Nature Of Moral Judgment Research Articles

Reasonableness, Pluralism, and Liberal Moral Doctrines

If there is, as it seems, deep and pervasive disagreement about what is right and good for us, as well as the nature of moral judgment, we may ask how political discussion can have any moral justification and how fellow citizens are to justify themselves and their proposals to each other in an era of pluralism. According to John Rawls, in a situation of moral pluralism, citizens should be reasonable. They should view each other as free and equal moral persons, and they should offer each other fair terms of social cooperation. Moreover, they should recognize and accept the consequences of the burdens of judgment, that differences between reasonable comprehensive doctrines have a morally innocent source, and therefore, that they should not try to attain a rational agreement on a single comprehensive doctrine. It follows that in justifying a political conception, the reasons given to others are ‘‘reasons we might reasonably expect that they, as free and equal citizens, might also accept.’’ For that reason, in his later work, political liberalism, Rawls seeks to ‘‘apply the principle of toleration to philosophy itself’’ and to bracket controversial

Evolutionary Psychology and Morality. Review Essay

Evolution has since the publication of The origin of species (1859) been a source of inspiration, and a bone of contention, not only for biology but also for philosophy and the sciences of man. The moral consequences of Darwinism have been a concern for ethicists since Herbert Spencer elevated the survival of the fittest to a norm underwriting cultural and societal progress—hard for the individual perhaps, but good for mankind. In contrast, Thomas Huxley saw evolution as a story of cruelty and ruthless selfishness (“nature, red in tooth and claw”), that a human moral society should combat rather than imitate. In the past 150 years several varieties of evolutionary ethics have been proposed. This review considers three books broadly concerned with meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is about the meaning of moral statements and the nature of moral judgments, about the specific characteristics of moral behaviour and moral attitudes, and about the nature of moral properties. If we want to understand how moral judgement works, we have to understand the mental architecture that produces such judgments, one might argue. That is why we should also look at psychology, in particular moral psychology (see e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong 2008), as a resource for meta-ethics. In psychology, evolutionary thinking has in recent years acquired a place, explaining emotions, cognition, etc, as biological adaptations (e.g., Buss 2007). So, we can see the big issue looming: can morality be explained as a biological adaptation, as an instinct, and most importantly, what does that mean for the status of moral judgments and moral facts? If what we do is not the result of a judgment about what is universally and objectively right or wrong, but of the blind instincts of our animal nature, designed to promote survival of Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2011) 14:117–125 DOI 10.1007/s10677-010-9223-1

Morality and Psychology

AbstractThis article briefly discusses the connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology, and then explores three intriguing areas of inquiry that fall within the intersection of the two fields. The areas of inquiry considered focus on (1) debates concerning the nature of moral judgments and moral motivation; (2) debates concerning good and bad character traits and character‐based explanations of actions; and (3) debates concerning the role of moral rules in guiding the morally wise agent.

Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy

PART I - NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AGENCY AND THE SELF 1. Moral decision-making and the brain 2. A case study in neuroethics: the nature of moral judgment 3. Moral and legal responsibility and the new neuroscience 4. Brains, lies and psychological explanations 5. Being in the world: neuroscience and the ethical agent 6. Creativity, gratitude and the enhancement debate: 7. Ethical dilemmas in neurodegenerative disease: respecting patients at the twlight of agency PART II - NEUROETHICS IN PRACTICE 8. From genome to brainome: charting the lessons learned 9. Protecting human subjects in brain research: a pragmatic perspective 10. Facts, fictions and the future of neuroethics 11. A picture is worth 1000 words, but which 1000? 12. When genes and brains unite: ethical implications of genomic neuroimaging 13. Engineering the brain 14. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and the human brain: an ethical evaluation 15. Functional neurosurgical intervention: neuroethics in the operating room 16. Clinicians, patients and the brain PART III - JUSTICE, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NEUROETHICS 17. The social effects of advances in neuroscience: legal problems, legal perspectives 19. Poverty, privilege and brain development: empirical findings and ethical implications 20. Religious responses to neuroscientific questions 21. The mind in the movies: a neuroethical analysis of the portrayal of the mind in popular media

Metaethical cognition and epistemic reasoning development in adolescence

The present study investigates whether epistemic cognition in moral domain (dubbed metaethical cognition) develops analogously to epistemic reasoning regarding empirical knowledge. The study’s conceptual framework distinguishes two main areas of metaethical cognition (beliefs about the nature of moral judgments and conceptions of the process of moral judgment formation), and three metaethical stances (intuitionism, subjectivism, and transsubjectivism). In a sample of 200 adolescents ( M 1/4 16.18 years, SD 1/4 2.41), these metaethical stances could be reliably identified by means of a semistructured interview procedure. Adolescents’ metaethical stance was related to age, cross-sectionally as well as longitudinally. Furthermore, significant differences in metaethical cognition were found between high school students and an expert group of university students with special training in moral philosophy. Overall, metaethical and epistemic stances were correlated substantially. Findings demonstrate that metaethical reasoning development is a structural analogue of epistemic development regarding factual knowledge. Implications for studies on moral development and for research addressing the domain specificity of epistemic reasoning development are discussed.

Expressivism, Projectivism, and Santayana

Expressivism, Projectivism and Santayana Glenn Tiller 1. Santayana and Non-Cognitivism There is a general consensus that Santayana's metaethical analysis of moral judgments falls under the category of non-cognitivism. For instance, Timothy Sprigge writes that "Santayana's position shares some features with those attitudinist theories of ethics or values for which value judgments express attitudes rather than beliefs."1 In another example, John Lachs states that "Santayana agrees with the emotivists that moral terms have no descriptive significance.2 And, in a similar vein, Thomas Munson writes that, for Santayana, "Ultimate Good is not an opinion hazarded."3 Each of these writers classifies Santayana as one who expounds the basic thesis of non-cognitivism that moral judgments are not descriptive, and hence neither true nor false. Certainly there is a wealth of textual evidence which suggests this interpretation. While it is true, as Sprigge comments, that Santayana offers only a collection of "scattered observations" on metaethical questions such as the nature of moral judgments, those observations amount to a clear affirmation of non-cognitivism.4 Below is a small but representative sample of Santayana's statements on this metaethical issue: Moral terms are caresses or insults and describe nothing.5 In order to understand why Santayana thinks that moral terms "describe nothing" and that to "esteem a thing good" is never to assert a truth, we must turn to Santayana's account of valuation. Santayana's account of valuation turns on two principle ideas which lie at the heart of his moral theory. These two ideas can be set out as follows. First, there is the origin of morality, which takes us into Santayana's notion of the psyche. Second, there is the phenomenology of moral experience, which centers on Santayana's epiphenomenalist theory of consciousness. We turn first to Santayana's analysis of the origins of morality. 2. The Psyche And The Origin Of Morality Santayana vigorously rejects any Humean empiricist notion of the self as "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions."8 Santayana objects that this phenomenalistic conception of the self leaves "no room for anything latent," and "in a living being, especially in a nice Englishman, what is latent is the chief thing."9 In Santayana's opinion, the assumptions of materialism must underlie any understanding we have of human nature. Thus, for Santayana the psyche is not some evanescent phenomenal self or passing datum, but rather "that habit in matter which forms the human body and the human mind."10 It is the principle of the long-term development of the individual, for contained within our psyche: There is our whole past, as it were, knocking at the door; there are our silent hopes; there are our future discourses and decisions working away, like actors rehearsing their parts, at their several fantastic arguments. All this is the psyche's work.11 In sum, we can say that the psyche accounts for everything that is latent in the self; it embodies the potentiality of a human life from its beginning to its final development. To say that the psyche embodies all that is potential within us and accounts for our material development is to view the psyche as the ultimate origin of animal interests. In other words, we can say that the psyche accounts for all the physical predispositions of an animal life. These predispositions, such as the [End Page 240] habit of the body to repair itself after being injured, may be considered "animal interests" insofar as they represent the (innate) physical course of development of some animal life. Of course, here we are taking the terms "animal interests" and "predispositions" in a purely materialistic way; we are noting, to repeat Santayana's phrase, the "habit of matter." Accepting that the psyche accounts for all predispositions in animal life and that it is the source of animal interests has important implications. According to Santayana, this fact alone accounts for the origin of morality: This predetermined, specific direction of animal life is the key to everything moral; without it no external circumstance could be favourable or unfavourable to us; and spirit within us would have no reason to welcome, to deplore, or...

On becoming non-judgmental: some difficulties for an ethics of counselling.

The growth in the availability of counselling services has been accompanied by growing concern about the conduct of counsellors, which in turn has led to the expressed need for an...

How can we Learn what Veritatis Splendor has to Teach?

HOW CAN WE LEARN WHAT VER/TATIS SPLENDOR HAS TO TEACH? ALASDAIR MAclNTYRE University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana V-ERITATIS SPLENDOR can be read in two very different ways. It can be read, and of course it should be ad, as a papal encyclical, a piece of authoritative Christian teaching. As such, it is addressed to the Catholic bishops and its subject-matter is not only Christian moral teaching in general, but more particularly the present condition of the academic discipline of moral theology. I of course am neither a bishop nor a theologian, so it might seem that all that I can be asked to do in reading Veritatis Splendor is to listen quietly to what is being said in a conversation between others. Yet the complexity of the experience of reading Veritatis Splendor makes it impossible for me to restrict myself to this role of a more or less innocent bystander . For Veritatis Splendor is not only a work of authoritative Christian teaching about moral judgment and the moral life, it is also a striking contribution by the Polish phenomenological and Thomistic philosopher, Karol Wojtyla, to ongoing philosophical enquiry, one in which an incisive account is advanced of the relationship between biblical and other Christian teaching, the various moralities of the various cultures of humankind and the argumentative conclusions of moral philosophers. (I am well aware that generally several anonymous writers contribute to the drafting of encyclicals, and doubtless they did so on this occasion . But any reader of Karol Wojtyla's major philosophical writings, from his doctoral dissertation onwards, will recognize, both in the style of arguments and in the nuances with which particular arguments are developed, a single nameable authorial 171 172 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE presence in this text.) The central theses of this encyclical thereby challenge a range of rival philosophical accounts of that relationship : Kantian, utilitarian, and Kierkegaardian, to name only the most important. But how can any one text perform both of these very different tasks? Insofar as V eritatis Splendor genuinely contributes to argumentative moral philosophy, must it not be precluded from presenting itself as authoritative teaching? And insofar as it is authoritative Christian teaching, how can it possibly be a contribution to the contentious debates of moral philosophy? Part of what is impressive about Veritatis Splendor is that in the course of answering a number of other questions, it also answers these questions about itself. Even so, any philosophical discussion of this encyclical which finds its argumentative conclusions compelling will be committed to an acknowledgment that philosophy itself, what it is and what it can legitimately hope to achieve, has to be understood in the light afforded by the Christian gospel. Veritatis Splendor never lets us forget this, so that even if I begin from the philosophy in the encyclical, I do so already knowing that it is going to direct me beyond philosophy. Nonetheless this is where I do have to begin, and this for two reasons. First of all this encyclical has an important argumentative structure and arguments are always matter for philosophy. Secondly, quite apart from any concern with Veritatis Splendor itself, what is inescapable for moral philosophers who are also Catholics, such as myself, is a strongly felt need for some definitive answer to the question of how their own peculiar philosophical conclusions about the nature of moral judgment and the moral life are related both to the dominant moral theories and practices of their own culture and to the biblical and Christian teaching by which they have been instructed. Each of these three presses upon us its own type of claim to our attention and allegiance and these sometimes conflicting claims define the situation in which and formed by which each of us encounters the theses and arguments of Veritatis Splendor. What then is my particular situation in these three respects, as Thomistic Aristotelian, as North American immigrant, and as Catholic? VERITATIS SPLENDOR 173 Thomists do of course quarrel a good deal among themselves. But there are two distinctive sets of conclusions which many of us take to be of crucial importance in the practical life. What are they? A first set concerns those rules...

Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.

Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic Teaching by Kevin D. O’Rourke, O.P. and Philip Boyle, O.P., and: Medical Ethics: Common Ground for Understanding by Kevin D. O’Rourke, O.P. and Dennis Brodeur, and: Healthcare Ethics: A Theological Analysis by Kevin D. O’Rourke, O.P. and Benedict Ashley, O.P.

BOOK REVIEWS 545 Haroutunian, would have balked at the notion that their " empiricism " could be abstracted from the christological and trinitarian confession 0£ the church. In general, it would seem that a genuinely " empirical" approach would seek to engage the actual truth claims of religious com· munities on their own terms-even when those claims conflict with historicist suppositions. Second, in so far as Dean thinks there is a uniquely American reli· gious experience or style of thought, privileging that style seems a dangerous move indeed. Dean is not unaware of the dangers. He specifically denies that he is engaging in any form of " American exceptionalism " (p. 25) ; it is simply that an " appropriately American historicism, centering on American culture, would have a greater chance of suggesting practices that work for and are true for America " (p. 24) . But I am skeptical that such disclaimers address the real problem. Near the very end of the book, Dean suggests that a modi· fied naturalism might lead to " a notion of God that was more genuinely American than anything earlier," culminating in the recognition that " American thought about God is really the thought of a national com· munity" (p. 144). Descriptively that may well be the case; but then the Christian theologian must seek norms elsewhere. History Making History does not show us how historicist insigh~ might be incorporated into ecumenical, trinitarian theology, but that does not mean the attempt will prove unfruitful. Meanwhile, this bit of philosophical tale-telling will hold the interest of readers theological and otherwise. JOSEPH L. MANCINA Yale University New Haven, Connecticut Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic Teaching. By KEVIN D. O'ROURKE, O.P. and PHILIP BOYLE, O.P. St. Louis: Catholic Health Associa· tion, 1989. Medical Ethics: Common Ground for Understanding. By KEVIN D. O'RouRKE, O.P. and DENNIS BRODEUR. St. Louis: Catholic Health Association, 1989. Healthcare Ethics: A Theological Analysis. By KEVIN D. O'RouRKE, O.P. and BENEDICT ASHLEY, O.P. 3rd ed. St. Louis: Catholic Health Association, 1989. Sources of Catholic Teaching is a compendium of recent "official" statements by Roman Catholic ecclesiastical bodies on issues concern· ing medical ethics. Arranged alphabetically according to topics, this col- 546 BOOK REVIEWS lection of statements from the papacy, the Roman Congregations, and the conferences of Catholic bishops could prove to he a very helpful reference tool. It contains a brief introduction which seeks to explain the role of these statements in the Catholic moral theology and Catholic medical ethics, a table of contents of the statements included, and then the statements themselves. In most instances it does not contain the entire document or statement hut only excerpts therefrom. There are some weaknesses in this work. First, these statements are not self-explanatory; they are in need of interpretation and explanation in many instances. But the authors present only the bald text and do not offer any explanatory comments. They apparently presume that these statements are pellucid to the reader, hut this is an unwarranted pre· sumption. For example, clarifying comments should have been added to the statement from the Declaration on Euthanasia because the allocution of Pius XII about giving lethal doses of analgesia is not entirely clear. A second difficulty with this work is the brief and somewhat insubstantial introduction on conscience and the role these statements should play in the formation of conscience. This sort of work invites a substantial and extended commentary on the nature of moral judgments , the relationship of conscience to the natural law, and the authority of these statements. The authors note that not all of the official statements issued by various organs of the Church are of equal authority , hut they do not try to identify the specific authoritative status of the various statements they include in their work. The reader is thus left to his or her own devices to determine, for example, the relative weight of statements of the administrative hoard of the NCCB versus statements of state episcopal conferences. A still further problem is that some of the statements are of virtually no significant authority for Catholics. For example, the statement of the administrative hoard of the NCCB on AIDS is of questionable...

Moral Judgments in History

This paper considers the nature of moral judgments, the criteria on which they are based, and their function. It discusses the objections to the use of moral judgments in historical writing put forward by three historians, and finds them in varying degrees unconvincing. It then examines whether there is a case for moral judgments in history, and concludes that they do have an inescapable role, but one that is not usually accepted by historians.

Young adults' moral reasoning about prohibitive and prosocial dilemmas

One hundred and five high school and college students were given tasks of social sensitivity, perspective taking, prosocial moral reasoning, and prohibitive moral reasoning. Social sensitivity and perspective taking were positively related to both types of moral reasoning, but only for females. For both males and females, level of principled moral reasoning was greater for the prosocial dilemmas than for the prohibitive dilemmas. Findings are generally viewed as being supportive of Piaget's and Kohlberg's conceptualizations of the nature of moral judgment. Differences between the two types of unrelated moral reasoning are discussed in terms of the relation between an individually constructed set of ethics and a more general social code of ethics.

Is Conscientiousness Always—or Ever—a Virtue?

On most views of the nature of moral judgments, it is possible for a person to be mistaken in the belief that it is right to act in a certain way. When someone believes that it is right to do something, does that thing on the basis of such a belief, and yet in so doing commits deeds which are wrong by moral standards other than his own, we do not quite know whether to praise him for his conscientiousness while condemning his actions. He acts according to his conscience and does what he believes to be right, but his beliefs are erroneous and his actions wrong. Shall we praise the man for his conscientiousness while condemning his actions ?

The Nature of Moral Judgment: A Study in Contemporary Moral Philosophy by Patrick McGrath

The Nature of Moral Judgment: A Study in Contemporary Moral Philosophy by Patrick McGrath

The Nature of Moral Judgment

The Nature of Moral Judgment

Hume and Conservatism

Although David Hume's stature as a philosopher has rarely been questioned, his claims as a political theorist have fared less well. Jefferson showed deep hostility towards Hume's ideas, while John Adams could find agreement with only a few points. Later opinion has been less vehement but still reserved. Thomas Huxley thought Hume's political writings suggestive, but on the whole marred by an unabashed desire for literary success. In Sir Leslie Stephen's judgment Hume was guilty of a “cynical conservatism” that was at once superficial and unhistorical.More recent studies, such as those of Sabine and Halévy, have established more securely Hume's place in political thought but have left certain ambiguities. Sabine has coupled Hume with Burke as an opponent of eighteenth-century rationalism, while Halévy viewed him as a forerunner of the “philosophical radicalism” of Bentham, Adam Smith, James Mill, and Ricardo. To have fathered squabbling children is always something of an embarrassment, but particularly so when one is, like Hume, temperamentally averse to taking sides. It is true, nonetheless, that if a temporary distinction is made between Hume's doctrine and his influence, it is possible to maintain that his influence worked in two quite different directions. His inquires into causation, the role of reason, and the nature of moral judgments helped eventually to undermine the natural law structure of eighteenth-century liberalism, while his emphasis on utility as the test of institutions contributed an important ingredient to Benthamite liberalism.

Bishop Butler's View of Conscience

In this article I propose to examine Bishop Butler's view of the nature of moral judgment, the epistemological problem which so greatly exercised some of the British moralists of his age. I have discussed the views of four of them in The Moral Sense. The problem seems to have been peculiarly lacking in interest for Butler. This may seem at first sight an odd statement: the moral faculty, or conscience, it would be said, is the chief subject of Butler's moral writings. This is true enough. But although Butler's description of the working of conscience is unsurpassed, he gives no clear definition of the faculty. That is, he does not clearly consider the question whether the moral faculty can be said to be identical with some faculty usually called by another name, or whether it is sui generis.