Abstract
Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on the vividness of mental imagery and contrasts with those accounts that treat vividness as an explanatory primitive and with those that attempt to provide a definition. We apply the natural kind methodology to make several substantive (but also provisional) claims about the vividness of mental imagery. First, we will argue that it forms a homeostatic property cluster, in that it is reliably correlated with, but not defined by, some properties, such as the level of detail, clarity, perception-likeness and intensity. In arguing for this claim, we also show how the cluster can be modified in the light of empirical research by complementing it with a correlation between vividness and familiarity. Second, we will argue that these correlations can be explained by an underlying property at the architectural level; i.e., the availability of stored sensory information for the elaboration of a mental image.
Highlights
It is a popular view in philosophy that sensory imaginings recreate or simulate perceptual experiences
We propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster
We argued that vividness, resistant to definition, can be fruitfully studied as a natural kind
Summary
It is a popular view in philosophy that sensory imaginings recreate or simulate perceptual experiences. At least since Hume, vividness has had its place in philosophical theories about the mind Nowadays, it is a recognized feature of mental imagery in psychological research where subjective estimates of vividness are a common staple. We will argue that there are good reasons to think vividness forms a homeostatic property cluster, in that it is reliably correlated with, but not defined by, some properties, such as the level of detail, clarity, perception-likeness and intensity This reliable correlation can be explained by an underlying property at the architectural level; i.e., the availability of stored sensory information for the elaboration of a mental image. Whenever an attitude has imagistic content, it can be more or less vivid in the imagistic sense, but they are vivid in virtue of the mental imagery that they involve, not in themselves
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