Natural Kinds Research Articles

Some Issues Regarding Artifacts

"When it comes to artifacts, the functional accounts define them as objects that have an intended function. This function is considered essential for them and is used to classify artifacts and differentiate them. However, functional accounts of artifacts face some serious criticism. It seems that a function is neither essential, nor sufficient for an artifact. Thomasson offers a new perspective on artifacts. The author defines artifacts based on their intended feature. A feature may, of course, be a function but does not have to be just that. Generally speaking, intended features are norms of how to treat that specific artifact. Such an account is able to escape the criticism raised against functional accounts. In this article is presented Baker’s functional account of artifacts and some criticism that can be raised for such an account. The second part of the article critically introduces Thomasson’s account for artifacts. The aim of this article is to support Thomasson’s account against a functional perspective. Keywords: artifacts, mind-dependent objects, intended function, natural kinds, intended feature, Amie Thomasson, L. R. Baker"

Can the Epistemic Value of Natural Kinds Be Explained Independently of Their Metaphysics?

The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separating the epistemic value of natural kinds from their underlying metaphysics. On that account, (i) the co-instantiation of any sub-cluster of the properties associated with a given natural kind raises the probability of the co-instantiation of the rest, and (ii) this clustering of property instantiation is invariant under all relevant counterfactual perturbations. We argue that it is not possible to evaluate the stability of a cluster of properties without taking stock of the metaphysical picture used to account for that stability. Thus, even on the stable property cluster account, the epistemic value of natural kinds remains partly grounded in their metaphysical status.

NATURAL KINDS AND OUR SEMANTIC INTUITIONS ALONG THE ROAD

This is a comment on Gómez-Torrente’s approach to natural kinds and natural kind terms. Here I will focus on his concerns related to the arbitrariness argument and his attempt to formulate a reply to it that maintains most (if not all) of the “Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy” when it comes to the reference-fixing of such terms. Gómez-Torrente concludes that ordinary kind terms have distinct referents from scientific terms. I will challenge one of the premises that he employs in reaching this conclusion: namely, that the difference in determinacy profiles between ordinary natural kinds and scientific kinds is enough to assume that the terms referring to them do not share their referents. I also suggest that some kind of contextual interpretation of natural kind terms might provide a nice explanation of those determinacy variations.

An evolutionary system of mineralogy, Part V: Aqueous and thermal alteration of planetesimals (~4565 to 4550 Ma)

AbstractPart V of the evolutionary system of mineralogy explores phases produced by aqueous alteration, metasomatism, and/or thermal metamorphism—relicts of ancient processes that affected virtually all asteroids and that are preserved in the secondary mineralogy of meteorites. We catalog 166 historical natural kinds of minerals that formed by alteration in the parent bodies of chondritic and non-chondritic meteorites within the first 20 Ma of the solar system. Secondary processes saw a dramatic increase in the chemical and structural diversity of minerals. These phases incorporate 41 different mineral-forming elements, including the earliest known appearances of species with essential Co, Ge, As, Nb, Ag, Sn, Te, Au, Hg, Pb, and Bi. Among the varied secondary meteorite minerals are the earliest known examples of halides, arsenides, tellurides, sulfates, carbonates, hydroxides, and a wide range of phyllosilicates.

ON DESCRIPTIVISM AND NATURAL KIND TERMS. REPLY TO FERNÁNDEZ MORENO

Luis Fernández Moreno has given a number of arguments that descriptive knowledge or stipulations have a greater role in the fixing of the reference of natural kind terms than I allow in my book Roads to Reference. In this note I criticize Fernández Moreno’s arguments.

ORDINARY KINDS AND ONTOLOGICAL ANGST. REPLY TO DEMARTINI

Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.

ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA

My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.

The causal structure of natural kinds

One primary goal for metaphysical theories of natural kinds is to account for their epistemic fruitfulness. According to cluster theories of natural kinds, this epistemic fruitfulness is grounded in the regular and stable co-occurrence of a broad set of properties. In this paper, I defend the view that such a cluster theory is insufficient to adequately account for the epistemic fruitfulness of kinds. I argue that cluster theories can indeed account for the projectibility of natural kinds, but not for several other epistemic operations that natural kinds support. Natural kinds also play a role in scientific explanations and categorizations. A theory of natural kinds can only account for these additional kind-based epistemic practices if it also analyzes their causal structure.

Multiple Realization and Evolutionary Dynamics: A Fitness-Based Account

ABSTRACT Multiple realization occurs when a natural kind is variably realized at more basic levels and the common physical structure of the realizers is not essential for supporting nomological statements. It has been suggested that this phenomenon may be an outcome of natural selection acting over multiple realizers that perform an adaptive function. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we present a revision of this model, characterized by stricter equilibrium conditions and superior explanatory power. Second, we present a typology of multiple realization that provides a plausible account of the differences between across- and within-species multiple realization. Third, we perform a formal analysis of the dynamics of multiple realization that sheds light on the differences between multiple realization at different levels of organization.

Vividness as a natural kind

Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on the vividness of mental imagery and contrasts with those accounts that treat vividness as an explanatory primitive and with those that attempt to provide a definition. We apply the natural kind methodology to make several substantive (but also provisional) claims about the vividness of mental imagery. First, we will argue that it forms a homeostatic property cluster, in that it is reliably correlated with, but not defined by, some properties, such as the level of detail, clarity, perception-likeness and intensity. In arguing for this claim, we also show how the cluster can be modified in the light of empirical research by complementing it with a correlation between vividness and familiarity. Second, we will argue that these correlations can be explained by an underlying property at the architectural level; i.e., the availability of stored sensory information for the elaboration of a mental image.

Linear and structural changes in rural space – the positive and problematic aspects (case of Latvia)

Abstract Rural areas as a space have many features in common: land as a significant resource for economic activity, forests as a natural kind of climate-friendly environment, a low population density, etc. At the same time, the natural resources of rural areas tend to be exploited in a different way, which is determined by the different activities of the population of a particular territorial unit about the exploitation of the natural resources. By employing cluster analysis, an analysis of 110 administrative-territorial units forming the space outside cities of national significance allowed identifying the geographical locations of the least economically developed territorial units and the most specific socio-economic characteristics of the units. Geographically, the territorial units were spread across all the planning regions in Latvia, while business and entrepreneurship there focused on the use of natural resources, i.e. agriculture, forestry and fisheries. The trend has been observed since 2009 and requires seeking innovative ideas for changing the situation, one of which could be the expansion of the e-environment and e-commerce in these areas as well as the establishment of a cooperation network for home producers.

Natural kinds: a new synthesis

What is a natural kind? This old yet lasting philosophical question has recently received new competing answers (e.g., Chakravartty, 2007; Magnus, 2014; Khalidi, 2013; Slater, 2015; Ereshefsky Reydon, 2015). We show that the main ingredients of an encompassing and coherent account of natural kinds are actually on the table, but in need of the right articulation. It is by adopting a non-reductionist, naturalistic and non-conceptualist approach that, in this paper, we elaborate a new synthesis of all these ingredients. Our resulting proposition is a multiple-compartment theory of natural kinds that defines them in purely ontological terms, clearly distinguishes and relates ontological and epistemological issues - more precisely, two grains of ontological descriptions and two grains of explanatory success of natural kinds -, and which sheds light on why natural kinds play an epistemic role both within science and in everyday life.

The Anomaly of Anomaly of Anomaly

The Anomaly of Anomaly of Anomaly

A Platonic Trope Bundle Theory

This paper provides a rational reconstruction of a Platonic trope bundle theory that is a live alternative to contemporary bundle theories. According to the theory, Platonic particulars are composed of what Plato calls images of Forms; contemporary metaphysicians call these tropes. Tropes are dependent on Forms and the Receptacle, while trope bundles are structured by natural kinds using the Phaedo's principles of inclusion and exclusion and the Timaeus’ geometrised elements, as well as by co-location in the Receptacle. Key elements of discussion include persistence and abundance of Plato's tropes. The resulting theory is compared with contemporary trope bundle theories.

Understanding scientific types: holotypes, stratotypes, and measurement prototypes

At the intersection of taxonomy and nomenclature lies the scientific practice of typification. This practice occurs in biology with the use of holotypes (type specimens), in geology with the use of stratotypes, and in metrology with the use of measurement prototypes. In this paper I develop the first general definition of a scientific type and outline a new philosophical theory of types inspired by Pierre Duhem. I use this general framework to resolve the necessity-contingency debate about type specimens in philosophy of biology, to advance the debate over the myth of the absolute accuracy of standards in metrology, and to address the definition-correlation debate in geology. I conclude that just as there has been a productive synergy between philosophical accounts of natural kinds and scientific taxonomic practices, so too there is much to be gained from developing a deeper understanding of the practices and philosophy of scientific types.

Grown or made? Children’s determination of the origins of natural versus processed foods

Children utilize different reasoning strategies based upon their knowledge of a category member’s origins. However, this has yet to be examined in the domain of foods, which can have origins that are both natural and human-made. Across two studies, younger and older children (N = 98) were asked if familiar and unfamiliar natural and processed foods, non-food natural kinds and artifacts were grown in a garden or made in a factory. Older children were more accurate than younger ones at identifying the origins of all items. In addition, both age groups were better at identifying the origins of non-foods than foods, and at identifying familiar compared to unfamiliar processed foods, though no difference was found between familiar and unfamiliar natural foods. Thus, knowledge of food origins is not developing similarly as with non-food items and familiarity is a factor in identifying processed, but not natural, foods.

Classifying and characterizing active materials

This article examines the distinction between active matter and active materials, and it offers foundational remarks toward a system of classification for active materials. Active matter is typically identified as matter that exhibits two characteristic features: self-propelling parts, and coherent dynamical activity among the parts. These features are exhibited across a wide range of organic and inorganic materials, and they are jointly sufficient for classifying matter as active. Recently, the term “active materials” has entered scientific use as a complement, supplement, and extension of “active matter.” At the same time, new work in the philosophy of science has considered the problem of how to classify the products of synthetic and laboratory processes, and the extent to which the aims of classifying natural kinds compare and contrasts with the aims of classifying these synthetic kinds. In this article, I apply those considerations to the problems of classifying and characterizing active materials. In doing so, I also argue for a conception of active materials’ coherent dynamical activity as multiscale, rather than emergent, and I discuss how the special non-equilibrium status of active materials factors in to classificatory concerns.

The location and composition of Group 3 of the periodic table

Group 3 as Sc–Y–La, rather than Sc–Y–Lu, dominates the literature. The history of this situation, including involvement by the IUPAC, is summarised. I step back from the minutiae of physical, chemical, and electronic properties and explore considerations of regularity and symmetry, natural kinds, and quantum mechanics, finding these to be inconclusive. Continuing the theme, a series of ten interlocking arguments, in the context of a chemistry-based periodic table, are presented in support of lanthanum in Group 3. In so doing, I seek to demonstrate a new way of thinking about this matter. The last of my ten arguments is recast as a twenty-word categorical philosophical (viewpoint-based) statement.

Historic Professions: Stabilizing the Reified Image of the Law and Other Historic Professions

Social institutions are commonly said to evolve. Yet there may be good reason why some institutions and some concepts are reified advantageously limiting any free-wheeling evolution over time. This is certainly true concepts like currency which stabilizes social ontology as much as concepts like rock stabilize natural kinds ontology. Important institutions such as the four historic professions moor civilization by being continually reified over generations aligning with sustainable public expectation. When a profession such as law is weaned from reified expectations of the public the effect is likely to be de-stabilizing of both the profession’s membership and the public the membership is meant to serve. The reified image of the bar, those entitled to the honor “esquire” following their name, assures society that a social ontology designates this group of professionals as leaders in forwarding society’s civilizing expectations. De-stabilizing this reification is not only self-destructive to the historic professions but to the societies they were intended to lead as well.

Food as a borderline domain of knowledge: The development of domain-specific inductive reasoning strategies in young children

This study investigated how young children’s inductive reasoning abilities pertain to the food domain in comparison with the natural kind and artifact domains. Two research hypotheses were tested: H1) Younger children (4−5 years) exhibit less differentiated inductive reasoning strategies between natural kind, food, and artifact domains of knowledge than older children (6−7 years) and H2) induction strategies are impacted by the degree of processing of the food (i.e. unprocessed, sliced, and pureed). Younger (n = 44, 4−5 years) and older children (n = 52, 6−7 years) were tested as well as a control group of adults (n = 48). Results confirmed H1) and only partial results obtained from older children (6−7 years) spoke in favor of H2). We conclude that these pieces of evidence cast a reasonable doubt on the shared assumption that foods are natural kind entities, and consequently open new research avenues for evidence-based food education programs.