INDIA'S STRATEGIC THINKING AND ITS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Abstract

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created grave problems for India’s foreign policy. New Delhi no longer enjoys the protection of the Soviet veto in the U.N. Security Council; the new Russian state no longer willingly acts as the guardian of India’s interests in international forums; and Moscow is no longer able to provide softcurrency military equipment deals. This dramatic and rapid shift in the strategic realm provides unprecedented opportunities for India to reassess its international orientation and maneuver itself into a dominant regional position, beyond the narrow geopolitical confines of the old East-West division, so as to realize fully its economic, cultural, and military potential. Thus, with the emergence of a unipolar world, India is less idealistic, moralistic, and doctrinaire than it was in the years when Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian foreign policy. Although fundamentally the character of India’s nonalignment policy has not changed, pragmatically the country’s policy toward the West is more open and soft as compared to the Cold War period. New Delhi is beginning to come to terms with the new realities of a world in which “non-alignment” has lost meaning. The main challenges for Indian diplomats and policy makers facing the post-Cold War world with its changing security environment are the need to (1) build a strong economic base capable of sustaining the country’s military growth and (2) maintain a higher diplomatic profile. This article evaluates the circumstances under which Indian elites develop national security strategy. Little analysis exists that systematically reviews the interplay of factors formulating Indian strategies and the characteristics of