Nolo Contendere Research Articles

The Application in Romanian Jurisprudence of the “Alford Plea” and “Nolo Contendere” Principles

The article aims to analyze the jurisprudence of the highest courts regarding the interpretation and application of guilt plea standards known in the United States of America as the "Alford" or "nolo contendere" pleas. In this regard, it will briefly present the special procedure of the guilty plea agreement, with a focus on the acknowledgment of guilt and the imputed offense by the defendants. Furthermore, it will present the elements of the aforementioned American procedures and recent relevant jurisprudence, followed by a conclusion.

Price Conspiracy in the Electrical Industry [History

In late November 1960, U.S. Attorney Robert Bicks filed charges in U.S. District Court in Philadelphia, PA, USA, against the big three electrical equipment manufacturers along with 26 smaller companies and 44 of their executives. The parties were charged with conspiracy to fix prices, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, of 1890, and the Clayton Antitrust Act, of 1914. Within four months, all 44 executives pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), and seven were sentenced to 30 days in prison.

The simplified order of the court proceedings on the basis of agreements: experience of the procedure legislation of the USA

The paper is dedicated to issues on simplified order of pre-trial investigation in Federal Criminal Procedure Legislation of the USA. It is stressed, the plea agreement is a separate institute of criminal procedure in the USA. The plea agreement is a comprehensive legal category, that includes a few independent criminal and procedural compromises. They are «Nolo Contendere Plea» (“I do not admit guilt, but I do not deny it either”), «Alford Plea» (“I admit the guilt, but I deny it”). The Alford Plea is an alternative to the Nolo Contendere. While Nolo contendere means that the defendant accepts whatever punishment the court deems appropriate but does not plead guilty, an Alford Plea means that the defendant pleads guilty but at the same time maintains his innocence. In general, the plea agreement is a compromise procedure, mentioned by the legislation. As a rule, it has features of agreement on terms of responsibility between the prosecution and the defense, in writing. The plea agreement is established in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of the United States, (Rule 11) and court decisions of a precedent nature. The plea agreement can be concluded on the stage of pre-trial investigation, at a preliminary hearing in court, at a grand jury trial, at the opening of a court session, but before the merits of the case begin. The appearance of agreements in the criminal justice needs, among other, developing of criminalistic methods of investigation of specifical kinds of crimes. Today, procedural regulation and distribution of agreements in criminal proceedings is practically not reflected in the novelization of the approaches of the forensic methodology of investigation of certain types of criminal offenses and forensic tactics. For the national legislator as well as for law enforcement, the experience of regulation of plea agreements in the USA has a significant mean. The architecture of this institution, provided by the CPC of Ukraine, is very simplified and needs to be developed.

'Importing' Restrictions from One Federal Rule of Evidence Provision to Another: The Limits of Legitimate Contextual Interpretation in the Age of Statutes

In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect. The basic policy thrust of the Rules was to simplify and liberalize the law of Evidence in federal court. In particular, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, Federal Rule 402 was intended to deprive the courts of the power to either enforce or enunciate uncodified exclusionary rules. Yet, as Part I of this article demonstrates, in several lines of authority federal courts have relied on contextual interpretation to impose evidentiary restrictions that have no grounding in statutory text. The common fact pattern in these lines of authority is the following: One provision of the Federal Rules contains a restriction, a second provision is silent on the restriction, and the text of neither provision manifests a legislative intent to import the restriction from the first provision into the second. The question naturally arises as to what are the legitimate uses and limits of contextual construction. As Part II explains, the enactment of the Federal Rules roughly coincided with the emergence of the textualist school of statutory interpretation. For formal and practical reasons, textualists assert the primacy of text and caution against uncritical reliance on extrinsic legislative history material. Unlike extrinsic material, legislative text has the formal status of law; and extrinsic history materials are vulnerable to distortion from the influence of special interest groups. The diminished importance of extrinsic history has enhanced the importance of contextual arguments, that is, arguments based on other provisions in the same legislative scheme. After all, like the text being construed, the contextual provisions have the formal force of law. The question of contextual interpretation is not limited to the setting of the Federal Rules of Evidence. More broadly, it affects the construction of all legislation in the Age of Statutes. Part II uses the Federal Rule as a microcosm for exploring the concept of contextual interpretation. On the one hand, Part II identifies several perfectly legitimate uses of contextual interpretation. To begin with, the wording of one provision may be used to eliminate an ambiguity in the wording of a second provision. By way of example, the court may look to the character evidence prohibition codified in Rules 404-45 to inform the meaning of “unfair prejudice” in Rule 403. Moreover, a blanket prohibition on the admission of a certain type of evidence in one provision may necessitate a narrowing construction of another provision that would otherwise permit the introduction of that very type of evidence. Hence, the prohibition of the introduction of evidence of nolo contendere pleas in Rule 410 can require a limiting construction of Rule 801(d)(2)(A) on statements or admissions of a party-opponent. However, when neither of those uses of context is in play, with one exception a court may not simply import a restriction from one provision of the Federal Rules into another. Doing so exceeds the interpretive power of context. Subpart II.B proposes that the importation is justifiable only in the exceptional situation in which the extrinsic legislative history contains an extraordinarily powerful showing of a broad legislative intent to bar the admission of a particular type of evidence, not a narrower intent to prescribe a restriction in one provision of the Federal Rules. Part III uses the standard proposed in subpart II.B to critically evaluate the three lines of authority discussed in Part I. Part III concludes that two of the three lines are flawed; one does not manifest the right type of intent, and the second relies on extrinsic history that is too mixed and conflicted to qualify as an extraordinarily powerful showing of intent. Only one line of authority is based on extrinsic history that includes compelling evidence of an intent to prevent the admission of a certain type of evidence under any theory. Hopefully, this article will not only prevent misreadings of the Federal Rules but also contribute to the larger debate over the proper role of contextual interpretation in the Age of Statutes.

In Cold Storage: Sex and Murder on the Plains by James W. Hewitt

Reviewed by: In Cold Storage: Sex and Murder on the Plains by James W. Hewitt Peter Longo James W. Hewitt, In Cold Storage: Sex and Murder on the Plains. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015. 132 pp. $16.95. James Hewitt's latest book and subject of this review, In Cold Storage: Sex and Murder on the Plains, adds interesting breadth to his excellent 2007 book. In Cold Storage reveals the complexity of human existence, in general, and particularly on the Great Plains. Images of the Great Plains often can conjure-up images of bucolic settings on which reside hard working, civic-minded, and law abiding folks. Such community contributors have been held out as examples for years and the author offers examples of such notable civic leaders such as George Norris and former Governors Ralph Brooks, Frank Morrison, and E. Benjamin Nelson. The aforementioned are provided historic markers at their former homes. The focus of the book is not on the well-known civic contributors, but the focus is on the notorious Ena and Harold Nokes. And, for the focus of the book, "No such marker, however, designates the home of Harold Nokes" (10). The work turns to the prurient as the seemingly unbounded carnal interests take hold of Harold Nokes and Kay Hein. … "The lovers embarked on a sexual journey that was to last until the spring of 1973, a journey that occurred with impressive frequency, often two or three times a week" (25). The real life events took a more complicated turn as Ena the devoted wife of Harold, joined the two-some and commenced upon a Great Plains "ménage a trois." The author offers dark glimpses of the human condition while peppering the passages with the graphic details associated with varied sexual activities. In all the activities, Kay Hein exclusively wanted Harold. "The end of the affair was discouraging for the Nokeses who found a new excitement in their lives" (38). As the end of the tryst winds down, the reader becomes well aware that the associated graphic sex events conveyed by Hewitt would not provide for [End Page 61] a happy ending. Unfortunately for Kay Hein's parents, Edwin and Wilma Hoyt, they became concerned parents in this bizarre triangle. The author provides the gripping details of the concern and involvement of Edwin and Wilma Hoyt. Ensuing conflict followed and on a Sunday night at the Nokes' home, a heated argument ended with Harold Nokes killing the Hoyts with an assist provided by Ena Nokes. The ensuing details, much like the details of the sexual activities, are considerably graphic. For example, Hewitt writes about the disposal process: "Gripping the ax halfway to the handle with his left hand, Harold used the instrument to break some of Edwin Hoyt's bones, remove the limbs, and then sever the head …" (53). The grizzly details associated with the dumping of the bodies in a nearby lake, Strunk Lake, built an additional layer of graphic details. The rest of the book documents the complexities associated with the legal and criminal justice process of the particular case. There were many perplexing unresolved issues associated with the murders that make for an interesting read. In the midst of the intense process, the author provides meaningful glimpses into the peculiarities of the landscape and scenes, such as the courthouse. Hewitt writes: "Unique among Nebraska's courthouses, the tiny and antiquated courthouse in Stockville must have seemed like a trip back in time. For well into the twentieth century, the courthouse had no running water or indoor toilet facilities. Consequently, no women were called for jury duty in Frontier County" (81). Such passages provide a humanistic balance to the assorted details associated with the murders. The events were carefully reconstructed by Hewitt. The many documented inconsistencies serve as a reminder that justice on the Plains or elsewhere is often elusive and mysterious. Inconsistencies aside, on January 10, 1974, Harrold Nokes was charged with one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder and his wife Ena was charged with two counts of unlawful disposal of a dead body. Harold entered guilty pleas and Ena pleaded nolo contendere (no...

In Extremis

In Extremis Deborah Warren (bio) Lucky possum who, in any crisis, doesn’t have to do a thing but yield: a stroke of narcolepsy takes control. Stunned by an automatic anaesthetic, his body seizes up, and the sudden coma (the silver corpse dead to the wood and field) is actual out-and-out paralysis, and it keeps the howling, yipping things at bay by telling the world: nolo contendere. Playing possum, as if it were a role and he a gray marsupial Juliet? Acting? No. He’s sleeping out the drama where, making of “death” a sanctuary, he lies until the trauma trots away. [End Page 104] Deborah Warren DEBORAH WARREN’s poems have appeared in The New Yorker, The Paris Review, Poetry, and The Yale Review. Her books include The Size of Happiness (2003); Zero Meridian (2004), winner of the New Criterion Poetry Prize; Dream With Flowers and Bowl of Fruit (2008), recipient of the Richard Wilbur Award; and Ausonius: The Moselle and Other Poems (Routledge, 2016). She holds a B.A. in English from Harvard College. Copyright © 2017 Deborah Warren

Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended the Cold War

<i>Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended the Cold War</i>

Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas

Criminal procedure is preoccupied with procedural values such as efficiency, accuracy, informed choice, and procedural fairness. This emphasis comes at the expense of the values of criminal procedure's sibling, substantive criminal law. This article examines Alford and nolo contendere pleas as case studies in how an obsession with these procedural values blinds courts and scholars to substantive values. Defendants can in effect plead guilty by entering Alford and nolo contendere pleas, even if they protest their innocence or refuse to admit guilt. These pleas risk not only convicting innocent defendants, but also impeding the reform, education, and condemnation of guilty defendants. These pleas leave psychological denial mechanisms in place, especially in the case of sex offenders. And regardless of how defendants respond, these pleas muddy the denunciation of the crime instead of vindicating victims and the community's moral norms (such as honesty and responsibility). Pleas should be reserved for those who confess. Trials are morality plays designed to acquit innocent defendants and teach lessons to guilty defendants who will not confess, their victims, and the community. This approach leads to a rethinking of plea procedures and the roles of lawyers, judges, and trials in our criminal justice system.

Fields of Practice: Connections between Law and Organizations

It is, of course, both a privilege and a challenge to have one's work attended to in the thorough and thoughtful manner exemplified by Professors Suchman and Edelman's and Professor Sutton's essays. The New Institutionalism in Organizarional Analysis has been subject of many review symposia—in journals of accounting, business, political science, and sociology. But the traffic has never been two-way: our work is typically imported into new domains, but here we also have the opportunity to see how law and society research might enhance institutional analysis. In reading and reflecting on these valuable commentaries, I am pulled by divergent reactions: “Why didn't we think of that?” and “that's not what we meant” are the most common. But rather than play out these responses in print, I plead nolo contendere and concur with Suchman and Edelman's contention that institutional analysis has treated the law and the legal environment in an overly determinist fashion. In focusing on the letter of the law and its purported impact, institutional analysis neglects the extent to which the law and the legal environment are subject to negotiation, interpretation, and contestation.

Fields of Practice: Connections between Law and Organizations

It is, of course, both a privilege and a challenge to have one's work attended to in the thorough and thoughtful manner exemplified by Professors Suchman and Edelman's and Professor Sutton's essays. The New Institutionalism in Organizarional Analysis has been subject of many review symposia—in journals of accounting, business, political science, and sociology. But the traffic has never been two-way: our work is typically imported into new domains, but here we also have the opportunity to see how law and society research might enhance institutional analysis. In reading and reflecting on these valuable commentaries, I am pulled by divergent reactions: “Why didn't we think of that?” and “that's not what we meant” are the most common. But rather than play out these responses in print, I plead nolo contendere and concur with Suchman and Edelman's contention that institutional analysis has treated the law and the legal environment in an overly determinist fashion. In focusing on the letter of the law and its purported impact, institutional analysis neglects the extent to which the law and the legal environment are subject to negotiation, interpretation, and contestation.

Periodization Schemes and “Party Systems”: The “System of 1896” as a Case in Point

1. Was there any such thing as the “System of 1896”—or indeed any other “system” in American political history, for that matter? Professor McCormick’s paper suggests that he would clearly answer this question in the affirmative. For essentially he argues not that no such system existed, but that much too heavy an interpretative burden in my analyses has been placed on 1896 itself. I am sure that, so far as this is concerned, Professor McCormick is right. Yet there do seem undercurrents in this friendly critique of the broader doubt as to whether there is any substantiality at all to the model which I first attempted to sketch out quite a few years ago. On any one of a variety of specific details, I would have to plead, if not guilty, then at least nolo contendere. Yes, I undoubtedly placed too great a burden on 1896 itself, which inevitably should and does create scholarly doubts. Yes, the original sketch which attempted to link elite motivation with underlying power structure and those with electoral politics in and after the 1890s was painted in very vivid colors indeed. This may tell a dramatic story, but it may assume a greater conspiratorial intentionality and future-prediction on the part of elites than was actually there. But once we deal with issues such as these, is there anything left? Professor McCormick, a friendly critic, seems to think there is, but undercurrents of doubt remain.

Does Collusion Pay... Does Antitrust Work?

While the per se illegality of price fixing has been relatively uncontroversial compared to other aspects of antitrust policy, some argue that market forces can break down collusion, even without intervention by the authorities [20]. This argument raises the possibility that collusion is not profitable, and that antitrust policy is unnecessary and ineffective. Relatively few studies have examined either the impact of conspiracy on profitability, or the effectiveness of antitrust intervention [ 18, 276 77]. In one of these studies, Asch and Seneca [1] looked at a sample of 51 firms that were found guilty of, or that pleaded nolo contendere to, Sherman Act conspiracy charges during 1958-67. When these companies were compared to a random sample of 50 other firms, the authors found (to their surprise) that the conspiring firms were less profitable than those in the control group, other things equal. In another study, Sultan [20] observed a positive but insignificant relationship between price fixing meetings and turbine generator prices. In a subsequent simulation analysis, however, he found a significant impact of conspiracy: predicted turbine generator prices for a model including conspiracy effects were about nine percent higher than those for a model without conspiracy [20, 348]. In sum, the questions of conspiracy's impact and antitrust's effectiveness remain uncertain.

We've Got a Problem: Impolite Speculations on Higher Education

NOTE: To the charge that these speculations lack supporting data, the author, an irascible fifty-year-old Professor of English, pleads innocent by reason of sanity, for no sane man would spend time doing research on the behavior of academic officials when he could be studying Don Quixote or Huckleberry Finn. To the charge that in view of the subjects they deal with these speculations are shockingly lacking in profanity, he pleads, like Spiro Agnew, nolo contendere.

Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea

Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea

Nolo Contendere--Its Use and Effect

Nolo Contendere--Its Use and Effect

Nolo Contendere. Its Use and Effect

Nolo Contendere. Its Use and Effect

Federal Courts. Procedure. Permission to Withdraw Agent's Plea of Nolo Contendere Refused despite Acquittal of Principal

Federal Courts. Procedure. Permission to Withdraw Agent's Plea of Nolo Contendere Refused despite Acquittal of Principal

Conspiracy. Nolo Contendere Plea as Providing Requisite Joint Guilt

Conspiracy. Nolo Contendere Plea as Providing Requisite Joint Guilt

Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications

Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications

Evidence: Admissibility of Judgments Based upon Plea of Nolo Contendere in Civil Suits under the Federal Antitrust Laws

Evidence: Admissibility of Judgments Based upon Plea of Nolo Contendere in Civil Suits under the Federal Antitrust Laws