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Abstract

INTRODUCTIONEarly on in The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Brentano presents his metaethical stance succinctly:Is there such a thing as a moral truth taught by nature itself and independent of ecclesiastical, political, and every other kind of social authority? Is there a moral law that is natural in sense of being universally and incontestably valid-valid for men at all places and all times, indeed valid for any being that thinks and feels-and are we capable of knowing that there is such a law? . . . My own answer is emphatically affirmative. (Brentano 1969, 6)Brentano's metaethical stance thus appears thoroughly realist and objectivist. However, his theory has several features that modern readers do not expect to find in a theory that holds that moral truths are objective and universal. The two most important unorthodox features of Brentano's realism concern moral knowledge and nature of moral judgment. According to Brentano, emotions are a presupposition for both moral knowledge and moral judgment. Brentano denies that there is a separate realm of values and norms, independent of emotive attitudes of love and hate, and he also denies that evaluative properties and facts are among content of acts of valuing.These unorthodox features of Brentanos view all tie in with notorious difficulties for moral realism, chief among which are accounting for (i) nature of moral truths and how we come to know them, and (ii) connection between moral judgments and attitudes that motivate action. In order to illuminate Brentanos moral realism, and how it purports to deal with such difficulties it is useful to compare it to another metaethical view with which it shares many commitments and which is also sometimes said to resist ready categorization, namely Thomas Reid's. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they oppose nonobjectivist views like Hume's on similar grounds. These shared commitments and similarities are explored in §1.I shall also argue that it is apt to classify both Brentano and Reid as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that connect in interesting ways to questions concerning (i) and (ii). Reid's brand of intuitionism resembles more closely than does Brentano's, intuitionist views of G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross, which became highly influential in twentieth century metaethics.1 In this respect, Brentanian intuitionism is an underexplored alternative.2 As we shall see in §11, differences between Brentanian and Reidian ethical intuitionism are reflective of more general differences between Brentano's and Reid's epistemological views.In §§III-IV, I focus more exclusively on Brentano's view, in particular on notion of correct emotions and its relevance for our capacity to acquire moral knowledge. Brentano explains valuing in terms of emotive attitudes of love, hate, and preference; and he explains value in terms correct love, hate, and preference. On Brentano's view, good is ethically prior to right, and correct is conceptually prior to good, in ways I shall explain in §§III and IV. As I shall explain in §IV, priority of correct over good has virtue of making Brentano's account immune to 'wrong kind of reason' problem, which has been much discussed in recent metaethical debate. In §V, finally, I sum up and return briefly to comparison between Brentano and Reid.I. BRENTANO AND REID: SHARED METAETHICAL COMMITMENTSWe have already seen that Brentano endorsed a metaethical view that appears thoroughly realist. Reid at several places expresses a similar commitment to moral realism. For example, he states that the principles of morals stand upon immutable foundation of truth, and can undergo no change by any difference of fabric, or structure of those who judge of them. …