Niche Diplomacy Research Articles

SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY SINCE THE TERMINATION OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME

This article reports on an analysis of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since the country terminated its nuclear weapons programme, and explains why it has not retracted on this position. Through the skilful use of strategies typically used by middle powers in their conduct of nuclear diplomacy as niche diplomacy, South Africa has succeeded in norm construction, identity formation, and securing a niche role for itself, which resulted in material and non-material advantages for post-apartheid and post-nuclear weapons South Africa.

Playing in the orchestra of peace: South Africa's relations with Iraq (1998–2003)

South Africa's status and prestige as a country that successfully and unilaterally disarmed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme enabled it to engage with the Saddam government of Iraq in the months leading up to the US-led invasion of March 2003. Following intense international diplomatic efforts, Saddam Hussein had agreed to allow UN and International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors to enter Iraq in November 2002. Acting outside the UN Security Council, the US and its coalition partners maintained that Iraq continued to maintain and produce WMD, a claim refuted by weapons inspectors, including a South African disarmament team that visited Iraq in February 2003. Employing three diplomatic strategies associated with niche diplomacy, South Africa contributed to attempts to avert the invasion by assisting with the orderly disarmament of Saddam-led Iraq and by practising multilateralism. These strategies, notwithstanding the US-led invasion signalling a failure of South Africa's niche diplomacy in this instance, provide valuable insight into the nuclear diplomacy of South Africa.

Water Scarcity: Moving Beyond Indexes to Innovative Institutions

Water scarcity is a media darling often times described as a trigger of conflict in arid regions, a by-product of human influences ranging from desertification to climate change, or a combination of natural- and human-induced changes in the water cycle. A multitude of indexes have been developed over the past 20 years to define water scarcity to map the "problem" and guide international donor investment. Few indexes include groundwater within the metrics of "scarcity." Institutional communication contributes to the recognition of local or regional water scarcity. However, evaluations that neglect groundwater resources may incorrectly define conditions as scarce. In cases where there is a perception of scarcity, the incorporation of groundwater and related storage in aquifers, political willpower, new policy tools, and niche diplomacy often results in a revised status, either reducing or even eliminating the moniker locally. Imaginative conceptualization and innovative uses of aquifers are increasingly used to overcome water scarcity.

Turning dread into capital: South Africa’s AIDS diplomacy

BackgroundIn much of the world, President George W. Bush was not admired for his foreign policy and diplomacy. It is therefore ironic that Bush’s single most uncontested foreign policy triumph was an instance of what has now become known as “health diplomacy”. In 2003 Bush launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a five-year $15 billion initiative to fight HIV/AIDS, mostly in Africa. The president’s pragmatic health diplomacy may well save his foreign policy legacy. This article argues that a middle power such as South Africa should consider a similar instrumental AIDS diplomatic strategy, to rehabilitate its public health as well as foreign policy images.DiscussionThis article reflects on the emergence and contemporary practice of health diplomacy. In particular, it explores the potential of niche areas within health diplomacy to become constructive focal points of emerging middle powers’ foreign policies. Middle powers often apply niche diplomacy to maximise their foreign policy impact, particularly by pursuing a multilateral agenda. The literature on middle powers indicates that such foreign policy ambitions and concomitant diplomacy mostly act to affirm the global status quo. Instead, this paper argues that there may well be niches within health diplomacy in particular that can be used to actually challenge the existing global order. Emerging middle powers in particular can use niche areas within health diplomacy in a critical theoretical manner, so that foreign policy and diplomacy become a project of emancipation and transformation, rather than an affirmation of the world as it is.SummaryThe article first describes the emergence and contemporary practice of health diplomacy; this is followed by a discussion of niche diplomacy, in particular as it applies to the foreign policy agendas of emerging middle powers. It then reviews South African foreign policy and diplomacy, before situating these policies within the context of emerging mechanisms of south-south multilateralism. The article concludes by synthesizing these elements and advocating for a South African AIDS diplomacy, emphasizing its potential to galvanize a global project of emancipation.

Beyond soft balancing: small states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations

The role of small states has been largely neglected in research on the process and outcome of multilateral negotiations. Even though these states may be active in the agenda-setting processes or display a specific engagement in certain thematic aspects of negotiations, in the end game the outcome of negotiations has been perceived to be dependent on the bargaining between major powers. However, small states also have strategies at their disposal to compensate for these weaknesses. Two principal ones come to mind, prioritization or niche diplomacy, and coalition-building to join forces with like-minded states in order to draw on their resources, expertise and manpower. In the article, we compare two cases of small state coalitions in multilateral negotiations, namely the Like Minded (LM) group in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in United Nations climate negotiations. While the two coalitions resort to similar strategies, they have not been comparably successful. We will show that the ability to translate discursive power into measurable effects on outcomes ultimately depends on the institutional setting of the negotiations and the nature of the issue that coalitions are tackling.

Nuclear diplomacy as niche diplomacy: South Africa's post-apartheid relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency

Since the termination of its nuclear weapons programme, commenced in 1989 and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) in 1993, successive South African governments have consistently advocated the country's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. South Africa has secured a niche role through norm construction and state identity for itself through its nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA. The article explores aspects of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA as an example of niche diplomacy. Therefore, it traces South Africa's diplomatic relations with the IAEA, starting with the IAEA's verification process and the implementation of a Safeguards Agreement (1989–1994) through the conversion of South Africa's research nuclear reactor (1991–2005); South Africa's position on greater representation for developing countries on the IAEA's Board of Governors; its ambition to be elected to the position of IAEA Director General (2008–2009); and its refusal to support the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank in Russia under the IAEA's auspices (2009–2010).

Review: Diplomacy in the Digital Age Essays in Honour of Ambassador Allan Gotlieb

DIPLOMACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE Essays in Honour of Ambassador Allan Gotlieb Janice Gross Stein, ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2011. 288pp, $29.99 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-7710-8139-2Scorned by scholars, ridiculed in the media and neglected by governments, diplomacy desperately needs some serious attention. The arrival of a new book on the subject, particularly one dealing with the Canadian experience and dedicated to examining the legacy of a distinguished former ambassador, Allan Gotlieb, is therefore cause for celebration. Diplomacy in the Digital Age features an exceptional range of contributors, offers a variety of perspectives on modern diplomatic practice, and provides some useful insights into the workings of the world's second-oldest profession. With 17 concise, diverse, and largely well-written chapters, the book provides an overview, stimulates reflection, and whets the appetite for more.To contextualize a fuller assessment of this anthology, however, I would observe that today, in too many countries around the globe, diplomacy is feeing very tough times. Countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey are significant exceptions, but elsewhere, and especially in the west, the budgets of foreign ministries are shrinking, foreign services are losing staff, and diplomatic missions are closing. Many western governments are looking to military force as their international instrument of choice.Canada is no exception. Today, the country lacks diplomatic initiative. Recall, by way of comparison, the record of the Mulroney years, including free trade with the United States, the Rio conference on environment and development, the campaign to end apartheid, the Montreal protocol on ozone depletion, and the acid rain treaty. Consider too the niche diplomacy that characterized Lloyd Axwcrth/s human security agenda during the second half of the 19905, including the land mine treaty, the Kimberley process to curtail trade in blood diamonds, the creation of the International Criminal Court, restrictions on child soldiers, and the responsibility to protect. Relative to these achievements, Canadian internationalism has all but disappeared today. The world, finally, has taken note. The spectacular failure in the fall of 2OIO to win a seat on the UN security council testifies to this decline.Gotiieb was Canada's ambassador to Washington from 1981 to 1989, at a time when this country occupied a larger space on the world stage. He was a pioneer, not just in conducting diplomacy - especially public diplomacy in Washington - but also in thinking about how to make diplomacy more effective and foreign ministries more relevant His contributions in this regard deserve recognition.Regrettably, the Canadian government has recently repudiated Gotlieb's prescription instead of building upon it. DFAIT is more marginalized than ever. It still does not serve as a central agency for the integration of international policy across government. Decision-makers no longer solicit its strategic advice. Budget cuts, the centralization of control over government communications, and the gagging of the foreign service have made Canadian public diplomacy nearly impossible.Oddly, the anthology gives no hint of these developments. It leaves the reader with no sense of urgency or crisis. It does not defend diplomacy as a nonviolent and cost-effective approach to managing global issues. Given the dire circumstances facing Canadian diplomats, these lacunae are curious. More significantly, the volume ignores a crucial question: What has become of Gotlieb's legacy, and why? It likewise fails to evaluate the specific implications of a digital world for Canadian foreign policy. All of this leaves the reader with a slight sense of disconnectedness.The book features a good balance of contributions from academics (Janice Stein, Denis Stairs, Kim Nossal, Brian Bow, Bob Bothwell), serving (Marc Lortie, Elissa Goldberg, Arif Lalani) and former (Jeremy Kinsman, David Malone, George Haynal ) diplomats, and ex- journalists (Sondra Gotlieb, Andrew Cohen, Drew Fagan, Ed Greenspon, William Thorsell). …

The New public diplomacy: soft power in international relations

Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements Introduction J.Melissen PART I: THE NEW ENVIRONMENT The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice J.Melissen Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy B.Hocking PART II: SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES Power, Public Diplomacy and the Pax Americana P.van Ham Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway A.K.Henrikson Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China I.d'Hooghe Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy P.Sharp The EU as a Soft Power: The Force of Persuasion A.Michalski PART III: IMPROVING PRACTICE Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works C.P.Schneider Making a National Brand W.Olins Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm? S.Riordan Training for Public Diplomacy: An Evolutionary Perspective J.Hemery Index

Singapore's Diplomacy: Vulnerability into Strength

AbstractSingapore is a practitioner of focused, innovative diplomacy, constantly in search of the political space for itself that would overcome its sense of vulnerability resulting from its geopolitical location. This has entailed involving other states in its well-being, constantly searching for ways to make itself relevant to the international community, through niche diplomacy and a proactive style.It has been creative in its use of regional diplomacy. It runs a relatively small network of embassies, with strong centralized control through its foreign ministry; it has economized on its scarce resource — skilled manpower — through extensive use of 'non-resident ambassadors'. Poor accountability to publics, attrition of talent and gender inequality are among its few weaknesses. Some, but not all, of its methods are relevant to other small states.

New Rabbits, Old Hats

Diplomacy is part art, part science, and is perhaps best understood as a nonviolent approach to the management of international relations.1 In the diplomatic context, results are obtained from the successful pursuit of national interests, the advocacy of policy, and the projection of values globally. In short, diplomats seek to advance or defend their country's political and economic place in the world. That is the purpose, the essence of diplomacy.In practice, results and resources combine in an intimate dialectic: they represent two sides of the same coin. Resources, when skilfully managed, usually produce results, and results, when recognized in exercises such as the bringing down of national budgets, tend to produce additional resources. Lately, we have found both to be in rather short supply. In fact, we seem caught between a mandate that is constant and an operating environment-characterized increasingly by crosscutting transnational forces and non-state actors-that has changed radically. We have arrived at a moment of disjuncture, and are struggling with variations on a central theme: how best to align structures, doctrines, and techniques with the new rule set?Foreign ministries almost everywhere have responded in a broadly similar fashion, by working smarter, by reconciling priorities with resources, by identifying clients and establishing standards of service, and by focusing on the core business. Innovation and entrepreneurship, as manifest, for instance, through partnership with civil society and an increasing reliance on the internet and other new media, are becoming more common, even if not yet universally in evidence.2 ;CAN PRACTITIONERS OF THE WORLD'S SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION LEARN A FEW NEW TRICKS?In this article, I illustrate some of these trends by looking more closely at Canada's case. In our country, severe budgetary cuts to all international policy institutions-the military, development assistance, and the foreign ministry-in the 19903 forced a fundamental rethink of the kinds of results that might realistically be achieved. At the end of the day, the long-standing centrality of large, global order objectives such as poverty eradication, conflict resolution, non-proliferation, and environmental advocacy gave way to a more short-term, team-centred, project-based approach. This new dispensation was well suited to brief bursts of concentrated energy and provided a tangible focus for such resources as were available.This was niche diplomacy, and it was extremely cost-effective. The results, rather than being measured in small increments over decades, were palpable and highly media friendly: a treaty to ban landmines; an International Criminal Court; an initiative to control small arms, highlighting the plight of child soldiers/children in conflict; a look at the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (which has recently resurfaced under the auspices of the responsibility to protect initiative, or R2P). Each project had a clearly defined start and finish, and made the political leadership look good; when maximum gains had been extracted, the minister could simply declare victory and move on.The foreign minister during this period of renewed international activism, Lloyd Axworthy, connected the dots joining the projects, and in so doing, elevated this approach to the level of an art form. By making a virtue of necessity, he produced the string of results adduced above within an extremely limited resource envelope. Toward the end of his tenure, in a stunning retrofit that produced the appearance of near perfect policy coherence, he tied it all together under the rubric of the human security agenda-but that's another story.3I should also add as a prefatory note that that we may finally have turned the corner on resources. After years and years of reductions, the February 2005 federal budget contains new money-not a windfall, but a significant investment of $641 million over five years-for additional positions abroad, for public diplomacy, for personnel safety, and for international peace and security support. …

Pinchpenny Diplomacy

ASPIRITED DEBATE HAS EMERGED IN CANADA IN THE 1990S IN BOTH the academic and the policy communities about the nature of Canadian foreign and defence policies in the post-cold war era. The debate focuses on how Canadian foreign and defence policies should be characterized; the doctrinal bases (if any) that underlie contemporary foreign policy in Canada; and, of course, the appropriate approach to policy. Given the traditional concerns of Canadians about the role of their country in the world,(f.1) it is perhaps not surprising that much of the debate revolves around whether Canada's role in world affairs is changing and, if so, how.Of particular concern is the fate of internationalism, the dominant foreign policy idea in Canada for much of the cold war era.(f.2) Some argue that it is simply no longer appropriate: to use the evocative analogy suggested by Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, Canada may be like Sunset Boulevards Norma Desmond, the star of the silent movies left behind by profound change.(f.3) Some applaud what they see as a more hard-headed calculus of Canadian 'self-interest' while some decry what they see as a 'retreat from internationalism.' And some argue that internationalism has not disappeared in Canada.The purpose of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the changes in train in Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s. The dualism usually used to assess the orientation of foreign policy - internationalism or isolationism - tends to be drawn from a parallel debate in the United States which is not fully applicable to the Canadian context. Although the 1990s have witnessed a progressive retreat from internationalism, this does not mean that what C.P. Stacey once called the 'tough weed' of isolationism has again taken root in Canada;(f.4) isolationism is an inappropriate description for Canada's foreign policy orientation in the 1990s. At the same time, however, other interpretations of Canada's external policy do not do justice to the profound changes that are occurring. Instead of such flattering notions as 'niche diplomacy,' what has occurred over the course of the 1990s is pinchpenny diplomacy, marked by a meanness of spirit that delegitimizes the voluntaristic acts of 'good international citizenship' that are essential components of internationalism.CANADIAN INTERNATIONALISM IN THE 1990S: JUST RESTING OR PINING FOR THE FJORDS?How 'alive' is internationalism in contemporary Canadian foreign policy? Two broad schools of thought seem to have emerged. One argues that internationalism in Canadian diplomacy is alive and well. This is certainly the government line - and the line of those who tend to interpret foreign policy using the government's criteria. This argument stresses the continuity in Canadian foreign policy, linking contemporary trends with a long tradition that dates back to the halcyon days of the birth of the internationalist era in the 1940s and 1950s. From this perspective Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s, despite the annual cycle of retrenchment, cutbacks, and closures, is as steadfastly internationalist as ever - appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Shifts in Canadian diplomacy are attributed to other factors. Some suggest that the uncertainties of domestic politics and the national unity question divert national attention inwards and dilute national energies that might otherwise be devoted to international affairs. (I have argued elsewhere(f.5) that what some have called the Canadian 'malaise' does not seem to have affected day-to-day foreign policy; on the contrary, the domestic political uncertainties of Canadian politics from Meech Lake to the Charlottetown referendum and the 1995 referendum stand in marked contrast to the relative self-assurance of foreign policy under both the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney and the Liberal government of Jean Chretien, however much those policies may have differed.)Alternatively, the downsizing and retrenchment of Canadian diplomacy are said to be merely the result of tough economic times and the need to get federal spending under control. …

Caution warranted: Niche diplomacy assessed

This article offers a critique of niche diplomacy using critical theory. The critique is based on the presumption that all policy is informed by a set of ethical and philosophical assumptions. Smith suggests that careful consideration of niche diplomacy is particularly necessary because it comes with a political agenda that legitimizes the narrowing of Canadian foreign policy in such a way that the credibility of foreign policy initiatives could be undermined. The critique examines the concept, practice, limitations, contradictions, and the long term viability of niche diplomacy. Smith concludes that Canadian foreign policy should not be dominated by niche diplomacy or similar concepts that promote a balance sheet mentality and shallow commitments

Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War

Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War

Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy

Few observers of Canadian foreign policy would deny that the number and complexity of foreign policy issues is increasing, yet the resources available to manage them are decreasing.(f.1) If we assume that 'old' foreign policy concerns -- non-proliferation, economic diplomacy, alliance politics, and multilateralism -- will continue to be important, Canada is left with three choices: increase the foreign policy budget to reflect the expanding agenda, do more things less well, or assign a lower priority to some issue-areas. This last choice implies a shift in Ottawa's focus away from some traditional functional concerns and geographic areas and towards those areas in which there is a clear and identifiable Canadian interest and where Canada's international policy decisions and programmes can have a maximum impact. The operative term here is maximum impact because the millions of public dollars spent to keep Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia may have satisfied the criterion of identifiable interest but have surely fallen short of maximum impact. In this article I argue that to maximize its influence in an era of fiscal austerity, Canada will have to be more selective about the many international spheres in which it plays. In the search for niches, Ottawa must not only use its resources more efficiently; it must look increasingly to the under-utilized and under-appreciated non-governmental and philanthropic sectors. Moreover, Canada's pent-up 'soft' power that comes from knowledge and ideas, and the information technologies that transmit them further, faster, and with greater effect around the world, must be allowed to flourish.(f.2) A greater exercise of such power -- in effect, energizing the cultural pillar of the foreign policy agenda of Jean Chretien's government rather than, for example, trying to achieve a greater naval presence in the Pacific in support of Canada's commercial interests in the region (as the 1994 defence white paper advocates(f.3)) -- is consistent with niche diplomacy. Foreign policy reviews over the past two years have emphasized that Canada's national interests dictate a global rather than a regional foreign policy and hence a widespread and effective diplomatic presence. At the same time, the various debates leading up to the Canada 21 report, the first two National Forums on Canada's International Relations (1994 & 1995), the final parliamentary foreign policy and defence reports, and Ottawa's programme reviews (I and II), all resonated with the need to 'make hard choices.' Growing domestic fiscal pressures have highlighted a fundamental tension in the conduct of Canada's international relations between a more engaged global player in an age of globalization and interdependence and a more disengaged actor. Despite the conclusions of the parliamentary reviews, this debate is not likely to abate. On the one hand, some (notably members of the Reform party) have questioned how long Canada can enhance its prestige in a number of expensive spheres of influence -- the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Commonwealth, la francophonie, Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and the Group of Seven (G-7), to name just a few simultaneously.(f.4) On the other hand, powerful forces reinforce this internationalism. As noted by the minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in April 1969,(f.5) it is anachronistic to try to draw a clear distinction between international and domestic. Because of economic and post-Cold War security globalization, problems are no longer East-West or North-South in scope. For example, unemployment, transportable diseases (for example, HIV), environmental degradation (for example, global warming) affect both South and North. As nation-states realize that they cannot respond to these challenges alone, increased multilateralism appears to be the only answer. From a narrower Canadian perspective, one need look no further than Canada's growing economic dependence on the rest of the world: in 1995 exports accounted for 37 per cent of national income compared to 17 per cent in 1960. …

Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy

Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy