COMMENT□ COLLECTIVEBARGAINING INCANADA Another perspective on the Canadian Fraser decision I based recent labour to Canadian The framework concerned the institutional challenges movement Canadian unionism has majoritytrade been by of labourmovement has been concerned by recentchallenges to the majoritybased institutional framework of Canadian trade unionism ROY ADAMS, Ariel F.Sallows Chair of Human Rights (Emeritus), University off Saskatchewan &Professor of Industrial Relations (Emeritus), McMaster University. In lawyer on her the recent recent Veena article Canadian Verma in presented this Supreme journal, a Court perspective Canadian Fraser lawyer Veena Vermapresented a perspective on therecent CanadianSupreme CourtFraser decisionwithwhichI emphatically disagree.By applauding an appealscourt decisionthat attacks worker human rights andcondemning onebythe Supreme Court that rightly overturns that decision, itundermines worker rights notonlyin Canada butaroundtheworld. Formostofthe20thcentury agricultural workersinOntario , contrary tointernational standards thatCanada has agreedto respect, receivedno governmental assistance toorganise orengagein collective bargaining. Indeed,Ontario policyperpetrated theidea thatcollective bargaining was inappropriate foragriculture. In the 1990sthat changed whena left-leaning NewDemocratic Party government introduced legislation intended toprotectfarmworker bargaining rights. A subsequent Conservative government overturned thatlegislation andwithdrew government support. TheUnited Food and Commercial Workers Union(UFCW)theprimary unioninvolved inOntario agriculture - tookthecasetocourt andintheDunmore decisionof2001scoredan apparent victory. TheSupreme Court ofCanadatoldOntario that itmust protect agricultural workers' right toorganisefree from interference andtoengageinthelawfulactivities ofanyorganisations that they formed - a statement that implicitly included engaging in collectivebargaining. The Ontariogovernment introduced minimalist legislation (theAgricultural Employees Protection Act[AEPA]) protecting the right offarm workers toorganise and,through their associations, to makerepresentations to employerswhilerequiring thatemployers reador listen tothoserepresentations. Itdidnotrequire employerstobargain ingoodfaith nordiditcontain stipulationsprotecting the right to strikeor other impasseresolution device. In2007, however, intheBCHealth Services case, theSupremeCourtofCanada made itclearthat Canadianworkers have a constitutional right to bargaincollectively and to be bargained within goodfaith. Inherarticle, Verma accurately reports that theCourt "found that freedom ofassociationrequires both employers and employees tomeet and to engagein ' meaningful dialogue ' inpursuit ofa common goal ofpeacefuland productive accommodation. They must avoidunnecessary delaysand makereasonable efforts to arrive atan acceptable contract. " In therecent Fraser II decision, themajority of theSupremeCourtaffirmed theHealthServices decisionandtheprinciples enunciated inittobe "goodlaw."Canadianworkers areentitled torely on thoseprinciples and Canadiangovernments havea constitutional duty tosecurethem. TheUFCW wasquitedismayed bytheAEPAand appealedit.Prior totheBC HealthServices decisiona lowercourt upheldthestatute but,subsequenttothereleaseofHealth Services, theOntario Court ofAppeal,inFraser I,found ittobe unconstitutional andordered Ontario toinstitute legislationcontaining thekeyfeatures oftheWagner-Act ModelonwhichmostCanadianlabourlegislation is based. InFraser I,Ontario Chief Justice Winkler declared thatinordertoqualify forgovernment collective bargaining supportagricultural workerunions would,likemostother Canadianunions, haveto demonstrate majority supportin an appropriate unit decidedbya government agency. TheCourt's intention was tosimply bring Ontario agriculture uptothesamestandards (andtoimposethesame limitations) as exist acrossCanada.Butthosestandardsdelimit a very defective version offreedom ofassociation. Voluntarily organised non-majority unionshave historically received nogovernment collective bargaining support in Canada.ButJustice Winkler's decision wentonestepfurther. Itspecified that the workeroptionoforganising in non-majority or uncertified unionsnotonlywouldreceive nogovernment support, inpursuit ofindustrial relations stability ithadtobe 'eradicated' altogether. Thatstipulation was,as I demonstrated ina previousissueofIUR (17.4),directly contrary tointernationalhumanrights law. The principal source ofrelevant international law is theInternational LabourOrganisation (ILO) and ithas longinsisted thatmajoritarianism as a minimum condition for unionrecognition doesnotpromote collective bargaining. Ithinders it. Recentreviews ofexperience by,forexample, AlanBogg in theDemocratic AspectsofTrade UnionRecognition, provide empirical support for thatposition.By insisting thatworkersmeeta majoritarian test for unionrecognition, theOntario Court ofAppealordered theOntario government notto respectbutrather to offend international law and,indoingso,tofrustrate rather thanpromotecollective bargaining. Whereemployers oppose unionisation vigorouslyitisexceedingly difficult for unionstomake anyprogress under majoritarian rules. IntheUnited States unions haveallbutabandoned available certification procedures becauseofaggressive employeropposition . InCanada, unions playing bymajoritarianrulesin theprivatesector,have been in declinefordecades. The overallcollective bargainingcoverageratein theprivate sectornow standsatabout16 percent and is falling. In agriINTERNATIONAL union rights Page 22Volume 18Issue 3201 1 COMMENT□ COLLECTIVE BARGAINING INCANADA culture thebargaining coverage rate, where majoritarianism is ineffect, is roughly fivepercent and isalsofalling. Despitetheseterrible numbers theUFCWwas content withChief Justice Winkler's decisionand was angry andchagrined bytheSupreme Court's overturning ofthatdecision.Why?Firstof all, becauseiftheWagnerActModelweretoapplyto agriculture theUFCWhadtheprospect oforganising several 'factory farms'. However, becauseof thedifficulties oforganising under that Model,the unionwouldhavegainedatbesta fewthousand new dues-paying members. Itwould have marginally improved itsstatus as an on-going institution .However, thegreat majority offarmworkers wouldhavebeenleft outinthecold,their conditionsofworksubject - fortheforeseeable future - tothevagaries ofthemarket and thearbitrary whims oftheir bosses. Another significant reasonwhytheUFCWwas content with theWinkler decision was becauseof itsapparent unfamiliarity withindustrial relations lawandpractice outside ofCanada.Verma tells us that "without majoritarian exclusivity" there canbe nomeaningful collective bargaining. Thisposition is also supported byJamesClancy, president of the National Union of...
Read full abstract