Panchayat; formation of a government responsible to the people; and affirmation that the nation's sovereignty is vested in the crown. But the reformed political system has not yet brought a significant change in the direction of political leadership on economic policies or foreign policy.

Nonalignment and Socialist Foreign Policy

Nonalignment and Socialist Foreign Policy

Domestic Sources of India's Policy of Non-Alignment

Domestic Sources of India's Policy of Non-Alignment

The China-Vietnam-Indochina Conflict: Search for Solutions

The main aim of this paper is to search for solutions to the China-Vietnam-Indochina conflict. It is not meant to apportion blame or to look for scapegoats. Nor is it meant to prescribe solutions. Rather, the emphasis is on an open and reflective discussion of the elements and the dynamics of the conflict, its historical background and possible alternatives in the light of the peace research theory. The concern is with the fate of the peoples of the region and the possible escalatory international implications. The search is therefore for political as against military solutions, and for a creative transcendence of the conflict of interests as against conflict reproducing violent options. The resolution of the conflict is seen within the framework of a policy of nonalignment and neutrality of the Indochinese nations, and the strategy proposed would rely on a dynamic continuum from initial dissociative low interaction to high associative cooperation between China and Vietnam.

MAJOR SHIFTS IN RECENT UGANDAN FOREIGN POLICY

A SMALL STATE may engage successfully in nonalignment politics if it is wooed by a number of major powers. In a conducive international environment, a small state may not need to depend on any one patron. It may cajole or demand as much from its protectors as possible, thereby lulling them into the illusion that it is dependent upon them. If the existing patrons do not continue delivering at the same rate or do not increase their aid when requested, however, the small state may be able to reject its former friends and look elsewhere to satisfy its needs. Optimally then nonalignment means a small state has the freedom to determine its own foreign policy without undue interference from outside powers.' Most African countries south of the Sahara have had limited opportunities to manoeuvre among the major powers. Few states have had the natural resources and power potential to follow a truly nonaligned policy successfully. Nigeria and Zaire seem to be in the best position because of their substantial natural resources. Other countries, which lack such advantages, but which have tried nevertheless to seek diversified sources of support, have eventually become quite dependent upon one particular patron. Tanzania, for instance, which pursued an exemplary nonaligned policy in the 1960s, has become more dependent upon Communist China in the 1970s.2 Despite the general constriction of foreign policy options for Black African states in the 1970s, Uganda has attracted considerable attention by switching power-bloc sides. Through concentrating power in the hands of one leader, who can move swiftly without prior consultations, this particular state's manoeuvrability has certainly increased. Field Marshal Idi Amin of Uganda, in a country which previously had too many internal problems to have a very active foreign policy,3 appears to have latched on to the nonalignment game almost instinctively by playing existing

The Third World as a Political Force

merely taken for granted. This state of affairs, of course, resulted from what had come to be described as the tight bipolar system of international relations, with Washington and Moscow representing the dominant centers of international power. The cold war, shrewdly fabricated in the late 1940s, provided a significant psychological weapon by means of which the superpowers sought to perpetuate their ascendancy over their respective systems of international order. Yet, with the sudden emergence in the 1960s of countervailing political forces, this bipolar structure of world society was to be subjected increasingly to multilateral pressures, culminating in the present polycentric dispersal of power within the international system. Among the most critical factors which combined to undermine this bicentric management of international relations must be identified the policy of nonalignment in foreign relations, embraced by the great majority of the new states of Asia and Africa, reinforced by the historic colonial movements for self-determination, and the successive waves of nationalist self-assertiveness

After Nkrumah: Continuity and Change in Ghana’s Foreign Policy

Over the nine years since the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in February 1966, Ghana has come under three different governments: that of the National Liberation Council (February 1966 to October 1969), the Progress government (late 1969 to January 1972), and the government of the National Redemption Council (1972– ). Various views have been expressed in journals and magazines where writers have tried to depict the country’s foreign policy under the different regimes. For instance, Ruth First said that the government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) pursued a pro-West policy, and the Times (London) said a day after the coup d’etat of 24 February 1966 that Ghana had “swung back to reliance on the West.” William Gutteridge, however, maintained that the NLC government had restored a degree of neutralism to the country’s foreign policy rather than abandon the policy of nonalignment and neutralism in entirety. He added that the NLC had opted for more modest pan-African policies following Nkrumah’s pan-African excesses. Other people accused the NLC government of supporting the colonialists in Africa by refusing to allow freedom fighters the opportunity to meet and organize from within Ghana.

Small States and the Policy of Nonalignment: The Yugoslav Position

Small States and the Policy of Nonalignment: The Yugoslav Position

Major Trends in Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment Policy after 1956

Major Trends in Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment Policy after 1956

Major Trends in Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment Policy after 1956

Major Trends in Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment Policy after 1956

Nepal and Israel: Uniqueness in Asian Relations

Fifteen years ago a Nepali who became actively involved in the conduct of his country's foreign relations took careful note of the geopolitical realities facing landlocked Nepal, situated between the two colossuses of Asia, India and China, and observed: security, independence and integrity of Nepal hinge on the of cordiality between India and China. India's foreign policy of non-alignment with any one of the international power-blocs admirably suits Nepal's own interests of safety and security.1 Nepal has endeavored over the years to translate her nonaligned policy and posture between India and China into a performance of cordiality, and with generally commendable success. But by the late 1950s she was also beginning to establish relations with a number of other countries and, through diversifying her diplomatic relations, was lessening the image that her foreign policy was virtually a carbon copy of something formulated in New Delhi. One of the most interesting and unique of Nepal's new international relationships to emerge during the past decade has been that developed with the State of Israel. It has endured through the present and merits discussion in the context of Asian relations. Following the first nationwide elections in the history of Nepal, held in early 1959, the socialist oriented Nepali Congress under B. P. Koirala began Nepal's painfully brief experiment with parliamentary democracy.2 The immediate international scene posed a difficult series of challenges for Nepal and her object of achieving a balanced foreign policy. Sino-Indian relations were rapidly deteriorating following the Chinese suppression of Tibet and the Dalai Lama's flight to India for political asylum, while Himalayan border disputes between the two great neighbors were becoming disturbingly manifest. On the Nepali domestic scene, Koirala as Prime Minister faced the task of accommodating factional and personal rivalries within his new cabinet and, as events later proved, of averting a takeover of the government by an assertive and mistrustful Crown in a royal coup d'etat. Perhaps in those trying circumstances the invitation from Israel to visit

Societal Conditions of the Policy of Nonalignment

The policy of non-alignment arose in the period after the Second World War as a response to the beginning process of the formation of two antagonistic blocs. The very designation given to it by its protagonists defines it negatively, i.e. as a policy of non-participation in groupings, military pacts or political blocs. And if we use the term of any language, it seems to contain the negation or non-participation in these creations of the Cold War. This has led many analysts and politicians to assume non-engagementfor a kind of peaceful neutrality, for a policy of tactics between the centers of individual blocs or for efforts to maintain the same distance between individual blocs. This opinion on the policy of non-alignment did not, understandably, originate from a misunderstanding or superficiality, but often from a deliberate underestimation of this policy or an effort to discredit it. This fact should be particularly emphasized, because it is one of the main methods the struggle against the policy of non-alignment during the Cold War was an attempt to obscure the goals and content of this policy with Russian obscurity or to distort them. In this regard, bloc-oriented propaganda has been making efforts for many years and has also achieved positive results in certain directions. One of them was the effort alone bearer of the policy of non-engagement to consider this policy as new, original and comprehensive world view. It was, in a certain sense, a reaction to contempt and criticism from the bloc