Neurophenomenological Approach Research Articles

Disembodiment and Affective Resonances in Esketamine Treatment of Depersonalized Depression Subtype: Two Case Studies

Introduction: Dissociative experiences are considered undesirable ketamine’s adverse events. However, they might be crucial for ketamine’s antidepressant effects, at least in some depression subtypes. Current understandings of ketamine’s therapeutic potentials converge on the so-called “relaxed prior hypothesis,” suggesting that glutamatergic blockage up-weights bottom-up surprising somatosensory/affective states. As a result, ketamine improves short-term plasticity in depression by enhancing sensitivity to interoceptive signals. Methods: We selected 2 case studies for their paradigmatic description of “depersonalized depression” (Entfremdungsdepression) symptoms. Patients were included in a 6-month-long esketamine program for treatment resistant depression, during which we collected their spontaneous experience with esketamine. According to a neurophenomenological approach, we combined subjective reports from unstructured clinical interviews and the review of previous objective neuroimaging results and neurocomputational models to unveil the relation between esketamine antidepressant effects and interoceptive sensitivity. Results: According to our clinical observations, esketamine-induced dissociation might be particularly effective in the depersonalized depression subtype, in which interoceptive awareness and interaffectivity are particularly compromised. Ketamine and esketamine’s dissociative effects and particularly disembodiment might suspend previously acquired patterns of feeling, sensing, and behaving. Conclusions: Coherently with previous research, we suggest that esketamine-induced disembodiment allows for a transient window of psychological plasticity and enhanced sensitivity, where the body recovers its permeability to affective affordances.

Feeling, thinking, and not seeing: how images engage and disengage in an information-saturated world – a neurophenomenological perspective

ABSTRACT We can no longer realise images solely through semiotic theories of interpretation and judgement fixed to earlier modes of communication, such as print. Instead, we engage with images through various networked digital devices and online social interactions. These engagements offer many possible experiences with images, some of which we have agency and others that are purely autonomic and some interactions resembling a healthy-bodied manifestation of visual agnosia or the loss of ability to recognise and identify. This paper utilises research from the ‘Fast Image’ study, a study of graphic design students and practitioners and their views on photographic image use, comparing print and online media. The author uses an interpretive approach supported by mixed data-gathering methods, including photo-elicitation, interviews and semi-structured questions. This discussion encourages advancing visual literacy and visual culture discourses to incorporate a Neurophenomenological approach toward understanding the effects of emerging technologies and viewing environments on photographic image use. These effects include sensory and cognitive responses to images and the influences of external stimuli on our phenomenological apprehension of images.

The Neuroscience of Literary Time Travel: How Literary Works Cross Historical Distance

ABSTRACT: How do literary works speak across historical distance? When critics attempt to answer this question, they typically invoke biological metaphors that testify to the inability of formal or historical categories alone to explain the mystery of how literary works reach across the boundary between life and death. This essay investigates the embodied cognitive processes that enable literary time travel by undertaking a neurophenomenological analysis of the relation between aesthetic experiences and their neural correlates. A neurophenomenological approach can clarify what eludes formalist and historicist accounts by correlating the intersubjective interactions that constitute aesthetic experience and the transpersonal biocultural processes underlying them. This essay explains how phenomenological theories of reading and aesthetic experience relate to neuroscientific research in four areas: embodied simulation; action understanding; brain-to-brain coupling; and the anti-entropic organization of "free energy" in predictive processing. Correlations between phenomenological theories of consciousness and neuroscientific findings about cognition show how the experience of interacting with past lives as we read is supported by embodied neurobiological processes that are ubiquitous in our everyday cognitive lives and that aesthetic experiences activate and exploit.

Investigation of advanced mindfulness meditation “cessation” experiences using EEG spectral analysis in an intensively sampled case study

Mindfulness meditation is a contemplative practice informed by Buddhism that targets the development of present-focused awareness and non-judgment of experience. Interest in mindfulness is burgeoning, and it has been shown to be effective in improving mental and physical health in clinical and non-clinical contexts. In this report, for the first time, we used electroencephalography (EEG) combined with a neurophenomenological approach to examine the neural signature of “cessation” events, which are dramatic experiences of complete discontinuation in awareness similar to the loss of consciousness, which are reported to be experienced by very experienced meditators, and are proposed to be evidence of mastery of mindfulness meditation. We intensively sampled these cessations as experienced by a single advanced meditator (with over 23,000 h of meditation training) and analyzed 37 cessation events collected in 29 EEG sessions between November 12, 2019, and March 11, 2020. Spectral analyses of the EEG data surrounding cessations showed that these events were marked by a large-scale alpha-power decrease starting around 40 s before their onset, and that this alpha-power was lowest immediately following a cessation. Region-of-interest (ROI) based examination of this finding revealed that this alpha-suppression showed a linear decrease in the occipital and parietal regions of the brain during the pre-cessation time period. Additionally, there were modest increases in theta power for the central, parietal, and right temporal ROIs during the pre-cessation timeframe, whereas power in the Delta and Beta frequency bands were not significantly different surrounding cessations. By relating cessations to objective and intrinsic measures of brain activity (i.e., EEG power) that are related to consciousness and high-level psychological functioning, these results provide evidence for the ability of experienced meditators to voluntarily modulate their state of consciousness and lay the foundation for studying these unique states using a neuroscientific approach.

A neurophenomenological approach to non-ordinary states of consciousness: hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics.

No contemporary unifying framework has been provided for the study of non-ordinary states of consciousness (NSCs) despite increased interest in hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics. NSCs induce shifts in experiential contents (what appears to the experiencer) and/or structure (how it appears). This can allow the investigation of the plastic and dynamic nature of experience from a multiscale perspective that includes mind, brain, body, and context. We propose a neurophenomenological (NP) approach to the study of NSCs which highlights their role as catalysts of transformation in clinical practice by refining our understanding of the relationships between experiential (subjective) and neural dynamics. We outline the ethical implications of the NP approach for standard conceptions of health and pathology as well as the crucial role of experience-based know-how in NSC-related research and application.

Cognition as a process in dynamic systems

The purpose of this article is to show the importance of the neurophenomenological approach for education, specifically in the digital society, where, more than ever, learning requires the co-development of our observation and analysis skills in conjunction with our abilities to design and implement actions in our surroundings in order to reduce complexity and increase our capacity for action. To this end, the connections between neurophenomenology and related theories will be firstly addressed. These theories provide us with the hermeneutical framework to introduce then some of the most relevant cognitive approaches to learning, with emphasis on new literacies related to advances in information technologies. Finally, the most relevant conclusions of the study are summarized, stressing the importance of promoting pedagogical innovations in the age of digital technologies that can facilitate inclusive education and learning environments.

De la cognition incarnée au corps cognitivisé

"From Embodied Cognition to the Cognitivised Body. The construction of meaning, before being a linguistic or neuronal phenomenon, is a sensitive phenomenon, indebted to the bodily experience of the world, the lived body. Varela’s neurophenomenological approach, which is inspired by the intertwining of the subject and the world as proposed by Merleau-Ponty, can only take in charge an ordinary production of meaning. What about when one produces a concept or a work of art? In other words, how does the body-mind relationship function in the act of creation? If the construction of meaning starts from the subject, in the sense that it is the subject who by his embodied cognitive activity produces meaning, the construction of a concept or a work of art solicits a super-personal force that engenders the subject himself: a heccéité, in the sense of Deleuze. What does this engendering of the subject mean and how does it intervene in the act of creation? In other words, why must the subject be somehow “recreated” in order to create? It is only when thought is destabilized by a point of crisis that it becomes a creative device that plays out between the chaotic intensities from which it tears itself away and the composition of a consistency. The starting point of the creative thought is the stopping of the thought and its continuation on another plane: a thought that leaves the field of cognition and recognition and derails, carried away by a sensitive line of flight, produced in the body, towards the inorganic and impersonal plane of a super-personal power. With the act of creation, the embodied cognition swings towards a de-subjectivation: the cognition becomes then a “chaognition”, an impersonal faculty mobilizing the power of passivity. Keywords: cognition, embodiment, subject, meaning, creation, heccéité, de-subjectivation. "

Imagine that: cholinesterase inhibitor treatment of complex visual hallucinations of unknown aetiology

ABSTRACT Introduction: Our objective is to highlight the value of the neurophenomenological classification of complex visual hallucinations (VHs). This approach enabled the authors to successfully treat VHs of uncertain aetiology with cholinesterase inhibitors because the content of the hallucinations suggested dysfunction in cholinergic modulated networks. Methods: We utilise the single case report to describe the nature and content of chronic VHs experienced by a 49-year-old woman following a prolonged admission to ITU. Despite extensive investigation, no clear cause was identified for these hallucinations and the patient did not respond to rationalisation of medications or trials of antipsychotics. We therefore adopted the neurophenomenological approach to classifying and treating her VHs. Results: After several years of distressing visual hallucinations, a course of Rivastigmine was trialed despite no evidence suggestive of a Parkinsonian syndrome. Nevertheless, the patient reported a dose-effect response with significant reduction in the frequency and intensity of her hallucinations, almost to complete resolution. Conclusions: At present there is limited evidence about the medical management of visual hallucinations. This case report suggests that cholinesterase inhibitors may be of benefit, even in the absence of clear parkinsonsian features, if the form and content of the VHs suggest dysfunction in cholinergic modulated attentional networks.

What is the nature of the alteration of temporality in Trauma-Related Altered States of Consciousness? A neuro-phenomenological analysis✰,✰✰,★,★★

According to the 4-D model of Frewen and Lanius, trauma-related altered states of consciousness (TRASC) involve an alteration of the dimension of time and memory which divides the symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) into those which occur in “Normal Waking Consciousness” (NWC) and those which present dissociative experiences as part of TRASC.The present report addresses the temporal dimension of TRASC from a neurophenomenological approach. Initially, we generate an updated model of the structure of normal temporality. From there, we derive a model of altered temporality in TRASC, which at the same time indicates, from a theoretical point of view, which specific points of the structure of temporality would be altered in PTSD with TRASC. We pose two theoretical questions to guide our analysis: 1) What logical consequences can we derive from a graphic model of temporality in TRASC based on neurophenomenological analysis? and 2) Can altered chronesthesia be proposed as a phenomenon related with the dissociative disorders that affect how time is experienced in TRASC? Material and methods: To answer these questions, we carried out a systematic review of the literature up to May 2019, as well as a review of the classic philosophical texts that offer a view of temporality, with special emphasis on works in the field of phenomenology and neurophenomenology which offer graphic models of temporality. Results: We found 2671 articles associated with the keywords used in the search. Of these, 2603 articles were discarded based on a review of the titles and abstracts, leaving 68 reports that were reviewed in full text. We also reviewed classic philosophical texts dealing with the problem of temporality. From the results obtained we designed a scheme of normal temporality from which we derived a hypothesis as to how this variable would be altered in TRASC. The central point of the analysis explains under which hypothetical mechanisms the patient would lose his or her normal capacity to remember a past event or anticipate a future event, with the perspective that this would occur FROM the present moment. This would be an essential aspect of the alteration of temporality in PTSD with TRASC. Discussion and conclusions: We discuss the possible implications of our model for clinical practice, including non-pharmacological treatments. We then draw a correlation between the logical consequences of our model and the neurofunctional findings described in the literature. Finally, we offer answers to the two questions proposed, and to the central question of this report, stressing how altered chronesthesia could account for the alterations of temporality observed in PTSD with TRASC.

O PROBLEMA DO TEMPO A PARTIR DE DUAS PERSPECTIVAS: AS LINHAS GERAIS DA FENOMENOLOGIA DE EDMUND HUSSERL E DA NEUROFENOMENOLOGIA DE FRANCISCO VARELA

EnglishSince ancient times the problem of time has concentrated efforts of the most diverse philosophical traditions and has been formulated and approached in multiple ways. Among these formulations and approaches is the famous phenomenology of time inaugurated by Husserl in the dawn of the twentieth century. From the turn of the twenty-first century, this phenomenology was included in a broad and growing approach to the cognitive sciences. In this context, this inclusion is justified by two internally articulated reasons: on the one hand, according to Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, Husserl has adequately formulated and also provided an appropriate response line to the time problem, avoiding a number of difficulties. in which other formulations and approaches incur, and, on the other hand, his descriptions of the dynamics of the tripartite structure of internal time consciousness are consistent with the dynamics of neurophysiological processes that underlie time experience, as identified by Francisco Varela's neurophenomenology. The general objective of this paper is to reconstruct the two lines of justification for the inclusion of Husserl's phenomenology in the cognitive sciences. More specifically, this reconstruction consists in initially presenting the difficulties that orbit the problem of time according to other formulations and approaches, and which are confronted by Husserl with the recognition of the tripartite structure of the internal consciousness of time, and then presenting it from a neurophenomenological perspective. The interpretative hypothesis defended in this paper is that the neurophenomenological approach to the time problem implies the opening of a set of questions and potential ontologically important consequences. portuguesDesde a antiguidade o problema do tempo concentrou esforcos das mais diversas tradicoes filosoficas e foi formulado e abordado de multiplas maneiras. Dentre estas formulacoes e abordagens destaca-se a celebre fenomenologia do tempo inaugurada por Husserl no despontar do seculo XX. A partir da virada para o seculo XXI, esta fenomenologia foi incluida em um amplo e crescente movimento de aproximacao com as ciencias cognitivas. Neste contexto, esta inclusao justifica-se por duas razoes internamente atreladas: por um lado, de acordo com Shaun Gallagher e Dan Zahavi, Husserl formulou adequadamente e tambem forneceu uma linha de resposta apropriada ao problema do tempo, evitando incorrer em uma serie de dificuldades nas quais outras formulacoes e abordagens incorrem, e, por outro, suas descricoes da dinâmica da estrutura tripartite da consciencia interna do tempo sao consistentes com a dinâmica dos processos neurofisiologicos que estao na base da experiencia do tempo, conforme identificados pela neurofenomenologia de Francisco Varela. O objetivo geral deste trabalho e reconstruir as duas linhas de justificacao da inclusao da fenomenologia de Husserl junto as ciencias cognitivas. Mais especificamente, esta reconstrucao consiste em inicialmente apresentar as dificuldades que orbitam o problema do tempo conforme outras formulacoes e abordagens, e que sao enfrentadas por Husserl com o reconhecimento da estrutura tripartite da consciencia interna do tempo, e, posteriormente, apresenta-la desde uma perspectiva neurofenomenologica. A hipotese interpretativa defendida neste trabalho e a de que a abordagem neurofenomenologica ao problema do tempo implica na abertura de um conjunto de questoes e de potenciais consequencias ontologicamente importantes.

Cardiophenomenology: a refinement of neurophenomenology

Cardiophenomenology aims at refining the neuro-phenomenological approach created by F. Varela as a new paradigm, jointly based on Husserl’s a priori dynamics of the living present and an experiment on anticipatory time-dynamics of visual motor perception. In order to do so, we will situate the paradigm of neurophenomenology at the cardio-vascular level, focusing on the emotional dynamics of lived experience and thus refining the dialogue, more precisely, the generative mutual constraints between first- and third-person analysis. In this article we present the theoretical hypothesis of cardiophenomenology, which places the bodily-emotional heartsystem at its core, as an intrinsic part of the cognitive system. The latter therefore needs to be enlarged in order to include an enactive embodied cardiac-affective dimension. Here we present five main arguments for the necessary inclusion of the bodily-emotional heartsystem in the cognitive system: first, two pragmatic operational arguments (experiential and methodological), then three theoretical ones (cognitive, homological and ontological-laden). A direct methodological-pragmatic consequence is the actual operativity of the generative mutual constraints based on an experiential (lived)-experimental (organic) continuity of the embodied cardiac-affective fold inherent in the subject.

Ultra-slow mechanical stimulation of olfactory epithelium modulates consciousness by slowing cerebral rhythms in humans

The coupling between respiration and neural activity within olfactory areas and hippocampus has recently been unambiguously demonstrated, its neurophysiological basis sustained by the well-assessed mechanical sensitivity of the olfactory epithelium. We herein hypothesize that this coupling reverberates to the whole brain, possibly modulating the subject’s behavior and state of consciousness. The olfactory epithelium of 12 healthy subjects was stimulated with periodical odorless air-delivery (frequency 0.05 Hz, 8 s on, 12 off). Cortical electrical activity (High Density-EEG) and perceived state of consciousness have been studied. The stimulation induced i) an enhancement of delta-theta EEG activity over the whole cortex mainly involving the Limbic System and Default Mode Network structures, ii) a reversal of the overall information flow directionality from wake-like postero-anterior to NREM sleep-like antero-posterior, iii) the perception of having experienced an Altered State of Consciousness. These findings could shed further light via a neurophenomenological approach on the links between respiration, cerebral activity and subjective experience, suggesting a plausible neurophysiological basis for interpreting altered states of consciousness induced by respiration-based meditative practices.

Phantom Sensations: A Neurophenomenological Exploration of Body Memory

This paper brings neuroscientific experiments into relation with concepts from phenomenological philosophy to investigate phantom sensations from the perspective of embodied subjectivity. Using a mirror device to create intersensory effects in subjects experiencing phantom sensations, one can create illusions aiming at alleviating phantom pain. Neuroplasticity as a general property of the brain and cortical remapping as a specific mechanism underlying the success of this procedure are interpreted with the phenomenological notions of body image, body schema, and body memory. It is argued that a phantom can be understood as an ambiguous unity of body-imagistic neglect and body-schematic remembering. This neurophenomenological approach highlights the significance of the polarity of subjective-objective embodied experience one the one hand, and the spatial and temporal horizons of the emergence of phantoms on the other. Thereby, implicit and explicit forms of remembering, habitual and reflective modes of behavioural and cognitive self-representation and -understanding can be compared according to how the body integrates its various sensations.

Le metafore linguistiche nella formazione sanitaria. Il contributo della neuro-fenomenologia

Metaphors can enhance students’ reflective skills. After the advantages and the limitations showed in the literature review, a neuro-phenomenological approach suggests how to use linguistic metaphors in health education.

The brain on silent: mind wandering, mindful awareness, and states of mental tranquility.

Mind wandering and mindfulness are often described as divergent mental states with opposing effects on cognitive performance and mental health. Spontaneous mind wandering is typically associated with self-reflective states that contribute to negative processing of the past, worrying/fantasizing about the future, and disruption of primary task performance. On the other hand, mindful awareness is frequently described as a focus on present sensory input without cognitive elaboration or emotional reactivity, and is associated with improved task performance and decreased stress-related symptomology. Unfortunately, such distinctions fail to acknowledge similarities and interactions between the two states. Instead of an inverse relationship between mindfulness and mind wandering, a more nuanced characterization of mindfulness may involve skillful toggling back and forth between conceptual and nonconceptual processes and networks supporting each state, to meet the contextually specified demands of the situation. In this article, we present a theoretical analysis and plausible neurocognitive framework of the restful mind, in which we attempt to clarify potentially adaptive contributions of both mind wandering and mindful awareness through the lens of the extant neurocognitive literature on intrinsic network activity, meditation, and emerging descriptions of stillness and nonduality. A neurophenomenological approach to probing modality-specific forms of concentration and nonconceptual awareness is presented that may improve our understanding of the resting state. Implications for future research are discussed.

Experiential Realism and Motion Pictures

This article sets up a neurophenomenological approach to understanding cinema spectatorship in order to investigate how embodied engagement with technologies of sound and motion can foster a sense of experiential realism. It takes as a starting point the idea that the empirical study of emotive, perceptual, motor, and cognitive processes involved in film spectatorship is impoverished without a phenomenological account of the lived experience under investigation. Correspondingly, engaging with neuroscientific studies enriches the scope of phenomenological inquiry and offers new insights into the film experience. Analysis of diverse films including Interstellar, Leviathan, San Andreas and The Thin Red Line reveals how technological innovations dating from Hale's Tours (pre-1910) to contemporary D-BOX and Dolby Atmos systems have enhanced the audience's sense of immersion and corporeal investment in the film experience. Building on the research of Vivian Sobchack and Vittorio Gallese, I argue that aesthetic techniques including the use of low frequency sound effects and wearable cameras facilitate shared affective engagement and a form of embodied simulation associated with kinaesthetic empathy and augmented narrative involvement.

Noise sensitivity: A neurophenomenological perspective

This paper addresses the current limitations of noise sensitivity research and the benefit of undertaking a neurophenomenological approach of investigation. It begins by questioning the invariance of noise sensitivity across different studies and contexts and argues that these are issues associated with the psychometric construct rather than the underlying reaction patterns. It suggest that our definition and operationalization of noise sensitivity might have been misspecified and that it needs to be revised on the basis of heuristically derived first-person data about our experiences of noise. It then shows why the basic principles of the neurophenomenological program are applicable to psychoacoustic research. Namely, it argues that phenomenological training leading to reflexive introspection and verbalization of our susceptibility to noise might have three-fold implication – (i) it will generate deeper understanding of noise sensitivity which will then allow us to deduce a hierarchical structure of meaning and concepts to supplement and be fed to quantitative research, (ii) it will provide better interpretation of neuroimaging and electroencephalographic data related to noise reaction and perception, which in turn will allow a process of reciprocal validation, (iii) and, most importantly, it presents a promising technique for emotional regulation of noise processing via modulation of the amygdalar function, when a state of awareness of this processing has been achieved.

The temporal dynamic of emotional emergence

Following the neurophenomenological approach, we propose a model of emotional emergence that identifies the experimental structures of time (i.e., anticipation, crisis, and aftermath) involved in emotional experience and their plausible components in terms of cognition, physiology, and neuroscience. We argue that surprise, as a lived experience, and its physiological correlates of the startle reflex and cardiac defense are the core of the dynamic, and that the heart system sets temporally in motion the dynamic of emotional emergence. Finally, in reference to Craig’s model of emotion, we propose an integrative model of the temporal dynamic of emotional emergence that allows emotions to be distinguished depending on each temporal phase and that involves the following three systems: the brain (3rd person), the consciousness (1st person), and the doubled-sided (subjective/objective) continuum of the body-heart context, with the heart as the focus within the body during emotion. This model provides the framework for future developments in 1st- and 3rd-person approaches for an integrative understanding of the science of emotion, including the fields of psychophysiology and psychopathology.

Changes in music listening in post-concussion syndrome after mild traumatic brain injury.

Mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI) constitutes a public health problem with major socioeconomic consequences (Maas, Stocchetti, & Bullock, 2008). The notion of post-concussion syndrome (PCS) following MTBI is now a well-described (Borg et al., 2004) and extensively discussed concept (Rees, 2003; Wood, 2007). However, current standard imaging (mainly MRI) techniques rarely reveal abnormalities, and the consequences of diffuse axonal damage are difficult to document. For these reasons, PCS is often considered to be either psychogenic in origin (Whittaker, Kemp, & House, 2007)ora fallacious pretext for financial compensation. However, it is clear that new MR imaging methods such as MRI diffusion anisotropy (Belanger, Vanderploeg, Curtiss, & Warden, 2007; Maller et al., 2010) and magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS; Garnett et al., 2000; Govindaraju et al., 2004) can reveal structural and metabolic white matter abnormalities in connection with post-concussion symptoms, including depression (Maller et al., 2010). A significant proportion (5-7%) of patients with MTBI present a later cognitive decline (Hammond et al., 2004). Recent studies conducted on 2525 U.S. soldiers exposed to blasts and who suffered MTBI clearly reveal the neurological correlates of PCS and indicate that PCS is closely associated with loss of consciousness during the trauma (Hoge et al., 2008). The link between cognitive deficits related to PCS and impairment of brain connectivity, particularly in frontal regions, has been recently demonstrated (Sponheim et al., 2011).Apart from a few music-related pathologies (congenital amusia, musicogenic epileptic seizures), few studies have reported abnorCeline malities of listening to or producing music in neurological and psychiatric pathologies (Vion-Dury & Besson, 2010). However, throughout human history, billions of human beings have created and listened to sound patterns and sequences that do not carry any denotative meaning (Sacks, 2008). In this respect, Andrade and Bhattacharya (2003) proposed that the brain is tuned to music. Although many studies emphasize the value of music therapy in patients with various neurological and psychiatric diseases, the scientific literature exploring changes in the quality of music listening is sparse. Sacks presented many clinical examples related to this issue (Sacks, 2008), but only a few examples of any given pathology are available to the best of our knowledge.The current study stems from a clinical observation: during individual interviews prior to neurophysiological assessment of PCS following an MTBI, several patients reported an experience of disruption, with alterations of their capacity to evaluate durations and the feeling of being disoriented in time. This led us to question them about changes in their music listening habits because music can be regarded as an art of time (Emery, 2000); thus, its appreciation requires precise processing of temporal structures at different scales (Accaoui, 2001). Following the question Has your way of listening to music changed since your brain trauma?, patients remained silent for several seconds. Then, they reported being aware that their music listening habits had changed. However, they were unable to accurately describe this modification. This recurrent clinical observation gave rise to this study, the aim of which was to assess musicrelated changes in patients suffering from MTBI, by combining both objective and subjective data experienced in the firstperson, according to the neurophenomenological approach (Vion-Dury, 2007; Vion-Dury et al., 2011) and by analyzing if these music-related changes are correlated to any abnormality in imaging, neuropsychological, or neurophysiologic evaluation.MethodSubjectsThis study took place during a global assessment of the PCS diagnosis in MTBI patients, as organized by the Groupe d'Etudes des Professionnels Alpes-Mediterranee sur les Traumatismes Crâniens (GREPAM-TC), from October 2008 to June 2009 (Soriat-Barriere, Tcherniack, & Vion-Dury, 2011). …

First-person approaches in neuroscience of consciousness: Brain dynamics correlate with the intention to act

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet's experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N=1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.