The author’s objective is to trace the principal stages of the genesis and evolution of the Russian maritime strategy in the context of the active expansion of its naval forces under Peter I and the deployment of the Archipelago expedition by Catherine II (1769–1775). The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of these developments on the geoeconomic landscape. In addition, this study examines the geopolitical situation of the Russian Empire following the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774). It also investigates how ruling circles in Alawi Morocco responded to the emergence of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean, which had the effect of limiting the naval power of the Ottoman state. The article elucidates the multifaceted political, economic, and military circumstances that precipitated the Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Muhammad ibn Abdallah (1757–1790), to pursue the opening of his country to extensive foreign trade. However, given the weak commodity flows and the economic inexpediency of maintaining large formations of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean, the initial stage of Russian-Moroccan relations was limited to the exchange of letters and messages. Consequently, the demise of Sidi Muhammad (1790) and Catherine II (1796) brought an end to the development of this project. The author addresses the issue of the veracity of the Russian-Moroccan peace and trade treaty of the eighteenth century, examining the arguments that suggest it was in fact never signed. However, even if it were to be proven that the treaty was drafted, the fulfilment of its hypothetical provisions would present a significant challenge for both parties.
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