Nature Of Moral Judgment Research Articles

Are there “Moral” Judgments?

Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment.

Expressivism and moral independence

AbstractMetaethical expressivism faces the perennial objection that its commitment to non‐cognitivism about moral judgment renders the view revisionary of our ordinary moral thought. The standard response to this objection is to say that since the expressivist's theoretical commitments about the nature of moral judgment are independent of normative ethics, the view cannot be revisionary of normative ethics. This essay seeks to evaluate the standard response by exploring several senses of independence that expressivism might enjoy from normative ethics. I develop a taxonomy on which, at least by the expressivist's own lights, normative ethics is not dependent on non‐cognitivism about moral judgment in a way that might render that claim itself normative ethical. The argument will require us to formulate a theory of moral subject matter according to the expressivist, a matter of independent interest. Although this discussion will essentially vindicate the standard response to the perennial objection, it will also highlight a major limitation thereof. This is that even for the expressivist, the taxonomic independence of non‐cognitivism about moral judgment from normative ethics does not guarantee its moral independence from normative ethics; that is, showing that non‐cognitivism about moral judgment is not a moral claim is not itself to show that it is not a morally relevant claim. I conclude by arguing that the question of moral dependence, usually discussed under the heading of objectivity, is ultimately first‐order moral rather than taxonomic, and so can only be resolved on first‐order moral grounds.

Consult Your Heart

In this article, I explore the authority of the heart (qalb) as a potential locus for the individual moral knowledge and normativity in Islamic ethics. To do so, I discuss the two ḥadīths that ostensibly suggest one’s “self” as a source of moral judgment. These ḥadīths raise renewed questions about the sources of moral judgment, the nature of moral judgment and the ethical capacity of the “self” (conscience)—“consult your heart and consult your self …”; “righteousness is good conduct, and sin is that which rankles in your chest and which you would hate for other people to look upon.” There are rich debates in the Islamic tradition on the place and authority of the bāṭin (inward) in generating moral knowledge, which correspond to contemporary discourses in Western ethics on the place of conscience in the moral formation of the individual. In this article, I argue that although Islamic legal tradition as a discipline has focused on qualified external actions of individuals and the ijtihād (independent legal reasoning) of mujtahids (jurists), it did not ignore the authority of the bāṭin for moral assessment and the ijtihād of common individuals. I propose that the inward dimension has always occupied an important space within the interdisciplinary field of Islamic ethics but has been overshadowed by the overarching theological disputes between the Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarīs over the sources of knowledge. The article starts by exploring the relevant aḥādīth (reports) and their interpretation in ḥadīth commentaries, followed by an analysis of discussions in the fields of Islamic jurisprudence and Sufism.

Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.

Bertrand Russell and the Paradox of the Committed Emotivist

Regarding his views on ethics, Russell is typically saddled with charges of (mainly pragmatic) inconsistency for holding that ultimate ethical valuations are subjective, while, at the same time, expressing emphatic opinions on ethical questions. In this paper, I re-examine some of the ways out of these accusations Russell himself proposed, mainly by pointing to the weaknesses of objectivism (among which its failure in reaching Occamist rigour is paramount). I also put forward some other possible replies that he did not explicitly explore. In particular, I stress that the object-language/metalanguage distinction, which has its historical roots in Russell’s theory of types, can be used to hold that there is no possible contradiction in maintaining a subjectivist metaethics and defending substantive ethical claims. Along these lines, I argue that Russell should have not been concerned with the charges of inconsistency of any kind, for second-order claims about the nature of moral judgments are not conceptually apt to ground first-order substantive moral views.

Bertrand Russell and the Paradox of the Committed Emotivist

Regarding his views on ethics, Russell is typically saddled with charges of (mainly pragmatic) inconsistency for holding that ultimate ethical valuations are subjective, while, at the same time, expressing emphatic opinions on ethical questions. In this paper, I re-examine some of the ways out of these accusations Russell himself proposed, mainly by pointing to the weaknesses of objectivism (among which its failure in reaching Occamist rigour is paramount). I also put forward some other possible replies that he did not explicitly explore. In particular, I stress that the object-language/metalanguage distinction, which has its historical roots in Russell’s theory of types, can be used to hold that there is no possible contradiction in maintaining a subjectivist metaethics and defending substantive ethical claims. Along these lines, I argue that Russell should have not been concerned with the charges of inconsistency of any kind, for second-order claims about the nature of moral judgments are not conceptually apt to ground first-order substantive moral views.

Moral judgment is important in COVID-19 pandemic.

The nature of moral judgment is not only of longstanding philosophical interest, but also it is a matter of immediate practical concern. Currently, when the information, the advice, even the science and the sequela of the pandemic COVID-19 are all consistently and rapidly changing, it creates inconsistency in our decision making. Nevertheless, we lack of a detailed scientific understanding of how people make moral decisions. The letter is an effort aimed at understanding moral decision-making during the present pandemic of COVID-19.

A natureza do juízo moral em Hume

A interpretação padrão da teoria da motivação humeana considera que a mesma subscreveria um modelo conativista baseado em desejos (paixões), enquanto intrinsecamente motivadores, que nos comprometeriam com uma concepção de internalismo motivacional e, por conseguinte, com uma posição não-cognitivista. Basicamente, esta interpretação padrão de Hume, sustenta que os juízos morais são de natureza puramente conativa, fornecendo, assim, ao agente uma razão ou motivo intrínseco para agir (internalismo motivacional), não exprimindo, no entanto, nenhum conteúdo racional cognitivo (não-cognitivismo). Dada a aproximação entre verdade e conhecimento, os cognitivistas afirmam também a tese de que há autêntico conhecimento moral. Os juízos morais possuem conteúdo cognitivo e não apenas, como querem os não-cognitivistas, expressões de atitudes, de preferências, de desejos ou de prescrições. Desta forma, o contraste entre cognitivismo e não-cognitivismo gira primariamente em torno da questão sobre a natureza do juízo moral. E, na interpretação clássica de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral seria não-cognitiva. Com este trabalho exploro uma linha de argumentação alternativa, em defesa de uma posição que privilegia a possibilidade de um conhecimento moral, segundo a filosofia moral de Hume. Os fundamentos da moral em Hume examinam a exigência motivacional tendo como alvo, a ser criticado, não o conhecimento moral (cognitivismo) e sim o racionalismo moral. No entanto, essa linha alternativa, não representa uma adesão pura ao cognitivismo. A estratégia seguida por essa argumentação, consiste em apontar o aspecto “prático” dos juízos morais, ou seja, o seu papel na orientação e na motivação das ações morais, e, em seguida, argumentar que, dada essa função primordial dos juízos morais, repetindo, o seu caráter prático, orientador de ações, não exclui, também, um conhecimento moral. De certa forma, o argumento é que, segundo a teoria da motivação de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral teria uma dimensão objetiva e prática (aquilo que realmente nos move para a ação).

The Social Nature of Moral Judgment and Behavior

The Social Nature of Moral Judgment and Behavior

К вопросу о предмете психологии морали

The article deals with the study of human moral functioning in the framework of neurobiological and psychological research. Presents the views of John. Green and John. Haidt about the nature of moral judgments. Studies of the neurobiological mechanism of moral judgment do not explain their individual variability. This question relates to the subject of psychological research. The psychological concepts of morality of L. Kohlberg and D. Forsythe are compared. It is argued that the concept of ethical positions of Foresight has an advantage, since it considers the individual variability of moral judgments from metaethical positions. The analysis of neurobiological and psychological approaches to morality concluded that they did not represent the behavioral component of moral functioning.

A brief assessment tool for investigating facets of moral judgment from realistic vignettes.

Humans make moral judgments every day, and research demonstrates that these evaluations are based on a host of related event features (e.g., harm, legality). In order to acquire systematic data on how moral judgments are made, our assessments need to be expanded to include real-life, ecologically valid stimuli that take into account the numerous event features that are known to influence moral judgment. To facilitate this, Knutson et al. (in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 5(4), 378-384, 2010) developed vignettes based on real-life episodic memories rated concurrently on key moral features; however, the method is time intensive (~1.4-3.4h) and the stimuli and ratings require further validation and characterization. The present study addresses these limitations by: (i) validating three short subsets of these vignettes (39 per subset) that are time-efficient (10-25min per subset) yet representative of the ratings and factor structure of the full set, (ii) norming ratings of moral features in a larger sample (total N = 661, each subset N = ~220 vs. Knutson et al. N = 30), (iii) examining the generalizability of the original factor structure by replicating it in a larger sample across vignette subsets, sex, and political ideology, and (iv) using latent profile analysis to empirically characterize vignette groupings based on event feature ratings profiles and vignette content. This study therefore provides researchers with a core battery of well-characterized and realistic vignettes, concurrently rated on key moral features that can be administered in a brief, time-efficient manner to advance research on the nature of moral judgment.

OUP accepted manuscript

INTRODUCTIONEarly on in The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Brentano presents his metaethical stance succinctly:Is there such a thing as a moral truth taught by nature itself and independent of ecclesiastical, political, and every other kind of social authority? Is there a moral law that is natural in sense of being universally and incontestably valid-valid for men at all places and all times, indeed valid for any being that thinks and feels-and are we capable of knowing that there is such a law? . . . My own answer is emphatically affirmative. (Brentano 1969, 6)Brentano's metaethical stance thus appears thoroughly realist and objectivist. However, his theory has several features that modern readers do not expect to find in a theory that holds that moral truths are objective and universal. The two most important unorthodox features of Brentano's realism concern moral knowledge and nature of moral judgment. According to Brentano, emotions are a presupposition for both moral knowledge and moral judgment. Brentano denies that there is a separate realm of values and norms, independent of emotive attitudes of love and hate, and he also denies that evaluative properties and facts are among content of acts of valuing.These unorthodox features of Brentanos view all tie in with notorious difficulties for moral realism, chief among which are accounting for (i) nature of moral truths and how we come to know them, and (ii) connection between moral judgments and attitudes that motivate action. In order to illuminate Brentanos moral realism, and how it purports to deal with such difficulties it is useful to compare it to another metaethical view with which it shares many commitments and which is also sometimes said to resist ready categorization, namely Thomas Reid's. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they oppose nonobjectivist views like Hume's on similar grounds. These shared commitments and similarities are explored in §1.I shall also argue that it is apt to classify both Brentano and Reid as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that connect in interesting ways to questions concerning (i) and (ii). Reid's brand of intuitionism resembles more closely than does Brentano's, intuitionist views of G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross, which became highly influential in twentieth century metaethics.1 In this respect, Brentanian intuitionism is an underexplored alternative.2 As we shall see in §11, differences between Brentanian and Reidian ethical intuitionism are reflective of more general differences between Brentano's and Reid's epistemological views.In §§III-IV, I focus more exclusively on Brentano's view, in particular on notion of correct emotions and its relevance for our capacity to acquire moral knowledge. Brentano explains valuing in terms of emotive attitudes of love, hate, and preference; and he explains value in terms correct love, hate, and preference. On Brentano's view, good is ethically prior to right, and correct is conceptually prior to good, in ways I shall explain in §§III and IV. As I shall explain in §IV, priority of correct over good has virtue of making Brentano's account immune to 'wrong kind of reason' problem, which has been much discussed in recent metaethical debate. In §V, finally, I sum up and return briefly to comparison between Brentano and Reid.I. BRENTANO AND REID: SHARED METAETHICAL COMMITMENTSWe have already seen that Brentano endorsed a metaethical view that appears thoroughly realist. Reid at several places expresses a similar commitment to moral realism. For example, he states that the principles of morals stand upon immutable foundation of truth, and can undergo no change by any difference of fabric, or structure of those who judge of them. …

PODE O NATURALISMO REDUCIONISTA DE DAVID COPP ACOMODAR O REALISMO E O CONSTRUTIVISMO MORAL?

Segundo David Copp, o cenário moral requer a compreensão de três aspectos inter-relacionados básicos: identificar a natureza dos juízos morais, especificar a justificação dessas decisões e determinar o papel da sociedade moral neste esquema. Para isso, o autor discute a necessidade de uma teoria cognitivista da linguagem normativa (standard based theory), assim como uma teoria da justificação dos códigos morais (society centered theory). O propósito deste artigo é analisar em que medida a teoria moral de Copp consegue acomodar a metodologia construtivista sobre as bases realistas de seu naturalismo moral sem desmantelar seu propósito naturalista de relacionar (e reduzir) propriedades morais à propriedades naturais.

Scrupulous agents

Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with morality) raises fascinating issues about the nature of moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients: perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.

Confounds in moral/conventional studies

In ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain’, Fraser (2012) criticises findings by Kelly et al. (2007) that speak against the moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, arguing that the experiment was confounded. First, we note that the results of that experiment held up when confounds were removed (Quintelier, Fessler, and De Smet 2012). Second, and more importantly, we argue that attempts to prove the existence of a M/C distinction are systematically confounded. In contrast to Fraser, we refer to data that support our view. We highlight the implications for the moral/conventional theory.

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgment. The "trolley problem" is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the trolley problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This, in turn, is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgment in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgment is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject's inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to trolley problems does not tell us very much about the psychopathic subject's capacity to make moral judgments, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy.

Does empirical moral psychology rest on a mistake?

Many philosophers assume that philosophical theories about the psychological nature of moral judgment can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the kind of evidence gathered by natural and social scientists (especially experimental psychologists and neuroscientists). I argue that this assumption is mistaken. For the most part, empirical evidence can do no work in these philosophical debates, as the metaphorical heavy-lifting is done by the pre-experimental assumptions that make it possible to apply empirical data to these philosophical debates. For the purpose of this paper, I emphasize two putatively empirically-supported theories about the psychological nature of moral judgment. The first is the Sentimental Rules Account, which is defended by Shaun Nichols. The second is defended by Jesse Prinz, and is a form of sentimentalist moral relativism. I show that both of the arguments in favour of these theories rely on assumptions which would be rejected by their philosophical opponents. Further, these assumptions carry substantive moral commitments and thus cannot be confirmed by further empirical investigation. Because of this shared methodological assumption, I argue that a certain form of empirical moral psychology rests on a mistake.

"Emotions, Intuition, and Reasoning in Moral Decision Making"

This paper explores the affective and cognitive dimensions of moral decision making. By reviewing and discussing traditional rationalist models and recent intuitionist models, we incorporate the perspectives of both moral reasoning and moral intuition to propose an interactive decision model to capture the composition and nature of moral judgments and decision making. We also introduce a hot-warm-cool-cold paradigm to explain the role of emotions and intuitions in moral decision making, especially how they signal people’s intuitive feelings about their own interests versus others’. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of our synthesized model of moral decision making for organizational decisions.

Recasting Scottish Sentimentalism: The Peculiarity of Moral Approval

By founding morality on the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith implied that the nature of moral judgment was far more intuitive and accessible than their rationalist predecessors and contemporaries would, or at least easily could, allow. And yet, these ‘Sentimentalists’ faced the longstanding belief that the human affective psyche is a veritable labyrinth – an obstacle to practical morality if not something literally brutish in us. The Scottish Sentimentalists thus implicitly tasked themselves with distinguishing and locating the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation in the human psyche. In this paper, I argue that this task led Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith to adopt a remarkable thesis when it came to the nature of the moral sentiments, namely, that the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation are peculiar – somehow radically unlike other sentiments.

Moral Reasoning in a Multicultural Society: Moral Inclusion and Moral Exclusion

Journal for the Theory of Social BehaviourVolume 40, Issue 4 p. 435-451 Moral Reasoning in a Multicultural Society: Moral Inclusion and Moral Exclusion STEFANO PASSINI, STEFANO PASSINI Dipartimento di Scienze dell'EducazioneVia Filippo Re, 6—40126Bologna, Italy[email protected]Search for more papers by this author STEFANO PASSINI, STEFANO PASSINI Dipartimento di Scienze dell'EducazioneVia Filippo Re, 6—40126Bologna, Italy[email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 21 November 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2010.00440.xCitations: 24Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume40, Issue4December 2010Pages 435-451 RelatedInformation